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Ask three people to describe a special economic zone (SEZ) and three 
very different images may emerge. The first person may describe a 
fenced-in industrial estate in a developing country, populated by  footloose 
multinational corporations (MNCs) enjoying tax breaks, with laborers in 
garment factories working in substandard conditions. In contrast, the 
second person may recount the “miracle of Shenzhen,” a fishing village 
transformed into a cosmopolitan city of 14 million, with per capita gross 
domestic product (GDP) growing 100-fold, in the 30 years since it was 
designated as an SEZ. A third person may think about places like Dubai 
or Singapore, whose ports serve as the basis for wide range of trade- and 
logistics-oriented activities.
In fact, all three of these are correct descriptions of this diverse instru-
ment: Table 1.1 provides a brief summary of the different types of zones 
in existence. This table highlights the many ways in which the concept of 
“special” economic zones has been operationalized and underscores the 
challenge of attempting to say anything specific about such a heteroge-
neous policy tool. But despite the many variations in name and form, all 
SEZs can be broadly defined as—
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demarcated geographic areas contained within a country’s national bound-
aries where the rules of business are different from those that prevail in the 
national territory. These differential rules principally deal with investment 
conditions, international trade and customs, taxation, and the regulatory 
environment; whereby the zone is given a business environment that is 
intended to be more liberal from a policy perspective and more effective 
from an administrative perspective than that of the national territory. 
(Farole 2011, p.23)
In this book, we use SEZ as a generic expression (as per FIAS, 2008) 
to describe the broad range of modern economic zones discussed in this 
book (see table 1.1). But we are most concerned with two specific forms 
of those zones: (1) the export processing zones (EPZs) or free zones (zona 
francha in our case studies on Honduras and the Dominican Republic), 
which focus on manufacturing for export; and (2) the large-scale SEZs, 
which usually combine residential and multiuse commercial and indus-
trial activity. The former represents a traditional model used widely 
throughout the developing world for almost four decades. The latter rep-
resents a more recent form of economic zone, originating in the 1980s in 
China and gaining in popularity in recent years. Although these models 
need not be mutually exclusive (many SEZs include EPZ industrial parks 
within them), they are sufficiently different in their objectives, invest-
ment requirements, and approach to require a distinction in this book.
SEZs have a long-established role in international trade. Entrepôts and 
citywide free zones that guaranteed free storage and exchange along 
secure trade routes—such as Gibraltar, Hamburg, and Singapore—have 
been operating for centuries. The first modern industrial free zone was 
established in Shannon, Ireland, in 1959.1 Before the 1970s, most zones 
were clustered in industrial countries. But since the 1970s, starting with 
East Asia and Latin America, zones have been designed to attract invest-
ment in labor-intensive manufacturing from MNCs. These zones became 
a cornerstone of trade and investment policy in countries shifting away 
from import-substitution policies and aiming to integrate into global 
markets through export-led growth policies.
SEZs normally are established with the aim of achieving one or more 
of the following four policy objectives (FIAS 2008):
1. To attract foreign direct investment (FDI): Virtually all zones programs, 
from traditional EPZ to China’s large-scale SEZs aim, at least in part, 
to attract FDI.
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2. To serve as “pressure valves” to alleviate large-scale unemployment: The 
SEZ programs of Tunisia and the Dominican Republic are frequently 
cited as examples of programs that have remained enclaves and have 
not catalyzed dramatic structural economic change, but that neverthe-
less have remained robust, job-creating programs.
3. In support of a wider economic reform strategy: In this view, SEZs are a 
simple tool permitting a country to develop and diversify exports. 
Zones reduce anti-export bias while keeping protective barriers in-
tact. The SEZs of China; the Republic of Korea; Mauritius; and  Taiwan, 
China, follow this pattern.
4. As experimental laboratories for the application of new policies and 
 approaches: China’s large-scale SEZs are classic examples. FDI, legal, 
land, labor, and even pricing policies were introduced and tested first 
within the SEZs before being extended to the rest of the economy.
In achieving these objectives, SEZs have had a mixed record of success. 
Anecdotal evidence turns up many examples of investments in zone 
infrastructure resulting in “white elephants,” or zones that largely have 
resulted in an industry taking advantage of tax breaks without producing 
substantial employment or export earnings. Moreover, many of the tradi-
tional EPZ programs have been successful in attracting investment and 
creating employment in the short term, but have failed to remain sustain-
able when labor costs have risen or when preferential trade access no 
longer offers a sufficient advantage. Empirical research shows that many 
SEZs have been successful in generating exports and employment, and 
come out marginally positive in cost-benefit assessments (cf. Chen 1993; 
Jayanthakumaran 2003; Mongé-Gonzalez, Rosales-Tijerino, and Arce-
Alpizar 2005; Warr 1989). Many economists, however, still view zones as 
a second- or even third-best solution to competitiveness, whose success is 
restricted to specific conditions over a limited time frame (Hamada 1974; 
Madani 1999; World Bank 1992). Concerns also have been raised that 
zones, by and large, have failed to extend benefits outside their enclaves 
or to contribute to upgrading of skills and the production base (cf. 
Kaplinsky 1993).
A number of examples, however, also illustrate the catalytic role zones 
play in processes of economic growth and adjustment processes (cf. 
Johansson and Nilsson 1997; Willmore 1995). For example, many of the 
zones established in the 1970s and 1980s in East Asia’s “tiger economies” 
were critical in facilitating their industrial development and upgrading 
processes. Similarly, the later adoption of the model by China, which 
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launched SEZs on a scale not seen previously, provided a platform for 
attracting FDI and not only supported the development of China’s export-
oriented manufacturing sector, but also served as a catalyst for sweeping 
economic reforms that later were extended throughout the country. In 
Latin America, countries like the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and 
Honduras used free zones to take advantage of preferential access to U.S. 
markets and have generated large-scale manufacturing sectors in econo-
mies that previously were reliant on agricultural commodities. In the 
Middle East and North Africa, SEZs have played an important role in 
catalyzing export-oriented diversification in countries like the Arab 
Republic of Egypt, Morocco, and the United Arab Emirates. And in Sub-
Saharan Africa, Mauritius is an example of zones operating as a central 
policy tool supporting a highly successful process of economic diversifica-
tion and industrialization.
Although the nature, scale, and scope of their success or limitations 
will no doubt continue to be debated for decades to come, what is clear 
is that the attraction to policy makers of SEZs as an instrument of trade, 
investment, industrial, and spatial policy is undiminished. In fact, since 
the mid-1980s, the number of newly established zones has grown rapidly 
in almost all regions, with dramatic growth in developing countries. For 
example, in 1986, the International Labour Organization’s (ILO’s) data-
base of SEZs reported 176 zones in 47 countries; by 2006, this number 
rose to 3,500 zones in 130 countries (Boyenge 2007), although many of 
these zones are single companies licensed indiviudally as free zones. SEZs 
now are estimated to account for more than US$200 billion in global 
exports and employ directly at least 40 million workers (FIAS 2008).
This rapid expansion in SEZs is happening in the midst of substantial 
changes in the macro context in which they are situated. Most important, 
the global trade and investment environment is changing in a way that 
may no longer support the traditional EPZ model. The rapid growth of 
EPZ programs around the world over the last two decades, and their suc-
cess in contributing to export-led growth in regions like East Asia, is due 
in part to an unprecedented globalization of trade and investment that 
took place since the 1970s and accelerated during the 1990s and 2000s, 
which saw trade grow 85 percent faster than GDP between 1983 and 
2008. This growth was enabled by the vertical and spatial fragmentation 
of manufacturing into highly integrated “global production networks,” 
particularly in light manufacturing sectors like electronics, automotive 
components, and especially apparel, which have accounted for the large 
majority of investment in traditional EPZs. Especially for countries with 
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low labor costs, scale economies, and preferential access to major con-
sumer markets like the Europe, Japan, and the United States, economic 
zones—with their access to duty-free inputs, quality, flexible infrastruc-
ture, and often generous fiscal incentives—proved to be a powerful instru-
ment through which to capture increasingly mobile foreign investment.
This era may well have come to an end, however, for several reasons. 
Although trade has recovered significantly from the depths of the 2008 
and 2009 economic crisis, it is clear that the United States and European 
economies can no longer be the ony engines of global demand. 
Responding in part to the crisis as well as longer-term strategic trends, 
lead firms in global production networks are increasingly consolidating 
their supply chains, both in terms of suppliers and production locations. 
Much of this consolidation increasingly is being entrenched in “factory 
Asia.” Linked closely to the issues discussed thus far, the expiration of the 
Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA)2 at the end of 2004 has had a huge 
impact on the cost competitiveness of textile and apparel manufacturing 
in EPZs in Latin America, Africa, and Eastern Europe in relation to low-
cost Asian producers.
Thus, for countries that have not yet established economic zones pro-
grams, the traditional variety targeting multinational assembly activities 
within global production networks is far from the sure thing that it used to 
be. In the absence of massive labor cost advantages (e.g., Bangladesh and 
Vietnam) or scale (e.g., China), most countries will need to design more 
sophisticated strategies—beyond the basic EPZ—to attract MNCs. For 
countries that already have established EPZ programs, the challenge is 
perhaps more acute. It is about remaining competitive, which in the 
absence of aggressive, long-term dampening of real wages, means upgrading 
production capabilities and attracting investment in higher value-added 
activities. But, as we will see from the examples in Parts I and II of this 
book, this is precisely where the EPZ models have often let down countries 
by creating an incentive environment that restricted adjustment processes.
Indeed, recent years have seen a shift away from the traditional EPZ 
model. In its place, zone development is moving toward the SEZ model, 
with emphasis on physical, strategic, and financial links between the zones 
and local economies, and a shift away from fiscal incentives to value added 
services and a greater focus on differentiation through the investment 
climate in the zone. Although many of these zones eschew the narrow 
focus of traditional EPZs in favor of multiuse developments encompassing 
industrial, commercial, residential, and even tourism activities, others are 
moving to highly specialized developments focused on specific high-end 
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services like information and communication technology (ICT) and bio-
tech. Another notable trend has been the growing importance of zones 
that are privately owned, developed, or operated (FIAS 2008).
In the postcrisis environment, in which competition for FDI likely will 
remain much more intense than it has been in the past, SEZs likely will 
continue to grow in importance. But it is not the existence of an SEZ 
regime, of a master plan, or even of a fully built-out infrastructure that 
will make the difference in attracting investment, creating jobs, and gen-
erating spillovers to the local economy. Rather, it is the relevance of the 
SEZ programs in the specific context in which they are introduced, and 
the effectiveness with which they are designed, implemented, and man-
aged on an ongoing basis, that will determine success or failure.
But recognizing the importance of context should not mean approach-
ing each situation anew, ignoring the substantial body of knowledge that 
has been built up over the past three decades on what determines success 
in implementing SEZs. While this book cannot hope (and does not 
attempt) to provide any such thorough review of the state of the art in 
SEZ knowledge, it is designed to offer policy makers, practitioners, and 
researchers with an interest in SEZs (and trade and investment policy 
more widely) a chance to take stock of the past and current role of SEZs, 
and their potential for the future. Combining theoretical discussions with 
practical examples from the field, through the use of case studies from 
(mainly developing) countries around the world, the book will discuss 
some of the well-known challenges facing both traditional EPZs and 
newer SEZs around the world and also will look forward to some of the 
emerging issues in the field, which will not only present further chal-
lenges to many SEZ programs, but will also open up new opportunities.
Specifically, the book is structured around exploring three main issues 
of critical interest to policy makers:
1. How to make economic zones successful in attracting firms that create jobs: 
This could be called a first-order or static measure of success.
2. How to ensure that zones are economically sustainable and deliver positive 
externalities, including facilitating upgrading and structural transformation 
and catalyzing economic reforms: This could be called a dynamic mea-
sure of success.
3. How to ensure that economic zones are sustainable from an institutional, 
social, and environmental perspective: This means not only minimizing 
negative externalities but, if possible, delivering noneconomic benefits 
to the society.
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Using this framework, the book is organized in three parts. Part I: 
Attracting Investment and Creating Jobs: Old Models and New Challenges 
includes case examples from South Asia, Latin America, and Africa com-
bined with a technical discussion of new issues in the trade environment 
that will offer both opportunities and challenges for first-order success. 
Part II: Moving from Static to Dynamic Gains: Can SEZs Deliver Structural 
Change? follows a similar approach, combining case examples highlighting 
the challenges with discussions of models for delivering dynamic benefits 
from SEZs. Part III: Social and Environmental Sustainability: Emerging Issues 
for SEZs discusses the issues related to gender and labor, as well as envi-
ronmental sustainability.
The remainder of this chapter discusses the themes of these sections 
in more detail and summarizes some of the main findings and policy 
conclusions based on the contributions in this book.
Attracting Investment and Creating Jobs:
Old Models and New Challenges
The fundamental benefits of SEZs derive from their role as instruments 
of trade and investment policy. These static benefits result from capturing 
the gains from specialization and exchange. They include employment 
creation, the attraction of FDI, the generation of foreign exchange 
through exports, and the creation of economic value added. Traditional 
EPZs were designed to capture these benefits by enabling countries to 
better exploit a key source of comparative advantage (low-cost labor) 
that otherwise was underutilized because of low levels of domestic 
investment and barriers (regulatory, infrastructure, etc.) preventing FDI. 
These EPZs have operated under simple principles: allowing investors to 
import and export free of duties and exchange controls, facilitating licens-
ing and other regulatory processes, and usually freeing these firms from 
obligations to pay corporate taxes, value added taxes (VAT), or other local 
taxes. To maintain control, EPZs normally have been fenced-in estates 
with strict customs controls at entry, and sales are typically restricted 
mainly to export markets.
The model has been extremely successful in many countries. For 
example, it allowed the Dominican Republic to create more than 100,000 
manufacturing jobs and shift dramatically away from reliance on agricul-
ture. Similar stories of industrialization and job creation can be seen in 
Mauritius, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan, China; in Honduras, El 
Salvador, and Madagascar; and more recently in Bangladesh and Vietnam. 
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It is clear, however, that the model is now increasingly reaching its limits. 
Indeed, it is perhaps no longer fit-for-purpose, given the changing mac-
roeconomic and regulatory environment in the global economy. This 
creates significant challenges for developing countries that are in the 
early stages of developing their zone programs. As we will see from the 
case studies in Part I, some of the basic principles at the heart of tradi-
tional EPZs are no longer (or perhaps never were) sustainable sources of 
competitiveness.
But regardless of the model, it is also apparent that some countries have 
been more successful than others in using zones to attract FDI, to encour-
age export-oriented production, and to create jobs. Indeed, reviewing the 
experience of economic zones across many countries over the past three 
decades, some clear principles emerge regarding the policies and practices 
that are associated with static success. The case studies in part I—of 
Bangladesh and Honduras, and of the experience of the recent Chinese 
investments in SEZs in Africa—highlight many of these principles.
In chapter 2, we examine Bangladesh, a country that perhaps high-
lights the contrasting recent fortunes between zones programs in low-cost 
Asian countries and those that have been established in Latin America 
and Africa. Mustafizul Hye Shakir and Thomas Farole describe how 
Bangladesh’s EPZ program has become part of the latest wave of benefi-
ciaries from multinational outsourcing in the classic low-wage-based gar-
ment sector. While the expiration of the MFA (for the garment sector) 
and the continuing trend of tariff liberalization has eroded the benefits of 
trade preferences for most zone programs, wage-based competitiveness 
can still be critical in many sectors. The case of Bangladesh emphasizes 
the importance of positioning the zone program to leverage the country’s 
comparative advantage. Indeed, while the program in Bangladesh initially 
aimed to attract high-technology investment, it took off only when it 
made a concerted effort to focus on the garments sector, in which it had 
a clear comparative advantage. The case of Bangladesh also highlights 
another observation about SEZs—that is, their incubation period. Even 
the biggest SEZ success stories like China and Malaysia started slowly and 
took at least 5 to 10 years before they began to build momentum. In 
Bangladesh, the program started in the early 1980s, but it only began to 
attract investment on a large scale in the early 1990s (a similar evolution 
is seen the Honduras case study). From a policy perspective, this means 
that governments need to be patient and to provide consistent support to 
zone programs over long time periods, a particular challenge in countries 
whose political cycles are rather shorter.
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Beyond the wage-based advantages of Bangladesh, the critical contri-
bution of the zones program was not, in fact, incentives (which exist but 
are relatively modest in global terms), but rather the provision of serviced 
industrial land infrastructure and relatively reliable supply of power. 
Indeed, recent research (Farole 2011) shows that on a global basis 
 infrastructure reliability has a significant impact on SEZ success, while 
incentives have no measurable effect.
The test of success for Bangladesh will be whether it can continue to 
attract investment in the program in the face of rising wages.3 The recent 
adoption of a modern Economic Zones Act in 2010, which opens up 
greater potential for private sector participation and for zones of various 
forms, and the adoption of programs to address labor and environmental 
issues, suggests that efforts are being made to modernize and diversify the 
program to ensure that it avoids stagnation.
In chapter 3, Michael Engman relates the case of Honduras, which has 
also been highly successful in attracting investment in the garment sector, 
but has faced challenges in maintaining competitiveness. Although the 
Honduran free zone program was built on the back of trade preferences, 
labor cost arbitrage, and a certain amount of good timing, this was just a 
starting point. The case study shows the critical importance of dynamic 
local entrepreneurs in catalyzing foreign investment (indeed, the success 
in Bangladesh also may be partly attributed to local investors, avoiding a 
reliance simply on footloose FDI).
Beyond this, the case study highlights three additional critical factors 
for successful zone programs. First is the role of the private sector. 
Although it is too simplistic to say that private sector development of 
zones is better than public sector development (bearing in mind the suc-
cess of many East Asian countries and of Mauritius with public sector–led 
models), the private sector can be much more dynamic in implementing 
zones in many countries and, regardless, is an important source of exper-
tise and risk management. In the case of Honduras, a stagnant government-
run zones program was transformed when the law was changed to allow 
for private developments of zones. Second, the government focused on 
providing not only the regulatory framework in which the private sector 
thrived, but also critical infrastructure and services, most notably a high-
quality port and road connections to the zones. Finally, it provided effec-
tive on-site customs services that allow investors efficient import and 
export procedures.
Ironically, as Engman points out in chapter 3, some of these sources of 
competitiveness may also prevent the zones program from diversifying 
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outside the garment sector. Specifically, it relies on investors that are 
entrenched in the garment sector (most zone developers are not real estate 
developers but rather garment manufacturers). Moreover, the privileges 
long enjoyed by the sector have become a powerful disincentive for 
reform, which has acted as a brake on innovation and competitiveness.
Surely China is at the top of any list of success stories in attracting 
investment and promoting exports through SEZs. At the bottom of the 
list probably sits Africa, where, outside of Mauritius (and partial success 
in Kenya, Lesotho,4 and Madagascar), most zones initiatives have been 
failures. In chapter 4, Deborah Brautigam and Xiaoyang Tang explore a 
recent development that seeks to leverage the Chinese model to create 
successful zone development in Africa. Specifically, they look at the 
recent Economic and Trade Cooperation Zones, an initiative which the 
Chinese government is supporting in six African countries. These initia-
tives have high-level government support and are implementing proven 
successful models (ironically, with one major difference—that is, they are 
being led by private developers5 rather than by provincial and local gov-
ernments). Although most of these zones remain in the early stages of 
development, troubling signs have emerged that highlight some impor-
tant lessons in zone development.
First, it is important to separate political support from political 
objectives in zone projects. Although strong commitment from the 
government is needed, projects must be designed carefully on the basis 
of clear strategic plans. The commercial case must be present. Moreover, 
that commercial case must be based on sustainable sources of com-
petitiveness, not on fiscal incentives. Second, despite the concept of 
zones as enclaves, in practice, their success is almost fully entwined 
with the  competitiveness of the national economy and the national 
investment environment. Most of the Chinese zone projects in Africa 
are operating in an environment of poor national competitiveness 
(weak local and national value chains). Regardless of what is done 
inside the walls of the zones, these projects face challenges in linking 
the zones and global markets, including critical infrastructure like ports, 
roads, and electricity.
Third, the policy and legal framework in which they operate, and their 
de jure implementation, are critical. An effective legal and regulatory 
framework is a necessary first step to zone program development. Putting 
in place a clear and transparent legal and regulatory framework codifies 
the program strategy and establishes the rules of the game for all 
 stakeholders involved in the process. This framework plays a fundamental 
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role in addressing often-difficult land issues, facilitating the provision of 
the required infrastructure, and ensuring compliance with labor and envi-
ronmental standards. But de facto implementation is of equal importance. 
In many of the African SEZs involved in the Chinese developments 
 discussed in chapter 4, the authority responsible for developing, promot-
ing, and regulating the program lacks resources and capacity to carry out 
its mandate. Of equal importance, it often lacks the institutional author-
ity to do so. The lack of a clear and transparent legal and regulatory 
framework and an authority with the capacity to enforce it has led to 
disputes and delays in several of the projects.
One critical aspect of the Chinese Trade and Economic Cooperation 
Zones is their potential to transfer knowledge to developing-country gov-
ernments on how to effectively plan and manage the implementation of 
SEZ programs. In fact, one the principal determinants of success or failure 
of SEZ initiatives has little to do with EPZ or SEZ models and much to 
do with the strategic planning, project implementation, and management 
capabilities of governments and their zone regulatory authorities specifi-
cally. With this in mind, chapter 5 looks back at China’s own experience 
in establishing SEZs, during which it took advantage of similar turnkey 
partnerships to learn from the expertise of other countries. Min Zhao and 
Thomas Farole present the case of the partnership between China and 
Singapore in development the Suzhou Industrial Park (SIP), which is a 
telling example of how host governments in Africa and elsewhere should 
approach zone partnerships to take advantage of the learning opportuni-
ties and set the stage for the sustainable development and management of 
zones programs. The case study highlights a number of key principles for 
success of partnership initiatives and zone program institutional develop-
ment more widely, including (1) the importance of high-level political 
commitment; (2) the need to align fiscal incentives among all partners 
(including local government); (3) the need to balance investments in 
infrastructure with a strong focus on “software”; and (4) the critical 
importance of putting in place an institutionalized process for learning and 
knowledge transfer between partners. Although the SIP partnership was 
not without its problems, the proactive, institutionalized approach to 
learning in the partnership played a critical role in ensuring that the host 
government took maximum advantage of the SEZ opportunity.
In addition to the competitive challenges emanating from the chang-
ing macroeconomic environment, economic zones (particularly, again, 
the traditional EPZ model) also are facing threats from changing 
 regulatory environments. In chapter 6, Naoko Koyama highlights how 
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one particular regulatory issue—the growing importance of regional 
preferential trade agreements—presents both challenges and opportuni-
ties for zones programs. Although the multilateral trade agenda has failed 
in recent years, bilateral and regional trade agreements are growing rap-
idly around the world. Many regional blocs are making substantial prog-
ress in integration efforts. A consequence of this progress is that the rules 
around which many traditional EPZ regimes were based suddenly may 
change. If an EPZ is prohibited from selling to the domestic market, but 
suddenly the regional trade agreement makes its neighboring countries 
“domestic” from a customs perspective, this change will have an enor-
mous impact on the business model of investors and on the attractive-
ness of zones. From an institutional perspective, it will be increasingly 
critical for zone programs to look beyond their borders and develop 
integrated or at least harmonized approaches to SEZ legal and regulatory 
frameworks, most notably on the treatment of exports, rules of origin, 
and fiscal incentives.
But beyond the regulatory issues, Koyama’s chapter also highlights 
another critical factor to the success of zones programs—that is, market 
access. One of the clear findings from research on SEZs (and on FDI 
in general) is that market access is often the number one investment 
location determinant. Koyama points out that regional agreements for 
smaller countries, particularly in Africa, offer the potential advantage of 
scale that these countries otherwise would not have. This is clear for 
export markets; but perhaps more important, Koyama discusses the 
potential for using zones to link up regional suppliers and leverage 
economies of scale in production. Indeed, linking regional SEZs to infra-
structure investments to create growth corridors may be a powerful new 
route to competitiveness.
Moving from Static to Dynamic Gains:
Can SEZs Deliver Structural Change?
Economic zone programs that are successful in contributing to long-term 
development go beyond the static benefits of attracting investment and 
generating employment. They leverage these static benefits for the crea-
tion of dynamic economic benefits. Ultimately, this means contributing to 
structural transformation of the economy, including diversification, 
upgrades, and increased openness. Critical to this process is the degree of 
integration of zones in the domestic economy. Countries that have been 
successful in deriving long-term economic benefits from their SEZ 
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 programs have established the conditions for ongoing exchange, and the 
accompanying hard and soft technology transfer, between the domestic 
economy and investors based on the zones. This includes investment by 
domestic firms into the zones, forward and backward linkages, business 
support, and the seamless movement of skilled labor and entrepreneurs 
between the zones and the domestic economy.
From a policy perspective, this suggests shifting from a traditional 
fenced-in EPZ model to an SEZ model that eliminates legal restrictions 
on forward and backward links and domestic participation. But it also will 
require implementation of much broader policies beyond the scope of 
any SEZ program, including the following: promoting skills development, 
training, and knowledge sharing; promoting industry clusters and target-
ing links with zone-based firms at the cluster level; supporting the inte-
gration of regional value chains; supporting public-private institutions, 
both industry specific and transversal; and ensuring labor markets are free 
to facilitate skilled labor moving across firms.
Chapter 7 presents the example of the Dominican Republic, one of 
the pioneers in establishing economic zones programs in the Western 
Hemisphere. Jean-Marie Burgaud and Thomas Farole illustrate how the 
traditional EPZ model initially had a transformative impact on the 
Dominican Republic, not just in terms of investment, exports, and jobs 
but also in shifting the economy radically away from a reliance on 
agricultural commodities. At its peak, the zones program contributed 
7.5 percent of total GDP and was responsible for 90 percent of the 
country’s exports.
However, the nature of the zone regime, including its reliance on fiscal 
incentives and wage restraint, and its enclave nature, which contributed 
to its prolonged failure in establishing significant forward and backward 
links with the Dominican economy, ultimately condemned it to an 
inevitable deterioration of competitiveness. Indeed, the recent macroeco-
nomic trends discussed earlier in this chapter have accelerated these 
processes so that the competitiveness gap is now too large to be closed by 
the “artificial sources” of the EPZ regime, exposing the adjustment chal-
lenge for the zones program.
The case of the Dominican Republic highlights that while low labor 
costs, trade preferences, and fiscal incentives each can play a role in cata-
lyzing a zone program, they are almost never sustainable. Indeed, they 
create pressure for further distortions and race-to-the-bottom policies, 
including extending and increasing incentives (rather than addressing 
more difficult factors of the investment environment) and granting 
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exemptions on minimum wage and labor rights (rather than addressing 
productivity or labor market rigidities).
For the Dominican Republic, and many other lower middle-income 
countries whose zones programs have focused on basic assembly manu-
facturing and trade, the main growth opportunities are now in services 
sectors, especially ICT, business services, and in more knowledge and 
research and development (R&D)–intensive sectors. As Justine White 
illustrates in chapter 8, this means fostering innovation. And this high-
lights the need for zones to avoid becoming enclaves and instead facilitate 
an ongoing exchange with the local economy. Chapter 8 reinforces the 
importance of skills development and training, bringing in examples not 
only of the Shenzhen case, but also of the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, 
and others. Finally, it establishes a clear set of guidelines for how to ensure 
that an SEZ plays an ongoing role in fostering innovation, and brings in 
rich examples of countries whose SEZ programs not only catalyzed a 
process but also provided the necessary spark to fuel continuous innova-
tion and upgrading.
But facilitating structural transformation through SEZs is not a 
mechanical process that simply requires the right policies. In fact, the 
principal factors explaining why many countries have distorted eco-
nomic structures and lack sufficient dynamism are political in nature. In 
many cases, political and economic elites benefit from the status quo and 
thus have little interest in structural change. It is in this context that 
SEZs can perhaps be most effective, in catalyzing processes of economic 
reform. Indeed, this is the classic case of China’s SEZs, which were used 
to test liberal economic reforms and to introduce them to the wider 
economy in a gradual way. Thus, although the idea of integration 
between SEZs and the domestic economy is ultimately the key to struc-
tural transformation, where economic reforms are politically sensitive to 
implement, it is precisely the enclave nature of zones that can be their 
key to success.
In chapter 9, Richard Auty explores this issue from a theoretical per-
spective, looking at the political economy of SEZs and their potential to 
play a catalytic role in facilitating economic reform in environments in 
which the barriers to such reform within the domestic economy are 
substantial. Auty introduces the concept of early reform zones (ERZs) as 
a dual-track strategy to overcome barriers to economic reform in rent- 
distorted economies. Although his model is relevant in many situations, 
perhaps most notably in natural resources driven economies, in chapter 9, 
he discusses specifically the context of Sub-Saharan Africa, where many 
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economies have entrenched patronage systems that undermine reform, 
resulting in stagnating competitiveness. Drawing lessons from the experi-
ences of China and Mauritius, as well as from Malaysia and others, Auty 
points out that the ERZ approach turns the often-criticized enclave 
nature of zones into “a virtue.” By using the enclave approach to address 
reform, necessarily in isolation from the rent-distorted economy, it later 
can allow for spillover and integration.
In chapter 10, Claude Baissac describes the case of Mauritius. He 
argues that although the country is often cited as an example of EPZ 
success, the true success story of the Mauritius EPZ program was not 
job creation, investments, or exports per se, but rather the reform pro-
cess, both economic and (critically) political, that it catalyzed. It is this 
reform that facilitated the structural transformation in the economy. 
Several important lessons can be drawn from the Mauritius case. First, 
it  highlights the importance of the political process and the importance 
of having a specific political champion behind the zones program, a les-
son that we also see from cases such as China and Malaysia (especially 
Penang). Second, not only does the Mauritius case emphasize the 
importance of domestic investment in the zones program, it shows that 
integration of the zone program must go beyond the physical and 
financial—it must also be integrated strategically. Indeed, one of the 
main differences between zone programs that have been successful and 
sustainable and those that have either failed to take off or have become 
stagnant enclaves is the degree to which they have been integrated in 
the broader economic policy framework of the country. In Mauritius, 
the EPZ program featured as a pillar of the country’s development stra-
tegic. Zones generally have failed to have a catalytic impact in most 
countries in part because they have been disconnected from wider eco-
nomic strategies. Zone programs often are put in place and then left to 
operate on their own, with little effort to support domestic investment 
into the zones, to promote links, training, and upgrading. Unlocking the 
potential of zones requires strategic integration of the program along 
with the government playing a leading, active role in potentiating the 
impact of the zones.
Finally, Baissac observes that in the process of achieving adjustment, 
the zones program effectively made itself obsolete. Although this is true, 
it is important to note also that Mauritius continues to use instruments 
of SEZs to promote emerging industries, such as ICT and financial ser-
vices, and indeed many argue that its duty-free island initiative effectively 
turns the whole country into an SEZ. And so, although the Mauritius case 
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suggests some life cycle of traditional EPZs, the instruments on which 
they are based may remain relevant in facilitating the ongoing transfor-
mation process.
Social and Environmental Sustainability:
Emerging Issues For SEZs
Both measures of success discussed in part III—static and dynamic—are 
concerned with economic efficiency alone. But SEZ impacts on host 
 societies go well beyond this. There has been much (mainly critical) 
documentation of the social and environmental impacts of zones over the 
years. It is important to recognize that these issues should not, in fact, be 
viewed as completely segregated from the economic ones discussed 
 earlier. Indeed, over time social, environmental, and economic outcomes 
are closely entwined. Zone programs that fail to offer opportunities for 
quality employment and upward mobility of trained staff, which derive 
their competitive advantage from exploiting low-wage workers, and 
which neglect to provide an environment that addresses the particular 
concerns of female workers are unlikely to be successful in achieving the 
dynamic benefits possible from zones programs and likely will be forced 
into a race to the bottom. By contrast, zone programs that recognize the 
value of skilled workers and seek to provide the social infrastructure and 
working environment in which such workers thrive will be in a position 
to facilitate upgrading.
In chapter 11, Sheba Tejani addresses an issue that has important social 
as well as economic implications for zones programs and the people who 
work within them. Several studies of employment in SEZs have found that 
firms located inside zones have a much higher share of women in their 
work force relative to the overall economy. (Kusago and Tzannatos 1998; 
Milberg and Amengual 2008; United Nations Centre on Transnational 
Corporations-International Labour Organisation 1988). In this regard, 
zones have created an important avenue for young women to enter the 
formal economy. On the other hand, zones have long been criticized for 
poor labor standards and, more generally, for failing to provide quality 
employment for female workers. But, it also is critical to understand the 
structural nature of the link between female workers and SEZs. Indeed, 
it is not a direct one. SEZs do not attract female workers per se. But they 
do attract the firms in sectors whose basis of competition is highly 
 dependent on the available supply of low-wage, flexible, and unskilled 
or semiskilled workers, a set of requirements that often results in a 
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 concentration of female workers due to prevailing social and cultural 
conditions. These firms have been attracted to traditional zones in part 
because they (1) minimize costs (through fiscal incentives and adminis-
trative efficiencies); (2) provide access to serviced land and more reliable 
infrastructure; and (3) reduce the investment requirement, lowering risk 
and providing operational and strategic flexibility.
So it is probably more appropriate to refer to sectors and tasks that are 
gender concentrated rather than zones per se. This is important for more 
than theoretical reasons. The evidence shows that as firms and zones 
upgrade—both into higher value added sectors and to higher value added 
activities within existing sectors—the share of females in the labor force 
tends to decline. Thus, countries that remain reliant on traditional labor- 
intensive, low-skilled activities will be forced in time to adjust, and it will 
be critical to consider some of the economic and social implications these 
adjustments may have.
Ensuring that the rights of workers are upheld and, beyond this, that 
efforts are made to provide the training and social infrastructure needed 
to enable individual workers to thrive, ultimately will be critical to ensur-
ing the sustainability of zones programs, and their potential to deliver the 
dynamic economic benefits discussed previously. Thus, zone programs 
will need to strengthen their approach to social and environmental com-
pliance issues, establishing clear standards and putting in place effective 
monitoring and evaluation (M&E) programs. At a national policy level, 
economic zones should be seen as opportunities to experiment with 
policy innovations.
These same principles—of policy experimentation, clear standards, 
and robust M&E—also are applicable in the environmental field. In 
chapter 12, Han-Koo Yeo and Gokhan Akinci explore a seldom-discussed 
issue in the zones literature, but one that will become increasingly criti-
cal in all economic policy discussions: climate change and the role of 
SEZs in supporting environmentally friendly development and produc-
tion. Some zones have been criticized as promoting “dirty” industries and 
failing to meet environmental standards. SEZs, however, offer an ideal 
environment for environmental policy experimentation, not only 
because of their enclave nature but also because they have built-in com-
pliance mechanisms that normally do not exist outside the zones, such 
as the ability to issue licenses, to monitor firms in a short time frame, 
and ultimately to revoke a license, terminate a lease, or impound con-
tainers. This context could offer interesting opportunities particular to 
innovations in both social and environmental policy. As Yeo and Akinci 
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discuss in chapter 12, the concept of developing low-carbon “green” 
zones is in its infancy, but already is being adopted in many SEZs around 
the world.
Conclusion
With more than 100 countries worldwide operating SEZ programs and 
several thousand individual zones, it is perhaps not surprising that huge 
diversity exists in terms of their objectives, design, and implementation. 
As a result, policy makers, donors, and private sector investors have a vast 
range of challenges and opportunities to consider. This book addresses 
only a small set of them, but in doing so, it sets out a substantial policy 
and operational agenda.
As SEZ programs continue to proliferate around the world, particu-
larly in developing countries, it will be critical for policy makers to learn 
from past experiences and to anticipate the implications of the emerging 
and future issues discussed in this book. Under the framework of attract-
ing investment and creating jobs, facilitating dynamic benefits, and ensur-
ing sustainability, this section set out a number of key principles for policy 
makers to consider. There is no need to enumerate these principles here. 
However, it is worth repeating that achieving success with SEZ programs 
in the future will require adopting a more flexible approach to using the 
instruments of economic zones in the most effective way to leverage a 
country’s sources of comparative advantage, and to ensure flexibility to 
allow for evolution of the zone program over time. Most fundamentally, 
this will require a change in mind-set away from the traditional reliance 
on fiscal incentives and wage restraint, and instead focusing on facilitating 
a more effective business environment to foster firm-level competitive-
ness, local economic integration, innovation, and social and environmental 
sustainability. It also will require proactive, flexible, and innovative policy 
approaches to address today’s significant macroeconomic constraints and 
the many unanticipated challenges that no doubt will shape the environ-
ment in the years to come.
Notes
 1. However, a form of industrial free zone was established in Puerto Rico as 
early as 1948 (Farole 2011).
 2. The MFA, which originated in 1974, was a system of quotas and voluntary 
export restrictions that resulted in quantitative restrictions on the textile and 
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garment exports used to protect the markets of the main importing countries 
of Europe and North America.
 3. The recent doubling of the minimum wage in the garment sector shows that 
wage restraint is not likely to be a policy of the government.
 4. Lesotho does not, in fact, operate any formal zones program.
 5. Most of the developers are state-owned enterprises.
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Introduction
Bangladesh is an extremely densely populated country (150 million 
people living on less than 150,000 square kilometers). Despite this 
density, the country relies mainly on agriculture to support the majority 
of its population. Although Bangladesh has a historical reputation for 
producing the finest quality textiles and jute products, and long has 
been a hub for trade, the country has a low industrial and manufactur-
ing base. Jute was the main export of Bangladesh for decades: during 
the 1950s to the 1960s, almost 80 percent of the world’s jute was pro-
duced in Bangladesh. However, from the 1970s onward, the global jute 
industry faced a long period of decline as a result of the development 
of synthetic substitutes.1 The gap in exports was filled by the textile and 
garment sectors, which gained a quick foothold in international mar-
kets, taking advantage of Bangladesh’s low labor costs to attract inves-
tors from other Asian economies (particularly the Republic of Korea; 
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Taiwan, China; and Hong Kong SAR, China) that faced quotas resulting 
from the MFA.
But the country’s phenomenal growth in garments was experienced 
only in the last decade. Indeed, in the early 1980s, Bangladesh had only 
50 garment factories, employing only a few thousand people. It was dur-
ing this time that the EPZ program was established—a move that would 
prove to have a substantial impact in catalyzing the development of the 
garment sector in the coming decades.
Bangladesh now has nearly 4,500 garment manufacturing units, employ-
ing almost 2 million workers (50 percent of the industrial workforce in 
the country), and contributing 75 percent of the country’s total export 
earnings (Bangladesh Bank 2009). Garment exports in Bangladesh have 
continued to grow strongly despite the recent global economic crisis. 
Although accounting for a minority of employment and exports, the 
EPZs are at the heart of Bangladesh’s dynamic garment sector. By provid-
ing serviced land, a supporting infrastructure, a transparent and relatively 
efficient regulatory environment, and a regime of incentives, the EPZs 
have played a critical role in attracting large-scale FDI. This environment 
has had a knock-on effect, catalyzing additional investment by domestic 
entrepreneurs in recent years.
As of 2009, the EPZs in Bangladesh employ more than 200,000 and 
account for a substantial share of national exports and investment. 
However, the program faces a number of challenges going forward. Chief 
among these challenges are how to maintain competitiveness while also 
upgrading wages and working conditions for EPZ workers, and how to 
achieve diversification outside of the garment sector. This diversification 
will require changes in the zones program itself. Indeed, the traditional 
EPZ model on which the program is based has become increasingly 
archaic, and a number of reforms are necessary to ensure that it remains 
an engine of economic growth into the future—in particular, private sec-
tor development and management of zones, implementation of World 
Trade Organization (WTO)–consistent policy and incentive frameworks, 
and more innovative regulatory frameworks. A new Economic Zones Act, 
which was passed in July 2010, represents an important step in addressing 
these challenges.
This chapter provides a brief history of the development of EPZs in 
Bangladesh and discusses its successes and the factors that have contrib-
uted to it. It then assesses the key challenges facing the Bangladesh’s 
export sector going forward and the role of the EPZs in addressing these 
challenges.
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Historical Development of EPZs in Bangladesh
Bangladesh’s EPZs were conceived of at a time when the trend among 
many developing countries was to shift toward import substitution. The 
industrial structure in Bangladesh was built around nationalized mills and 
factories. With the loss of many jobs in the jute sector, however, the gov-
ernment was anxious to create jobs and was open to establishing a more 
liberalized environment for trade and investment. The garment sector 
appeared to offer the main source of hope for large-scale job creation. 
Initially, this came through domestic entrepreneurs who invested in the 
industry with a small-scale production base. In addition, a cadre of about 
130 Bangladeshis, who were trained by the Daewoo Company in the 
Republic of Korea, returned home and started brokering deals to accom-
modate foreign investment in the sector (e.g., buying houses and facto-
ries). These ex-Daewoo trainees, in conjunction with a few Sri Lankan 
garment companies relocating during their country’s civil war, catalyzed 
the growth of the sector.
The government was quick to recognize these signals from the private 
sector. It acted decisively to take advantage of this opportunity by creat-
ing a secure environment for exporters to realize the industry’s potential. 
With the initiation of the Foreign Investment (Promotion and Protection) 
Act (1980), the foundations were set to attract foreign investment on a 
large scale. Nevertheless, the issues with land accessibility and administra-
tive and logistical obstacles were a major hindrance to attracting invest-
ment. The establishment of EPZs was coined as an innovative and quick 
way to deal with the issues while nationwide reforms were slowly unfold-
ing. The Bangladesh Export Processing Zone Authority (BEPZA) was 
established in 1980 and the first EPZ was built in Chittagong in 1983.
The establishment of EPZs is quite remarkable for several reasons. The 
concept of industrial serviced land was not new in the country, but never 
before was any piece of land declared as “extraterritorial” and dedicated 
to manufacturing of products for export. Significant changes were 
brought into the fiscal incentives scheme and administrative procedures 
for the import and export of goods. The range and quality of services 
provided were superior to what was ever offered by any government 
agency. The Bangladesh Small and Cottage Industries Corporation 
(BSCIC) already operated a number of estates around the country,2 
which catered to the small and midsize local entrepreneurs. However, the 
BSCIC estates typically are small (less than 40 hectares), land is leased for 
long periods (99 years), and the maintenance of the estates is minimal. 
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EPZs, on the other hand, typically are larger (the smallest ones are in 
excess of 40 hectares), walled, secured, and considerably well maintained 
and managed. Moreover, the package of incentives available in the new 
EPZs for export-oriented activity was not available in any other industrial 
estate in the country (see Section 3, Performance, for a detailed discussion 
on the incentives regime). 
Despite this progress, the EPZs caught on only gradually. It took 
almost 10 years for the zone to host a meaningful number of companies. 
But with the growth in global production networks in the garment sector 
during the 1990s, Bangladesh’s EPZs took off. A second EPZ was started 
outside Dhaka in 1993 (and later expanded) and an additional six have 
been opened since then, with several more in the pipeline.
Today, eight EPZs are operating under BEPZA, with two new zones in 
the planning stages. In addition, a privately developed zone, operated by 
the Youngone Corporation of the Republic of Korea, is under construc-
tion near Chittagong. Although the zones are spread throughout the 
country, in reality, economic activity in the EPZs is highly concentrated: 
of the eight operating zones, just two of them—Chittagong EPZ and 
Dhaka EPZ—account for more than 80 percent of the companies operat-
ing in the EPZs (see table 2.1).
Other than Chittagong and Dhaka, all the EPZs have been launched 
since 2000. The Adamjee and Karnaphuli EPZs were established on the 
grounds of suspended state-owned enterprises (SOEs, the former an old 
jute milling complex and the latter a steel mill), which the government 
had handed over to BEPZA. The Adamjee EPZ is fully operational and 
has been attracting investment at a fairly rapid rate. Karnaphuli is partly 
in the project stage, but it too already has attracted some investment. 
Table 2.1 Summary of EPZs, 2009
Location
Year 
Established
Size 
(Hectares)
No. of active 
enterprises
Chittagong 1983 183 140
Dhaka 1993 140 96
Mongla 2000 186 12
Ishwardi 2000 125 3
Uttara 2000 93 5
Comilla 2001 108 18
Adamjee 2005 119 12
Karnaphuli 2006 109 4
Source: BEPZA.
Note: Data represent the 2008/09 fiscal year.
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Similarly, the Comilla Zone—located on the Dhaka-Chittagong 
 corridor—has grown steadily, if gradually. The Uttara, Ishwardi, and 
Mongla EPZs have performed poorly, however. These zones, located at 
great distance from the port and Dhaka, have combined to generate less 
than 3,000 jobs. 
Performance
After a modest start, the EPZ program made substantial advancements 
within a short period of time. The EPZs employ a large number of work-
ers and account for a substantial share of exports and FDI in Bangladesh. 
Given the size of the Bangladesh economy, however, the contribution of 
the zones to GDP and employment is modest. Moreover, the program 
remains highly concentrated in labor intensive, low skill manufacturing.
The remainder of this section reviews the results of the EPZ program 
in terms of (1) firms and investment, (2) exports, (3) employment, and 
(4) domestic market linkages. 
Firms and Investment
The EPZ program has been quite successful in attracting investment, 
particularly taking into account that Bangladesh has historically one of 
the lowest levels of FDI in the region. Between 1994 and 1999, average 
annual investment flows into the EPZs were US$52 million; this grew to 
US$88 million in the subsequent five years (2000–04) and has since 
nearly doubled to US$172 million in the period since (2005–08). As of 
2009, accumulated investment in the EPZs was nearly US$1,500 million. 
This is equivalent to about 15 percent of the total FDI flows into the 
country since 1995.3 In 2008 and 2009, the EPZs accounted for 18 per-
cent and 22 percent (respectively) of FDI in-flows. Approximately 290 
active companies are operating in the EPZs. 
The majority (61 percent) of companies in the EPZs are fully foreign 
owned. Of these, by far the biggest group of investors comes from the 
Republic of Korea, followed by Japan; Hong Kong SAR, China; and 
Taiwan, China. In addition, a number of investors from across the 
European Union and the United States are prevalent across the zones. 
Second most prevalent are 100 percent locally owned enterprises, 
which account for 25 percent of all EPZ enterprises. Indeed, the num-
ber of Bangladeshi-owned enterprises is about on par with Korean-
owned enterprises across the EPZs. Joint ventures account for the 
remaining 41 enterprises in the EPZs. 
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Of the active companies operating in the EPZs, nearly two-thirds are 
in the garment sector (see table 2.2), with a number of other labor inten-
sive manufacturing sector making up the rest.
Exports
Promotion and development of exports is a key objective of BEPZA. 
In this regard, it has been quite successful since the early 1990s (see 
 figure 2.1). Exports have grown rapidly, at an average annual rate of 
23 percent since 1993, to reach nearly US$2.5 billion by 2008. EPZ 
Figure 2.1 Exports (US$ millions) and Contribution to National Exports 
(percent) of EPZ Enterprises
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Table 2.2 Operating Enterprises in the EPZs by Sector, 
2009
Sector No. enterprises Percent
Textile and apparel (garment) 189 65%
Electrical and electronics 15 5%
Footwear and leather 13 4%
Metal products 12 4%
Plastic products 12 4%
Food and beverages 8 3%
Other manufacturing 31 13%
Services 3 1%
Source: BEPZA.
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contribution to national exports peaked at more than 18 percent in 
2003 and stood still above 17 percent in 2009. It is worth noting, 
however, that the EPZs still represent only 20 percent of total garment 
exports from Bangladesh.
Employment
In a country with millions entering the workforce annually, the contri-
bution of the EPZs to employment generation is crucial. In terms of 
this objective, the EPZ program has been modestly successful. As of 
2009, about 220,000 jobs had been created in the EPZs. Although this 
represents fairly substantial job creation over a short period of time 
(most of it has taken place only since the early 1990s), it is important 
to put this number into perspective. With a workforce of 70 million in 
Bangladesh, EPZ jobs are virtually a drop in the ocean. Even relative to 
the industrial workforce, the EPZ jobs contribute only about 3 percent 
of total employment. In fact, even in the garment sector up to 90% of 
jobs exist outside the EPZs, although evidence suggests that at least 
some of these jobs exist because of the competitive export sector inside 
the EPZs.
Nevertheless, EPZ jobs have had an important, positive impact on the 
economy, particularly because the majority of jobs created within them 
are held by women (data from BEPZA indicate that women account for 
64 percent of employees in the EPZs). Nearly 60 percent of all jobs in the 
EPZs are in Chittagong, which accounts for nearly 136,000 jobs; another 
72,000 jobs are in Dhaka EPZ. Unlike many other EPZ programs globally, 
the Bangladesh EPZs do not rely extensively on foreign labor. In fact, 
99.5 percent of all employees in the EPZs are Bangladeshi—foreign 
workers account for less than 1,200 jobs in the EPZs.
Figure 2.2 outlines the annual and cumulative rates of employment in 
the EPZs. Over the past 10 years, nearly 15,000 new jobs have been cre-
ated annually in the EPZs. Over this time, evidence indicates that labor 
productivity has been increasing steadily, if not spectacularly. Exports per 
worker in the EPZs rose by an average of 2 percent annually between 
1998 and 2008, reaching a level of more than US$11,000.
Domestic Market Linkages
Linkages with the domestic market are relatively limited as a result not 
only of business strategies of FDI, but also of the policies and practices of 
the EPZ program. Evidence, however, demonstrates that increasing sup-
ply links have been developed in recent years.
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In terms of forward linkages, the EPZ program has restrictive policies 
in place, limiting local market sales to only 10 percent of production. 
Most important, for textiles and garment companies, who make up the 
bulk of EPZ enterprises, no local sales are allowed. The local market 
restriction attempts to protect against unfair competition, which is 
understandable given the size of the local industry and the substantial 
incentives available to EPZ-based companies. Given the large domestic 
market, however, FDI increasingly is looking at Bangladesh not only as a 
location for an export platform, but also as an opportunity to tap into the 
local market. This is particularly relevant in industries like metal products 
and processed food. In general, FDI is looking to have flexibility to tap 
into both local and international market demand; the domestic market 
restrictions place significant limits on this. For example, a company that 
wanted to set up a US$500 million steel mill recently approached the 
Korean EPZ. The company, however, wanted access to the domestic mar-
ket for this investment and decided against investing because of the local 
market sales restrictions. For those sectors that are allowed to sell 10 
percent into the local market, administrative procedures act as an addi-
tional barrier. Firms are first required to obtain authorization from 
BEPZA; they then must pay customs duties, the procedures for which 
are said to be particularly burdensome.
Backward linkages, however, are not actively prohibited and, in theory, 
are encouraged. However, a number of regulatory, administrative, and 
Figure 2.2 Employment Generation in EPZs (Year-Wise and Cumulative)
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general market factors place significant barriers in the way of backward 
linkages. In theory, local producers selling into the EPZs can obtain duty 
drawback on imported inputs (as an indirect exporter), putting them on 
a level playing field with foreign suppliers to the EPZs. But for a small 
producer of garments accessories or a dying and washing unit servicing 
larger units inside EPZs, this turns out to be extremely difficult in prac-
tice. The Duty Exemptions and Drawback Office (DEDO) is severely 
understaffed, the system of drawbacks is heavily bureaucratic, and the 
process suffers from total lack of trust between the service receiver and 
provider.4 Small, indirect exporters often complain that they cannot claim 
drawback because they cannot attach the original bill of export with their 
claims with the DEDO. As a result, small suppliers rarely claim duty 
drawback.5 Second, because of security concerns and EPZ products leak-
ing into the local market, BEPZA has restricted the movement of trucks 
from the domestic territory into the EPZs. This has made the process of 
getting supplies from local companies more difficult—for example, trucks 
are prohibited from coming in and out of the zone outside specifically 
designated hours.
Despite these problems, the large local supply base is making some 
inroads into the EPZ exporters. BEPZA points to the case of a Swedish 
contractor to H&M, which sources inputs from 27 different local sup-
pliers. This certainly may be the exception to the rule, but it does 
underscore the size of the local supply base and the diversity available, 
something that is not the case in many EPZ programs in Africa, for 
example.
Key Success Factors
A number of exogenous factors explain the rise of Bangladesh as an 
export location for the garment sector, but several aspects of the EPZ 
regime have played an important role—in particular, the availability of 
serviced land and supporting infrastructure, the transparent and relatively 
efficient administrative regime in the zones, and the incentives regime 
that is available to zone-based firms. This section discusses each of these 
factors after an initial introduction to two critical exogenous factors that 
also are affected by the EPZ program: wages and market access.
Exogenous Factors: Wages and Market Size
Whatever role the EPZs have played in supporting the rapid growth of 
garment sector exports in Bangladesh, the most critical factor behind 
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growth of the sector in Bangladesh is the country’s labor cost advantage. 
Low-skill garment workers in Bangladesh receive among the lowest 
wages paid in formal employment anywhere in the world, with starting 
wages only around US$30 per month.6 Figure 2.3 shows a comparison of 
average wages in free zones around the world, based on a recent World 
Bank survey (Farole 2011). The labor cost advantage for Bangladesh is 
striking—wages are 2.5 times lower than the next cheapest country 
(Vietnam), and more than three times lower than in most African SEZs. 
Even accounting for relatively low productivity, for labor-intensive activ-
ities like garment processing (where wages often account for 50 percent 
or more of total production costs) the case for locating in Bangladesh is 
compelling.
In addition to the significant labor cost advantage, Bangladesh also 
benefits from its huge market size. Despite limited purchasing power, 
producers in Bangladesh are interested in accessing the 150 million 
people living in the country. In addition, the scale of the market—
particularly around Dhaka and Chittagong—ensures access to critical 
material and service inputs to producers, which may be unavailable in 
smaller markets.
Offsetting these advantages, however, Bangladesh, like most low-
income countries, struggles with a poor investment climate. The private 
Figure 2.3 Comparison of Average Wages and Benefits of Unskilled Workers 
in SEZs
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sector remains weak, and regulations and weak institutions make setting 
up a business extremely difficult, for both foreign and domestic investors. 
Bangladesh ranks 119 of 183 countries in the World Bank’s Doing Business 
index for 2010 (World Bank 2009). In some key components of the 
index, in which Bangladesh has fared worst, it is clear that the EPZ envi-
ronment helps investors to overcome significant constraints. In particular, 
these constraints relate to accessing and developing serviced land 
(Bangladesh ranked 176 of 183 countries on the measure “registering a 
property”), obtaining licenses, and other regulatory constraints. Other 
important investment climate constraints identified—for example, in the 
World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys (World Bank 2008)—include corrup-
tion and unreliable power. The environment for both of these constraints 
is at least partly improved inside the EPZs. Finally, companies operating 
inside the EPZs report that internal security protects them from such 
issues as labor unrest, vandalism, and petty extortion, which are problem-
atic outside the zones.
Provision of Serviced Land and Supporting Infrastructure
Because Bangladeshi land titling issues present a major constraint to 
investment and the country’s industrial land market is severely con-
strained, BEPZA’s provision of land and factory shells plays a critical role 
in attracting investment. BEPZA offers land on 30-year leases, which may 
be renewed, and enterprises construct their facilities in designated plots 
of typically 2,000 square meters. BEPZA also rents prebuilt factory units 
on shorter lease periods, which attracts investors that are not in a position 
to invest substantially upfront and are looking to set up operations 
quickly and with little risk. Given the high costs of land access and devel-
opment in Bangladesh, it is widely believed that the rates charged are 
highly subsidized.
As of end 2009, no space is left in the two main zones of Dhaka and 
Chittagong. Although company turnover allows some new investors to 
move in every year, most investors are now limited in their options—they 
must either move to another EPZ in a less desirable location or set up 
outside the EPZs. BEPZA has been looking to expand in Dhaka for several 
years, but the high cost of land acquisition is making this problematic.
Another key area of infrastructure provision by BEPZA is electricity 
and gas. Outside of the zones, power is a major problem in Bangladesh, 
and most companies must rely on their own generators. Inside the zones, 
BEPZA purchases power from the national grid and sells it to enterprises 
in the zones, adding a 10 percent surcharge (this is an important revenue 
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source for BEPZA). Although the country faces an acute power shortage, 
BEPZA’s power supply takes priority over other national usage. BEPZA 
also has allowed companies to produce power within the zone for the 
zone’s use only, and several of these power plants (some under public-
private partnerships (PPPs)) are expected to be in operation soon.
In addition to this core infrastructure, BEPZA also develops and main-
tains a wide range of key supporting infrastructure in the zone, including 
business and commercial infrastructure, administrative infrastructure, and 
infrastructure to support leisure, family, and quality-of-life issues. These 
include the following:
• Business: Bank, business center, courier, post office, clearing, forwarding, 
and shipping agents
• Administrative: Customs office, police station, in-house security, fire 
station, public transport, medical clinic
• Support and quality of life: Restaurant and canteen, health club, investors 
club, recreation center, school, sport complex
Efficiency of the Administrative Regime
In the bureaucratic environment of Bangladesh, BEPZA offers the best 
service in terms of ease of obtaining licenses and approvals. BEPZA’s rec-
ommendation to other agencies is taken seriously and BEPZA’s officials 
make an effort to guide the processes through the various channels. The 
administrative functions within BEPZA’s own domain work quite well, 
and investors seem to be quite satisfied with the speed and efficiency of 
the system within BEPZA. The BEPZA executive board has the capacity 
to make its own decisions and execute them. Moreover, certain activities 
have authority delegated to BEPZA, including registering a business, for-
eign investments and loans approval, and outsourcing services such as 
power generation. The fact that BEPZA reports directly to the prime 
minister’s office is seen as a critical factor that supports its efficient deliv-
ery of services to investors.
Incentives Regime
The core fiscal incentive offered in the zones is a 10-year tax holiday, 
followed by an additional five years with a 50 percent reduction 
(the normal corporate tax rate for industrial companies ranges from 
27.5 percent for publicly traded companies to 37.5 percent for 
 nonpublicly traded companies7). This incentive is broadly in line with 
The Thin End of the Wedge       37
international norms; however, it actually is less generous than in many 
EPZs, which either offer unlimited tax holidays or allow the tax holiday 
to begin only after a ramp-up period or when the company first reaches 
profitability (in Bangladesh, the tax holiday begins the first year of 
operation). In addition to corporate tax, expatriate workers receive a 
three-year exemption from paying income tax. Other fiscal and nonfis-
cal incentives, offered in most EPZs around the world, are available in 
Bangladesh (see box 2.1).
Another important part of the package to attract foreign investors is a 
regulatory framework that provides confidence of across-the-board inves-
tor protection. This includes the Foreign Investor Protection Act of 1980, 
Box 2.1
Incentives Offered in Bangladesh EPZs
Fiscal incentives
• 10-year tax holiday; additional 5 years at 50 percent
• Duty-free import and export of raw materials and finished goods
• Duty-free import of construction materials, equipment, office machinery, spare 
parts
• Relief from double taxation
• Exemption from dividend tax
• Duty-free import of two to three vehicles for use in EPZ
• Expatriates exempted from income tax for three years
• Accelerated depreciation allowance on machinery or plant
• Remittance of royalty, technical, and consultancy fees allowed
Nonfiscal incentives
• 100% foreign ownership permissible
• No ceiling on foreign or local investment
• Full repatriation of capital and dividend
• Foreign currency loans available directly from abroad
• Permission to hold nonresident foreign currency deposit account 
• EPZs enjoy most-favored nation (MFN) status
• Operation of foreign currency account allowed for all companies not 100% 
locally owned
Source: BEPZA.
38       Special Economic Zones
the availability of insurance through the Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation (OPIC, a U.S. government agency) and the Multilateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA, part of the World Bank Group), 
access to arbitration through the International Settlement of Investment 
Disputes, and safeguarding of copyrights through the World Intellectual 
Property Organization.
Challenges for the Future
Despite the rapid growth of exports in recent years, Bangladesh’s manu-
facturing export sector will face a number of significant challenges in 
the years to come. The EPZ program has the potential to play an impor-
tant role in confronting these challenges; but to do so, the program will 
need to undertake some significant reforms of its own. This section dis-
cusses some of these key challenges and the implications for Bangladesh’s 
zones program.
Balancing Competitiveness with Sustainable Wages 
and Working Conditions
Bangladesh’s competitive positioning in the global garment sector is built 
around its significant labor cost advantage relative to alternative produc-
tion locations. But even with millions of new workers entering the labor 
force each year, the huge wage differential is unlikely to remain sustain-
able. Indeed, the recent decision to nearly double the minimum wage (to 
3,000 taka per month, up approximately US$43 from 1,662.50 taka) in 
the garment sector is evidence of the upward pressure on wages. In addi-
tion, although the EPZs have created substantial employment opportuni-
ties for low-skilled workers and have had a particularly important impact 
on poor families through the creation of wage-earning opportunities for 
females, they also have been criticized for quality of work, working condi-
tions, and worker rights. Maintaining a competitive labor cost (or produc-
tivity) position while also delivering quality, sustainable employment 
opportunities will be a significant challenge for the zones program.
Most evidence indicates that wages and working conditions inside the 
zones are better than outside the zones. For example, wages in the zones 
are on average 20–30 percent higher than what is offered for the same 
job outside the EPZs, and factories outside the EPZs are infamous for 
delaying wage payments. Moreover, benefits (transport, meals, access to 
health clinics, holidays) and mandatory annual wage increases make 
employment inside the zones superior to what is available outside. 
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Despite these benefits, worker rights in the zones were poorly protected 
for a long time. EPZs have been exempted from national labor regula-
tions. The EPZ Act, in an apparent effort to provide a more favorable 
investment environment, suspended the application of the 1969 Industrial 
Relations Ordinance and subsequent amendments, which provide for the 
right to organize labor unions and enter into collective bargaining agree-
ments, as well as other labor-related legislation. Consequently, labor 
unions have been prohibited in the zones.
In 2004, against international pressure, Parliament passed the EPZ 
Workers Association and Industrial Relations Act 2004 (amended October 
2010). This granted the workers some leeway to establish a franchise of 
workers. Although limited to only certain types of collective activity, the 
act allows the workers to organize elections to represent their demands 
and participate in collective actions in harmony with BEPZA’s other 
regulations. This is a step toward rights to free collective union. Under this 
legislation, however, a ban on strikes and lockouts remained. The legisla-
tion was originally set to expire at the end of 2008, but BEPZA was able 
to extend it through October 2010.
In the absence of national regulations, BEPZA follows a suggested 
set of instructions regarding labor relations, which are referred to as 
“Instruction 1” and “Instruction 2.” These instructions have been the rules 
and regulations bible in terms of the worker-owner-BEPZA relationship 
and compliance, and therefore they provide an established reference 
point. The problem is that, although the de facto situation in most firms 
in the EPZs is relatively good, the de jure situation as per Instructions 
1 and 2 not only offers weak protection of workers’ rights but also speci-
fies lower benefits to what is available under the national labor regulations. 
In addition, capacity to monitor and enforce regulations is limited.
As a result of this inconsistency, and in light of the recent labor unrest 
and the massive protests against some of the factory owners, BEPZA has 
made efforts to improve worker-owner relations in the zones. One com-
ponent of this effort was the establishment of a Labor Counselor Program 
(see box 2.2). After an initial pilot, 67 counselors were recruited to act as 
go-betweens and resolve problems between workers and managers. These 
counselors worked closely with the workers and the management and 
reported progress to BEPZA. They were extension workers of BEPZA 
and became solid advocates for the workers’ concerns and rights. This 
project, originally funded by the World Bank, has been slightly modified 
and sustained through funding by the Bangladesh Investment Climate 
Fund (BICF).
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Box 2.2
The Labor Counselor Program
The Bangladesh Export Processing Zones Authority (BEPZA) is endowed with 
the responsibility of ensuring compliance on social and labor issues within its 
zones. Acknowledging that BEPZA’s resources, especially in the areas of social 
and labor aspects, are thinly stretched, BEPZA initiated an innovative program 
in 2005. The program, funded by the World Bank, recruited approximately 67 
counselors to work closely with the workers and their respective management 
with the intention of proactively addressing issues related to wages, working 
conditions, food, childcare, benefits, and security. These counselors worked on 
behalf of BEPZA but were perceived more like facilitators than regulators and 
enforcers. These young recruits paid almost daily visits to their designated fac-
tories to work with management on the correct application of labor issues and 
compensation practices. They also acted as informal arbitrators between man-
agement and workers to resolve grievances. They also reported to BEPZA any 
existing or potential issues. The International Finance Corporation (IFC) esti-
mated that the better implementation of existing rules thanks to the role of 
these counselors resulted in an increase of 32 percent in wages for the workers 
in the EPZs. 
The program was valued both by BEPZA’s management and the workers. The 
initial funding for the program expired in 2009. At BEPZA’s request, the IFC BICF 
put in additional funding to continue the counselor program. Realizing the ben-
efit of the program, BEPZA is committed to integrating the program into its main-
stream operational budget. Following allegations of unpaid wages, the country 
experienced massive demonstrations and unrest. In 2006, two factories were set 
fire in the Dhaka EPZ. This case of unrest was one of the worst in recent times. The 
role of the counselors in avoiding such situations in the future has been estab-
lished and acknowledged by all stakeholders.
Despite significant unrest that shook Bangladesh’s garment sector in 2010, 
no incidents were reported in any of the EPZs in the country. The work of the 
labor counselors since the BICF started employing them in 2007 has been 
 instrumental in the stark contrast in unrest inside and outside the zones. The 
counselors have acted as an effective and informal arbitration mechanism and 
have built a relationship of trust between worker and employer in all the EPZs. 
As evidence of this, in the Dhaka EPZ, grievances have declined from 2,000 in 
2007 to 400 in 2009. 
Source: Authors.
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Diversification
When the Board of Investment established the first EPZ in Chittagong, 
the mandate was to accept only high-technology companies and not to 
attract labor-intensive garment companies. This, in part, explains the long 
delay in filling up the EPZ. Apparently, it was only after one garment 
company called itself “Hi Tech Knitwear” that they were allowed into the 
zone. This paved the way for other garment companies and the EPZs 
subsequently took off.
Since that time, there has been much talk about diversifying the indus-
trial base of the EPZs, but little to no concerted action has been taken to 
effect such change. Across all the EPZs in Bangladesh, garment produc-
tion accounts for two-thirds of companies and close to 90 percent of jobs. 
Despite the BEPZA’s repeated statements of intent to deny any more 
garment investments into the EPZs to promote diversification, as late as 
December 2009, new garment projects had been accepted. In recent 
years, the EPZs have shown little to no diversification and no apparent 
targeted investment promotion strategy that will effect such a change.
Within the garment sector as well, upgrading over the years has been 
limited. Although the EPZs have suppliers across the range of inputs, 
assembly, and finishing, few companies have become full-package sup-
pliers, with the vast majority carrying out simple cut, make, and trim 
activities.
Reform of Existing EPZ Regime
To address these and other challenges facing the export sector, in the com-
ing years, reforms to the existing EPZ regime are needed in several areas.
First, BEPZA needs to realign its program of fiscal incentives. Like 
most traditional EPZ programs, BEPZA’s incentive scheme is tied to 
exports, which makes it incompatible with the WTO Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. As a least-developed country 
(LDC), Bangladesh remains exempt from these prohibitions for the time 
being. However, as the leases in the EPZs are set for 30 years, it may be 
difficult to phase out the incentive schemes in the future (when 
Bangladesh does graduate from the low-income country exemption) if 
the adjustments are not made ahead of time. This adjustment likely will 
involve a phasing out of the core fiscal benefits over time.
Second, there is a need to promote much greater private sector devel-
opment and management in the zones program. BEPZA’s role as regula-
tor and operator has been identified as a major obstacle to the continued 
success of the zones, both in terms of regulatory compliance and private 
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sector–led growth. Until very recently, BEPZA has had an implicit 
monopoly on developing and managing EPZs. Although the Private EPZ 
Act of 1996 makes a provision for private entities to develop and run 
EPZs, it lacks any clear criteria for approving such zones and the nominal 
regulator of private zones (an Executive Cell, which is essentially a paral-
lel regulator to BEPZA) has no capacity or resources to perform its 
responsibilities. Thus, 13 years after the passage of the legislation, only 
one private sector–led EPZ has been initiated, and it has not yet managed 
to become operational (see box 2.3).
The Economic Zones Act, which was passed in July 2010, will result 
in substantial changes to the existing zones regime in Bangladesh and 
Box 2.3
The Korean EPZ: The First Private EPZ in Bangladesh
The Youngone Corporation was the first company to obtain a license from the 
Government of Bangladesh to build and operate an EPZ. Youngone is a Republic 
of Korea conglomerate that has been operating in the Bangladesh EPZs since the 
early 1980s. It is one of the largest and most reputable companies in BEPZA’s 
zones, with at least eight companies operating in textiles, garments, footwear, 
sportswear, and plastics. The “Korean EPZ” will, when it becomes operational, be 
the largest EPZ in Bangladesh. 
Youngone purchased 2,500 acres of land in Chittagong to build an EPZ in the 
mid-1990s. The land has since been prepared and the site has been zoned. 
Equipped with housing, hospitality, independent jetty, and an 18-hole golf course, 
the Korean EPZ is designed to host an array of activities and service within its 
boundaries, including both light and heavy industry. The master plan for the proj-
ect estimates that it will attract US$1 billion in investment, resulting in at least 
100,000 jobs and US$1.25 billion worth of exports.
However, the process of establishing the EPZ has proceeded far from smooth-
ly. Licensing of the EPZ took almost eight years and an operational license was 
only obtained in May 2007. This delay is attributed to problems in gaining envi-
ronmental clearance, bureaucratic procedures in setting up the zone, and the lack 
of institutional capacity to support private sector zone development. In addition, 
the project suffered long delays because of the inability to access electricity and 
gas supplies. Indeed, access to gas still was not resolved as of late 2009 and con-
tinues to delay development.
Source: Authors.
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will address many of the reforms (see box 2.4). The act moves 
Bangladesh beyond the traditional EPZ regime to embrace a broader 
SEZ or “economic zone” model. Specifically, it allows for much larger 
scale zones and takes a more flexible approach to the types of activities 
that can be undertaken within the zones. In addition, not only does the 
new act put greater emphasis on private sector participation in zone 
development, but it also substantially alters the role of BEPZA by split-
ting its regulator function from its development and management role. 
Finally, it ensures more private provision of public goods in the zones as 
well as PPPs.
Conclusion
In 2008, BEPZA celebrated its 25th anniversary. What started as a pilot 
program has now become a large and substantial element of the 
Box 2.4
The Economic Zones Act
The Economic Zones Act, which was passed by Parliament in July 2010, has the 
following strategic provisions:
• Establish one law to govern all economic zone programs in the  country
• Create a broader and more flexible model for zones allowing exports as well as 
local sales
• Bring larger areas under special regimes, which may include existing EPZs and 
industrial estates
• Set clear and objective criteria for site selection and mandatory feasibility stud-
ies to eliminate discretionary powers and erratic decision making
• Facilitate an increased role of the private sector in ownership, management, 
and operation of zones
• Allow a light-handed approach to the regulation of zones
• Ensure that all zones are operated on commercial principles and the market to 
drive the price of services
• Allow the conversion of any zone into an SEZ with parameters  fulfilled
• Make a provision for declaring large geographic areas to be brought under 
special administrative and incentive regimes to allow “brownfield” approach
Source: Authors.
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 government’s investment attraction and industrialization efforts. 
Bangladesh’s EPZs have been highly successful in attracting investment 
and creating jobs, particularly for low-skilled female workers. It also has 
played a part in creating a more efficient investment environment in the 
country and, indeed, in putting Bangladesh on the map as a low-cost 
location for FDI in the garment sector. Given the size of the national 
economy, the overall impact of the EPZs on employment and exports 
has been relatively modest; however, they are likely to have played at 
least some catalytic role in supporting the growth of the garment sector 
outside the walls of the EPZs.
On the other hand, the EPZs have been less successful in facilitating 
upgrades and diversification in the economy. Indeed, they arguably have 
further entrenched the reliance on garment assembly. In addition, the 
EPZs have been widely criticized for their treatment of workers and for 
environmental failings. Although, in fact, the situation in both these 
respects is generally much better inside than outside the EPZs, it is true 
that the EPZs have not yet met their potential as modernizing influences 
in the industrial system in Bangladesh. That said, several recent initia-
tives discussed in this paper—most critically the adoption of a modern 
Economic Zones Act—suggest that the EPZs still have a potential to play 
a role in facilitating a transition toward a higher quality, more sustainable 
manufacturing sector for Bangladesh.
Notes
 1. Although in recent years, demand for natural fibers has grown, leading to 
a substantial rise on the global market and prices for raw jute (de Vries 
2007).
 2. As of March 2009, BSCIC operated 74 industrial estates. 
 3. Assumes that approximately 80 percent of EPZ investments accrue from 
FDI.
 4. In a survey conducted in 2006, DEDO had more than 2,000 pending applica-
tions, 30 percent of which were from 2004; in most cases, drawback takes 
3–18 months and significant amounts of paperwork to be processed. 
 5. An estimated less than 10 percent of eligible duty drawback is claimed 
through the system.
 6. The data presented here on wages in Bangladesh were obtained before the 
July 2010 decision to raise the national minimum wage substantially.
 7. The vast majority of EPZ companies are not publicly traded.
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Introduction
How did a small, unremarkable Central American country with a turbu-
lent political past (and, indeed, present) manage to become a leading 
exporter of clothing and apparel to the United States and, in doing so, 
create in excess of 100,000 new jobs? Although not without peers in the 
region, Honduras has achieved notable success with its free zones. The 
Honduran free zone/maquila program was established as early as 1976; 
however, it was not until the 1990s that it reaped dividends for the 
economy, as a confluence of factors, including external political events 
and economic trends, government policies, and a dynamic private sector, 
enabled the country to attract large-scale FDI and become a location of 
choice for offshoring in the U.S. apparel sector.
Over the last two decades, the free zone industry has expanded rapidly 
in terms of investment, exports, and employment. However, the global 
economic downturn began to affect the sector in the second half of 2008. 
By mid-2009, the poor economy resulted in sizeable layoffs and some 
companies closing down their operations in Honduras. The global eco-
nomic crisis has exposed possible weaknesses in the competitive position 
of the traditional labor-intensive processing activities on which Honduras’ 
free zones have relied and highlighted the urgency of diversification. 
Success and Stasis in Honduras’ 
Free Zones
Michael Engman
C H A P T E R  3
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In facing this challenge, Honduras can draw on many of the strengths that 
allowed it to build a successful free zone export sector. Some of these 
same factors also may be a source of “lock-in” that prevents the govern-
ment and the free zone sector from making the decisions necessary to 
achieve diversification and upgrading in the sector. 
This chapter analyzes Honduras’ experience with free zones over the 
past three decades. It discusses the factors that contributed to its success 
and the key challenges the industry faces today. 
Historical Development of Free Zones in Honduras
The maquila1 (or maquiladora), which in Latin America and the 
Caribbean refers to factories that use duty-free imports of materials and 
equipment to assemble products that are exported predominantly to the 
U.S. market, was introduced in Honduras in the mid-1960s. The interest 
in this factory concept stemmed from a wave of initiatives in Central 
America, the Caribbean, and East Asia to integrate industrial parks into 
national development plans. By establishing geographically limited 
enclaves with dedicated infrastructure, streamlined public administration, 
and various fiscal incentives, the underlying idea was that developing 
countries would be able to attract foreign capital and technology used for 
labor-intensive, export-oriented production activity. This capital would 
generate employment and foreign exchange that by extension would 
stimulate economic growth and facilitate the payment of imports.
Political disturbances including the 1969 war with El Salvador, which 
destroyed infrastructure, alarmed investors, and shifted policy attention, 
were partly responsible for Honduras failing to follow Mexico and the 
Dominican Republic as early adopters of the maquila policy. In 1976, 
however, the country enacted its first free zone law,2 which allowed 
export-oriented companies established in Puerto Cortés to enjoy a num-
ber of mostly fiscal incentives. 
The early years following the passing of the Free Zone Law saw limited 
investment and business activity—eight companies chose to invest in the 
Puerto Cortés free zone in its initial years of operations. To broaden the 
choice of location for investors, the Free Zone Law was in 1979 extended 
to another five counties: Amapala, Choloma, La Ceiba, Omoa, and Tela. 
In 1984, the Temporary Importation Regulations Law extended many of 
the fiscal incentives to export-oriented companies based outside the free 
zones to create a domestic supply base and soften the economic  distortions 
that the zones gave rise to. The Export Processing Zone (EPZ) Law of 1987 
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later provided similar fiscal incentives to both export-oriented companies 
and real estate owners who invested in the physical infrastructure of 
industrial parks anywhere in the country. Finally, on May 20, 1998, after 
22 years of selective enlargements, this process was complete as the 
National Congress declared the entire national territory a Free Zone Area 
(Decree No. 131-98), allowing privately owned and managed EPZs (or 
“ZIPs,” Zonas Industriales de Procesamiento) to be established anywhere in 
the country.
Honduras offers several advantages as a base for manufacturing of light 
goods, including (1) the proximity to the U.S. South and East Coast mar-
kets; (2) the efficient deepwater port of Puerto Cortés; (3) the sizeable 
cluster of textiles and clothing companies in the San Pedro Sula region; 
(4) preferential market access through the Caribbean Basin Trade 
Partnership Act (CBTPA) and the Dominican Republic-Central American 
Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA); and (5) a comprehensive free zone 
regime with favorable fiscal incentives (see box 3.1). In addition, although 
higher than in neighboring Nicaragua and in some other large exporting 
countries like Bangladesh, China, and Vietnam, labor costs are relatively 
low in Honduras compared with other countries in its region.
Performance 
Honduras has experienced rapid growth in the free zone program, par-
ticularly in the period from the early 1990s through 2007. This section 
provides a brief summary of progress of the zones program across the 
main components of performance: firms and investment, exports, 
employment, and local market linkages.
Firms and Investment
The free zone sector in Honduras consists of a fairly large cluster of light 
goods manufacturers concentrated around the city of San Pedro Sula near 
Puerto Cortés. As of the end of 2008, 342 free zone companies, pre-
dominantly in the textiles and clothing sector, were based either in one of 
two dozen privately operated zones or operating as “single zone enter-
prises.” Most of the companies operating in the zones are foreign owned, 
while the owners and operators of the free zone industrial parks are pre-
dominantly Honduran investors. The dominant position of the textiles 
and clothing sector is confirmed by the data available on FDI (see 
tables 3.1 and 3.2). The sector received on average 64 percent of total 
FDI in the manufacturing sector in 2004–2007. “Electronic components,” 
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Box 3.1
Incentives in the Honduras Free Zones
The fiscal incentive structure that the Government of Honduras offers companies 
with free zone status is generous from an international perspective. Free 
zone–based companies are exempt from all federal and municipal taxes as well as 
duties and charges associated with trade. What makes the fiscal incentive struc-
ture in Honduras rather unique is the fact that there is no time limit attached to 
the fiscal incentives. The boxed table summarizes the incentive structure offered 
in the various laws that cover companies in Honduran free zones.3 The legal 
framework that currently governs the free zones is tailor-made for the manufac-
turing industry and does not cover the provision of services. However, in practice, 
the government does not enforce this rule and it is said to allow those zones that 
move into the business of call center services. 
Incentives
Free Trade Zone 
(ZOLI)
Export Processing 
Zone (ZIP)
Temporary Import 
Law
Imported duties on 
raw materials, 
components
100% exemption 100% exemption 100% exemption
Export taxes 100% exemption 100% exemption 100% exemption
Local sales and 
excise taxes
100% exemption 100% exemption 100% exemption if 
imported
Taxes on net assets 100% exemption 100% exemption Subject to payment
Taxes on profits 100% exemption 100% exemption Subject to payment
Municipal taxes 
and obligations/
duties
100% exemption 100% exemption Subject to payment
Taxes on profits 
repatriation
100% exemption 100% exemption Subject to Central 
Bank
Capital repatriation 100% exemption 100% exemption Subject to Central 
Bank
Currency 
conversion
Unrestricted Unrestricted Subject to Central 
Bank
Customs Cleared on site Cleared on site Through a customs 
agent
Sales to 
local market
5% of total 
production 
paying customs 
duties
Only paying 
customs duties 
authorized by the 
Secretariat of 
Industry and Trade
Only paying customs 
duties authorized 
by the Secretariat 
of Industry and 
Trade
(continued next page)
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Incentives
Free Trade Zone 
(ZOLI)
Export Processing 
Zone (ZIP)
Temporary Import 
Law
Eligibility 
requirements
Industrial and 
commercial 
companies can 
be established
Industrial and 
supporting 
companies can be 
established
Industrial and 
commercial 
companies can be 
established
Source: Asociación Hondureña de Maquiladores (2009). 
Box 3.1 (continued)
Table 3.1  FDI in Manufacturing Activities
(US$, million)
2004 2005 2006 2007 Average 2004–2007
Textiles 92.2 76.3 127.3 197.6 63.7%
Input services 20.7 22.9 32.0 20.0 12.3%
Commerce –3.3 8.0 16.3 5.8 3.5%
Agriculture and fishery 7.7 7.8 8.2 4.3 3.6%
Cardboard products 3.8 3.3 –9.1 1.9 0.0%
Plastic products 0.0 0.6 0.4 0.1 0.1%
Chemical products 0.0 2.7 0.0 0.0 0.3%
Furniture & wood products 0.5 –0.4 0.5 –1.5 –0.1%
Tobacco 22.4 5.3 –0.1 –3.6 3.1%
Electronic components 28.7 65.3 2.3 –5.3 11.7%
Other industry 2.2 3.9 6.9 0.2 1.7%
Total 174.9 195.8 184.7 219.6
Source: Central Bank of Honduras (2008).
Table 3.2 FDI in Manufacturing by Country of Origin
(US$, million)
2004 2005 2006 2007 Average 2004–2007
Canada 37.9 4.5 65.6 112.6 28.5%
El Salvador 1.4 0.9 0.2 1.0 0.5%
Germany 2.2 0.8 0.4 –2.8 0.1%
Korea 16.8 17.5 10.9 10.9 7.2%
Mexico 0.2 0.6 7.0 –3.4 0.6%
Spain 4.3 1.3 3.9 0.1 1.2%
Switzerland 0.0 7.0 6.6 7.2 2.7%
Taiwan 4.2 6.4 10.6 5.7 3.5%
UK –0.1 1.0 4.1 5.0 1.3%
United States 75.8 140.0 75.9 81.7 48.2%
Other countries 32.2 15.8 –0.5 1.6 6.3%
Total 174.9 195.8 184.7 219.6
Source: Central Bank of Honduras (2008).
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which includes wire harnesses, generated significant amounts of FDI in 
2004–05, but this sector has been largely defensive in the 2006–2009 
period, and some companies have closed down their operations in 
Honduras. Canada and the United States were by far the largest sources 
of FDI inflows in 2004–2007. Overall, the free zone industry captured 
34.4 percent of total FDI in 2007 (EIU 2008).
Production and Exports
Table 3.3 shows that in 2007, the value added contribution of the free 
zone/maquila industry to the overall economy (GDP) and to the coun-
try’s overall industry production was 7.7 percent and 42.7 percent, 
respectively. The share of the maquila industry to GDP has been stable 
in the years following the expiration of the MFA (at least until the 
beginning of the global economic crisis starting in 2008), which sug-
gests that one or more of the following is happening: the industry is 
maintaining competitiveness in its traditional apparel-processing activ-
ities despite the growing competition from Asian producers; it is shift-
ing to higher value added segments of the sector; or it is diversifying 
away from clothing.
Free zone exports have grown rapidly since the early 1990s. Value 
added export earnings reached US$3.3 billion in 2007 (EIU 2008), a 
level 10 times higher than in 1993 (equivalent to 20 percent average 
growth each year over that period). Recent data by the Central Bank of 
Honduras also indicate that this expansion continued in 2007 but that 
the global economic downturn, which started in Honduras’ main export 
market, the United States, had a negative impact toward the end of 2008 
and a strong negative impact in 2009. According to the Maquila 
Association of Honduras, the country is now the fourth-largest supplier 
of clothing (garment) products (5.9 percent market share) and the sec-
ond-largest supplier of electric harnesses to the United States. It is also 
Table 3.3 Value-Added Contribution by Manufacturing in “Industry” and 
“Maquila Industry”
Year
GDP 
(Lempira mn)
Gross value 
added industry 
(Lempira mn)
Gross value 
added Maquila 
(Lempira mn)
Maquila 
industry 
(percent)
Maquila/GDP 
(percent)
2005 183,749 35,066 13,898 39.6 7.6
2006* 204,685 38,129 15,558 40.8 7.6
2007* 232,817 42,209 18,029 42.7 7.7
Source: Central Bank of Honduras (2008).
* = preliminary.
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the world’s largest importer of U.S. yarn (US$799 million in 2008). 
Honduras’ producers excel in particular at producing small orders for 
expedient delivery to the U.S. market. This is a key comparative advantage 
given rapid shifts in fashion and taste as well as retailers’ effort to reduce 
the costs of inventory. U.S. orders of textiles and clothing in the mass 
market are increasingly being sourced from more cost-effective locations 
like Bangladesh, China, and Vietnam.
Employment
The main objective of the government’s free zone policy is employment 
creation—in this regard, the program has been quite successful. In 2007, 
employment in the free zone industry reached 134,000 workers; up by 
3 percent year on year in 2005 and 2006. Seventy-seven percent of the 
workers were employed in the textiles and clothing sector. The only other 
product category with more than 3,500 employees was “car parts and 
wire harnesses” for vehicles, which accounted for about 10 percent of free 
zone employment (13,600).
Figure 3.1 illustrates the development of employment in the free 
zones since 1995. The figure indicates that rapid growth of employment 
took place mainly in the 1990s. Following recent declines, however, the 
estimated employment in 2008 was only 15 percent higher (114,000) 
than employment 10 years earlier (99,000). This is partly a result of 
capital deepening and increases in productivity—important factors to 
stay competitive and to move up the value chain—since exports have 
increased more rapidly over the same period (see WTO 2003). But it also 
reflects declining competitiveness in the labor-intensive assembly  activities 
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that traditionally have been at the heart of the maquila program. Thus, 
although the free zone policy generally has been a success, free zones may 
have limited scope to absorb more than a small share of the growing labor 
market in the future. 
In 2007, 169 textiles and clothing companies were based in the free 
zones, but a small handful of MNCs accounted for the majority of the 
103,377 workers in the sector. Canadian company Gildan, which assem-
bles a wide range of products, including socks, fleece products, and knit 
products such as T-shirts and underwear across several factories, is the 
largest employer in the Honduran free zones. Gildan, along with U.S. 
multinationals, such as Fruit of the Loom and Hanes, each employs more 
than 10,000 workers. 
Local Market Linkages
Forward linkages are limited, in part, because the dominant apparel pro-
duction sector is geared almost exclusively for the U.S. market. But policy 
barriers also restrict forward linkages by free zone companies. To protect 
local producers based outside the free zones (those that do not enjoy tax 
free status or other incentives available to free zone firms), Honduras 
restricts free zone firms to selling a maximum of 5 percent of their output 
into the local market.
Honduras has been fairly successful at developing backward linkages 
(i.e., establishing a domestic support industry that provides locally pro-
duced goods and services for the free zone–based manufacturers). The 
original maquila concept was essentially a “job shop” in which imported 
inputs were assembled and stitched together by local labor and then 
exported to foreign markets. This situation held for Honduras during the 
early years; however, local suppliers based in Honduras now are providing 
a number of locally produced intermediary goods in the production 
chain, in particular, textiles used in the apparel sector. As of 2011, 
Honduras had 10 to 12 mills producing textiles for the clothing and 
apparel sectors.
Key Success Factors
As noted, although the free zone program in Honduras began in the mid-
1970s, it was by no means an immediate success. In fact, it took at least 
15 years before the investment in the sector really began to take off. A 
number of factors contributed to this eventual success, including a will-
ingness to evolve the legal framework for the program; effective use of 
Success and Stasis in Honduras’ Free Zones       55
preferential trade agreements; government support to develop the neces-
sary infrastructure and support services for the zones; support for agglom-
eration; effective institutional support, particularly in marketing and 
promotion; and, most important, a dynamic, entrepreneurial domestic 
private sector. But what appears most critical to this success is that all of 
these factors came together at the same time. Moreover, they did so at a 
fortunate time when external political and economic factors also favored 
investment in Honduras—specifically, the U.S. recession of the early 
1990s, which helped to trigger offshoring of labor-intensive production in 
the apparel sector, and Honduras’ position as a relatively stable environ-
ment in the midst of civil strife throughout the region. This section 
reviews each of the main components that contributed to the success of 
the free zone program.
Experimentation and Evolution to Reach a Sound Legal Framework 
that Facilitated Private Investment
It took Honduran legislators almost a quarter of a century to find a legal 
framework for free zones that conformed to the demand of all stakehold-
ers. The enactment of the first piece of legislation in 1976 created a small 
publicly run enclave near Puerto Cortés, which targeted export-oriented 
foreign investment. Over time, the government enacted several pieces of 
new legislation that broadened the geographic reach of the free zone 
policy. Most critical in this regard was the 1987 Export Processing Law, 
which (1) abandoned the previous policy discriminating against domestic 
private investors, and (2) opened up the fiscal incentives of the free zone 
program to export-oriented companies and real estate developers who 
invested in the physical infrastructure of industrial parks anywhere in the 
country. As discussed in the following section, this law helped to unlock 
investment from local entrepreneurs in developing the industrial parks, 
which in turn catalyzed investment from U.S. multinationals.
Further development of the legal framework sought to create more 
backward linkages by extending many of the tax-free and duty-free 
incentives to local producers outside the free zones. The evolution culmi-
nated in 1998, with the declaration of the entire national territory as a 
Free Zone Area (Decree No. 131-98).
Effective use of Preferential Trade Agreements
The United States traditionally has been Honduras’ largest trading part-
ner, and U.S. policies providing preferential treatment to Honduran prod-
ucts have had a significant impact on Honduran exports. The Caribbean 
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Basin Initiative (CBI) was initiated by U.S. President Ronald Reagan and 
came into effect on January 1, 1984, as a unilateral and temporary pro-
gram. It offered preferential market access to several countries in Central 
America and the Caribbean for exports of clothing and apparel to the 
United States. It was part of U.S. policy to combat political movements 
through aid and trade. With CBI in place, Honduran producers did not 
have to pay duties on reexported inputs, such as textiles and fabrics, of 
U.S. origin, but only on local value added. In 1990, the U.S. passed the 
Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Expansion Act (CBI II), which 
made the incentives in the CBI permanent. Thus, in the period from the 
late 1980s into the early 1990s, when the legal framework was fine-tuned 
to facilitate investment in industrial parks and to attract FDI, the devel-
opment of preferential trade agreements was also working strongly in 
Honduras’ favor.
The impact of CBI-induced trade preferences was reduced signifi-
cantly following the passing of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) in 1994. Mexico was a major competitor in the clothing and 
apparel sector, and the implementation of NAFTA offered Mexican pro-
ducers new preferences to the U.S. market in relation to Honduran pro-
ducers. However, in 2000, the U.S. passed the CBTPA, which provided 
renewed trade preferences for Honduras’ producers. In particular, the 
CBTPA extended preferential tariff treatment to textile products assem-
bled from U.S. fabric that previously had been excluded from the CBI. 
This boosted the use of local content in the production value chain and 
resulted in significant investment in textile mills in Honduras. According 
to the Maquila Association of Honduras, CBTPA shifted the incentive 
structure from the previously preferred solution of importing all input 
material from the United States to using locally produced input material. 
Today, roughly 60 percent of inputs are produced in Honduras, although 
most of the intermediary goods used in the production process are pro-
duced in the domestic free zone environment. This production used to be 
less than 10 percent in the 1980s and parts of the 1990s.
On April 1, 2006, Honduras ratified and implemented DR-CAFTA, 
which covers the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, and the United States.4 DR-CAFTA provides addi-
tional trade preferences to Honduran producers, although in this case the 
rules of origin clause in the agreement led to mixed results for Honduran 
producers of clothing and apparel. Rules of origin are applied to dis-
criminate between suppliers, and DR-CAFTA favors U.S. producers of 
fabrics to suppliers from cost-effective producers in Asia. These rules of 
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origin have weakened the supply chain of Honduran clothing manufac-
turers since uncompetitive U.S. mills already were starting to close down 
during the DR-CAFTA negotiation. 
Government Support for Key Infrastructure and Services 
In the initial years of the free zone program, key infrastructure, including 
factories, roads, and port facilities, was not yet in place to support the 
large-scale investment. The government played a critical role in facilitat-
ing targeted investment for the free zone program, again beginning the 
late 1980s and early 1990s. One key program derived from the private 
sector debt crisis that affected the country in the late 1980s, forcing sev-
eral important domestic companies to default on their loans. As a part of 
a deal to address this crisis, the government agreed to buy corporate 
bonds that were then valued at only $0.08–0.12 each for US$1; in return, 
the private sector agreed to invest the proceeds in free zones and other 
infrastructure. Thus, several free zone industrial parks and the surround-
ing infrastructure were financed by this debt-swap deal, in particular, in 
the San Pedro Sula and Puerto Cortés regions.
The government also has played an important role in providing adja-
cent infrastructure. For example, the Honduran government invested in a 
number of roads, including between San Pedro Sula and Puerto Cortés, 
which attracted investment. Some of these roads are publicly operated 
roads with toll systems that recoup public investments. Significant invest-
ments also were made in the port itself, including (most recently) the 
designation of Puerto Cortes as a SAFE (Security and Accountability for 
Every Port) port under the U.S. Secure Freight Initiative, one of the few 
such ports in the hemisphere. Finally, the government also ensured the 
implementation of an expedient and effective customs regime for the 
free zones. This customs regime has allowed free zone operators to enjoy 
rapid and simplified customs procedures, with on-site customs officials 
inside each free zone.
Support for Agglomeration
Many countries have sought to use free zones as regional development 
tools, and plenty of political leaders have targeted remote or poor areas 
where they perceive jobs to be particularly needed. The government of 
Honduras initially sought to promote geographic diversification by selec-
tively expanding the zone policy to targeted regions, including the capital 
Tegucigalpa, but this approach had little success. As discussed, the gov-
ernment slowly abandoned this regional development approach and, in 
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parallel with opening up the sector to domestic investors in the late 
1980s, it permitted investors to choose to locate where it best suited 
them. The market response was to agglomerate around San Pedro Sula 
(see box 3.2). Almost 80 percent of all employment in Honduras’ free 
zones is concentrated in the Cortés region.
Institutional Support in Marketing and Promotion 
FIDE (Foundation for Investment and Development of Exports), the 
national export and investment promotion agency, was established in 
1984. From its inception, FIDE’s objectives have been to promote invest-
ment, develop export markets, and work closely with the government 
and other private organizations to create new legislation aimed at improv-
ing the business climate in Honduras. A key initiative of FIDE was to 
Box 3.2
San Pedro Sula: Key Agglomeration for the Export Sector
Although the government had an objective to develop an export sector around 
the capital Tegucigalpa (as well as in peripheral regions of the country) and ini-
tially aimed to use the free zone program as an instrument to attract investment 
toward Tegucigalpa, it failed to shift capital from the Cortés region, particularly 
San Pedro Sula, for several reasons. First, the cost of living is higher in Tegucigalpa. 
There is also a scarcity of suitable land. Transporting containers overland is always 
a challenge in Honduras given the country’s hilly landscape and security prob-
lems. Manufacturers based in San Pedro Sula benefited greatly from its proximity 
to Puerto Cortés, which is the country’s entry and exit point of seaborne goods. 
The San Pedro Sula region also had a first mover advantage. It hosts a number 
of influential industrial families, including the Rozenthal, Canahuati, and Facousse, 
who had established small clothing and apparel businesses even before the 
 enactment of the free zone Law. The availability of local suppliers was attractive 
to investors who sought proximity to the value chain. In addition, the San Pedro 
Sula cluster offers economies of scale in the supply of input services for the kind 
of service support sectors required by local entrepreneurs and foreign investors, 
like international schools, health services, financial institutions, supermarkets, and 
recreational activities like golf courses. Access to international transport services, 
logistics, land, human capital, local entrepreneurs, and so on has been crucial in 
San Pedro Sula’s rise as a hub of the free zone manufacturing sector.
Source: Author. 
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establish export promotion offices in Florida, Atlanta, and New York to 
nurture networks and connect Honduran exporters and zone operators 
with companies in leading U.S. centers of textiles and clothing produc-
tion. This policy was successful and much valued by Honduran-based 
companies that benefited from the contacts established by FIDE and the 
investment that was generated through its work. FIDE also worked 
closely with key leaders in the domestic sector, for example, organizing 
visits in the middle of the 1980s, during which a number of local leaders 
of industrial families visited free zones in other countries, including in 
Asia and the Dominican Republic, to learn from their experiences. 
Dynamic and Entrepreneurial Domestic Private Sector
The Honduran government realized early the need for private sector 
participation in the establishment of free zones. It was not until the enact-
ment of the EPZ law in 1987 and the associated end in government dis-
crimination between domestic and foreign manufacturers that investment 
in free zones gathered momentum. The domestic industry’s investment 
in zone infrastructure and the establishment of manufacturing companies 
catalyzed FDI. The free zone industry now is almost entirely made up of 
private zone operators and private companies. The ZOLI (zona libre) 
Puerto Cortés is the only publicly operated zone—this zone never 
expanded much beyond its initial development phase and now hosts only 
11 total companies. 
Although domestic entrepreneurs have played an increasingly impor-
tant role as investors in free zone companies—for example, between 
2000 and 2007, Honduran companies in the free zones grew by almost 
700 percent, or from 13 to 103 companies—it was the role of local indus-
trialists in establishing the free zone industrial parks in the later 1980s 
and early 1990s that was critical to catalyzing FDI into the sector, which 
in turn spurred rapid growth in exports and employment (see box 3.3).
The poorer the business environment in a country, the more important 
is the role of the zone operator and the quality of the services it provides. 
The zone operator offers a security buffer to a sometimes-turbulent 
external business environment as well as a range of support and facilitat-
ing services that are tailored to the client’s specific needs. This has very 
much been the case in Honduras, which ranks 141 out of 183 countries 
in the World Bank’s Doing Business Index (World Bank 2009), behind all 
the countries in Latin America and the Caribbean except Bolivia, Haiti, 
Surinam, and Republica Bolivariana de Venezuela. In this context, 
Honduran zone operators also have played an important role in providing 
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an environment that allows manufacturers to focus on their operations 
without major distractions from the challenges that affect entrepreneurs 
outside the zones. As one zone operator expressed it, “a customer [foreign 
investor] who gets exposed to government-related corruption and other 
problems gets scared and wants to leave. The maquila operator functions 
as the interface that sorts out all the issues behind the scene, leaving the 
companies to do what they do best, which is manufacturing.”
The increasing sophistication of the services offered by zone operators 
is striking. For example, some parks offer “shelter plans” for particularly 
footloose companies. These plans include everything from servicing the 
real estate to the provision of administration services, such as payroll and 
human resource services. The zone operator provides the labor for lease 
to manufacturers. Free zones like ZIP Buena Vista and ZIP Choloma 
provide engineers and builders that can be hired for short-term jobs. 
Some zone operators thus are becoming manpower agencies as well as 
real estate agents. And manufacturers increasingly are willing to pay for 
these value-added services.
Box 3.3
 The Critical Role of Domestic Investors in Attracting FDI
Investment in the establishment of an industrial park takes several years to pro-
vide a return on the investment: in good conditions, around 7–12 years. It is a 
chicken and egg problem in which companies want to locate to free zones where 
everything is in place. Thus, there are large upfront investments that take time to 
recoup. This is arguably the main reason why the free zones in Honduras are 
owned and operated by domestic companies.
In a historically volatile region like Central America, foreign investors also want to 
see that domestic companies are taking on the risk and commitment by investing 
in bricks and mortar. Investment by domestic entrepreneurs signals to foreign inves-
tors that returns are possible. For Honduras, attracting an anchor investment—
a leading MNC like Arrow, Gildan, Hanes, or Sara Lee—sent an important signal 
to prospective investors. It created interest among competitors who routinely 
benchmark their operation to those of their competitors and thus positioned 
 Honduras on the map for production centers of textiles and clothing. In addition, 
it was equally important for the first greenfield investors to get a good start in 
Honduras because they soon became “salespeople” for the country. 
Source: Author.
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Challenges for the Future
More than three decades following the enactment of the Free Zone Law, 
Honduras can boast a fairly sizeable export industry. However, it faces a 
significant challenge to diversify, both in terms of product categories that 
are being exported and the geographic coverage of the zones. Diversifi-
cation will require a significant shift in the approach by both government 
and the private sector. Most important, the government must be willing 
to forego protecting existing interests and thus avoid the risk of stasis in 
the free zone sector, which ultimately will result in the continuing stag-
nation and decline of investment, exports, and, perhaps most important, 
employment.
After several years of sustained investment and increased exports, the 
maquila industry was hit by the global economic downturn that struck in 
2008. The downturn affected U.S. sales of both automobiles and clothes, 
which make up the great majority of exports from Honduran free zones. 
The former sector was severely hit as sales by the three U.S. automobile 
manufacturers dropped and General Motors and Chrysler went into 
Chapter 11 administration. Honduran textiles and clothing producers 
already were affected by Asian competition in the post-MFA environ-
ment, and the global economic downturn may well have accelerated the 
shift of U.S. clothing assembly to Asia. From a peak of 134,000 workers 
in 2007, employment in Honduras’ free zones had, according to estimates 
provided by industry experts, dropped to approximately 100,000 work-
ers in May 2009. The Maquila Association of Honduras argues that many 
zone operators are in debt and 50 percent of their plots of land are empty. 
Workers who lose their jobs often move to the informal sector or seek 
employment opportunities in the United States. However, migration to 
the United States has become increasingly risky as many migrants are 
losing their jobs there. Workers who have been employed in the free 
zones for many years are not necessarily attractive candidates on the job 
market, and many workers struggle to find new jobs.
Next to the global economic downturn, the free zone industry has 
faced several external shocks in the last few years. First, the domestic cur-
rency, the lempira, which is pegged to the dollar, has appreciated in rela-
tion to other currencies of leading exporters of wire harnesses and textiles 
and clothing products. For example, the Mexican peso depreciated by 
28 percent in relation to the U.S. dollar (and hence the lempira) on the 
year to June 30 2008 to 2009. The macroeconomic climate is not favor-
able and the risks associated with inflation keep interest rates high and, as 
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a result, for those who can (many cannot) borrowing from abroad is the 
favored option. Second, on January 1, 2009, the national minimum wage 
was raised by 60 percent to 5,500 lempira (US$297). Although the free 
zone industry managed to negotiate an exemption from this raise, it still 
increased the cost of many of the goods and services in the production 
supply chain. 
Third, Honduras’ growing crime—fueled in part by a squeeze on orga-
nized crime in Colombia and Mexico and the subsequent migration of 
criminal elements to the region—is scaring off some investors and adding 
security costs to company operations. For example, security personnel 
need to protect the factories and the zones, all workers are screened to 
ensure that criminal gangs do not infiltrate businesses, and containers 
need to be protected during transportation.
Finally, international competition, especially from China, is increasing 
the pressure on free zone companies to make more use of technology and 
raise labor productivity. The big dislocation of textiles and clothing pro-
duction from the United States to Latin America and the Caribbean that 
took place in the 1990s is to a large extent complete. North American 
clients are now benchmarking their production matrixes in Latin America 
with those in Asia. Consequently, Honduras is facing competition from 
China and Bangladesh rather than Atlanta, North Carolina, or Mexico. 
And the requests by foreign investors are increasing. Twenty years ago, 
they would be pleased with the cost of labor, the proximity to the U.S. 
market, and the services offered in the port. Today, as one zone operator 
put it, “they ask if the country has global ambition; if we have FTAs with 
other countries; about the sources, cost and reliability of electricity; how 
many training centers we have; the level of expertise, etc., because 
Honduras is not so inexpensive anymore.”
Employers in the free zones have responded by attempting to address 
productivity through increased training and incentives like production-
linked bonus schemes, free breakfast and dinner for workers who arrive 
early to the factory or leave late, childcare provided on weekends, and so 
on. But while improving productivity with the help of capital, technology, 
and incentives is reducing the demand for labor, this improvement may 
be somewhat at odds with the government’s main objective of employ-
ment creation through the free zone program. 
Although productivity increases certainly are required, in light of the 
challenges the free zone sector is facing, it is clear that a competitive posi-
tion based on low-cost production of garments (and wire harnesses) for 
sale to the U.S. market, is unlikely to be sustainable. Therefore, the 
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 strategic focus of the free zones must be on diversification outside the 
traditional garment sector and upgrades (moving into higher value added 
activities inside or outside the garment sector).
The relatively recent establishment of the wire harness industry was a 
significant step in terms of product diversification. UTI, later Lear 
Corporation, located in Nacu, outside San Pedro Sula, and suppliers like 
Alcoa (metallic wires) and a number of French companies (producing 
tubes) followed in its steps. Honduras lacks the establishment of the 
entire value chain, which makes them sensitive to competition. One of 
the key strengths of the country’s free zone sector is the comprehensive 
and efficient services package offered by the zone operators, but these 
operators often are garment manufacturers. These operators have found 
it difficult to diversify into new sectors and largely have failed to attract 
a more diverse set of investors. Despite an industry-neutral incentive 
structure, only textiles, clothing, and wire harnesses have gathered sig-
nificant investment (see figure 3.2). 
The textiles, clothing, and apparel sectors still have scope for diversifi-
cation. For example, Honduras does not produce synthetics and this is 
a multibillion dollar market. Honduras may be the leading producer 
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of underwear and T-shirts for the U.S. market, but it is not one of the 
10 leading producers of nylon production. Tariffs are lower for the former 
two products, but they have not taken advantage of the tariff preferences 
they enjoy in the U.S. market. Additionally, agriculture, fishery, and 
tobacco processing activities exist in some free zones, but these are rela-
tively small businesses. The Atlantic Coast is processing fruits and the 
Pacific Coast hosts shrimp and melon farms. Currently, interest seems to 
be high in the export potential of call center services. Some zone opera-
tors are assessing the requirements to attract foreign call center compa-
nies. As of May 2009, however, no call center company had yet located 
to Honduras. 
One critical factor in the challenge of diversification is the need to 
upgrade the skills of the free zone workforce. The traditional garment 
assembly operations, however, historically have provided only minimum 
training and skills development. The maquilas have worked in PPPs to 
develop vocational training for maquila workers. But, in general, maquila 
workers are relatively low skilled and possess limited formal education 
(see box 3.4 for an initiative to address vocational training).
Despite the significant success of domestic investors in the free zone 
sector, and the critical role played by the effective interaction between 
the government and the private sector, they may also be a source of 
lock-in, limiting the scale and speed by which the necessary processes of 
adjustment take place. One reason for this limitation is that the majority 
of free zone developers and operators in Honduras are not real estate 
developers, but rather they have direct interests in the textiles and gar-
ment manufacturing sector. As such, their primary interest tends to be on 
salvaging competitiveness in their traditional activities, rather than per-
haps focusing on attracting more diversified tenants into their zones. 
More broadly, the privileges enjoyed by the free zone sector can be a 
powerful disincentive to reform. For example, in the 1980s and early 
1990, the Honduran government offered exchange rate convertibility in 
the free zones. This policy is likely to have accelerated the devaluation 
of the Honduran lempira. The government faced increased pressure 
from the free zone industry to provide greater exchange rate incentives. 
This led to a macroeconomic distortion, which is likely to have under-
mined the currency. Indeed, while the government of Honduras at times 
has been open to reforming the legal framework to better suit local and 
foreign market conditions, it has not strategically leveraged the free zone 
policy for more comprehensive policy reform that could benefit all 
investors and entrepreneurs. 
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Conclusion
Honduras has more than three decades of experience of hosting free 
zones. It took approximately a decade and a half following the enactment 
of the Free Zone Law in 1976 before the policy had a significant eco-
nomic impact. In addition to U.S. demand, the key to takeoff in the early 
Box 3.4
Instituto Politécnico Centroamericano 
Instituto Politécnico Centroamericano (IPC) is a nongovernmental, nonprofit, 
 vocational training institute that was founded in 2005. An assessment of Hondu-
ras vocational training system had concluded that the system was broken: instruc-
tors were incapable of teaching and 95 percent of equipment was stolen, broken, 
or irrelevant. Based on these findings, IPC was established to design courses for 
current and future workers in all sectors of the economy, including in manufactur-
ing and textiles and clothing. The institute’s objective is to provide workers with 
relevant skills demanded by industry. Its curricula hence are influenced strongly 
by input from employers. IPC strives to offer the best technical equipment, curri-
cula, and test instructors in the region. For example, a majority of the 12 instructors 
are brought from North America, Europe, and Latin America. In the spring of 2009, 
IPC had 270 full-time students and some 1,400 workers that were upgrading their 
skills in courses lasting between 2 and 18 weeks. A majority of the graduates join 
the free zone companies: for example, Gildan, the Canadian company that spon-
sored the above-mentioned study, hires 60 students from IPC every year. 
Nine students out of 10 come from large families earning less than US$300 per 
month and the fee for a year of full-time training is US$1,500. The expenses are 
partly covered by companies, charitable organization, and governments—for 
 example, a U.S. nongovernmental organization (NGO) covers transportation and 
a daily meal; a Swiss company that supplies chemicals to the textiles industry 
donated a chemistry lab; a French company provided design equipment; and an 
Italian company donated sewing equipment. Roughly 95 percent of the stu-
dents receive a corporate scholarship that covers 75 percent of the fee. In return, 
they commit to work for the sponsor for two to four years. Foreign MNCs are car-
rying most of the expenses, whereas Honduran companies are less willing 
to invest in training and retraining—a pattern that is common throughout the 
developing world.
Source: Author, based on information supplied by IPC.
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1990s was the fact that all the crucial conditions with regard to infra-
structure, free zone policy, trade policy, and committed domestic inves-
tors were in place. When foreign MNCs started to shift their assembly 
lines to Honduras, the small Central American republic with its turbulent 
political past (and present) quickly developed into a leading exporter of 
textiles and clothing products to the United States. 
Over the course of 22 years, the Honduran government enacted sev-
eral pieces of new legislation that broadened the geographic reach of the 
free zone policy to finally cover the entire country. The government 
learned from its early mistakes: for example, the implicit discrimination 
against domestic manufacturers up until the enactment of the EPZ Law 
reduced domestic investors’ interest in developing the local free zone 
environment and consequently had a discouraging effect on foreign inves-
tors. In more recent years, manufacturers have suffered from the unfavor-
able macroeconomic climate and the difficult security situation, which 
raise the cost of capital and risk of doing business. 
The country has gotten many things right. The in-house customs solu-
tion is a widely lauded PPP that is expedient and efficient. The profes-
sionally managed Puerto Cortés has been crucial to the competitiveness 
of the free zone industry. The zone operators’ decision to differentiate 
their free zones from other free zones in the region by investing in quality 
infrastructure and focus on providing high-quality services appears to 
have been the right strategy. Foreign anchor investments helped signal to 
foreign investors that Honduras was a potentially attractive supply base 
of clothing for the U.S. market. A professional trade and investment pro-
motion agency also plays a seemingly important role.
Honduras has been fairly successful at developing backward linkages. 
The lesson for small economies is that the design of the rules of origin in 
trade agreements may have a huge impact on the country’s ability to 
sustainably integrate new industries into the domestic economy. Honduras 
benefited greatly from preferential market access to the United States 
extended first in the CBI and later in DR-CAFTA. The rules of origin 
incorporated in these agreements, however, had a huge impact on the 
types of textiles and clothing product categories the country exports: at 
times, the rules have had a negative effect, and at other times, they have 
had a positive effect. 
Despite the success of the free zones program, it remains highly con-
centrated in terms of exported product categories and geographic cover-
age of the zones. The government’s selective geographic expansion of free 
zone policy did not have any significant effect, and the zone operators 
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have not been particularly effective at broadening the scope of investors. 
This situation indicates the bluntness of the free zone policy tool and the 
difficulty of using it for industrialization purposes. Increasing interna-
tional competition, especially from China, has taught the free zone indus-
try that it constantly needs to adapt, make use of technology, and raise 
labor productivity if it wants to remain in business. Addressing the latter 
will require a greater attention to skills development at all levels.
Finally, the fiscal incentive structure that the government of Honduras 
offers companies with free zone status, including time unlimited exemp-
tion from taxation and duties, is generous from an international perspec-
tive. This incentive regime undoubtedly has played a role in attracting 
investment into the free zones program both from FDI and local inves-
tors. But it also has created a dual economy that is sustained by the gov-
ernment’s disinclination or inability to address issues that impede the 
private sector. The application of the Free Zone Law discriminates against 
small and midsize manufacturers, and prospective exporters thus may be 
left out of the business. The private sector would benefit in the long term 
if the government provided a more equal incentive structure for small 
and large companies, producers of services and goods, and exporters and 
companies producing for the domestic market alike. 
Exclusivity has proven to be a powerful force against comprehensive 
reform and has contributed to stasis in the free zone sector. Although the 
government of Honduras at times has been open to reform the legal 
framework to better suit local and foreign market conditions, it has not 
strategically leveraged the free zone policy for more comprehensive pol-
icy reform that could benefit all investors and entrepreneurs. 
Notes
 1. The term maquiladora derives from the practice of millers charging a maquila 
(“miller’s portion”) to process other people’s grain. This chapter uses the 
terms maquila and free zone interchangeably.
 2. Law Establishing the Free Zone of Puerto Cortés (Ley Constitutiva de la Zona 
Libre de Puerto Cortés, Decree No. 356).
 3. On some rare occasions, the government has provided fiscal incentives linked 
to training to specific companies. For example, Lear Corporation received 
some fiscal incentives to train 100 employees. 
 4. In addition, Honduras has signed trade treaties with Mexico and currently is 
in the process of negotiating preferential tariff arrangements (PTAs) with 
Chile, Colombia, the European Union, Panama, Taiwan, China, and Canada.
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China’s Overseas Special Economic Zones: Aims and Objectives
In 2006, as part of the implementation of its 11th five-year plan, the 
Chinese government announced that it would establish up to 50 overseas 
economic and trade cooperation zones. In the experimental manner that 
characterizes many Chinese policy innovations, the rollout of these zones 
has been gradual. In Africa, two competitive tenders (discussed in 
 section 2) have led to the selection of seven proposals for overseas zones, 
all of which became eligible for incentives from the Ministry of Commerce 
and other Chinese government agencies. This chapter outlines the back-
ground of this policy innovation, describes the current status of the seven 
African zones, sheds light on the variety of mechanisms by which these 
zones have been established and operated, provides a preliminary assess-
ment of the benefits and drawbacks of the zones, and provides recom-
mendations that might be helpful in allowing African economies to fully 
maximize potential benefits from these investments. The chapter draws 
on the authors’ field research,1 as well as on a literature review and tele-
phone interviews.
China’s Investment in Special 
Economic Zones in Africa
Deborah Brautigam and Tang Xiaoyang
C H A P T E R  4
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Background
China’s efforts to attract foreign investment relied at first on SEZs. In 
1979, four SEZs were established in the southeastern coastal region of 
the country (a fifth zone was later added on Hainan Island). These were 
patterned after similar zones established in Taiwan, China; the Republic 
of Korea; Singapore; and Hong Kong, China. In 1984, 14 Chinese coastal 
cities set up industrial and technological development zones, many of 
which nurtured clusters targeting a particular industry. More than a hun-
dred zones of various kinds now have been established around the coun-
try, offering low taxes2 and infrastructure at international standards. These 
zones have become one of the principle means by which the Chinese 
government, at the local, provincial, and national levels, provides prefer-
ential policies to foster the development of technology and industry.
China has some experience with international partnerships in the 
development of these zones. In 1983, the Japanese government helped 
develop a master plan for the port of Qingdao, and in the early 1990s, 
Japan’s International Cooperation Agency (JICA) provided foreign aid for 
the Jiaozhou Bay Highway, a railway, and a sewage treatment plant, all 
connected to the Qingdao Economic Development Zone. In 1993 and 
1994, the Jiangsu province cities of Wuxi and Suzhou developed indus-
trial parks with Singaporean partners to learn from Singapore’s model. 
These zones were run on a commercial basis, as joint ventures. The 
Singaporean interests held majority shares, and took the lead in develop-
ing and marketing the zones until around 2001–02 when the capital and 
management were restructured and Chinese interests became the major 
shareholders and decision makers in both zones. The Chinese government 
closely followed this process: the Suzhou zone even had a vice premier 
as chairman of its board. In recent years, several Chinese development 
zones have invited institutes from the U.S., Japan, Australia and U.K. to 
participate in planning.
In the mid-1990s, after nearly 20 years of “bringing in” (yin jinlai) 
 foreign investment, technology, and skills, the Chinese government began 
to emphasize “going out” (zou chuqu) or “going global.” Going global 
involved finding new markets for Chinese goods and services, building up 
Chinese brand names, and ratcheting up China’s own foreign investment. 
In an experimental fashion, the Chinese government and Chinese com-
panies began to establish overseas industrial and trade zones, as early as 
1998. In 2006, a policy decision was made to establish up to 50 special 
economic cooperation zones in other countries as a central vehicle for 
this aim.
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The China-Africa Development Fund (CADF), a venture capital 
instrument set up by one of Beijing’s policy banks, China Development 
Bank, is one of the key tools for the going global strategy. First announced 
at the November 2006 Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation 
(FOCAC), CADF was established with US$1 billion in assets and is 
expected to rise to US$5 billion over time. CADF’s role is to invest in 
Chinese companies, Sino-Africa joint ventures, or African companies, 
with the commercial objective of at least breaking even. CADF has taken 
equity shares in some of the overseas zones projects.
Objectives 
Overseas economic zones were believed to meet several strategic objec-
tives. First, they would increase demand for Chinese-made machinery 
and equipment, while making it easier to provide postsales product sup-
port. Second, by producing overseas and exporting to Europe or North 
America, Chinese companies would be able to avoid trade frictions and 
barriers imposed on exports from China. Third, the zones would assist 
China’s efforts to boost its own domestic restructuring and move up the 
value chain at home.3 Fourth, they were intended to create economies 
of scale for overseas investment, and in particular, to assist less experi-
enced small and midsize enterprises to venture overseas “in groups.” 
Finally, fifth, they were viewed as a way to transfer one element of 
China’s own success to other developing countries, a strategy that the 
government believed would be helpful for recipient countries, while also 
benefiting China. These multiple objectives mean that Chinese compa-
nies also have a variety of objectives in constructing and investing in 
these zones. Indeed, evidence from the zone in Egypt, which is the most 
advanced of the projects, supports the perspective that companies 
investing in the Chinese zones are not following one model. Some 
Chinese manufacturers in the zone are producing for the European mar-
ket (garments), others are serving the Egyptian market (oil rig assembly, 
women’s sanitary products), and yet others are exporting back to China 
(marble).
Brief History of China’s Overseas Economic Zones
The policy established in 2006 built on earlier overseas experiments. For 
more than a decade, Chinese companies already had ventured into estab-
lishing a variety of overseas industrial and trade zones. For example, in 
1999, the Chinese government signed an agreement with Egypt to assist 
in the establishment of an industrial zone in the Suez economic area. Also 
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in 1999, the giant Chinese appliance firm Haier built its first industrial 
complex outside of China: a 46-hectare industrial park in South Carolina, 
United States. Fujian Huaqiao Company built an industrial and trade 
zone in Cuba in 2000. In 2001, Haier and a Pakistani company, Panapak 
Electronics, constructed a joint industrial park near the Pakistani city of 
Lahore. A Chinese company began to implement an industrial zone in 
the Chambishi area of Zambia in 2003. In 2004, China Middle East 
Investment and Trade Promotion Center and Jebel Ali Free Trade Zone 
constructed a US$300 million trade center, designed to host 4,000 
Chinese companies in Dubai. Similarly, also in 2004, Tianjin Port Free 
Trade Zone Investment Company and the United States Pacific 
Development Company set up a Chinese trade and industrial park in the 
South Carolina city of Greenville.
Thus, the decision to establish overseas zones as a part of the going 
global policies was made after Chinese companies already had set up 
industrial and trade zones overseas. China’s Ministry of Commerce and 
the National Development and Reform Commission studied the experi-
ence of these companies in formulating the policies of support.
China’s Overseas Zones in Africa: Current Situation
Chinese support for the development of “economic and trade coopera-
tion zones” is not limited to Africa. To date, the Chinese government has 
selected 19 overseas zone proposals (see appendix 4.A) across 15 coun-
tries for official support under the going global policies. Seven of these 
projects, across six countries, are in Africa (five projects in four coun-
tries are located in Sub-Saharan Africa with two in North Africa), with 
the goal of developing at least 10 overseas Chinese economic and trade 
cooperation zones during the 11th five-year plan (2006–10), and stimu-
lating overseas investment of US$2 billion from some 500 Chinese 
companies.4 These zones are not expected to conform to a single model. 
They can be science and technology parks, manufacturing and process-
ing bases, or multiuse facilities. They can emphasize domestic markets 
(import substitution) or export processing. In addition, some mainland 
Chinese and Hong Kong, China, companies have established industrial 
estates and other spatially delimited areas for trade, logistics, or manu-
facturing in Africa and elsewhere, outside of the scope of official gov-
ernment  support.
This section outlines the overall plans for the zones. Their results to 
date are discussed in Part IV, “Progress, Challenges, and Potential.”
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China’s Seven Approved Zones in Africa
China’s Ministry of Commerce has approved seven African zones for 
special funding under the going global initiatives; six had commenced 
construction as of November 2009. These zones are located in Zambia, 
Mauritius, Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria (two), and Algeria. This section pro-
vides an overview of the seven zones, including their location, partici-
pants, investment, industry focus, and current status. It discusses the 
future of the Chinese initiative and briefly looks at Chinese investments 
in industrial parks and other SEZs in Africa, but outside of the special 
initiative. In addition to these seven zones, other Chinese companies and 
provincial governments have experimented with the establishment of 
industrial parks and free trade zones in Africa. Some of them sent propos-
als to the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) tenders, but did not win. 
Most are quite recent, and their experiences vary widely: some failed at 
an early stage, but others have survived and grown. In comparison with 
the seven official zones, their sizes vary, forms are more diversified, and 
strategies are more flexible. Among these are the Guoji Industry and Trade 
Zone in Sierra Leone, the Nigeria Lishi-CSI Industrial Park, Linyi 
(Guinea) Industrial Park, China Daheng Textile Industrial Park in 
Botswana, and the Shandong Xinguang Textile Industrial Park in South 
Africa. Several other proposals for industrial parks or zones have been 
mentioned in various media, but they either are at an early stage, remain 
under discussion, or failed to begin.
Zambia-China economic and trade cooperation zone/Chambishi 
 multi-facility economic zone. China Nonferrous Mining Co. (CNMC 
Group) began planning the Zambia-China Economic and Trade 
Cooperation Zone in 2003 in Chambishi, about 420 kilometers north 
of the capital of Lusaka. CNMC’s decision to open a zone for mineral 
processing and related industries allowed the company to make full use 
of the 41-square-kilometer surface area of its Chambishi copper mine. 
In 2006, CNMC won official support from MOFCOM for the 
Chambishi zone. In a sign of the political importance of this initiative, 
in February 2007, China’s president Hu Jintao presided at the opening 
ceremony of the zone.
The Chambishi Zone focuses on the value chain of copper and cobalt: 
mining, processing, recycling, machinery, and service. It aims to attract 
50 to 60 enterprises, create some 6,000 jobs for Zambians, and reach an 
annual output of more than US$1,500 million by 2011. By July 2009, 
11 enterprises had been established in the zone, including the Chambishi 
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copper mine, copper smelters, a sulfuric acid plant, and a foundry, for a 
total investment of US$760 million.
CNMC’s Lusaka subzone project, adjacent to the Lusaka airport, was 
launched, at least symbolically, in January 2009. The zone is planned to 
have an area of 5 square kilometers. A master plan for the zone is 
expected to be completed by the end of 2009, with construction slated 
to begin in 2010. Although the focus of the zone remains to be deter-
mined, CNMC has indicated a wish to focus on services (hotels, a confer-
ence center), light industries such as food and tobacco processing, and 
assembly of home appliances and electronics. The strategic purpose of the 
Lusaka subzone may be to diversify out of resource-intensive investment 
as well as to accommodate the Zambian government’s desire for urban 
employment opportunities. China Development Bank has set up a 
Zambia team to provide funding support for the zones and CNMC 
activities in Zambia. The Chambishi and Lusaka zones were the first of 
five Multi-Facility Economic Zones (MFEZs) planned by Zambia. 
Malaysian interests are also constructing an MFEZ near Lusaka, with 
technical assistance from JICA.
Egypt Suez Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone. Egypt Suez Economic 
and Trade Cooperation Zone is located in Sector 3 of the North-West 
Suez Canal Economic Area just outside Egypt’s new deep-water Sokhna 
Port, just below the southern entrance of the Suez Canal, 120 kilometers 
from Cairo. It is being developed by Egypt TEDA Investment Co., a joint 
venture between Tianjin Economic-Technological Development Area 
(TEDA) Investment Holdings, Egyptian interests, and the China-Africa 
Development Fund. The Suez project has a long and complicated history 
(see box 4.1). Discussions on a transfer of China’s experience were initi-
ated by Egypt in 1994. TEDA Investment Holdings was tasked by Beijing 
to set up a zone project in the Suez area in 1998. A joint consortium, 
Egypt-Chinese Corporation for Investment (ECCI), was set up to imple-
ment this initial project. TEDA relied on the experience of their Egyptian 
partners to learn how to operate in Egypt. The venture began long before 
the area infrastructure was complete and the initial years were not very 
successful, but with time a number of companies have set up operations 
in Sector 3 of the zone.
In November 2007, TEDA participated in the second tender of 
MOFCOM for overseas zones. After winning the bid, they bought addi-
tional land in Sector 3 of the zone and formed a new joint venture with 
Egyptian interests. The zone builds on the earlier investment and will be 
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Box 4.1
Timeline: Tianjin TEDA in Egypt
1994  Egypt and China begin discussion of cooperation in economic zone 
development.
1998  Chinese and Egyptian governments sign a memorandum of understand-
ing to construct a free trade zone in North-West Suez. TEDA assigned the 
task. Sets up Suez International Cooperation Co. 
1999  ECCI was formed by TEDA, Arab Contractors Co., National Bank of Egypt, 
National Investment Bank, and the Suez Canal Authority. TEDA had 10 per-
cent of the shares. ECCI acquires rights to 21.95 square kilometers of land 
in NWSEZ (all of Sector 3).
2000  TEDA sets up Suez International Cooperation Co., which is 100 percent 
TEDA because they believed the joint venture business plan was not via-
ble. They plan to develop 1 square kilometer for small and medium 
 enterprises (SMEs) on their own. They started construction. 
2003  After slow start, ECCI releases most of its land rights in Sector 3, retaining 
6 square kilometers. The infrastructure is established. Some companies are 
established (a marble company).
2004  January. Egypt-China Joint Working Group established to boost coopera-
tion at zone. TEDA concentrates on Sector 3 of North-West Suez, 1 square 
kilometer. White Rose (a Chinese textile machine company), drilling 
equipment joint venture, and companies in steel tableware, luggage, and 
women’s sanitary products. 
2004  October. International Development Ireland wins contract to design over-
all plan for Suez zone and trains staff of Egypt’s General Authority for Free 
Zones and Investments (GAFI). 
2007  November. TEDA’s proposed Suez Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone 
won the Chinese MOFCOM tender.
2008  July. Egypt TEDA established by TEDA (75 percent), ECCI (20 percent), and 
Suez International (5 percent) to develop the industrial park over three 
3-year phases. 
2008  October. China-Africa Development Fund signed an agreement to invest 
in TEDA’s Suez Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone. They set up a 
new holding company with TEDA (on a 60%/40% ownership basis). 
This new company now holds the 75 percent of shares originally held by 
TEDA. 
(continued next page)
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established on a cluster model. Currently plans exist for four clusters: 
textile and garments, petroleum equipment, automobile assembly, and 
electrical equipment. In the second phase, electronics and heavy indus-
tries may be added (Interview, Vice Director of the Suez TEDA Zone, 
2009).5 As of July 2009, 16 enterprises already had moved into the first 
one square kilometer start-up zone. This start-up phase is planned to 
conclude around 2011, when the zone aims to have around 50 compa-
nies. Chinese companies with high energy consumption and high labor 
intensity are especially encouraged to invest in this zone.
In March 2009, TEDA won an international Egyptian tender, compet-
ing against 29 other companies for the right to develop Egypt’s first 
“Chinese-style” SEZ (“Chinese-style” means that part of the zone will be 
developed for residential use). Phase I of the SEZ is located in an unde-
veloped portion of Sector 3 of the North-West Economic Zone. It will 
develop approximately 6 square kilometers (600 hectares) out of the 
available area of 20.4 square kilometers, adjacent to TEDA’s existing 
 Sector 3 industrial development. TEDA’s investment in infrastructure 
and basic construction was expected to amount to between US$200 mil-
lion and US$280 million.
Ethiopia Eastern Industrial Park. The Ethiopia Eastern Industrial Park 
is located 30 kilometers from Addis Abba. It originally was formed by 
two private Chinese steel product makers: Yonggang Group and Qiyuan 
Group from Zhangjiagang city. Qiyuan initiated the idea of building an 
industrial zone in Ethiopia and the participation of Yonggang, a much 
larger conglomerate, guaranteed financing so that it won the second 
MOFCOM bidding in 2007. Later, two additional Zhangjiagang compa-
nies, Jianglian and Yangyang Asset Management, joined the project. 
2009  March. Chinese-Egypt TEDA wins Egyptian tender for SEZ development in 
North-West Suez. 
2009  July 17. TEDA and Egyptian government sign contract to develop part of 
Sector 3 in North-West Suez as an SEZ. TEDA will invest US$280 million for 
infrastructure within zone. 
2009  November. Chinese and Egyptian premiers presided at the opening cer-
emony of the North-West Suez Special Economic Zone in Sector 3.
Source: Authors.
Box 4.1 (continued)
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Zhangjiagang Free Trade Zone was brought in as a technical partner, but 
not as a shareholder. Because of financial difficulties, however, Yonggang 
left the project early in 2009 and the smaller company, Qiyuan, has 
become the major shareholder and executor (Interview, Eastern 
Industrial Park Management, 2009). Originally, the park planned to 
attract 80 projects in five years and create 10,000 to 20,000 jobs for 
Ethiopians. This plan will be subject to substantial  revision after the 
capital restructuring.
Because of the Chinese partners’ financial difficulties (related to the 
global economic crisis), the area of the zone has been reduced from 
5 to 2 square kilometers (500 to 200 hectares) and the investment from 
 renminbi (RMB) 1 billion (US$146 million) to RMB 690 million 
(US$101 million). The start-up area is 100 hectares and is expected to 
cost US$22 million to launch. It currently is under construction, with an 
expected completion date of 2010. The zone developers still are negotiat-
ing with China Eximbank for loan finance (Foreign Trade Information and 
Survey Newsletter 2009), while CADF is also studying the feasibility of 
equity participation. Meanwhile, the first project in the zone, a cement 
plant, began production in 2010. Eleven enterprises with US$91 million 
total investment have signed letters of intent to move in—these enter-
prises cover such industries as construction materials, steel products 
(plates and pipes), home appliances, garment, leather processing, and 
automobile assembly.
Mauritius Jinfei Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone. JinFei Economic 
and Trade Cooperation Zone is located in Riche Terre, an undeveloped 
area 3 kilometers northwest of Port Louis, near the Free Port. The sole 
original developer was the Shanxi province Tianli Group, a provincial 
SOE active in trade, construction, real estate, and textiles. Tianli arrived 
in Mauritius in 2001, establishing a state-of-the-art spinning mill, which 
since has expanded several times. Tianli’s plant supplies much of the 
demand for cotton and synthetic thread in the Mauritius textile industry, 
as well as exports to other countries.
Tianli’s proposal for an overseas zone was one of the winners of the 
first MOFCOM tender in 2006. Securing land and resettling farmers 
caused delays, however, and the zone ran into further difficulties after the 
developer was hit by the global economic slowdown. The Chinese central 
government then instructed Shanxi province to coordinate capital 
restructuring of the Tianli zone. Two much bigger partners, Shanxi 
Coking Coal Group and Taiyuan Iron and Steel Company, joined the 
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team. CADF also invested in the zone. Construction finally began on 
September 16, 2009.
The zone has an area of 211 hectares; the first development phase is 
on 70 hectares (0.7 square kilometers) with an expected investment of 
US$220 million. On completion in early 2012, the zone is expected to 
provide a manufacturing and service base for Chinese enterprises doing 
business in Africa. A second phase, targeted for 2016, aims to focus on 
solar energy, pharmaceuticals, medical equipment, and processing of sea-
food and steel products, as well as housing, hotels, and real estate. If fully 
implemented, the total project is estimated to cost US$720 million and 
hopes to create from 30,000 to 42,000 jobs.
Nigeria Lekki Free Trade Zone. The Lekki Free Trade Zone (LFTZ) is 
located 60 kilometers east of Lagos alongside a new planned deepwater 
port. The project is a joint venture between a consortium of four 
Chinese companies and Nigerian interests, including the Lagos state 
government. The government of Lagos state provided 165 square 
 kilometers (16,500 hectares) of land—of which 30 square kilometers 
(3,000 hectares) has been officially transferred to the joint venture so 
far—and the right to a 50-year franchise. CADF also will provide equity 
finance, and a proposal to include CADF on the board of directors still 
is under negotiation.
The project was initiated in 2003 by China Civil Engineering 
Construction Corp. (CCECC), which has been operating in Nigeria for 
more than a decade. In March 2006, a Chinese consortium, CCECC-
Beiya (“Beyond”), was set up in Beijing. In May 2006, the consortium 
partnered with Nigerians to establish the LFTZ Development Co. In 
November 2007, the Lekki zone won support in the second MOFCOM 
tender.
The development of the initial 3,000 hectares is divided into three 
phases. The first phase (1,000 hectares) is the official China-Nigeria 
Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone. Construction on these 1,000 
hectares (designed to support 200 companies) began in October 2007. 
An investment of approximately US$267 million is planned for the first 
three years and the total investment is estimated around US$369 million. 
The zone will be divided into six sections: (1) transportation equipment, 
(2) textile and light industry, (3) home appliances and communication, 
(4) warehousing, (5) export processing, and (6) living and business. 
According to an interview with a Beijing representative of CCECC-Beiya 
(2009), this first phase will serve only or mainly Chinese companies. 
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Sources from the Nigerian partner, however, indicate that the zone is 
open to all investors, and the list of investors that have signed MOUs 
includes mainly non-Chinese companies. An initial group of companies 
(all Chinese) was expected to begin construction in March 2009. In inter-
views management indicated this was expected to be delayed until early 
2010; however, this timeline has also slipped.
Nigeria Ogun-Guangdong Free Trade Zone. Nigeria Ogun-Guangdong 
Free Trade Zone is located in the Igbessa region of Ogun state, 30 kilome-
ters from Lagos International Airport. Its shareholders include Guangdong 
Xinguang International Group, China-Africa Investment Ltd., Chinese 
CCNC Group, and the Ogun state government. The project originated 
from a 2004 study of South China University of Technology on the fea-
sibility of setting up a Guangdong economic trade cooperation zone in 
Nigeria. This report was used for the successful bid by Xinguang 
International Group in the first MOFCOM tender in 2006. The project 
originally was sited in Imo state, but the developers apparently ran into 
high administration fees imposed by the state government, experienced a 
general climate of insecurity, and  relocated to Ogun state (Soriwei 2008). 
This delayed the project, and construction began in Ogun only in the first 
half of 2009. By July 2009, several Chinese enterprises had begun to 
build staff housing.
The zone has a total area of 100 square kilometers, which will be 
developed in two phases. Phase I utilizes 20 square kilometers (2,000 
hectares) with an estimated investment of US$500 million; within this, 
the start-up zone will be developed on 250 hectares, with an investment 
of US$220 million. The zone will focus primarily on light manufacturing, 
including construction materials and ceramics, ironware, furniture, wood 
processing, medicine, small home appliances, computers, lighting, and 
paper. A high-tech agricultural demonstration park may be added in the 
future. The developers aim to attract more than 100 enterprises to 
the zone within five years, and 700–800 companies within 10 years. As 
of the middle of 2010, 36 companies had registered to invest in the zone; 
six had begun construction.
Algeria-China Jiangling Free Trade Zone. Algeria-China Jiangling Free 
Trade Zone in Algeria will be developed by Jiangling Automobile Group 
from Nanchang, Jiangxu province and Zhongding International Group 
(there is no local partner at present). Jiangling Automobile, one of China’s 
flagship companies, has more than 40 sales agents in Algeria and, by 2007, 
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had taken one-third of Algeria’s automobile market. Zhongding 
International Group is the arm for overseas construction and engineering 
of Pingxiang Coal Group (PKCC). PKCC has been operating in Algeria 
for more than 17 years and contracted dozens of medium and large proj-
ects there. Responding to MOFCOM’s call for applications, the Jiangxi 
provincial government coordinated an effort to link PKCC and Jiangling 
Automobile Group, both based in Jiangxi, to establish a platform for the 
enterprises of Jiangxi province to go global. They won in the second 
MOFCOM bidding round in 2007.
The Algeria zone was projected to have a total investment of 
US$556 million and a land area of 500 hectares, with a first development 
phase on 120 hectares. It planned to attract 30–50 Chinese enterprises 
into an industrial park focusing on automobiles and construction materi-
als. In March 2008, Zhongding International and Jiangling sent a com-
bined team to Algeria for preparation. The zone has been in limbo since 
May 2008. Legislative reforms in Algeria’s investment regime, passed in 
early 2009, require foreign investors to form joint ventures with Algerian 
partners as majority shareholders).6 This may not be acceptable to the 
Chinese developers. Negotiations with the Algerian government were still 
ongoing as of November 2009 (Interview, Ministry of Commerce Official, 
Bejing, China, November 25, 2009).
China’s Overseas Zones: Mechanisms
The Chinese government built on earlier experiences working with 
Chinese companies to establish Investment, Trade, and Development 
Promotion Centers in Africa and elsewhere, beginning in the mid-1990s, 
and studied experiences such as TEDA’s in Egypt. Officials also consid-
ered China’s past difficulties in ensuring that development projects estab-
lished in Africa would be sustainable once Chinese involvement ended. 
This dictated a new model of engagement,7 in which the Chinese govern-
ment gave Chinese enterprises incentives to build and operate the 
zones.
Chinese enterprises take the lead in proposing and developing the 
zones for profit, but they compete for subsidies and support from the 
Chinese government. They propose the location, invest their own capital, 
negotiate with the host government, and compete with other Chinese 
companies for support through an open tender system. Once the zones 
are developed, the enterprises will rent space and offer services to other 
companies, replicating the model developed earlier in China’s overseas 
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Investment, Trade, and Development Promotion Centers. As with many 
Chinese policy innovations, the zones are treated as an experiment, with 
a variety of approaches encouraged. The results of the first two sets of 
pilot projects (i.e., those projects approved during the two MOFCOM 
tender calls; see next subsection, “The tender process in China’’) will be 
examined for lessons learned before the effort is scaled up.
The Tender Process in China
After developing guidelines for the tendering process, China’s MOFCOM 
asked its branch offices in the provinces and municipalities to promote 
the idea and the guidelines among enterprises in their region, and help 
them to apply. Two rounds of tenders were held, in 2006 and 2007, after 
which the government paused to see the initial results of the pilot proj-
ects. Although MOFCOM was primarily concerned with the potential 
for the projects to succeed as businesses, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
also had to provide a political sign-off on the projects, as they were to 
receive official government subsidies. There does not seem to have been 
any specific strategy for locating the zones in particular countries and, 
indeed, two separate proposals were funded for projects in Nigeria, one 
of Africa’s largest markets. As a counter example, the Tanzanian govern-
ment was interested in having a zone, and political ties between Tanzania 
and China are close, but no Chinese company was interested in propos-
ing a zone in Tanzania (Interview, Dar es Salaam, 2008; Interview, 
Ministry of Commerce Official Beijing, China, 2009).
More than 60 companies submitted expressions of interest in the first 
tender round held in 2006. About half of these companies were invited 
to submit formal proposals, documenting the market potential and 
investment environment, and providing written evidence of support from 
the host country. Twelve companies were invited to Beijing as finalists to 
appear before a panel of independent outside experts (officials from 
Chinese special zones and university professors). Eight were selected, 
with the major criteria being the proposal (including the market poten-
tial, investment environment, and support from the host government), 
the financing capacity of the developer, and the developer’s proven 
capacity to implement a major construction engineering project (Interview, 
Ministry of Commerce, 2009).
Based on lessons from the first tender round, the government added 
new requirements in the second round in 2007. The most important 
requirement was a stipulation that companies proposing zones for 
 support needed to demonstrate an annual turnover of RMB 15 billion 
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(about US$2 billion) for at least the two previous years. This was an effort 
to ensure that companies would have the resources to successfully 
finance the development of the zones, with the Chinese government 
playing only a supportive role. More than 50 companies applied in the 
second round, 20 of which were invited to submit formal proposals, with 
11 proposals finally selected. At least two of the losing proposals were 
located in Africa, including the Guoji Industrial Zone in Sierra Leone, and 
the Nigerian industrial estate proposed by Ningbo CSI (Zhongce) Power 
and Machinery Group and Nigeria Lishi Group.
Chinese Government: Mechanisms of Support
In addition to the general going global policies in support of Chinese 
overseas investment, MOFCOM assists companies with winning propos-
als in a number of ways. Winning companies receive RMB 200 to 
300 million (US$29 to US$44 million) in grants and long-term loans of 
up to RMB 2 billion (US$294 million). Subsidies can cover up to 
30  percent of specific costs of zone development for preconstruction 
(feasibility studies, visits for planning and negotiating, securing land, the 
costs of preparing a bid) and actual implementation (the purchase or rent 
of land, factory or office space, legal and notary fees, customs, and insur-
ance) through MOFCOM’s Trade and Economic Cooperation Zone 
Development Fund. These costs can be retroactive to January 1, 2004, for 
preconstruction and January 1, 2006, for implementation.
Chinese enterprises moving into the zones are eligible for a number 
of incentives. First, they can be reimbursed for up to half of their mov-
ing expenses. They receive export and income tax rebates or reductions 
on the materials sent for construction and get easier access to foreign 
exchange in China’s strict capital control system. They also can apply to 
a second MOFCOM fund, the Special Fund for Economic and 
Technological Cooperation, to receive a rebate on up to 100 percent of 
the interest paid on Chinese bank loans, a benefit good for five years. 
In addition, the stamp of approval from the government is expected to 
help Chinese policy banks (China Development Bank or China 
Eximbank) or funds like CADF look more favorably on companies’ 
applications for low-cost finance or equity participation. For example, 
China Development Bank established a dedicated Zambia team to pro-
vide funding support for the Zambia zone and NFC African Mining 
activities in Zambia. Finally, Chinese embassies provide diplomatic sup-
port in negotiations with the host government over land, tax incentives, 
or work permits.
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Some provinces and municipalities have provided additional funds for 
these overseas zones.8 For example, Jiangsu province and Suzhou munic-
ipality have awarded the Ethiopian Eastern Zone more than RMB 
100 million (US$14.6 million). In the Egypt zone, the government of 
Tianjin has promised to provide a subsidy of 5 percent of the actual 
investment amount, pay the utility costs (rent, gas, water, and electricity) 
for service enterprises in the zone, and provide full foreign investment 
insurance and overseas personal accident insurance for three years. The 
Tianjin government has given RMB 10,000 (US$1,470) for every Chinese 
employee in the zone as a food subsidy in the first year.
SEZs, industrial parks, and science and technology zones in China usu-
ally are managed by special authorities, which often are subsidiaries of 
provincial or local governments. Some of these authorities have estab-
lished investment companies to explore opportunities overseas. At least 
three of these companies are among the firms and consortia involved in 
the winning bids for the zones in Africa. These include TEDA, the largest 
multi-industry, economic-technology development area in China, which 
is involved in Egypt’s Suez zone; Nanjing Jiangning Development Zone, 
one of China’s first national-level high-tech development zones, which 
is a minority partner in the Chinese consortium leading the development 
of the Lekki project in Nigeria; and Zhangjiagang Free Trade Zone, a 
satellite city and EPZ in Suzhou municipality, which is a technical advisor 
to the Eastern Zone in Ethiopia.
Strategy and Financial Commitments: Local Partners, 
Other Investors, and Incentives
The overseas economic zones have a variety of models with regard to 
local partners; level of financial commitments; managerial, development, 
and marketing roles; and openness to non-Chinese companies (local 
African companies and other FDI). The Chinese companies developing 
these zones include national and provincial SOEs, and also include some 
private firms (minying). The majority of the companies winning bids 
already were operating businesses in the respective countries for some 
time, at least a decade, in many instances. Ethiopia and Nigeria-Ogun are 
exceptions, and, in Algeria, Jiangling had been involved only in exports 
of its vehicles but had developed relationships with a network of 
agents.
The first overseas zone established under the new MOFCOM program 
was in Pakistan. A large Chinese appliance company, Haier, had earlier 
constructed an industrial park near Lahore with a Pakistani company, 
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Panapak Electronics, the distributor of Panasonic electronic products. In 
2006, Haier proposed to establish the China Pakistan Enterprise Zone, an 
overseas trade and economic cooperation zone, and along with Ruba 
General Trading Company, became the first overseas economic zone to 
be launched. The Haier-Ruba zone ran into problems with the acquisition 
of land, however. According to some sources, Haier-Ruba insisted that 
land for the project be provided without cost, or with heavy subsidies, 
while the local government resisted this demand. In Africa, the partner-
ships and policies for the zones vary. Some are 100 percent Chinese 
owned, and others are African-Chinese joint ventures, usually with host 
governments as minority partners. In fact, the African private sector has 
no investment in these zones.
The Chinese government initiated the concept of overseas zones and 
established a framework for support for Chinese companies on an exper-
imental basis. MOFCOM has had a role in negotiating double-taxation 
treaties and general investment protection treaties with host govern-
ments, but several of the zones have been established in countries in 
which there is no double-taxation agreement (e.g., Ethiopia and Zambia) 
or no investment protection agreement (e.g., Algeria, Mauritius, Nigeria, 
and Zambia). MOFCOM has stepped in to help Chinese companies in 
their negotiations, particularly when by stepping in, they were able to 
assure host governments that companies did have Chinese government 
support in their plans. From all accounts, however, the Chinese govern-
ment has taken a hands-off attitude toward African policies on these 
zones. The Chinese government does not impose conditionality on host 
governments in return for investment in these zones, which is in keeping 
with long-standing Chinese policies that regard conditionality as interfer-
ence in the internal affairs of another government. Chinese companies 
take the lead in negotiations with host governments over particular 
incentives.
Incentive structures for the Chinese invested zones appear to take no 
standard form and are dependent on individual negotiations and existing 
laws in each country. In most cases, the negotiation does not appear to be 
around tax and other fiscal incentives, but more around land values and 
pricing (Interview, Lekki Worldwide Investments, December 14, 2009), 
and the host partner’s commitment to infrastructure provision. For the 
most part, the projects are governed by existing SEZ legislation in the 
host country and thus conform to the standard set of incentives offered 
through these regimes. One exception is Mauritius, where special incen-
tives were negotiated to attract the Tianli investment, but at the request 
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of Tianli, the agreement remains a secret (this is a bone of contention in 
democratic Mauritius). Several incentives have come to light: the 
Mauritian government agreed to supply land at a favorable rent, with a 
99-year lease; investors meeting certain requirements could obtain 
Mauritian passports, whereas usually the policy is to allow only for per-
manent residence; investors apparently were allowed licenses to carry out 
banking and lottery businesses; and, although Mauritius has long used 
laborers from China (and elsewhere in Asia), the Jinfei Zone apparently 
has been given flexible permission to employ a high percentage of 
Chinese workers.
Development and Management: Division of Responsibilities
In China, most zones have infrastructure provided by various branches of 
the Chinese government. In some cases, such as the Qingdao Zone, for-
eign donors (Japan Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund) provided 
development assistance loans for some of the infrastructure (port, high-
way, and water supply) in the zone areas. In Africa, most of the develop-
ment responsibilities inside the zones are carried out by the Chinese 
developers, with African governments responsible for providing infra-
structure outside the zones, but there are exceptions (see below). In all 
cases, the master plans and development strategies for the zones are pro-
vided by the Chinese partner. The Tianli Group hired a Shanghai firm to 
work on the concept for the zone in Mauritius; CCECC-Beiya hired 
Shenzhen Institute of Planning and Design (Shenzhen Guihua Sheji 
Yuan) to plan the Lekki Zone in Nigeria; and, in Zambia, CNMC brought 
in the China Association of Development Zones. Consortium partner 
Jiangning also held an evaluation meeting in China, bringing in experts 
and consultants from Nanjing University, Southeast University, and 
Nanjing Planning and Design Institute to advise and comment on the 
security, transportation, layout, and other aspects of the initial zone 
design.
Construction responsibilities usually are shared between the Chinese 
and African partners, with the Chinese consortiums handling the on-site 
infrastructure. In Mauritius, for example, Tianli was expected to contrib-
ute US$3.3 million for external infrastructure, while the government of 
Mauritius invested US$16 million to enlarge a reservoir and extend water 
lines to the JinFei Zone, and US$5.6 million to build a new link road and 
bring wastewater, electricity, and telecoms to the project site.9 In Nigeria’s 
Lekki project, the joint venture consortium is responsible for building a 
gas-fired power plant, water, and wastewater treatment plants, as well as 
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communication switching stations. The Lagos state government is respon-
sible for off-site access roads. In Zambia, however, the government 
announced in 2010 that it had budgeted US$4.2 million for its share of 
infrastructure required for the Lusaka subzone.10
In terms of operations and management, Chinese companies tend to 
handle the day-to-day management, but administration takes place in 
several layers. For example, Egypt has an informal joint China-Egypt 
Task Force for the Suez Economic Zone addressing high-level problems; 
an Egyptian SEZ Authority for the zone, which operates under the 
prime minister and which has its own board of directors; a licensed 
joint-venture Main Development Company (MDC) with authority to 
develop the zone; and a development company (Egypt TEDA) that 
executes what has been licensed to the MDC (Government of Egypt 
2002, 2). Ethiopia also has a layered structure, with (1) a bilateral coor-
dination committee between the Chinese and Ethiopian governments; 
(2) the Ethiopian management and service agency of the industrial 
park, which will regulate the zone; and (3) the 100 percent Chinese-
owned Eastern Industrial Park Ltd. Co., which will invest in and operate 
the park.
The Chinese developers often market the zone to Chinese companies 
(although their websites usually are bilingual English and Chinese). 
Their African counterparts, particularly state investment agencies, mar-
ket it to local firms and other international firms. For example, in 
Nigeria, Lekki Worldwide Investments Ltd. has a website and is actively 
marketing the LFTZ, and the Chinese consortium has a separate website 
and has held a number of marketing events in China. In Mauritius, mar-
keting is managed jointly by the Mauritius Board of Investment and 
Tianli. The most comprehensive approach can be found in Egypt. 
Tianjin municipality formed a leadership panel for the Egyptian Suez 
Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone. Coordinated by this panel, the 
Tianjin municipal State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission promotes SOEs to invest in the zone, the Science and 
Technology Committee encourages technology enterprises, and the 
Agriculture Committee and the Construction Committee promote 
investment by agricultural enterprises and construction materials firms. 
TEDA also has formed the China-Egypt Commercial Association in 
Suez, organizing market information seminars, participation in large-
scale trade fairs, and so on. TEDA has produced promotional materials 
both in Chinese and in Chinese and English. At the same time, Egypt’s 
government agency, GAFI, does some marketing of the zone through its 
China’s Investment in Special Economic Zones in Africa       89
general promotional materials for investment in Egypt, and the General 
Authority for the Economic Zone North-West Gulf of Suez also  markets 
the SEZ.
Chinese Enterprises and Chinese Labor
The Chinese developers appear to be open to investment from other 
foreign firms as well as local firms, although most are aiming for a major-
ity of Chinese investors. In most cases, the expectation (from both par-
ties) is clear that the Chinese partners will bring in a substantial Chinese 
investment. MOFCOM insists that because of the subsidies coming from 
China, the subsidized cooperation zones primarily must serve Chinese 
enterprises. Although no explicit limit is stated, MOFCOM hopes that 
Chinese companies can make up 70 to 80 percent of the enterprises in 
the cooperation zones. In some zones, however, they also have set specific, 
non-Chinese foreign investment targets.
• Nigeria (Ogun): The six companies that have started construction in 
Ogun, and indeed all of the 36 companies that have registered to invest, 
are from China (specifically, Guangdong). Initially, the plan was to have 
a mix of half SOEs and half private companies; this target was later 
reduced to 30 percent SOEs. In reality, all the existing companies that 
have begun construction are private companies.
• Zambia: Zambia’s MFEZ regulations, which apply to the Chambishi 
Zone, require a minimum investment of US$500,000 to be able to take 
advantage of government incentives, but Chambishi does not prohibit 
Zambian firms or other foreign investors. Zone developers aim to have 
40 Chinese companies and at least 10 from other countries by 2011, 
and they have developed bilingual promotional materials. According to 
Felix Mutati, Zambian minister of commerce, trade and industry, the 
Zambian government initially wished for the zone to be solely Chinese, 
but the Chinese wanted the zone to remain open to other investors. 
That said, at present, only Chinese investors have committed to open 
factories in the zone.
• Mauritius: Local investors are not allowed in the zone, at least in the 
first phase. This requirement, the only one of its type among the Chi-
nese zones, was set by the Mauritian government, not the Chinese.11 
Non-Chinese foreign investors are specifically welcome, however.
Finally, responding to concerns about Chinese incentives being limited to 
Chinese companies, the Chinese government announced in November 
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2009 that it would establish two new programs. First, as part of the 
Action Plan for 2010–2012, the Chinese would assist African SMEs to 
invest in the zones. Second, a fund of US$1 billion will be set up for 
African SMEs. It is not yet clear how they will be carried out.
The zones vary with regard to the regime for Chinese labor during 
construction and operating phases. Most of the zones for which informa-
tion exists state that local laws on the use of expatriate labor apply. Because 
only two of the zones have begun to operate (Egypt and Zambia), it is 
not possible to determine the degree to which this is actually the case. In 
these two zones, the workforce of the companies operating in the zones 
is primarily local; however, it does appear that a relatively large percent-
age of Chinese are employed during the construction and start-up phases 
in most of the projects. In Egypt, there is a clear national regime for for-
eign labor: one foreign employee is allowed for every nine Egyptians 
employed. The first stage of the TEDA zone has more than 1,800 local 
workers and (an informal estimate) about 80 Chinese staff, putting the 
share of Chinese workers at below 5 percent. The general contractor for 
the zone is an Egyptian company and some of the construction work was 
subcontracted to local Egyptian companies. In Zambia’s MFEZ, approxi-
mately 400 Chinese and 500 Zambians were employed during the early 
phase of construction, machinery installation, and training, putting the 
Chinese share of employment at 45 percent. At present, with the instal-
lation and commissioning of specialized machinery at many of the facto-
ries, the percentage of Chinese employees is in flux. In the Chambishi 
Zone as a whole (including the mines), in late 2009, there were approxi-
mately 700 Chinese and 3,300 Zambians (Haglund 2009). CNMC’s 
already commissioned factories have an average of two Chinese to every 
eight Zambians (25 percent Chinese workforce).
Information on the use of local and Chinese labor in other zones is 
patchy and is available only for the construction phase. According to 
Chinese sources, the first phase of construction of the Lekki Zone ini-
tially employed more than 50 engineers from China and 100 Nigerian 
workers. Chinese partners state that the project currently has a ratio of 
20 Chinese to 80 Nigerians.12 Nigerian officials confirm that informal 
agreements have increased the number of Nigerians employed, particu-
larly from the project-affected community.13 In Mauritius, the construc-
tion phase of JinFei began only in September 2009, so it is early to assess 
the situation. Overall, Mauritius has the most open approach to Chinese 
workers among the six countries. During the first phase of construction, 
60–65 percent of the workers reportedly have been Chinese (Minister 
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of Finance cited in “Zone Économique JinFei: Ce Que Vous Devez 
Savoir” 2009, 8). The zone was at first expected to use 8,000 Chinese 
contract workers at full development, while creating 5,000 local jobs 
(and another 2,500 indirect jobs). Later revisions of the plan predicted 
the creation of 34,000 jobs, with “more than half” expected to be local, 
although the actual expected numbers have been much debated in the 
media. Foreign workers have long been a staple of the island’s manufac-
turing and construction industries. Concerns have been raised in 
Mauritius, however, about the sheer number of Chinese expected as a 
result of this project.
Progress, Challenges, and Potential
The Experience to Date and Key Challenges
China’s initiative to develop SEZs in Sub-Saharan Africa is still in its early 
stages. Of the five zones, only the Chambishi Zone in Zambia is operat-
ing—the SEZs in Nigeria (LFTZ and Ogun Guangdong Free Trade Zone) 
and Mauritius are in relatively advanced stages of construction, and the 
Eastern Zone in Ethiopia began construction in 2010. To date, some high-
level knowledge sharing and training of local managers has taken place, 
but local employment, supply chain linkages, and technology transfer 
remain limited. The most advanced zone (Chambishi in Zambia) had, as 
of November 2009, attracted 11 companies and US$760 million in 
investment, with five additional companies expected in 2010. The zone 
employs about 4,000 workers (80 percent of whom are local). However, 
most of the 11 companies invested to date are subsidiaries of the CNMC 
developer and were present in 2006. Moreover, of the 4,000 workers 
employed, only 600 are in the zone, with the majority working in the 
mines or at other CNMC subsidiaries.14
All the zones have attracted interest from a number of (mainly 
Chinese) enterprises. Chinese companies, especially those new to Africa, 
appreciate the “feels-like-home” environment, convenient services, infor-
mation network, and proven credibility. The expectation is that enter-
prises within a value chain will cluster together in a planned zone and 
increase their competitiveness. Furthermore, these zones are widely pub-
licized and promoted in China. Embassies and provincial governments 
recommend the zones to companies planning to invest in Africa. Tax 
incentives and facilities are an extra bonus.
Yet, despite many expressions of interest, most of the zones have been 
slow to fill up with companies. It is still early in a process that may take 
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10 years or more, but several factors may explain the slow start. One is 
the global economic crisis and, perhaps more broadly, challenges of 
obtaining financing. The developers of the zones in Ethiopia and Mauritius 
encountered serious problems at home, which were related to the finan-
cial crisis. These problems required substantial modification of their plans. 
Both developers, however, have begun construction. Likewise, the main 
company developing the Ogun Zone, Xinguang International, has run 
into financial constraints at home, slowing progress on the zone.
The (in)experience of some of the developers has been a contributing 
cause of uneven progress. The Zambia Chambishi Zone already had a 
copper mine, copper smelters, sulfuric acid plant, and foundry before 
2006. In Egypt, TEDA has been developing an experimental zone for 
nearly 10 years and knew the market and environment. For both, the 
inclusion into the MOFCOM program simply facilitated their expansion. 
On the contrary, developers for the Ethiopia and Algeria zones had no 
experience investing in those countries, and their plans were possibly less 
realistic. In Ethiopia at least, tested by the economic crisis, revised plans 
now account for such factors as the exchange rate, the need to plan for 
foreign exchange shortages, and, relatedly, risk diversification. Whereas 
the zone initially was going to focus in part on construction materials and 
the production of steel, the developers may add nonferrous metal mining 
to generate foreign exchange and diversify risks.
Another problem in some zones has been the failure to deliver a 
world-class investment environment. For example, in Egypt during the 
first years of the TEDA participation, a gap existed between the promised 
services, facilities, and other benefits and the reality of what was offered. 
Over time, the Egyptian government was able to fulfill most of its prom-
ises, but enterprises, understandably, do not want their investments to rest 
on promises. Egypt still has not been able to ensure a permanent supply 
of adequate water to the Suez Zone, for example. The greater Lekki pen-
insula is slated to get a new airport and port, the latter of which is critical 
to the competitive offering of the LFTZ, but progress has been slow.
Finally, several zones are located at some distance from a large city. 
Enterprises in the zones sometimes find it difficult to employ qualified 
workers and arrange their daily commute. Chinese promotional activities 
so far mainly target Chinese companies, often companies in their own 
province, which limits the sources of possible investment and can hamper 
the benefits clustering provides for the transfer of technology between 
firms (local personnel still can be a vehicle for transfer, however, if hired 
at a high enough skill level, which is another challenge).
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Although it is premature to draw any conclusions, it is clear that while 
some positive progress is evident, its pace is slow, and the challenges that 
have arisen suggest that success is by no means guaranteed. Indeed, these 
projects not only face many of the typical difficulties that afflict large 
infrastructure projects, particularly in Africa, but additional issues of 
cross-cultural communication, governance, political factors, and power 
relations (see box 4.2 for an example of the challenges faced in one 
project).
Box 4.2
Challenges in the Lekki Free Zone in Nigeria
Nigeria’s Lekki Free Trade Zone (LFTZ) is perhaps illustrative of some of the chal-
lenges facing both sets of partners in executing the joint venture SEZs in Africa. 
The project has been under planning since 2003. Although it has made significant 
progress, the development path of the project has faced many obstacles along 
the way. Among them are the following:
• Financing constraints and partnership disputes: Construction was delayed for a 
period because of financial constraints on the part of the Chinese consor-
tium; this was apparently linked to a dispute over partnership terms within 
the Chinese consortium and a subsequent restructuring of the consortium.
• Miscommunications over terms of partnership: Nigerian partners expected the 
Chinese consortium to deliver their share of investment in capital, whereas the 
Chinese partners expected to deliver it in-kind through infrastructure develop-
ment. In addition, there have been concerns from the Chinese partners on 
 infrastructure responsibilities of the Nigerian partners (e.g., access to the gas for 
the power plant). Chinese partners have raised concerns over the Nigerian 
partners’ potential to ensure that the enabling policies critical to the success of 
the zone actually will be implemented by the Nigerian federal authorities.
• Local community disputes: Local communities around the project protested 
over resettlement terms, the construction of utilities lines through their com-
munities, as well as the employment of Chinese workers for construction. This 
caused project delays and resulted in transferring 5 percent of the shares of 
the Nigerian partner to the local community. In addition, negotiations resulted 
in increasing employment opportunities for workers from local communities.
Source: Authors.
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On the basis of their experience at home, Chinese developers expect 
host governments to support zone development actively; instead, they 
are finding in some projects (e.g., Ethiopia) that governments allocate 
land to developers and do little else. Developers have been frustrated by 
the lack of progress or poor quality of infrastructure provided by some 
local governments outside the zones. In addition, many of the projects 
have faced difficulties related to land acquisition and compensation. 
Although these issues normally have been the responsibility of host 
governments, they have contributed to project delays and friction with 
the local communities (e.g., Lekki). Finally, although the political situa-
tion in the countries hosting zones generally is stable, abrupt policy 
changes and conspicuous gaps between de jure policy and de facto 
implementation has been problematic. Chinese companies have found 
that promises of services like “one-stop shops” fail to materialize (e.g., in 
Ethiopia). Even when express registration of investments has been set 
up, obtaining licenses and work permits has caused delays (e.g., Nigeria, 
Zambia).
African governments and civil societies have raised concerns on a num-
ber of levels. One of the biggest issues relates to lack of transparency and 
poor communication. Although governments are privy to the contracts 
signed for these zones, in most cases, they have not been published. This 
not only is problematic for civil society but also contributes to misunder-
standings among the partners (see box 4.1). Some of these problems 
relate to language—for example, at one of the zones, African officials 
reported that relations improved when their Chinese partners brought in 
a couple of high-level officials who were fluent in English. Some 
African officials also worry that Chinese companies may use the zones to 
bring in Chinese goods for reexport with African labels into areas where 
African exports receive special incentives, as well as to enter local markets 
without paying duties, as occurred in Sierra Leone. The use of Chinese 
rather than local materials and labor has been a concern in certain proj-
ects (e.g., Mauritius). Chinese nationals tend to take most of the manage-
ment and technical positions, at least in the initial project stages. For 
unskilled jobs, concerns about wages and working conditions have been 
raised, although at this early stage of development most of these concerns 
are still theoretical. Finally, there are concerns that the zones will become 
Chinese enclaves, unconnected with the rest of the domestic economy. 
Although all the zones are open to any foreign and (with the exception 
of the Mauritius Zone) domestic investors and no explicit preferential 
treatment is given to Chinese investors, the reality to date in most of the 
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zones is that investor interest has come primarily from Chinese  companies. 
Thus, in the absence of proactive efforts to promote integration, Chinese 
enclave zones are a real risk.
Despite these risks and the challenges experienced to date, these zones 
have the potential to deliver benefits to both parties. Benefits for African 
economies should include those associated with foreign investment more 
generally: employment, transfer of more advanced technologies, spin-offs 
to local firms and foreign exchange earnings from exports. The more 
African firms invest in the zones, the greater the opportunity for technol-
ogy transfers and spin-offs, although technical skills also can be taught on 
the job to African employees of Chinese firms. Furthermore, the zones 
should contribute to the government revenue, at least moderately. For 
Chinese enterprises, benefits include the reduction in transport costs 
from being closer to African or European markets, lower labor costs in 
some cases, cluster economies, as well as the discussed incentives. Chinese 
zone developers expect to profit from the increased value of the land, 
fees, and rents. Some (Lekki, Mauritius) have planned extensive residen-
tial, commercial, and entertainment areas, making the zones multiuse.
Maximizing Benefits 
The partnership to develop SEZs is part of a long-term process of strate-
gic engagement between China and Africa. It offers a significant oppor-
tunity to contribute to job creation, industrialization, and poverty 
reduction in the region. To fulfill this potential, however, the projects 
must be successful from a business, social, and environmental perspec-
tive. This will require a partnership framework that includes the follow-
ing elements:
• High-level commitment and active engagement from host governments: As 
noted, China learned many aspects of SEZ management through build-
ing zones with overseas partners. These lessons were widely applied 
throughout China’s SEZs and have become common practice. African 
governments have been less strategic at managing the projects as learn-
ing experiences. Few participate actively in the management of the 
projects or have set up specific programs aimed at developing SEZ 
expertise over the long term. Assigning specific individuals, preferably 
Mandarin-speaking, to work with Chinese development teams can 
help, as can high-level participation on boards.
• Ensuring the provision of quality off-site infrastructure: Worldwide, getting 
zones off the ground has proven difficult in part because of 
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 infrastructure inadequacies (power, roads, water, sanitation). PPPs or 
other models, such as independent power producers, are options that 
can accelerate this development, bringing employment and other 
 benefits online earlier. Involving the local private sector, in addition to 
Chinese investors, will be critical.
• Communicating and enforcing standards: Local job creation, environ-
mental sustainability, and labor standards all depend on African govern-
ments enforcing existing standards and regulations. It may help to have 
these translated into Mandarin, as Mozambique has done for labor 
regulations.
• Implementing programs to promote domestic market linkages: African 
countries will not profit from the dynamic benefits of SEZs without 
ensuring closer links between the (mostly Chinese) foreign investors in 
the zones and the domestic private sector. Supplier development pro-
grams and initiatives to facilitate local companies to set up inside the 
zones can play an important role in creating these linkages. The re-
cently announced funding from the Chinese government to support 
African SMEs and plans to assist these SMEs to invest in the zones 
could provide a foundation to improve linkages.
• Transparency and community relations: When contracts and agreements 
for these important zones are not made public, suspicion can fester. For 
the zones to be sustainable, they need to have buy-in from local com-
munities who understand the nature of the agreements. The agreement 
in the Lekki project for example, where 5 percent of the shares of the 
Nigerian consortium were transferred to local communities, may 
be one way of addressing some of these concerns.
Appendix 4.A. China’s Official Overseas Economic and Trade 
 Cooperation Zones
Country Zone
2006 Tender
1. Pakistan  Haier-Ruba Home Appliance Industrial Zone
2. Zambia  Chambishi Nonferrous Metal Mining Group Industrial Park
3. Thailand Luoyong Industrial Zone
4. Cambodia  Taihu International Economic Cooperation Zone, Sihanouk 
Harbour
5. Nigeria  Guangdong Ogun Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone
6. Mauritius  Tianli (now JinFei) Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone
(continued next page)
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Country Zone
7. Russian Federation  St. Peterburg Baltic Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone
8. Russian Federation  Ussuriysk Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone
2007 Tender
9. Republica Bolivariana Lacua Tech and Industrial
 de Venezuela  Trade Zone
10. Nigeria Lekki Free Trade Zone
11. Vietnam  Chinese (Shenzhen) Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone
12. Vietnam  Longjiang Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone
13. Mexico  Ningbo Geely Industrial Economic and Trade Cooperation 
Zone
14. Ethiopia  Eastern/Orient Industrial Park, Jiangsu Qiyaan Investment 
Group
15. Arab Republic of Egypt  Tianjin TEDA Suez Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone
16. Algeria  Chinese Jiangling Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone
17. Republic of Korea Chinese Industrial Zone
18. Indonesia  Chinese Guangxi Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone
19. Russian Federation  Tomsk Siberia Industrial and Trade Cooperation Zone
Source: Brautigam 2009, 315–16.
Notes
 1. Some of this information has been published in Deborah Brautigam, The 
Dragon’s Gift (Oxford University Press, 2009).
 2. China introduced a new tax regime in 2008 that essentially did away with the 
tax holidays that previously were offered in the SEZs and harmonized the tax 
structures between SEZ and domestic firms. This new regime is in compliance 
with the WTO.
 3. As China prepared to join the WTO, policy makers sought ways to assist 
Chinese firms to face the increased competition and inevitable restructuring 
that trade liberalization would bring. Helping mature “sunset” industries to 
move offshore, where they could be closer to their markets or raw materials, 
would reduce costs and increase competitiveness. For example, Chinese com-
panies with high energy consumption and high labor intensity are  especially 
encouraged to invest in the Egypt zone (see Suez.TJCOC.gov.cn (2008)).
 4. “Jiangxi Province plans to invest RMB 3.8 billion in Algeria” (2008).
 5. The difference between the 19 zones chosen by tender, and the public goal of 
10, allows for a comfortable margin. The Chinese government would prefer 
to overshoot its goals, rather than come up short. In Africa, for example, the 
official goal was announced in November 2006 as “three to five” zones by 
2009. Seven actually were approved, and six were announced as under way 
in November 2009 at the FOCAC meeting in Egypt.
98       Special Economic Zones
 6. “Aerjiliya Xincuoshi jiang dui Woqiye Chukou he Touzi Chansheng Yingxiang” 
(2009).
 7. This is discussed further in Brautigam (2009).
 8. “Dongfang Gongyeyuan, Kaipi Feizhou Taojinlu” (2008); “Suyishi Jingwai 
Jingmao Hezuoqu 10 yue Jiepai” (2008).
 9. “JinFei Project—Infrastructure Works, Terms and Conditions of Agreement” 
(2009).
 10. “Government allocates K 20 billion for Lusaka South Multi Facility Economic 
Zone” (2009).
 11. The government wanted the special incentives for the zone to be used to 
attract additional new investors from overseas, and not investors already pres-
ent in Mauritius (Interview, Minister of Finance, 2008).
 12. Interview, Lekki Zone Representative (2009); “Weida de Kaituo – Laiji 
Zimaoqu Jianshe Jishi” (2008).
 13. Nigerians reported that they had asked the Chinese to send some of their 
construction workforce of about 200 back to China and hire Nigerians. One 
researcher reported that an agreement negotiated between the two sides calls 
for at least 40 percent of the workforce to be Nigerian. However, Nigerian 
officials we spoke with denied that this was the case (Mthembu-Salter 2009, 
3; interview, Lekki Worldwide Investment officials, December 14, 2009 and 
December 16, 2009).
 14. The mining activities and the CNMC subsidiaries are not technically 
 considered part of the zone.
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Background
SEZs were established in China in the early 1980s as “demonstration 
areas” to test policy reforms aimed at economic liberalization and to 
attract foreign investment. SEZs have had a transformational effect in 
building a competitive manufacturing sector in China and catalyzing its 
economic development. They have played a significant role as a labora-
tory for economic reforms in the country and have been a major source 
of technological learning to enable upgrading by local firms. During the 
development of the SEZ program, the Chinese government made an 
explicit effort to partner with foreign entities to learn about setting up 
and managing modern industrial parks. One example of this approach 
was the China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park, a modern industrial 
township developed in the early 1990s. Although it faced many difficul-
ties in its early years, it has emerged as a major success, attracting US$17 
billion in FDI and supporting more than 500,000 jobs.
Partnership Arrangements 
in the China-Singapore (Suzhou) 
Industrial Park: Lessons for Joint 
Economic Zone Development 
Min Zhao and Thomas Farole
C H A P T E R  5
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Governments throughout the world, particularly in developing coun-
tries, are keen to develop SEZ programs to support diversification, attract 
investment, create employment, and benefit from skills and technology 
transfer. Many of these governments are turning to foreign partners, 
including China, Malaysia, and Singapore, that can bring not only invest-
ment but also substantial expertise and experience in establishing and 
running SEZs. China’s own experience in making use of foreign expertise 
through joint venture partnerships suggests that this approach may offer 
significant potential for developing-country governments not only to 
attract investment and international-standard infrastructure, but also, and 
perhaps most important, to learn about how to plan, develop, and man-
age large economic zone projects.
This chapter highlights the case example of China-Singapore Suzhou 
Industrial Park (SIP) as a lesson for how governments and SEZ investors 
in developing countries can maximize the benefits of partnership arrange-
ments in their zone programs. 
Introduction to Suzhou Industrial Park 
SIP is a “new township” located in East Suzhou, a major industrial city 
approximately 80 kilometers from the commercial center and port facili-
ties at Shanghai. Launched in 1994, SIP now hosts six functioning areas:
• Jinji Lake-Rim Central Business District (CBD)
• DuShu Lake Innovation District of Science and Technology (11 square 
kilometers)
• Eastern High-Tech Industrial Area
• Integrated Free Trade Zone (5.28 square kilometers)
• SIP Ecological Science Hub (4 square kilometers)
• Yangcheng Lake Tourism Resort
Of the six functioning areas, Jinji Lake-Rim CBD, Eastern High-Tech 
Industrial Area, and the Integrated Free Trade Zone are located in the 
80-square-kilometer (8,000-hectare) China-Singapore cooperative zone, 
which covers just over one-fourth of SIP’s total land area. SIP Ecological 
Science Hub is outside of the core zone, but it was developed by the joint 
venture development company China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park 
Development Co., Ltd. (CSSD) in 2007. 
By the end of June 2008, SIP had attracted around 3,300 foreign enter-
prises, including 82 Fortune 500 MNCs with a cumulative contractual 
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foreign investment of US$34 billion, and domestic companies with total 
contractual investment of RMB 130 billion (US$19 billion). In 2008, 
exports from the zone grew to more than US$30 billion. There has been 
rapid clustering of industries in information and communications tech-
nologies (ICT), thin-film transistor and liquid crystal display screens, and 
automotive and aeronautical parts, and recently, the zone has shown rapid 
emergence of high-end sectors, including software, outsourcing services, 
and pharmaceuticals.
SIP has become a major driving force of the Suzhou economy, achiev-
ing an annual average economic growth of 30 percent since its launch 
(see table 5.1). With around only 4 percent of the total land and popula-
tion, and 7 percent of the industrial electricity, SIP contributes about 
15 percent of Suzhou’s GDP and 30 percent of its trade. By the end of 
2008, SIP accommodated 600,000 residents and supported more than 
500,000 jobs. More notable, SIP has built a reputation as one of the most 
business-friendly, residential-friendly, and environment-friendly industrial 
parks in China. SIP ranks the second best in terms of investment climate 
among 57 national-level industrial parks in China, according to the 
Ministry of Commerce. It ranks highest in infrastructure, human resources, 
and social responsibility, and it ranks second in economic strength, envi-
ronment protection, and technology innovation (China Economic 
Development Zone Association 2008). 
The success of SIP has built considerable mind share among the 
Chinese officials and a “Singapore” brand name that Singapore companies 
can leverage, especially in the area of township development and urban 
Table 5.1  SIP Key Statistics 
Foreign companies  3,300
Investment:
–  Foreign (Share of Suzhou FDI)
–  Domestic
US$34 billion (25%)
RMB 130 billion (US$19 billion)
Employment (end 2008) 500,000
Exports (GDP) (2008)
–  Share of Suzhou Exports
US$ 31 billion
~30% (share of total trade)
Output (GDP) (2008)
–  Share of Suzhou GDP
RMB 100 billion (US$14.6 billion)
15%
Average annual growth (1994–2008) 30%
Taxes generated (2008)
–  Share of Suzhou revenue
RMB 9.5 billion (US$1.4 billion)
15%
Source: Suzhou Industrial Park.
Note: GDP = gross domestic product; FDI = foreign direct investment.
For more detailed annual statistics, see appendix 5.A.
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solutions throughout China. It also brought a good financial return to its 
investors. Although the project incurred significant losses in its initial 
years, CSSD reached cumulative profitability in 2003 and has been prof-
itable every year since. Reported profits in 2007 were RMB 360 million 
(US$52.7 million). For an overview of key milestones in SIP’s develop-
ment from 1994 through 2009, see appendix 5.B.
The Strategy of the Chinese and Singaporean Governments 
The SIP was launched on February 26, 1994, when Chinese Vice Premier 
Li Lanqing and Singapore Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew signed the 
Agreement on the Joint Development of Suzhou Industrial Park in Beijing. 
On the same day, both parties also signed the General Agreement on 
Suzhou Industrial Park, which laid a foundation for the establishment of 
the CSSD. From the outset, SIP was viewed a flagship project in eco-
nomic cooperation between China and Singapore and commanded high-
level political attention. Indeed, SIP played an important strategic role 
both for the Chinese and the Singaporean governments.
For China, SIP was established against the context of the transition 
from a planned, closed, mainly agricultural economy to a global, indus-
trial, market economy. Following Deng Xiaoping’s now famous southern 
tour in 1992, the 14th National Congress of the Communist Party 
adopted the goal of establishing a socialist market economy and accelerat-
ing the pace of opening up. Faced with the task of learning how to man-
age in a market economy, senior leaders were inspired by the economic 
miracle achieved by Singapore in the 30 years after its independence. As 
Deng Xiaoping laid out in 1992, “Singapore enjoys good social order and 
is well managed. We should tap on their experience, and learn how to 
manage better than them” (Deng 2004). That year, more than 400 
Chinese officials visited Singapore to study how the country achieved 
progressive economic success while maintaining social order. Because 
China already was experimenting with large-scale industrial zones, 
Singapore’s successful experience in developing such zones was of great 
interest.
For Singapore, SIP offered opportunities on both economic and politi-
cal grounds. At the same time China launched its first stages of market-
oriented reform, Singapore was moving to a new phase of its development. 
With the economy expanding, finding space for new industries became a 
significant challenge. At the beginning of the 1990s, the government of 
Singapore launched the Regional Industrial Parks Initiative, one of several 
China-Singapore (Suzhou) Industrial Park: Lessons for Joint Economic Zone       105
thrusts within its broad “regionalization strategy.” The aim of the initiative 
was “to generate an external stream of revenue that would supplement 
Singapore’s domestic economy” (Pereira 2007; Perry and Yeoh 2000). SIP 
was an important vehicle to demonstrate that the Singapore model of 
industrial parks could be transferrable (Inkepen and Pien 2006), thus 
opening up a potential new industry for the country, delinked from the 
physical constraints of its small market. Politically, SIP provided Singapore 
with the opportunity to better understand an emerging China, and to 
deepen relations with the country, through the various platforms set up 
for interaction between both leaders and officials. To achieve these aims, 
Singapore was particularly keen to work not just on a project with China 
but in China. For this, SIP fit the bill perfectly. The project allowed 
Singapore to share its development lessons comprehensively, including 
how to plan, implement, and administer an entire integrated develop-
ment with industrial, housing, commercial, and recreational components 
in “the Singapore way.” Although Singapore invested in other industrial 
parks in the region, the economic and political importance of China gave 
this project a high profile and strong government involvement. 
Jointly, a key objective of SIP was that Singapore would share its 
knowledge of efficient economic management and public administration 
experience with its Chinese partner so that the latter could formulate 
pro-business policies in SIP and could govern with transparency and effi-
ciency. With a benign business environment and good infrastructure, SIP 
was expected to be competitive in attracting investment and generating 
positive return to developers. But beyond this, both Singapore and 
China’s leaders had a larger vision for SIP to be a model of reform and 
innovation for other parts of China. 
Partnership Structure
SIP was established with a multilevel governance structure, as illustrated 
in figure 5.1. Overall governance of SIP is the responsibility of the China-
Singapore Joint Steering Council (JSC). The JSC was designed to meet 
relatively infrequently (every 12–18 months) to review the progress, 
resolve major implementation issues, and set future development goals. 
The JSC is cochaired by the Chinese vice premier and the Singapore 
deputy prime minister and includes ministerial chiefs of the two coun-
tries, senior officials of Jiangsu provincial and Suzhou municipal govern-
ments, and the head of Jurong Town Corporation (JTC). At a more 
operational level, the Joint Working Committee, which was more active 
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during the start-up phase of the SIP, is cochaired by the mayor of Suzhou 
and Singapore Ministry of Trade and Industry permanent secretary.
The Suzhou Industrial Park Administrative Committee (SIPAC) was 
empowered by the Suzhou municipal government as an independent 
local government authority to oversee SIP, which covers a total jurisdic-
tion of 288 square kilometers (of which 80 square kilometers belongs to 
the China-Singapore cooperative zone1). The remaining area belongs to 
three counties—Loufeng, Weiting, and Shengpu.2 SIPAC was granted 
high autonomy in policy making and law enforcement. Currently, SIPAC 
is also primary land developer of SIP.3 
CSSD was initially the main land developer and still is a major real 
estate developer and industrial property agent of SIP. CSSD is a joint 
venture between China Suzhou Industrial Park Co., Ltd. (the Chinese 
consortium) and Singapore-Suzhou Township Development Co., Ltd. 
(the Singaporean consortium). The Chinese consortium is made up of 
several large Chinese SOEs at national, provincial, and municipal levels. 
The Singaporean consortium was composed of 24 companies, of which 
10 are government-linked companies and statutory boards with total 
share of about 42 percent of the Singaporean consortium (Straits Times, 
January 15, 1998). From 1994 through 2000, CSSD was controlled 
65 percent by the Singaporean consortium and 35 percent by the Chinese 
Figure 5.1 Governance Structure of SIP
SIPAC
Joint Working Committee
(JWC)  
Software
Project Office
Permanent Secretary
(Trade & Industry)  
Adapting
Singapore
Experience Office 
Suzhou Mayor
Joint Steering Council
(JSC) 
China
Vice Premier 
Main Developer:
China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park
Development Group Co. Ltd (CSSD)
Singapore
Deputy Prime
Minister
Sources: http://www.cssd.com.cn/chinese/yqjj.shtml, 2009.
Note: SIPAC = Suzhou Industrial Park Administrative Committee.
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consortium. But based on an agreement made in 1999, the equity stake 
of the two consortia was flipped on January 1, 2001. Along with this, 
corporate control and management responsibility also shifted from the 
Singaporean side to the Chinese side. As of August 2005, CSSD attracted 
three more minority shareholders, which took a 20 percent share, diluting 
the Chinese and Singaporean consortia to 52 percent and 28 percent, 
respectively. The current structure of CSSD is shown in figure 5.2.
Currently, CSSD has formed the four core businesses, namely, primary 
land development, real estate development, public utilities, and multiser-
vices. The primary land development is represented by the development 
of SIP Ecological Science Hub. The real estate development includes the 
industrial properties developed by CSSD headquarter and the residential 
properties developed by CS-SIP Land Corporate. The public utilities 
mainly refer to the water, power, and gas operated by CS-SIP Public 
Utilities Development Group Corporate. And the multiservices mainly 
include investment promotion, infrastructure development, international 
education and property management, and so on.
The Knowledge-Sharing Process
Singapore not only provided initial capital for zone development and 
designed a high-standard land-use plan, but also played a critical role in 
facilitating improved governance and, perhaps most important, in trans-
ferring wide-ranging technical knowledge of industrial-city planning and 
management. In all of this, the government of Singapore played a critical 
lead role.
First, Singapore provided substantial initial investment capital, risk 
sharing, and investment promotion, in particular, in the early phase of 
development. In addition to its equity share in CSSD, Singapore govern-
ment-linked companies also have stakes in other joint venture companies 
in SIP: total investments by statutory boards and government-linked 
companies to SIP came to more than US$120 million by the end of 1997 
(Straits Times, January 15, 1998).4 
To attract MNCs to locate their high value added operations in SIP, the 
Singapore Economic Development Board (EDB), the lead government 
agency to attract foreign investment, was brought in to share their knowl-
edge with SIP officials on investment promotion in the initial stage of SIP 
implementation. EDB’s overseas centers also assisted with SIP’s invest-
ment promotion initiatives in the start-up years and even introduced to 
CSSP some investors who intended to invest in Singapore. At a time 
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when foreign investors were skeptical about China’s business environ-
ment, the partnership with Singapore provided foreign investors with 
confidence to invest in SIP. 
The most important contribution of the partnership arrangement in 
SIP has been in the area of knowledge transfer. Indeed, a formal knowl-
edge transfer scheme and institutional structure was built into the part-
nership agreement. The Chinese side established an Adapting Singapore 
Experience Office under the SIPAC, and the Singapore side set up a 
counterpart—the Software Project Office (SPO)5 affiliated with the JTC. 
These two agencies meet quarterly in SIP to review the software transfer 
program. In the early years when SIP was putting in place the basic infra-
structure, software transfer focused on such topics as Township 
Development, Urban Planning, and Public Works Management. With SIP 
moving into higher value added industries in recent years, such as high-
tech manufacturing, R&D, and modern services, software transfer has 
kept pace with these changes to include such topics as the following:
• Eco-Friendly Industrial Park Development
• Science and Technology Development
• Talent Management
• Development of the Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) Industry 
Since SIP’s inception, more than 2,000 Chinese officials have attended 
training conducted by the Singapore SPO. 
To ensure the effectiveness of the knowledge transfer, officials that 
attended training were required to report what they had learned. 
Additionally, they drafted laws and regulations by adapting Singapore 
practice to local conditions. So far, more than 100 regulations have been 
enacted by adapting Singapore practice. Meanwhile, knowledge transfer 
was reinforced through staff exchange. SIPAC sent staff to their 
Singaporean counterpart and Singapore also sent staff to SIPAC and 
CSSD to work for short-term periods. The rotation period was often 
three months. These rotations helped SIPAC and Suzhou municipality to 
build up public management capacity, as SIP strived to become a service-
oriented, transparent government providing full-day, complete process, 
and all-round services to investors and residents. 
In the process of SIP development, the Chinese side also learned by 
doing. One example that received great recognition was urban planning. 
Right before the construction of SIP and with the strong emphasis of 
Singaporean side, experts from both China and Singapore drafted a 
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sophisticated urban plan, which Chinese officials marked as far-sighted. 
The plan included not only a general framework and detailed master plan, 
laying out land by industry, trade, living, and other town functions, but 
also set up more than 300 professional plans. This plan helped to build a 
philosophy among Chinese officials of (1) planning before construction 
and (2) constructing underground works before works above ground. 
Meanwhile, the partnership arrangement also strengthened governance, 
including a law enforcement management system. 
SIP has strictly followed the plan over the 15 years since it was drafted. 
At the time, this was rare. Such a philosophy now has been widely 
expanded among industrial parks in China. Many new industrial parks 
invited Singaporean companies to design their land plans. SIP has become 
a model of change and innovation for other parts of China. It is estimated 
that more than 20,000 officials from all over China make learning visits 
to SIP each year. Singapore also has been asked by various Chinese cities 
and provinces to share their experiences, given the attention generated by 
SIP’s success. CSSD is now beginning to leverage its expertise within 
China; it recently began the development of a 10-square-kilometer indus-
trial park project in Suqian, in northern Jiangsu Province. CSSD also 
ventured to neighboring Nantong to develop a 40-square-kilometer 
Suzhou-Nantong High-Tech Park in a joint venture with the Nantong 
government. 
Challenges to the Partnership
Although the partnership arrangement brought many benefits to the 
project, it also brought difficulties that might not exist, or at least would 
be less complex, in a typical government-run project. Having the majority 
stake in the initial project stages was critical to enable the Singaporean 
consortium to drive the project forward, but it also created its own set of 
problems, in particular, the misaligned incentives of some of the key 
Chinese stakeholders. The Singaporean partners focused on using SIP as 
a platform to transfer developmental experience, and so put emphasis on 
knowledge transfer and urban planning. They intended to build SIP infra-
structure to international standards, which implied high development 
costs. By the end of 2000, infrastructure investment in the 9 square kilo-
meters developed at SIP totaled RMB 7.8 billion (US$1.14 billion), 
whereas in the other four state-level development zones in Suzhou, 50 
square kilometers were developed with an investment of only RMB 6.9 
billion (US$1.01 billion) (Suzhou Statistical Yearbook, various years)—
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that is, infrastructure investment in SIP was six times more intensive 
(expensive) than in the other parts of the zone. As a result, the land was 
expected to be sold or rented at a rate high enough to recover this devel-
opment cost. 
For local government, which had only a minor share of the project, the 
incentives were quite different. They cared less about commercial returns 
and more about the social and economic returns, including job creation, 
GDP, and perhaps most important, tax revenue. In China, local govern-
ment is responsible for the provision of most public goods and services, 
and its main source of revenue is the value added tax paid by industrial 
firms. Thus, the incentive for local government is to attract as many 
industrial investors as possible, as quickly as possible. Land rents and 
prices that are too high to attract industrial investors result in less tax 
revenue and fewer jobs. Thus, there was a clear misalignment of incen-
tives between the Singaporean majority stakeholders and the local gov-
ernment. This misalignment was exacerbated by the fact that the central 
government made a commitment in the initial project agreement to 
allow SIP to keep all tax revenues generated in the zone. Thus, local gov-
ernment had no incentive to invest in the critical connecting infrastruc-
ture to SIP. 
Perhaps the biggest source of difficulty in the partnership was the 
fierce competition that arose in neighboring industrial parks. Before the 
launch of SIP in 1994, Suzhou Administration already had four state-
level economic development zones—Suzhou New and Hi-Tech 
Development Zone (located west of the old Suzhou city),6 Kunshan 
Economic and Technological Development Zone (just 30 kilometers 
away from SIP), Zhangjiagang Bonded Area, and Suzhou Taihu National 
Tourism and Vacation Zone, as well as numerous provincial-level zones. 
Except for the latter of these, all the zones targeted industrial investors. 
As the other industrial parks were all government sponsored, land 
developers in those industrial parks usually were SOEs. Their interests 
naturally were aligned much more closely with local governments. 
Attracting investors, rather than short- or medium-term commercial 
returns, was tops on their agenda. Industrial land therefore was rented 
to industrial investors at a subsidized rate, creating serious competition 
for SIP and making it almost impossible to maintain rents at levels that 
could deliver a commercial return.
Moreover, free-riding could hardly be avoided. As SIP is an open area, 
roads built inside or connecting to SIP also could be used outside of SIP, 
including in adjacent industrial zones. At the time SIP was attracting 
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interested investors with the help of Singapore’s promotion, other indus-
trial parks and neighborhood villages and towns were watching and learn-
ing from SIP, recruiting staff who received on-the-job training in SIP, and 
even lobbying investors who initially were attracted by SIP. Competition 
with the Suzhou New and High-Tech Development Zone drew the most 
attention and criticism from Singapore partners in late 1990s. 
Despite excellent infrastructure and governance, SIP had little com-
petitive advantage relative to other industrial parks in Suzhou during 
its initial years, partly because its world-class approach may have been 
too far ahead of the market at the time. Heavy infrastructure invest-
ment, misaligned incentives, and the decline in FDI resulting from the 
Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s resulted in huge losses for CSSD 
in the early years. From 1994 to 2001, the total cumulative losses for 
CSSD totaled US$77 million. By 1999 (the fifth anniversary of SIP), 
with the foundation of SIP firmly laid and the knowledge transfer 
 process in an advanced stage, the Singapore consortium reviewed its 
position and decided to relinquish majority shareholding to the Chinese 
partners in 2001 to better align the incentives and encourage the local 
officials to focus on the long-term development of SIP. Management 
responsibility for CSSD was also transferred to a Chinese partner as of 
January 1, 2001.
Since the time of the shift in ownership control, SIP has emerged as a 
major success. However, interviews with Chinese officials from SIPAC 
attribute the change in fortunes at SIP after 2000 mainly to the change 
in the macroeconomic context rather than anything related to the man-
agement or ownership structure of the project. From around 2000, China 
experienced a wave of industrial relocation of MNCs; in addition, the 
Chinese ecotnomy recovered from Asian financial crisis. Both trends were 
accelerated further with China’s accession to WTO. Indeed, from 2000 to 
2007, FDI to China grew much more rapidly than in from 1995 to 2000 
(see table 5.2). SIP attracted FDI at more than double the national rate, 
but this was from a small base. Similarly, exports also boomed during this 
period: China’s nationwide exports increased 3.9 times, while Suzhou’s 
Table 5.2  FDI Utilized, US$ Billion
1995 2000 2007 CAGR ‘95–00  CAGR ‘00–07
SIP 0.41 0.52 1.76 4.9% 19.0%
Suzhou 2.32 2.88 7.16 4.4% 13.9%
China 37.5 40.7 74.7 1.7% 9.1%
Source: SIP Statistical Office, 2009; Suzhou Statistical Bureau, 1995–2008; and authors’ calculations.
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exports increased 10.3 times and SIP’s exports increased by 17.9 times, 
although again from a low base (China Statistical Bureau 2008; SIP 
Statistical Office 2009; Suzhou Statistical Bureau various years). 
Overcoming Partnership Challenges and 
Implementing Innovations
It is perhaps unsurprising that the early implementation of SIP encoun-
tered significant teething problems. An ambitious project such as SIP 
required a considerable shift in mind-set and an alignment of expecta-
tions and objectives of all major stakeholders. Despite similarity in lan-
guage and culture, Singapore and China have two different administrative 
systems and corporate cultures. The key to SIP success was the funda-
mental resolution by both governments to make SIP a win-win project, 
and their willingness to evolve the business model to address operational 
problems, without compromising the emphasis on the softer aspects of 
developmental planning and a pro-business environment.
Over the past 15 years, partnership arrangements evolved to overcome 
or mitigate difficulties. The key change was to align the interests of all 
stakeholders. Tax revenues (VAT) generated from SIP, which were 
allowed to be kept in SIP at the inception, are now shared between cen-
tral government, Jiangsu provincial government, Suzhou municipal gov-
ernment, and SIPAC: the central government gets 75 percent, Jiangsu 
provincial government gets 12.5 percent, Suzhou municipal government 
gets 10 percent, and SIPAC keeps only 2.5 percent. The main tax revenue 
source for SIPAC is corporate and personal income tax, 60 percent of 
which is retained; SIPAC also is allowed to keep all revenues from land 
sales. Original residents of cooperative areas (farmers) were relocated to 
the other towns in SIP, but are under the governance and support of 
SIPAC. These original residents are compensated by SIPAC with resi-
dences and monthly allowances. Suzhou New and High-Tech Development 
Zone, a major competitor of SIP, took 5 percent of the CSSD stake in 
2005. Thus, all stakeholders are now able to benefit in one way or another 
from the development of SIP. Meanwhile, the role of SIPAC has been 
strengthened and the head of SIPAC was granted the rank of vice mayor. 
The head of each department in SIPAC now enjoys rank of director, the 
same level as their counterparts in Suzhou municipal government. 
As a result of the realigned incentives, SIPAC has emerged as a de facto 
main land developer. An Investment Promotion Office was established, 
and SIPAC has put substantial resources into attracting both domestic 
114       Special Economic Zones
and foreign investors. Industrial land and factories were rented at a com-
petitive market rate, while commercial and residential land was auc-
tioned. Revenues from land sales were used to finance infrastructure 
investment. Several state-owned corporations under the supervision of 
SIPAC were established following the model of Temasek—some join 
CSSD in land development and some manage state-owned properties. 
The participation of these SOEs accelerated the pace of SIP develop-
ment. Although CSSD still plays an active role in the industrial land 
development, it also has expanded its business areas to residential and 
commercial estate development, property management, and the provi-
sion of other services.
The success of the partnership also can be attributed to the high-level 
leadership attention accorded to the project by China and Singapore. The 
Singapore government invested substantial resources into making the 
project a success. In addition to committing many of its best officials to 
spearhead the project,7 many Singapore government ministries and agen-
cies in charge of such areas as urban planning, water treatment, commu-
nity infrastructure, and social security actively provided knowledge 
transfer to SIP officials, a commitment that continues into 2011.
The strong support from China’s central government extends to the 
many policy incentives granted to SIP, which further sharpened SIP’s 
competitive edge. SIP was awarded the same status as China’s five SEZs 
and Shanghai’s Pudong New District at its inception in 1994. In addition 
to the preferential policies enjoyed by the SEZs and Pudong, SIP also 
enjoyed many other privileges of its own as a unique Singapore-China 
cooperation project. For example, at the project’s inception in 1994, the 
corporate tax in SIP was reduced to 15 percent from the usual 30 percent 
for most parts of China. The local authority, SIPAC, also was authorized 
to approve investments of any size with no upper limit on the total 
amount of investment in SIP.8 Adopting Singapore’s experience of the 
Central Provident Fund system, SIP developed the SIP Provident Fund 
System (SPF), the only such regional scheme in China and perhaps the 
most important preferential incentive offered at SIP. Based on prepay-
ment accumulation and personal account deposit, the system covers 
social security items, such as pension, medical care insurance, unemploy-
ment insurance, employment injury insurance, maternity insurance, and a 
housing fund. The contributions from enterprises or individuals to SPF all 
go to a personal account and can be moved when employees leave SIP. In 
contrast, the contribution from enterprises to pension funds is put into a 
pool and is not portable when employees move to other provinces or 
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cities. This SPF model lowers the cost to employers by up to 60 percent 
of wage costs for a typical low-skilled worker versus the cost to provide 
the same income, including pension, in a personal account. Thus, it helps 
enterprises not only to lower labor costs but also to retain talent. 
In addition to preferential tax policies, the government has supported 
the zone by streamlining regulatory and approval procedures for firms 
operating in the zone. With the support of the central government, SIP 
made many innovations in public administration by adapting the 
Singaporean experience. In January 1995, 19 departments, including the 
Special Economic Zones Office of the State Council, set up on-site 
offices in SIP to facilitate licensing, regulatory, and operating administra-
tion for SIP-based firms. Since 2002, this one-stop service center has been 
empowered by SIPAC to operate as a fully authorized, independent gov-
ernment department since 2002. 
Perhaps the most prominent feature of government support has been 
the continued streamlining of customs procedures and port handling, 
which have been adapted and upgraded to help SIP overcome its natural 
disadvantage of being landlocked. From SIP’s inception in 1994, a 
Customs Sub-Administration was planned; it was launched formally in 
1999 (box 5.1 lists major milestones of its development). SIP now oper-
ates as a virtual port, and it is allowed to handle customs clearance of 
exports and imports directly. Firms in SIP enjoy an efficient “green lane” 
and independent customs supervision, which has run 24 hours a day, 
seven days a week since 2003. An Integrated Free Trade Zone (IFTZ) was 
founded in SIP in 2008, by integrating two processing trade zones, one 
bonded logistic center and one customs checkpoint.9 The IFTZ now 
serves as a platform to promote the development of the BPO industry in 
SIP. Some multinational corporations, including Fairchild Semiconductor 
Inc., Samsung, and Chi Mei Optoelectronics, already have established or 
are planning to establish their distribution centers in the IFTZ. Thus, an 
international logistics and distribution base is gradually taking shape.
Conclusion
As developing-country governments engage with China and other foreign 
partners in large economic zone development projects, the experience of 
China’s partnership with Singapore for SIP reveals a number of valuable 
lessons. These are summarized in three main categories: (1) partnership 
structure and governance; (2) planning, development, and operations; 
and, possibly of most importance, (3) learning and knowledge sharing.
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Box 5.1
SIP Free Trade Zone Development
1994 (August): An office was set up to make preparation for the establishment of 
SIP Subadministration of Customs.
1995 (August): Custom’s Regulation on Supervision over Exports and Imports in 
SIP was enacted.
1997: SIP Weiting Customs Supervision Station was founded and became one of 
the first three express inland ports in China.
1998 (September): The second-class land port was opened in SIP.
1999 (May): SIP Subadministration of Customs was formally in operation.
2001 (January): SIP bonded zone for export processing (EPZ) was in operation. 
Customs adopted an electronic customs declaration and supervision system to 
manage enterprises in EPZ, where the Electronic Data Interchange system replaces 
the use of the Processing Trade Logbook and Bank Deposit Account System. 
 Enterprises located in EPZ can enjoy additional preferential policies, including 
duty exemption for construction materials, equipment, packing materials, con-
sumable materials, and a rational amount of office appliances. Other preferential 
policies include exemption from value added tax on products produced in EPZ 
and exemption from tariff quota and license control for cargos into and out of EPZ 
to and from overseas (excluding restricted items), and a tax rebate on Chinese-
made raw materials, parts and components, packing materials, and construction 
materials entering into EPZ. 
2002: With the approval of State General Administration of Customs, the first 
air-land transfer mode was introduced, making SIP a virtual airport. With the 
Air-Land Transshipment Model, supervised warehouses of the Shanghai Airport 
are extended directly to SIP, making import and export declaration possible at 
the local customs—SIP Customs. This function realizes a one-stop service for 
declaration, inspection, and dispatch, and it offers flexibility in the arrival, decla-
ration, inspection, and clearance of goods. The time required for getting through 
customs procedures was greatly reduced from one to two days to seven to 
eight hours, making it possible for local IT companies to control their produc-
tion cycle within five days.
(continued next page)
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Partnership Structure and Governance
• Ensuring active political commitment at the highest level: One key to suc-
cess was the strong resolution of both Chinese and Singaporean govern-
ments to make SIP a win-win success. Top-level political commitment 
is demonstrated by the profile of the board of the project’s joint steer-
ing committee, which is cochaired by the Chinese vice premier and the 
Singapore deputy prime minister and includes ministerial chiefs of 
both countries. Singapore also has put senior ministers in charge of dif-
ferent aspects of the knowledge exchange program. This political com-
mitment helped to overcome many of the problems faced in the early 
days of the partnership, ensuring that both parties had an active interest 
in finding ways to make things work.
Box 5.1 (continued)
2003: SIP Subadministration of Customs provides all-day services—24 hours a 
day, seven days a week. 
2004: SIP Bonded Logistics Center (Type B) with a total planned area of three 
square kilometers was founded. The Type B Bonded Logistics Center has the func-
tions of a “free trade port.” All imported goods entering the logistics park enjoy 
“bonded” status. Goods entering the logistics park from within China can be 
regarded as an export and enjoy a tax rebate. 
2007: With the operation of a new land-air transfer mode, the virtual airport 
finally realized the two-way direct transportation. This made SIP a unique vir-
tual port in China combining ocean, air, and land shipment, and allowed SIP to 
handle customs declaration, inspection, and clearance of exports and imports 
directly. 
2008 (January): The SIP IFTZ (China’s first) was in operation by integrating the exist-
ing two EPZs, the Customs Bonded Logistic Center and Weiting Customs Check-
point. Within the planned area of 5.28 square kilometers, the IFTZ has the functions 
of bonded logistics, bonded processing, international trade, and port operation. 
Incoming foreign goods are under duty bond, incoming domestic goods enjoy 
export duty refund, and all transactions of goods within the area are exempted 
from VAT levies. Customs set up a dedicated office in the zone.
Source: Authors.
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• Aligning incentives among key partners: The main challenges to the part-
nership arose in part because of the difficult balance of meeting both 
commercial and political objectives. For these high-profile projects, 
both objectives are critical. In the initial structure of the partnership 
arrangement, however, incentives were not properly aligned to address 
this balance. Although the flip in ownership and control of the project 
was the high-profile part of the realignment of incentives, a number of 
other important actions were taken to ensure that all stakeholders in-
volved had the incentive to work toward common goals.
• Establishing a strong institutional structure for project governance: The 
partnership developed a strong, multitiered governance structure for 
SIP, consisting of three elements: (1) a steering committee that func-
tions as a platform of policy dialogue, coordination of policies among 
all government departments, and problem resolution when needed; 
(2) an empowered local authority who performs the government 
role and whose interest is closely aligned with the zone develop-
ment; and (3) a joint venture development entity, invested by both 
parties so that both sides will share cost, risk, and return from zone 
development.
• Planning for local phase-in: Although having the Singaporean partner 
control the project at the outset was practical, as the Chinese partner 
built its technical capacity, a phase-in of local management control was 
practical, both politically and commercially.
• Recognizing the importance of flexibility: Given the long-term nature of 
these projects, and the large sunk costs to get them started, it is criti-
cal that partners show a willingness to evolve the business model as 
necessary. China and Singapore both proved to be highly practical in 
their approach to resolving the significant early stage challenges of 
the project. 
• Building mutual respect and recognizing capabilities and constraints: On 
the one hand, the host side should be flexible and ready to build a 
business-friendly investment environment in an innovative and prag-
matic manner, and should provide the needed support to make zone 
development sustainable and profitable. On the other hand, the inves-
tor should respect the constraints that the host government faces and 
should take advantage of the local knowledge of its counterpart. SIP 
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suffered at first because of the failure of both parties to fully appreciate 
this necessity.
Development and Operations
• Complementing physical development with policy reform to generate a 
business-conducive environment: In the context of building economic 
zones, streamlining customs procedures and reducing the time and 
cost of documentation, transit, port handling, and customs procedures 
would be of the highest priority. The more efficient government ser-
vices the host government provides and the better investment envi-
ronment, the fewer tax incentives are needed to make the zone 
development sustainable. In this respect, SIP established a compre-
hensive one-stop service with a strong mandate (including devolved 
decision-making authority). Efficient, on-site customs service was a 
fundamental component of the zone offering. Officials not only estab-
lished a dedicated customs subadministration (and gave it a strong 
mandate) but also continued to evolve and expand the services avail-
able, eventually leading to the establishment of an integrated free trade 
zone within SIP. Finally, innovations in other aspects of administration 
and regulations, most notably the SPF, created important sources of 
competitive advantage for SIP.
• Shifting the mind-set from “hardware” to “software”: Although the Chi-
nese local partners largely were focused in the beginning on infra-
structure (as tangible evidence of “success”), the Singaporean partners 
placed great emphasis on the importance of “software” or knowledge, 
whose results were not immediate but were critical to the sustain-
ability of the project. Facilitating this shift in mind-set is a difficult 
challenge, practically and politically, and is aided strongly by a robust 
program of knowledge sharing. 
Learning and Knowledge Sharing
• Ensuring a strong, two-way institutionalized commitment to learning: 
Knowledge sharing was fundamental to the partnership from the 
 beginning. Critically, this was one of the main objectives of both the 
host government and the investor. Moreover, it went well beyond plat-
itudes to clear, active commitment. On the Singaporean side, this was 
evidenced by putting senior officials in charge of various parts of the 
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“software transfer” program over the years. On the Chinese side, the 
government not only put many officials through the training programs, 
but also required those officials to demonstrate their acquired knowl-
edge on the job.
• Making use of practical exchanges: Formal training also has been embed-
ded at SIP through a long-running program of staff exchanges between 
the partners.
• Establishing a formal institutional structure to promote the learning 
program: A formal program was put in place at the start, with both 
partners setting up counterpart offices (China’s Adapting Singapore 
Experience Office and Singapore’s SPO) designed to plan and oversee 
the process of knowledge exchange.
• Taking a comprehensive approach to the curriculum, with an evolving 
focus over time: The knowledge-sharing program designed for the part-
nership covered almost all important aspects of zone planning and 
implementation, and public services delivery. Moreover, as the focus 
of SIP evolved over time, so too did the training needs. And the cur-
riculum was adapted to meet these needs, bringing in new subjects, 
such as environmentally friendly part development and BPO sector 
development.
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1994 On February 26, the representatives from the governments of China and 
Singapore signed the Agreement on Joint Development of Suzhou Indus-
trial Park. 
“Suzhou Industrial Park Development Co., Ltd.”, invested in by Suzhou 
Industrial Park Co., Ltd. (Chinese Consortium) and Singapore-Suzhou 
Township Development Pte. Ltd. (Singapore Consortium), was approved 
to establish in mid-1994. The total amount of investment was US$100 mil-
lion. The registered capital was US$50 million, in which Singapore consor-
tium invested US$32.50 million that accounted for 65 percent and China 
consortium invested US$17.50 million that accounted for 35 percent.
On September 2, Jiangsu Provincial Government issued a notification on 
accelerating SIP construction, asking all government departments to put 
SIP development at the top of their work agenda and give full support.
In November, the company changed its name to “China-Singapore Suzhou 
Industrial Park Development Co., Ltd.”
 October 12, an office was established to prepare for the establishment of 
SIP Subadministration of Customs.
On November 18, the master land plan for phase 1 was approved.
1995 On January 5, 19 departments, including SEZs Office of State Council, set 
up on-site offices in SIP.
On February 21, Suzhou Industrial Park Administration Commission 
(SIPAC) was established.
On August 1, the Customs Regulation on Supervision over Exports and 
Imports in SIP was enacted.
On December 27, SIP was granted preferential treatment of Special Eco-
nomic Zones in terms of import tariffs.
 CSSD increased the total amount of investment from US$100 million to 
US$150 million.
(continued next page)
Appendix 5.B  SIP Timeline and Major Milestones 
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1996 CSSD company increased the total amount of investment to US$300 mil-
lion and increased the registered capital to US$100 million. The sharehold-
ing structure remained unchanged.
On October 12, the Steering Committee announced that the phase 1 of 8 
square kilometers were to be completed by end of 1997. 
1997 On March 16, Suzhou municipal government approved the Provision on 
SIP Provident Funds Management.
1998 On September 1, the second-class land port was opened in SIP.
1999 On January 1, SIP Local Tax Administration was established.
On May 12, SIP Subadministration of Customs was formally in operation.
On June 28, China and Singapore signed a Memorandum of Understand-
ing on the Development of SIP. It states that Chinese and Singaporean 
consortium would flip its stake on January 1, 2001. After the adjustment, 
the major responsibility of management of CSSD would be transferred 
from the Singaporean side to the Chinese side. 
2000 On September 5, Suzhou municipal government called for mobilizing all 
resources and pushing forward the development construction of SIP.
2001 In line with the spirit of the Memorandum of Understanding on the 
Development of SIP reached on June 28, CSSD adjusted the investment 
proportion of China and Singapore on January 1, 2001. The investment 
proportion of Chinese consortium was adjusted from 35 percent to 65 
percent, and that of the Singapore consortium was adjusted from 65 per-
cent to 35 percent. After the adjustment, the Chinese side took over the 
major responsibility for management.
January 10, SIP bonded zone for export processing was in operation.
March 23, Suzhou municipal government launched the development of 
phase 2 and phase 3 of SIP.
On October 28, the state-owned land-use right was auctioned for the 
first time.
(continued next page)
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2002 CSSD completed the capital enlargement and injection in August 2005. 
The registered capital was increased to US$125 million. Three new share-
holders were attracted: Hong Kong and China Gas Investment Ltd., CPG 
Corporation Pte. Ltd., and Suzhou New District Hi-Tech Industrial Co., Ltd.
2003 On December 9, SIP Intelligent Property Right Protection Center was in 
operation.
 On March 31, SIP People’s Court and People’s Procuratorate were in 
operation.
2007 In April, SIP became a pilot of National High and New Technology Zone.
In May, SIP became a demonstration zone for service outsourcing.
2008 On January 15, the SIP Integrated Free Trade Zone (the first one in China) 
was in operation and customs set up an office in the zone. 
 On June 29, CSSD joint stock company founding meeting was held and 
the joint stock company was established on June 30.
Source: Authors.
Notes
 1. This is equivalent to more than one-tenth of the total land area of 
Singapore.
 2. The initial cooperation area was 70 square kilometers and there were five 
townships at the outset of SIP. Later the cooperation area was expanded 
to 80 square kilometers and the five townships were combined into three 
townships.
 3. The 80-square-kilometer Cooperative Zone was designed to met the standard 
of “Nine Utilities and Leveled Land” (the nine utilities being Roads, Power 
Supply, Water Supply, Gas Supply, Steam Supply, Sewage System, Storm 
Water Drainage, Telecommunication, Cable Television), meaning it was fully 
prepared and serviced, ready for development of operating infrastructure.
 4. Xinsu Industrial Development was set up to develop and operate ready-built 
factories in the park. These are Temasek Holdings (US$4.14 million), JTC 
International (US$16.54 million), Keppel Land (US$10.33 million), and 
Sembawang Industrial (US$10.33 million). Three companies have additional 
stakes in Gasin (Suzhou) Property Development Co. Ltd., a company set up 
to develop residential property in the SIP: Temasek Holdings (US$4.23 
China-Singapore (Suzhou) Industrial Park: Lessons for Joint Economic Zone       125
million), JTC International (US$4.23 million), and Keppel Land (US$5.29 
million). 
 5. “Software” in this context refers to knowledge—the term is intended to con-
trast with the “hardware” of infrastructure, which is at the core of the com-
mercial partnership.
 6. This site initially was offered to Singapore for development of SIP.
 7. For instance, current Minister (Prime Minister’s Office) Lim Swee Say was 
the first director of the Singapore SPO, and former Minister of State for Trade 
and Industry Chan Soo Sen was the first chief executive officer of the joint 
venture CSSD.
 8. SIP’s approval limit subsequently was capped in a State Council decree issued 
in 2002, but the approval limit has since increased.
 9. After the success of the scheme in SIP, it has since been extended to 20 other 
cities.
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Introduction
Paralleling the rapid development of SEZs in recent decades has been the 
development of regional trade agreements (RTAs)1 to promote trade and 
economic integration. As of February 2010, a total of 457 RTAs have been 
notified to the WTO, out of which 266 are already in force. These num-
bers are expected to continue to rise.
SEZs and RTAs are policy tools that promote trade and investment of 
countries and regions. When successful, SEZs generate significant local 
employment, increase exports, and accelerate economic growth. 
Meanwhile, successful RTAs contribute to increased trade among mem-
ber countries and promote regional integration more broadly. When the 
two initiatives exist simultaneously, they have the potential to generate 
significant synergies. Specifically, by lowering barriers to regional trade 
and facilitating the potential for realizing scale economies in regional 
production, RTAs stimulate investment by both domestic and foreign 
firms. By providing serviced land, infrastructure, and an improved 
SEZs in the Context of Regional 
Integration: Creating Synergies 
for Trade and Investment
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 regulatory environment, SEZs lower the cost and risk to firms in under-
taking such investments. In addition, the growth of intraregional trade 
may create opportunities for specialized zones, for example, focusing on 
logistics or cross-border trade.
Although SEZs have the potential to facilitate regional synergies, RTAs 
often face challenges in incorporating SEZs into their regulatory frame-
works. This is particularly true in the case of traditional EPZs. This chal-
lenge stems from the fact that although RTAs represent bilateral or 
multilateral instruments, SEZs are, in all cases to date, instruments by 
which an individual country promotes investment and exports, the for-
mer potentially in competition with their RTA partners. In particular, 
when SEZ programs provide enterprises with tariff-related incentives, 
they trigger various issues in the context of RTAs. For example, they 
may create an incentive for “tariff-jumping”—that is, when a foreign 
firm decides to jump over the tariff wall to avoid trade costs (tariffs). 
This tariff-jumping might happen through investment of a physical 
presence in a member country (the traditional definition of tariff-
jumping), although in this case, the investment would be in an SEZ and 
not necessarily within the member country’s customs territory. But it also 
might happen without any physical presence at all, by using the SEZ as a 
bulwark to enter the customs territory. Specifically, because many SEZs 
allow duty-free entrance of inputs imported from outside of a territory, 
foreign (extra-RTA) goods could potentially enter the RTA free of duty 
through an SEZ, and then leak into the customs territory of other RTA 
member states. If a newly established RTA disallows exports from a mem-
ber country’s SEZ to the territory of other RTA member countries, how-
ever, the operation of existing SEZ investors may be affected substantially. 
Consequently, this may necessitate a reform of SEZ programs in member 
countries to prevent a large loss of investment. Furthermore, excluding 
SEZ investors from taking advantage of the RTA prevents member coun-
tries from realizing the full potential of these two trade and investment-
generating instruments and achieving effective regional integration. To 
leverage fully both of these policy tools, RTA member countries need to 
take a collaborative approach to harmonize their SEZ programs.
Despite the growing significance of both SEZs and RTAs, research on 
the connection between these two instruments of trade and investment 
has been limited. In practice, most RTAs take measures to prevent tariff-
jumping through SEZs. Yet, few efforts have been made to harmonize 
SEZ programs across member countries in some RTAs. Such collabora-
tion could generate considerable benefits by creating synergy between 
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SEZ and RTA and by acting as a step toward greater economic integra-
tion. This chapter aims to fill part of the research gap. In particular, the 
objectives of this chapter are (1) to discuss the implication of RTAs on 
SEZs and review experiences in various RTAs, including country-specific 
cases; and (2) to outline the potential opportunities that a harmonized 
approach toward SEZ initiatives might generate.
In the above framework, this chapter first reviews briefly the role, 
trend, and impact of RTAs, with particular attention to those of Sub-
Saharan Africa. Then, after laying out various types of issues arising from 
overlap of RTAs and SEZs with preferential tariff treatment, it reviews 
how RTAs have been managing these issues and draws lessons from case 
examples. Finally, it discusses how harmonizing SEZ programs, including 
but not limited to duty-free imports and fiscal incentives, within RTA 
member countries can help realize synergies between the two policy 
instruments and contribute to greater trade and investment generation 
and deeper economic integration.
Regional Trade Agreements
Introduction to RTAs
RTAs promote the expansion of trade between or among member 
countries by offering preferential access to certain products through the 
reduction (but not necessarily elimination) of tariffs. Under the WTO 
and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) principles of 
MFN treatment, any arrangements to offer zero or low rates of tariffs 
between two members would automatically require an extension of this 
treatment to all WTO members. GATT article XXIV, however, allows 
for a deviation from MFN principles, in the form of “regional trade 
agreements” (WTO 2009).
RTAs offer both static and dynamic benefits to member countries. At 
the firm level, by removing or reducing trade barriers, RTAs lower the 
cost of exporting or (in the case of a free trade agreement) essentially 
expand the size of the “domestic market.” They also provide export- 
oriented producers with access to lower cost and possibly higher quality 
inputs than might have been available in the domestic market (or through 
imports from alternative sources). At the level of the wider economy, 
RTAs facilitate industrial restructuring, resulting in higher scale, more 
specialized, and competitive producers. The procompetitive effect of 
reducing barriers to cross-border trade and investment results in the least 
productive firms exiting the market, merging with or being acquired by 
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larger or more productive firms, and contributing in time to greater pro-
duction scale and lower costs, with competition ensuring that the savings 
are passed on in the form of lower prices (Baldwin, forthcoming). From 
the perspective of economic development, RTAs can facilitate industrial-
ization and specialization. In small markets (as is the case in many coun-
tries of Sub-Saharan Africa), the requirement for firms to cover their 
fixed costs places strict limits on the degree of specialization that is pos-
sible. By expanding the scale of the accessible market, RTAs therefore 
enable local firms to specialize while maintaining sufficient economies of 
scale. Specialization then becomes another source of competitiveness—a 
virtuous circle is created.
For firms, one of the most fundamental implications of RTAs is that 
they turn regional export markets into “virtual” domestic markets. 
Although this creates significant opportunities, for firms that are based 
inside SEZs (particularly those inside traditional EPZs that combine 
duty-free import and fiscal incentives with restrictions on sales to the 
domestic market), it may also mean a loss of their privileged position in 
selling to regional markets vis-à-vis firms based outside the zones. 
Unlike SEZs, which have historically targeted foreign investors,2 RTAs 
benefit businesses regardless of the source of capital. As discussed, 
RTAs should facilitate the ability of local firms to exploit economies of 
scale, specialize and become more sophisticated, and start exporting in 
the regional market. It is this balance between foreign and local inves-
tors and exporters that creates the tension in the relationship between 
SEZs and RTAs.
Trends in Development of RTAs
Although more countries join the WTO, the creation of RTAs also has 
been increasing at an accelerating speed, as illustrated in figure 6.1. In 
2009, the number of RTAs notified to the WTO reached its historical 
record of 37 cases. As of February 2010, 457 cumulative cases have been 
notified, of which 266 are in force. These include bilateral and multilat-
eral reciprocal preferential trade agreements, including free trade agree-
ments (FTAs), customs unions, partial scope agreements, and economic 
integration agreements. Among these, FTAs account for the majority.
Should the Doha Round ever reach successful completion, it should 
be expected to curtail the need for RTAs. Yet, many analysts predict that 
the number of RTAs will continue to grow, at least in the short term. 
One reason is that some agreements already are signed or under nego-
tiation and will come in effect soon. But it can also be attributed to the 
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RTAs’ capacity to address multiple dimensions of economic and other 
regional concerns that cannot be covered within the WTO framework. 
Many countries are members of more than one RTA, some RTAs are 
subgroups of larger groups, and many regional trade blocs negotiate a 
further RTA or Economic Partnership Agreement with another regional 
bloc. All of these aim for greater regional integration. Yet, they also add 
complexity to trade relationships, as each RTA tends to have its own set 
of rules and regulations, which may create contradictions and com-
plexities in managing overlapping relationships. In the case of SEZs, for 
example, it may be that different trade agreements specify a different 
treatment of SEZs.
Sub-Saharan Africa is not an exception in this regard. Figure 6.2 exhib-
its the current landscape of RTAs in Africa and Middle East.
Figure 6.2 Network of Plurilateral Groupings in Africa and Middle East
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A decomposition of RTA participants by the level of economic devel-
opment reveals another interesting trend. Increasing numbers of newly 
signed RTAs involve both industrial and developing countries, with RTAs 
among industrial countries growing almost fourfold between 2005 and 
2009. RTAs involving both industrial and developing countries account 
for more than two-thirds of the cumulative number of RTAs under nego-
tiation and signed as of February 2010.
Increasing numbers of RTAs, especially since the early 2000s, go 
beyond the simple agreements on trade. They include rules and measures 
to create harmonized frameworks of various cross-border policies among 
participating members. Such rules and measures typically relate to cus-
toms administration, intellectual property, competition policy, technical 
barriers to trade, sanitary and phytosanitary agreements, government 
procurement, and investment. In this context, policies regarding SEZs 
are also referred to in several agreements, including the East African 
Community (EAC) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa (COMESA).
The Performance of RTAs
The primary, short-term objective of RTAs is to increase trade and invest-
ment as a result of providing access to a larger market. But given that 
many countries participate in various RTAs with different degrees of lib-
eralization, they may create additional complexity and, ironically, may 
adversely affect trade relations.
The performance of RTAs in promoting trade has varied around the 
world. Several RTAs signed in the 1990s appear to have contributed to 
significant growth in intraregional trade, including the European 
Economic Community, the Association of Southeast Nations (ASEAN) 
Free Trade Area (AFTA), the Andean Community, and the South Asian 
Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA). All of the member countries experi-
enced an increased share of intra-RTA trade to total trade following the 
trade liberalization in the region. But other RTAs, including the 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the Central American 
Common Market (CACM), actually experienced a stagnant or declin-
ing share of intra-RTA trade after the implementation of the agree-
ment. Finally, in some RTAs, significant growth in trade in the initial 
years following the agreement later gave way to declining trade after a 
certain period. These include NAFTA, the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC), the Closer Economic Relations Agreement between Australia 
and New Zealand, and the Economic and Monetary Community of 
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Central Africa (CEMAC). The evolution of the intra-RTA trade is illus-
trated in figure 6.3, along with the indications of RTA implementation 
and enlargement. When assessed in terms of intratrade’s contribution 
to GDP, however, the results have been promising for most RTAs. 
Except in EFTA, all of the major RTAs experienced growth in the ratio 
of intra-RTA trade (export and import) to GDP since 1980s (Acharya, 
Crawford, Maliszewska, and Renard 2011).
Various factors determine the effectiveness of RTAs. Coverage and the 
degree of liberalization in the agreement appear to be among the most 
important. In addition, many successful RTAs go beyond simple agree-
ments on tariffs and address comprehensive trade facilitation measures, 
such as harmonized procedures and rules on behind-border procedures, 
investment, and intellectual property rights. Also, RTAs appear to be 
likely to yield a greater result when they are designed to align with over-
all economic reforms of member countries. RTAs that fail to get imple-
mented fully tend to be less successful, as do those with overlapping rules 
of origin and tariff schedules, which complicate trade relations and pre-
vent member countries from integrating into global value chains. These 
findings on RTA success factors suggest an important implication for SEZ 
programs—that is, that harmonization and simplification of SEZ pro-
grams likely is crucial in the context of RTAs.
Implication of RTAS for SEZs
RTAs have, by and large, been successful in promoting trade among mem-
bers, but the existence of SEZs in countries within RTAs sometimes has 
been problematic. This section will first discuss the reasons why SEZs and 
RTAs can sit uneasily together. It then reviews how RTAs, particularly 
those in Africa, have responded to these issues. Although SEZs vary sig-
nificantly in objectives, form, and function, those that are most problem-
atic in the context of RTAs are those that provide preferential tariff 
treatment based on export performance. This is most commonly the case 
in traditional EPZs.
Why is it an Issue?
The issues arising from the coexistence of RTAs and SEZs relate to trade 
triangulation, competitiveness of local producers, promotion of regional 
economic integration, and competitive positioning. This section discusses 
each of these in turn.3
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Figure 6.3 Evolution of the Share of Intra-PTA Imports in Total Imports, 1970–2008
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Trade triangulation. The primary concern for RTA members regarding 
SEZs is the potential for trade triangulation. If a product processed under 
a preferential duty scheme of an SEZ is allowed to enter into the customs 
territory of an RTA member as an originating product, it opens the possi-
bility that any product not originating in an RTA may enter the RTA free 
of duties through the SEZ. This could happen, for example, if a product 
from Country A was shipped into a firm located in an SEZ in Country B 
and subsequently was relabeled as “Made in Country B” or received a cer-
tificate of origin from Country B. In that case, the product could enter the 
customs territory of Country B’s RTA (and therefore the markets of all 
other countries in the RTA) with little to no value added within the RTA. 
This would infringe on the tariff collection policies of RTA members and 
potentially could erode the RTA’s bloc against extraterritory countries.4
From the perspective of RTA member governments, a second problem 
with trade triangulation is that it has the potential to undermine FDI 
opportunities in the territory. If an RTA prohibits the duty-free entry of 
SEZ-processed products, foreign suppliers of inputs to SEZ operators 
may consider setting up an operation in the territory so that their custom-
ers and thus themselves can take advantage of the expanded market 
access resulting from the RTA. But when duty-free entry is possible 
through an SEZ, foreign suppliers may have less incentive to invest in a 
new operation in the territory.
Competitiveness of local producers. A producer operating under an SEZ 
program typically benefits from preferential duty schemes, including but 
not limited to drawbacks and suspensions of duties on imported equip-
ment and inputs. A local producer who pays full import duties on 
imported equipment and inputs will therefore be at a disadvantage 
against an SEZ operator if products processed under the SEZ program 
can enter the RTA’s local market as originating products. In addition, the 
financial incentives that may be available to SEZ-based producers (again, 
particularly those based in traditional EPZs) often go beyond those 
related to import duties. In many cases, these incentives are granted par-
tial or total exemption of direct and indirect taxes temporarily or perma-
nently, often on the condition that their export performance meets a 
required threshold. Such special incentives for SEZ operators also put 
local non-SEZ producers at a disadvantage if products from the SEZs are 
allowed to enter local markets free of duty.5
Promotion of regional economic integration. Placing local suppliers at a 
disadvantage against SEZ-based operators also may pose a threat to the 
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effectiveness of the RTA in promoting one of its primary objectives—i.e., 
regional economic integration—by hindering interindustrial integration 
across member countries. If SEZ-based operators, including those engaged 
in trading of foreign equipment and inputs, are allowed to sell their prod-
ucts to local producers in RTA member countries, they risk crowding out 
immature local suppliers.6 Thus, local producers, even with greater access 
to suppliers in another member country of the RTA, may choose to pur-
chase foreign inputs through SEZ-based operators, who may be able to 
offer both a cost and a quality advantage. On the one hand, this should 
improve the competitiveness of local producers (through their access to 
higher quality, lower cost inputs) at least in the short term; on the other 
hand, it may curtail the effectiveness of the RTA in nurturing local sup-
pliers and promoting local vertical industrial linkages.
Competitive positioning of the SEZ. The flip side to promoting regional 
integration is that firms based inside the SEZs may suffer a deterioration 
of the relative advantages they enjoyed before the RTA. Specifically, as 
many of the fiscal benefits provided in traditional EPZs are linked directly 
to exports (or at least dependent on the firm serving export markets), the 
RTA essentially turns what were regional export markets for these firms 
into “domestic markets.” This not only puts these firms on a more level 
playing field in terms of market access versus non-zone-based firms, but 
also may have implications for zone-based firms to maintain the export 
requirements on which their incentives are based. The implication is that 
this market access potentially reduces some of the advantages of being 
based in the SEZs, and thus has implications not only for the zone-based 
firms but also for existing zone developers and managers (which, in many 
countries, is the government).
The Response of RTAs to Tariff-Related Issues
RTAs have taken various approaches in response to the problematic issues 
of SEZs. In particular, most RTAs have implemented a system to avoid strict 
duty-free entry of products processed under SEZ schemes, although the 
degree of stringency varies from one RTA to another. This section explores 
the main approaches taken by RTAs in controlling the entry of SEZ-
processed products into the RTA territory. It then reviews some cases in 
which RTAs responded to the needs of particular countries, as well as cases 
in which RTA member countries reacted to an RTA’s policy on SEZs.
Major approaches. Most RTAs take measures to prevent the products 
processed in SEZ from freely entering into the territory, but how they 
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achieve this and how restrictive they are varies widely. Most RTAs do 
so either by establishing a special rule on the treatment of products 
processed in SEZs of RTA member countries or by applying rules of 
origin that are generally applicable to products processed anywhere in 
the RTA.
Special clause for SEZ-processed products. Many RTAs set out a special 
clause to stipulate how the goods from SEZs in member countries should 
be treated in the context of the RTA. Examples include the EAC customs 
union and the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU, or 
UEMOA from its French name). Many of these RTAs establish an article 
to address specifically the entry of SEZ-processed products into the prin-
cipal protocol of trade or an additional protocol, although some unions 
set a rule in the annexes of the trade agreement. The most stringent rule 
takes the form of complete prohibition of the entry of products processed 
under SEZ programs into the RTA territory. NAFTA is the only major 
RTA that applies such stringent rules—this agreement was implemented 
over a seven-year transitional period through 2001.
All other RTAs reviewed in this study that include a special clause 
on SEZ-processed products stipulate that such products may not ben-
efit from the status as an originating product. Unlike rules of origin, 
this rule usually applies regardless of the level of local content of 
products. There are some variations in how RTAs define the products 
subject to the special clause. Some RTAs refer to goods processed in 
SEZs, whereas others describe these goods as goods processed under 
special tariff regimes. None of the RTAs reviewed in this study refers 
to whether the MFN status would apply to SEZ-processed products 
that cannot benefit from the status as an originating product. Yet, in 
practice, these products that do not carry a certificate of origin are 
subject to normal tariff schedules.
Many RTAs, although not all, set up exceptions to this rule in various 
dimensions. For example, some RTAs accept products processed in SEZs 
as originating products if import duties are paid on the inputs of these 
products. In Africa, WAEMU adopts this type of exception rule. WAEMU 
also has a unique exception rule that SEZ-processed products can be 
granted the status as an originating product if the import duties applied 
on their inputs are greater than those that would be applied on finished 
goods. Another type of exception, such as that in the RTA agreement 
between Central America and the Dominican Republic, allows for the 
entry of SEZ-processed products under the same terms as the host 
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 country if the SEZ allows the entry of such products into their own 
domestic market.
Rules of origin. Many RTAs that do not establish a specific clause for the 
treatment of products from SEZs simply apply rules of origin. Rules of 
origin is a standard and widely used method of avoiding trade deflection 
or tariff-jumping in cases in which a product enters into the trade area 
through a low or no-tariff member country to exploit the duty-free 
nature of the RTA. To some extent, rules of origin can restrict the entrance 
of SEZ-processed products because SEZ operators generally have a rela-
tively high import ratio and thus may not meet the rules-of-origin 
requirement. Yet, when the local content requirement is sufficiently low, 
SEZ operators still can benefit from both duty-free import (SEZ) and 
duty-free access to a greater market (RTA). For example, COMESA 
applies relatively loose rules of origin and it allows up to 60 percent of 
extraterritory inputs.7 Under such a generous rule, many SEZ operators 
may be able to take advantage of both SEZ and RTA, placing local pro-
ducers at disadvantage.8 Conversely, stringent rules of origin, such as 
those proposed at the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) Free Trade Area, also can be problematic. When rules are too 
strict, local producers are at a competitive disadvantage against foreign 
producers because they are forced to purchase costly local inputs. In an 
extreme case, foreign producers may be able to sell products at a cheaper 
price than an RTA’s local producers, especially when external tariff rates 
for finished goods are not so high (Flatters 2002).
No rule. Among those RTAs reviewed in this study, a few have neither a 
special clause on SEZ-processed goods nor rules of origin. In most RTAs, 
however, the SEZ issue has been raised as a concern. In such cases, either 
a special clause or rules of origin or both are being discussed. These 
include the agreement between Dominican Republic and the Caribbean 
Community, in which case a special agreement on the treatment of prod-
ucts from free zones has been proposed. The proposed arrangements 
include (1) products from SEZs must not enjoy additional advantages to 
those they now enjoy in the different customs territories, and (2) they 
must enjoy no less favorable treatment than what they now enjoy in 
reciprocal trade (Granados 2003).
Figure 6.4 summarizes the classification of various tariff-related mea-
sures taken by RTAs discussed above. Appendix 6.B contains a list of how 
various RTAs treat SEZ-processed goods.
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Country- and Region-Specific Cases
In some cases, the incompatibility of a country’s existing SEZ program 
with the rules under a newly established RTA constitutes a significant 
impediment to the country’s trade and investment potential. The responses 
of countries and of trade blocs to these challenges have varied consider-
ably, depending on factors such as the region, government’s leadership, and 
the importance of intra-RTA trade for existing SEZ operators. In some 
countries, such as Mexico under NAFTA, governments modified their 
zone policy to overcome such challenges and grandfathered in existing 
investors. In other countries, such as Uruguay under the Southern 
Common Market (Mercosur), in the absence of any significant govern-
ment policy initiatives to redress the challenges, industries evolved to 
adjust themselves to the new environment. In some cases, an RTA has 
allowed for temporary exceptions to consider country-specific circum-
stances (e.g., SADC). Following is a brief review of some of these country- 
or region-specific cases.
Mexico. NAFTA, which came into force in January 1994, set a strict 
prohibition on the entry of goods processed under SEZ schemes, within 
a seven-year transitional period. At this same time, Mexico’s exports from 
the maquila program had increased substantially, reaching 41 percent of 
the country’s total exports and accounting for 1.3 million jobs by 1998. 
With most products from maquila exported to the United States, it was 
critical for the Mexican government to find a solution to comply with the 
NAFTA requirement without dampening fast-growing industries. As a 
part of the policy response, Mexico established the Sectoral Promotion 
Program. This program grants registered companies MFN tariff prefer-
ences, which are 5 percent or less in most cases, on more than 5,000 
inputs used in production. Companies engaged in specified industries9 
are eligible to register for and benefit from this program. Critically, this 
preferential tariff treatment is not contingent on export performance, and 
it applies equally to exporters and to companies who sell to the domestic 
market, thus ensuring that it is in compliance with NAFTA. This is a suc-
cessful case in which a country managed to comply with an RTA’s strin-
gent rule on export-based special incentives by shifting from an 
export-oriented program to a sector-focused one (Granados 2003).
Uruguay. Facing a similar challenge with its participation in Mercosur, 
in 1994, Uruguay had little scope to restructure its incentives regime. 
Under Mercosur’s Decision 8, goods processed or entered into SEZs are 
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treated as extraterritory products and thus are subject to external tariffs 
and are not granted certificates of origin. Although a transitional period 
was allowed for the Manaos free zone in Brazil and the Tierra del Fuego 
free zone in Argentina (because of their location in “lagging” peripheral 
regions), Uruguay could not secure such an exemption for its SEZs. The 
Uruguayan government did not take a particular initiative to mitigate the 
impact of Decision 8 on existing SEZ operators. Thus, SEZ operators 
were forced to adapt to new rules and find a way to survive. Within a few 
years, the nature of activities in the SEZ had changed considerably, refo-
cusing toward the changing comparative advantage of Uruguay within 
the region. Specifically, firms began focusing on offshoring (including 
financial services) and logistics activities, positioning the zone as a gate-
way into Mercosur for firms based outside of the regional bloc. By 2005, 
only 27 percent of exports from SEZ operators in Uruguay were destined 
to Mercosur. This shift was supported by a later government policy, 
which responded to the evolution of SEZ activities by endorsing a tax 
reform to allow all types of offshore activities in SEZ and by granting 
some incentives, including the elimination of accounting requirements 
for companies whose assets are all offshore (Granados 2003; Malaver 
2009). Thus, despite a pessimistic prospect of SEZ continuity after the 
launch of Mercosur, SEZ operators in Uruguay adapted to the new envi-
ronment and some of them now generate high incomes. Yet, unlike the 
Mexican case, its development is parallel to the regional integration under 
Mercosur, and no synergy exists between the RTA and SEZ programs.
Kenya. The EAC customs union, which came into effect in 2005, clearly 
excludes SEZ-processed goods from benefiting from the status as origi-
nating products. Among five member countries, only Kenya had the 
potential to be affected immediately, because it is the only country that 
had established a sizable SEZ program at the signing of the customs 
union. Most current users of SEZs are not affected by Kenya’s integration 
into EAC customs union either, because their major export destinations 
are outside of the EAC (mainly to the United States and Europe). Thus, 
Kenya’s SEZ program has not been forced to address reform, so far. 
However, there is no guarantee that the impact will remain limited in the 
future. Kenya’s full integration to EAC customs union is likely to change 
the economic rationale of potential investors, leading to more invest-
ments targeting the large EAC market. Indeed, some investors in the 
SEZs are already requesting Kenyan authority to loosen the current rule 
that requires all SEZ firms to export at least 80 percent of their  output 
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and allow them to sell more to the EAC market (Manchanda 2010). The 
current request does not relate to the treatment of tariffs on finished 
goods entering into EAC territory, but rather to the minimum export 
requirement to reside in SEZ areas. However, once the SEZ tenants are 
allowed to sell more to EAC territory, the question of the tariff on the 
goods processed in the SEZ will undoubtedly arise as an issue among 
EAC member countries.10
SADC. Although SADC does not set specific rules governing the entry 
of SEZ-processed goods, it has proposed restrictive rules of origin, requir-
ing high local content for any import into the RTA territory to take 
advantage of duty-free access. At the same time, however, some excep-
tions are granted to accommodate the circumstances of member coun-
tries and sectors. In particular, it allowed temporary special arrangements 
for textiles and garments exports from Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, 
and Zambia to the partner countries of the Southern African Customs 
Union (SACU) (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and 
Swaziland). This special arrangement, which expired in 2009, enabled the 
manufacturers in the four countries to continue procuring fabrics from 
outside SADC for duty-free sales to SADC, during which time the coun-
tries were expected to develop their local fabric-producing capacity. This 
arrangement included all textiles and garments produced in SEZs. It pro-
vides an example in which an RTA flexibly adjusted its rules considering 
the significance of the industry—in this case, textiles and garments—for 
some member countries as well as the volume of its trade within the 
region. Although the policy does not focus specifically on SEZs, a similar 
approach could be taken, by which an RTA establishes a special arrange-
ment for SEZ-processed goods. This approach could be especially helpful 
when a practical approach is necessary to allow member countries time 
to adjust their national policies and to enable existing investors to restruc-
ture their business under the new RTA context.
Harmonization of SEZs: Beyond Tariff Issues
The previous section discussed how RTAs take various measures to con-
trol the entry of the goods processed in SEZs. Yet, this approach merely 
constitutes a passive response to the issues arising from the overlap of 
SEZ and RTA. It addresses potential risks caused by the SEZs, but it 
misses out on the potential to develop synergies between the SEZ and 
RTA instruments, specifically to enable SEZs to leverage and promote 
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regional integration under the context of RTAs. In practice, few RTAs 
have made efforts toward harmonization of SEZ programs among mem-
ber countries, although some discussions and initiatives have been 
launched, for example, by EAC and COMESA.
In several potential areas, however, the complementarities between 
SEZ and RTA could be better exploited, including the following:
• Harmonizing regulations
• Taking collective action to lower or remove financial incentives (e.g., 
general investment incentives)
• Establishing strategic frameworks as a region, such as the following:
° Joint marketing of region as investment destination
° Creation of industrial linkages among SEZs in RTA
° Specialization of SEZs based on comparative advantage relative to 
other members in RTA
This section explores the opportunities that harmonized SEZ programs 
might generate for RTA member countries and the challenges in doing so. 
The discussion in this section is most relevant for RTAs within the con-
text of regional integration agreements; it will be less relevant for bilateral 
or multilateral trade agreements that have no integration component or 
that involve countries that are not proximate.
Regulatory Framework
Having simple, straightforward regulations helps a country to promote 
investment by lowering investors’ costs of search and compliance. The 
same logic applies to the SEZ-related regulations within an RTA. When 
investors consider exploring a new market or opening a new production 
site, they will research and compare the investment-related laws, includ-
ing SEZ regulations across all potential locations in a chosen region. They 
are likely to assess various factors, including the existence and details of 
the SEZ law, the requirements for establishing operations in the zone, the 
fiscal and nonfiscal incentives available, how application and registration 
processes are managed, and whether a competent zone authority has 
been established. Having clear SEZ rules and consistent definitions of 
terminologies across member countries reduces the search costs for inves-
tors, allowing them to focus more on strategic factors, such as target 
customer base, suppliers, distribution network, and so on. More attractive 
regulations, infrastructure, or incentives may help a country to win an 
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investment over its neighbors, but harmonized SEZ regulations across an 
RTA may be a powerful tool through which to compete against other 
regions to ensure that an investment comes into the RTA. Perhaps most 
important, such a harmonized approach then allows SEZs in each mem-
ber country to compete for an incoming investment based on their own 
sources of comparative advantage.
Coordination among member countries on regulations yields another 
benefit, especially to the government whose credibility is perceived as 
questionable by investors. By binding together within the RTA, govern-
ments are less likely to change their regulations, as the cost of deviating 
from the RTA agreement may be higher than the benefits that would 
accrue from altering an individual regulation. This provides predictability 
to investors, which is critical to building a long-term, sustainable business 
base in the country.
Harmonizing regulations is, of course, more easily said than done. 
Each country inevitably will have its own agenda. Even when some 
member countries are ready to simplify and harmonize the regional rules, 
others, especially those that are economically lagging, may see offering 
more favorable or liberal SEZ rules as a potential means of attracting 
investment and “catching up” to their neighbors. Also, each country has a 
different level of political and administrative capacity. Thus, it takes a 
long time for all parties to agree. One potential solution is to set a tran-
sitional period to allow each member to discuss the changes and their 
implications with existing investors, and adjust their national SEZ poli-
cies. Such efforts will not only help establish integrated SEZ rules but 
will also be a step toward harmonizing the overall investment laws 
among RTA member countries. Finally, countries without experience 
with SEZs can leverage the experiences of more advanced neighbors by 
consolidating their programs, although the caveat remains that the exist-
ing SEZ programs of advanced neighbors may not necessarily represent 
“best practice.”
Financial Incentives
Different structures and levels of financial incentives among SEZs of 
member countries pose further problems than simply adding search costs 
for investors. First, differences often involve export-performance-based 
conditions, which usually are incompatible with the RTA framework and 
with the WTO rules. Second, when member countries compete for 
investment by offering ever-greater financial incentives, they risk eroding 
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their tax bases without necessarily attracting more investment than they 
otherwise would—in effect, transferring rents directly to (usually multi-
national) investors.
Among various incentives, export-based incentives, a form of incen-
tives that most SEZs employ, are particularly problematic. As is clear 
from the discussion in the previous section, export-based tariff-related 
incentives prevent member countries from taking full advantage of 
potential synergies between RTA and SEZ programs. Such incentives 
motivate member countries to rule out the possibility of SEZ-processed 
products enjoying RTA benefits or, in extreme cases, they prohibit the 
entrance of such goods into the RTA territory altogether to prevent 
tariff-jumping.
As is the case with regulatory harmonization, removing or unifying 
financial incentives among member countries takes time, especially if 
some member countries have established SEZ programs in which many 
investors are already granted with permanent exemption or reduction of 
tariffs or other taxes. Even if a country currently does not have financial 
incentives for SEZ operators, it may feel pressure from potential and 
existing investors to establish one, particularly if many of its neighbors 
have them. Yet, the advantage of investment promotion through financial 
incentives should be balanced with the potential loss of a tax base as well 
as lost opportunities from synergies with RTAs. Also, by aligning the fac-
tors that are most evident and most frequently exposed to comparison 
(i.e., quantifiable financial incentives), member countries can establish a 
foundation on which they can move forward to discuss strategic develop-
ment and integration on equitable terms. To remove the most problem-
atic form of financial incentives based on export performance, countries 
can learn from Mexico, which managed the participation in NAFTA by 
shifting incentive programs away from export-based ones to those based 
on other type of performances, such as investment amount or employ-
ment generation.
Strategic Framework
Ideally, an RTA would establish an integrated strategic framework for SEZ 
programs of member countries, not only establishing rules of the game 
with respect to financial incentives, but more broadly, enabling them to 
complement each other’s resources and capacities and cooperate to 
achieve shared goals.
An integrated strategic framework can take several forms. One such 
form is to develop regional manufacturing or service linkages, using the 
SEZs in the Context of Regional Integration       147
SEZs as hubs. By combining and coordinating efforts to strategically fos-
ter SEZ-based clusters that take advantage of complementary endow-
ments of different member countries, member countries can help sectors 
leverage SEZ infrastructure and RTA depth to overcome limitations of 
scale and specialization. This might facilitate improved backward linkages 
in critical sectors like garments. Such integration of regional value chains 
within SEZs might also represent an important test case toward deeper 
regional economic integration.
Furthermore, in parallel to the “soft” elements of regional integration, 
such as trade agreements, many developing countries and their donors are 
placing vast resources on transportation infrastructure to connect regional 
producers to markets. Developing these regional industrial linkages 
through SEZs also makes sense in this context, if countries wish to lever-
age the improved transport corridors that allow smoother and more cost-
effective logistics within the region.
Cooperation on strategic framework can also take the form of cobrand-
ing and comarketing of SEZs in the region. Members of an RTA typically 
promote investment by advertising the potential to access the wide 
regional market. In this context, it would be natural (and certainly cost-
effective, particularly for small countries with limited investment promo-
tion budgets) also to consider advertising the region’s SEZs collectively as 
investment destinations.
Again, this is more easily said than done. On the one hand, SEZ pro-
grams are meant to be the pilot test for investment promotion policies for 
countries with limited resources and are intended to generate quick suc-
cesses. On the other hand, coordinating among countries takes time. 
Therefore, how to handle the balance between quick wins and long-term 
strategy and how to handle the transition from a stand-alone policy to a 
regional policy are critical issues when considering the harmonization of 
SEZ strategic frameworks.
Cases of SEZ Harmonization
While regional harmonization of SEZ policy remains in its infancy, fol-
lowing are brief descriptions of two regions—in Southeast Asia and in 
East Africa—in which some initiatives have been taken.
Growth triangles in Asia. In 1993, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand 
launched the subregional growth triangle—the “transnational export pro-
cessing zone”—to accelerate their subregion’s economic growth and indus-
trial transformation. As growth triangles create greater economies of scale 
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and allow firms to exploit complementarities and comparative advantages 
of member countries in various production factors, such as natural 
resources, low labor costs, and technology, they may offer greater potential 
to attract investments than standalone SEZ programs. In addition to the 
coordinated investment in infrastructure and human resources, the gov-
ernments of these three countries are trying to harmonize regulations 
governing investment, tax, land, labor and immigration, and customs to 
market this subregion effectively to investors. This growth triangle is fos-
tering economic expansion of participating regions through industrial 
linkages and by positioning the area as an integrated manufacturing base 
of various high value-added products. These linkages have contributed to 
developing advanced manufacturing as well as R&D capacity across the 
region. Many other subregions followed similar triangle initiatives, includ-
ing the growth triangle between Singapore, Johor in Malaysia, and Riau 
Island in Indonesia.11
Harmonization of export processing zones programs in EAC. As a rare 
example, the EAC customs union formed an extensive annex to establish 
a common regulatory framework on EPZ in the member countries. As 
Article 2 of the regulations state, they were created to ensure that the 
process regarding EPZ is “transparent, accountable, fair and predictable.” 
They first define the terminologies related to EPZs, including “EPZ” itself, 
“export,” and “duties and taxes,” so that these words are used consistently 
by all member countries. They also set out permitted activities in EPZs, 
define the establishment and function of competent authorities, stipulate 
how EPZ-processed goods are treated when entering into the territory, 
and identify how complaints are to be resolved.
The Investment Climate Advisory Services (CIC) of the World Bank 
Group is engaged by a multidonor facility to work with EAC to promote 
its regional trade in the region, and part of its work covers the advisory 
for SEZ programs. As of April 2009, CIC’s global SEZ team assessed the 
current SEZ programs in the region and made preliminary recommenda-
tions on harmonization to the EAC and host governments. In terms of 
spatial mapping, most of the region’s zones are located close to the major 
transport corridors. Given the considerable upgrading of these infra-
structure networks that facilitates smooth and cost-effective transport 
among SEZs, the CIC team suggested that the EAC countries consider 
developing regional linkages, because current manufacturers in SEZs 
have limited transactions among them and their capacity for specializa-
tion is limited. Other recommendations include jointly marketing SEZs 
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for priority sectors such as ICT considering the importance of sectors for 
all member countries as well as the small size and resources of each 
country. These are preliminary recommendations, and EAC member 
countries have not yet taken any significant steps to implement them. 
Yet, these countries have made first steps to unify the regulatory frame-
work and establish competent authorities that will have similar powers 
across member  countries. How effectively the EAC member states build 
on this common ground and integrate their SEZ program is likely to play 
an important role in their ability to take full advantage of the customs 
union and transport facilities to achieve greater regional integration, 
more effective trade and investment, and, ultimately, more rapid and 
sustainable growth.
Conclusion
When a country participates in an RTA, export-based preferential tariff 
treatment (a typical incentive granted under SEZ programs) poses prob-
lems such as tariff-jumping and raises concerns over local business com-
petitiveness. Because such preferential treatment tends to be granted for 
a certain period of time, these incentives cannot be removed immediately. 
Therefore, preventing duty-free entrance of SEZ-processed goods is prob-
ably a necessary measure as an immediate response to protect the effec-
tiveness of an RTA. Although it may be a best available temporary 
measure at the introduction of a RTA, more creative solutions may be 
appropriate in the longer term to avoid creating a mutually exclusive 
system between these two instruments of trade and investment: RTAs 
and SEZs. It would also be worthwhile for RTAs to consider options to 
provide exceptional treatment or a transitional period under special cir-
cumstances to allow a smoother transition to greater integration, as the 
case examples from NAFTA and SACU illustrated.
In addition to passive responses to these issues rising from RTAs and 
SEZs, RTA member countries should move forward to consider harmoniza-
tion of SEZ programs to further promote regional integration. Traditionally, 
SEZ have been employed as a country-specific policy instrument. Therefore, 
coordinating among member countries on regulatory framework, financial 
incentives, and strategic framework of SEZ program can be a challenging 
and time-consuming task. Such collective efforts have the potential not 
only to yield the short-term benefits in the form of trade and invest-
ment, but also to build collaboration toward deeper regional economic 
integration.
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Appendix 6.A Regulations and Handbooks of Regional Trade 
Agreements
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA)
• ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement, Cha-am, Thailand, February 26, 
2009
• Annexes of the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement, Cha-am, Thailand, 
February 26, 2009
• Protocol to Amend the Agreement on ASEAN Preferential Trading Ar-
rangement, Bangkok, December 15, 1995
• Agreement on the Common Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme for 
the ASEAN Free Trade Area, Singapore, January 28, 1992
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)
• COMESA Treaty
• Protocol on the rules of origin for products to be traded between the 
member states of the COMESA
East African Community (EAC)
• The EAC Customs Union Regulations, Annex VII on Export Processing 
Zones
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
• Treaty of the ECOWAS
• Protocol relating to the definition of the concept of products originat-
ing from member states of the ECOWAS
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
• The Customs Union of the GCC Member States, January 2003
Southern African Development Community (SADC)
• SADC FTA Handbook 2008
• Protocol on Trade
West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU, also UEMOA)
• Acte additionnel n° 04/96 / 1996
• Protocole additionnel n° III/ 2001
• Protocole additionnel n°I/2009
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Notes
 1. Multiple variants of regional trade agreements and terminologies are not 
always used consistently by different institutions and researchers. This report 
uses the generic term of “regional trade agreement” to refer to all reciprocal 
preferential agreements, including free trade agreements, customs unions, 
partial scope agreements, and economic integration agreements. For more 
detail, refer to Acharya, Crawford, Maliszewska, and Renard (forthcoming).
 2. Some SEZs, normally traditional EPZs, target foreign investors explicitly by 
setting the eligibility criteria of foreign capital. Others do not limit the zones 
to foreign investors, but other eligibility criterion often become too high a 
hurdle for domestic investors, especially those with limited capital. More 
recently established zones, particularly those under the more modern SEZ 
models, encourage domestic as well as foreign investment.
 3. Most of the discussion in this section is drawn from Granados (2003).
 4. Although erosion of the bloc constitutes one of the major reasons why 
RTAs takes measures against allowing the duty-free entry of SEZ-processed 
goods, a liberal trade policy would argue against any bloc attempting to 
raise trade barriers against countries outside the bloc. Such a barrier typi-
cally would lead to trade diversion and goes against the principles of “open 
regionalism.”
 5. WTO prohibits subsidies and other financial incentives that are conditional 
on export performance. Therefore, various schemes of SEZs also raise an issue 
for WTO accession and compliance. This chapter focuses on the discussion of 
SEZs and RTAs and leaves the discussion of WTO compatibility to other 
 literatures.
 6. Indeed, this “infant industry argument” is one of the primary contentions of 
many countries for maintaining tariffs on foreign producers. This is a contro-
versial argument, which various empirical research has both refuted and 
 supported.
 7. Although 60 percent is the general rule, the actual rule is more complex and 
depends on product categories.
 8. Taking advantage of COMESA’s rules of origin, South African juice makers 
process and package South African juice concentrate in a free zone in 
Mauritius for sale in the COMESA market. See box 4 of Flatters (2002). The 
example is cited as a successful case of investment generation through a lower 
requirement of local content. Yet, at the same time, this practice may be plac-
ing local juice producers at disadvantage.
 9. Eligible industries include electrical, electronic, furniture, toys and sporting 
goods, footwear, mining and metallurgy, capital goods, photographic, agricul-
tural machinery, various industries, chemicals, rubber and plastics, iron and 
steel, medicines and medical equipment, transport, automotive and vehicle 
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parts, paper and cardboard, leather and hides, textiles and clothing, chocolates 
and confectionary, and coffee.
 10. While it is considered in practice that 80 percent minimum export 
requirement may apply to SEZ operators, technically, it may not be the 
case when the EAC agreements are analyzed. Whereas the EAC Customs 
Protocol stipulates that an 80 percent minimum export requirement 
applies to any “export promotion scheme,” that is, economic benefit con-
tingent on export performance, it is not clear whether this rule applies to 
SEZs. First, the extraterritoriality of SEZs may make the export promotion 
argument irrelevant for SEZs. Second, analysis of the agreements, particu-
larly Part G of the EAC Customs Protocol, reveals that free ports and 
other special economic arrangement do not constitute an “export promo-
tion scheme.”
 11. See Landingin and Wadley (2005) and Australia Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade (2005) for more examples of Asian growth triangles.
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Moving from Static to Dynamic Gains: 
Can SEZs Deliver Structural Change?
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Introduction
One of the original pioneers of free zones (FZs), the Dominican Republic 
is probably the Western Hemisphere’s most widely recognized success 
story in the literature on free zones. Indeed, few other countries world-
wide have used the free zones program as effectively as an engine of 
diversification and growth. Fueled by the offshoring of the U.S. textile 
and garment industry (see box 7.1) and supported by preferential trade 
agreements and a favorable exchange rate policy, the FZs were principally 
responsible for the Dominican Republic’s shift away from a commodity-
oriented economy, with the manufacturing sector growing from just 18 
percent of GDP in the 1970s to 30 percent by the 2000s. GDP growth 
in the Dominican Republic has far exceeded the regional and global aver-
age in every decade since FZs were established. At its peak in 2003, FZ 
companies accounted for 7.5 percent of total GDP in the country. 
When Trade Preferences and Tax 
Breaks Are No Longer Enough: The 
Challenge of Adjustment in the 
Dominican Republic’s Free Zones
Jean-Marie Burgaud and Thomas Farole
C H A P T E R  7
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After rapid growth in FDI and exports throughout the 1980s and most 
of the 1990s (FDI, for example, grew 37 percent per year between 1994 
and 1999), over the past decade, the Dominican Republic has faced sig-
nificant threats to their FZ-based economic model. Between 1999 and 
2003, a rise in oil prices; global economic slowdown; the impact of 
September 11, 2001, on tourism; and the collapse of the second-largest 
Dominican private bank, Baninter, all contributed to slowing growth in 
the Dominican Republic economy. But for the FZ sector in particular, the 
end of the MFA and the growing dominance of Asian manufacturing 
threaten the future of the Dominican Republic’s textile and garments-
exporting sector, which is at the heart of the FZs. The program has 
Box 7.1
The Apparel Sector in the Dominican Republic
Since almost the start of the FZ program, and until the recent crisis, apparel was 
the star of Dominican Republic’s FZ, to the extent that it gave birth to several lead-
ing companies in the region. Bratex International, created in 1988, became the 
largest exporter of brassieres in Latin America and the Caribbean. The company, 
created in 1988, developed its own patent for a model of brassiere, which  required 
special equipment for its production, and reached an agreement with  DuPont for 
its commercialization. Interamericana Products International, started in 1985, 
 developed to become a full-package service provider by 1995. The company 
grew to include Claiborne, Lee, Levi’s, and Eddie Bauer among its clients. Finally, 
Grupo M became the largest apparel manufacturer in the Caribbean, employing 
up to 14,000 workers in the Santiago FZ and in the Dominican Republic. The com-
pany now employs only 4,000 in the Dominican Republic, but another 4,000 in a 
FZ the group created in Haiti (see box 7.3).
At its height, Dominican Republic’s FZs had about 5 percent market share in 
the United States. However, this has now fallen to around 2 percent. According to 
U.S. trade statistics (see http://otexa.ita.doc.gov/msr/catV1.htm), U.S. imports of 
Dominican apparel fell by 28 percent during the first eight months of 2009, com-
pared with same period of previous year—more than twice the rate of decline for 
U.S. imports overall and higher than the declines experienced by regional com-
petitors such as Nicaragua (11 percent), El Salvador (18 percent), Honduras 
(22 percent), and Guatemala (26 percent), all of which offer lower labor costs than 
the Dominican Republic.1
Source: Authors.
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 stagnated since 2004 in terms of its value added, with its subsequent 
contribution to national GDP halving in only five years.
In response to this stagnation, the government has attempted some 
policy reforms in the FZ sector and given policy priority to wider eco-
nomic competitiveness. Among other measures taken in recent years, 
customs procedures were streamlined, tariffs were reduced, import sur-
charges and export taxes were eliminated, and new legislation was 
adopted on government procurement, competition policy, and intellec-
tual property rights. On the trade policy side, the Dominican Republic 
signed the FTA among the Dominican Republic, Central America, and 
the United States (DR-CAFTA) and the economic partnership agree-
ment (EPA) between the European Union and the Caribbean Forum of 
African, Caribbean, and Pacific States. 
It appears, however, that the malaise in the FZ sector has deepened 
through the recent global economic crisis. Since the beginning of 2009, 
exports have declined considerably. Although there is some evidence of 
slowly increasing diversification in manufacturing and a shift to more 
value added production activities as well as services in the FZs, many 
argue that the FZ program is principally to blame for the economy’s 
overdependence on apparel manufacturing and its relative failure to 
adjust to changing comparative advantage. Indeed, the FZ’s export-ori-
ented growth model, which relied on cheap labor and trade preferences, 
was perhaps equipped to deliver jobs but not necessarily able to facilitate 
substantial poverty reduction or an evolutionary pattern of upgraded in 
the economy. Whether success will continue into the future, given the 
evidence of declining competitiveness in recent years, remains to be 
seen.
The Dominican Republic’s experience highlights the limitations of FZ 
programs that rely on sources of competitiveness that are unlikely to 
remain sustainable—specifically, low wages, trade preferences, and fiscal 
incentives. Although these all may offer valuable advantage in the short 
term, the Dominican Republic (like many countries who have embarked 
on export processing zones) failed to build competitiveness in parallel, 
through investments in education and skills, and through integration of 
FZ firms with the local economy. This chapter discusses briefly the his-
tory and achievements of the FZ program in the Dominican Republic. It 
focuses on the challenges that the program faces in light of declining 
competitiveness in traditional labor-intensive garment production, the 
government and FZ industry’s response, and the gaps in the long-term 
approach to these challenges.
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Free Zones in the Dominican Republic 
Like most countries in the region, the Dominican Republic followed 
import substitution policies from the 1960s, including protection of the 
domestic market and subsidies for domestic production. The economy 
remained highly specialized, based on primary agricultural products (e.g., 
sugar, bananas, and coffee) and mining. The launch of the Dominican 
Republic’s first FZ in 1969 was not part of a policy initiative to move 
away from imports substitution toward export-oriented diversification, as 
was the case in many countries that later adopted SEZs. Rather, it was a 
private initiative—led by the Gulf and Western company—in a specific 
context (see box 7.2). In any case, this initiative demonstrated that the 
Dominican Republic could develop competitive assembly operations 
under an FZ regime. In the 1970s, the government followed suit, opening 
a public zone in San Pedro de Macoris, with the main objective of gener-
ating employment. The private sector in Santiago—the second-largest 
Box 7.2
Gulf and Western Establishes the Dominican Republic’s 
First FZ in 1969 
The American conglomerate Gulf and Western purchased a sugar plantation and 
the Dominican Republic’s largest existing sugar mill—the Central Romana  (located 
in the town of La Romana in the southeast of the Dominican Republic)—in 1968. 
To avoid what they viewed as unsustainable wage demands by the workers in the 
mill, the company opened an industrial FZ nearby to provide wage-earning op-
portunities to the wives and families of those workers as well as to absorb labor 
that had been shed as part of their modernization of the mill. Gulf and Western 
lobbied the government in support of incentives, which were introduced into 
Law 299.2 To kick-start the zone, Gulf and Western transferred some of their own 
U.S.-based manufacturing subsidiaries into it. A number of U.S. companies fol-
lowed suit, setting up assembly plants in the La Romana Zone.
The results were impressive. Within a short period, the local economy experi-
enced major growth in employment. The towns of San Pedro and Santiago, also 
dependent on agricultural products (sugar, coffee, and tobacco) began to lobby 
the government to establish their own FZs in the early 1970s. The government 
approved both of these requests and the groundwork was laid for the major 
expansion of the FZ program by the 1980s.
Source: Derived from Schrank (2008).
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city in the Dominican Republic—also joined together to establish an FZ 
under the management of a nonprofit association. 
But during these initial years, the free zones remained very much 
enclaves, from both a physical and a policy perspective. Partly as a 
result, growth of zones during the period 1969 to 1983 remained rela-
tively slow. During those years, the four zones generated about 10,000 
jobs, primarily in the garment activity. But following the debt crisis in 
the early 1980s, the Dominican Republic began to liberalize its econ-
omy and shifted toward the promotion of nontraditional exports. 
Along with the growth of the tourism sector, key to this economic 
restructuring was the expansion of the free trade zone program. FZ 
development accelerated during the second half of the 1980s, as the 
country became a favored location for relocating factories (particularly 
in the apparel sector) to serve the U.S. market, and FDI rapidly flowed 
into the country. This growth was driven by several factors, including 
the following:
• Trade preferences: The U.S. CBI introduced in 1984 provided duty-free 
access to the United States for about 3,000 products, including 
 apparel. 
• Low wages: Linked to trade preferences, a huge wage arbitrage op-
portunity existed between the United States and Dominican Repub-
lic in the 1980s. Hourly compensation for semiskilled workers in 
export-manufacturing sectors in the Dominican Republic was only 6 
percent (US$0.79 per hour versus US$13.66 per hour) that of the 
United States in 1987 (Kaplinsky 1993). Even at this time, the 
 Dominican Republic’s wages were three times higher than in “low-
wage Asia,”3 which underscores the critical importance of trade pref-
erences and of FZ incentives in the competitiveness of the Dominican 
Republic from the beginning. Special provisions inside the FZs facili-
tated the Dominican Republic’s low-wage competitiveness. Although 
the FZ law states that the national labor law applies in FZs (including 
the requirement to make Social Security contributions), minimum 
wage4 is lower in the FZs and profit-sharing (compulsory in the 
 domestic market) is not required.
• Competitive exchange rate: A series of devaluations in the early 1980s, 
with a sharp devaluation in 1985 (resulting from floating the peso in 
relation in the dollar), depressed labor and other operating costs. 
• Fiscal incentives: Within the FZ environment, foreign investors could 
access generous incentives, including exemptions on corporate income 
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tax, import duties, value added tax,5 and property taxes. Tax exemp-
tions are valid for a period of 15 years for location in most zones; 
a special exemption period of 20 years is offered for developers and 
companies in free zones located in provinces on the Haitian border. 
Both periods may be extended on a company-by-company basis, upon 
petition to Consejo Nacional de Zonas Francas de Exportación or 
National Free Zones Council (CNZFE). FZ companies are required to 
export at least 80 percent of their production, although this restriction 
can be lifted in cases in which the product is not manufactured 
 domestically and if local inputs account for at least 25 percent of value. 
Box 7.3
Profile of the Dominican Republic’s Free Zones in 2010
As of the end of 2009, the Dominican Republic had 55 registered FZ industrial 
parks, 47 of which had active companies operating within them. The majority of 
these parks are clustered in two locations: outside the main city of Santo Domin-
go on the southern coast and outside the second-largest city, Santiago (de los 
Caballeros) in the Cibao Valley in the North-Central region.6 Few zones are located 
in the western half of the island, despite the incentives available for establishing 
and locating in zones along the Haitian border.
Among the zones there are 31 private parks, 21 public parks, and 3 parks that 
are operated as PPPs or through registered charities. Most of the public parks are 
run by a government agency, the Center for Industrial Development and Com-
petitiveness (Proindustria).7 Some 456 firms were operating in these parks, and 
110 single factory zones are registered across the country. Most of the parks are 
relatively small in size—indeed, the vast majority of the parks have a constructed 
area that is less than 5 hectares in size, with the largest park (Santiago) construct-
ed on only 35 hectares (and only five other parks with more than 10 hectares). 
More than half the parks have less than 5 companies operating within them; only 
a handful have more than 10 companies. 
A large majority of the companies operating in the FZs originate from the 
United States or the Dominican Republic. According to statistics from CNZFE, as 
of the end of 2008, 44 percent of zone companies were U.S. owned (and another 
3 percent were from Puerto Rico), with 32 percent having domestic ownership. 
The next largest investors are from the Republic of Korea (14 firms or 2.7 percent 
of the total), Spain (12 firms), and Holland (11 firms).
Source: Authors.
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Import duty is payable on all local sales; however, the valuation on 
which duty is payable excludes the value of local inputs. 
• Strong regulator: The Dominican Republic’s FZ program benefits from 
an effective regulator. The CNZFE was established in 1978. It reports 
directly to the presidency and is governed by a board of directors, which 
gives 50 percent representation and voting power to the private sector.
The FZs became the most dynamic engine of growth in the Dominican 
Republic’s economy during the 1980s and 1990s. Between 1985 and 
1989, the number of FZs more than tripled, from 6 to 19, the number of 
FZ companies rose from 146 to 220, and employment jumped from 
36,000 to nearly 100,000. The program continued to expand during the 
1990s, helped in part by the government enacting a comprehensive FZ law 
and regulations in 1990. By the end of the 1990s, the Dominican Republic 
had more than 50 operating industrial parks housing more than 500 com-
panies. In addition, more than 100 single factory zones, known as zonas 
francas especiales (ZFEs) have been established since the 1990 law. The 
program reached its peak in terms of employment (195,000) in 2000; this 
was equivalent to up to 10 percent of the country’s total employment. 
In the past decade, however, the zones have faced major challenges 
(see figure 7.1) related to competitiveness in the core textile and apparel 
Figure 7.1 Index of Growth (1995 = 100) in the Free Zone Program
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sector, which is maturing and no longer a particularly low-cost produc-
tion base for the U.S. market. Declining performance of the apparel sec-
tor began in 2001, with increasing competition from c ompanies 
established in Central American FZs, which has gathered pace since the 
MFA ended in 2005, and with subsequent competition from Asia. 
Employment in the FZs has declined some 35 percent since 2000. 
Yet despite this, exports have remained steady, as the result of some 
diversification in the FZ program over recent years. Less than one-third 
of FZ companies in the Dominican Republic now manufacture textiles 
and garments; other key manufacturing now includes shoes, leather 
goods, cigars, jewelry, pharmaceutical products, and electronic parts. 
Potentially more important has been the limited, but evident, growth 
in service activities within the FZs, including trading, call centers, and 
data processing.
Since 2009, however, the FZ program has experienced absolute decline 
across all sectors. According to the president of the Dominican 
Association of Free Zones (ADOZONA), the number of operating firms 
will decline to below 500 and more than 8,000 jobs were lost in the FZs 
during the first quarter of 2009 alone. The decline in exports is even 
steeper, at more than 20 percent annualized. Although this decrease is 
driven by the global economic crisis, it highlights more fundamental 
competitiveness issues that will remain a major challenge to the sustain-
ability of the program into the future. 
Performance and the Challenge of Adjustment
As discussed earlier in this case study, the FZ program in the Dominican 
Republic undoubtedly has had a major impact on the growth and 
development of the economy since its inception (see figure 7.2). Since 
2000, the FZ program has made a contribution of around US$1 billion 
in foreign exchange. It has been chiefly responsible for diversifying and 
industrializing the economy, has contributed substantially to employ-
ment, and has been the main source of productivity growth in the 
economy. On the other hand, on virtually all measures, the FZs pro-
gram is in stagnation or decline, and this is contributing to a significant 
slowdown in the Dominican Republic’s overall economy. 
The following sections provide a brief summary of performance 
and challenges against key measures of investment, exports, and 
 employment.
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Investment. At the end of 2008, accumulated FDI in the FZs was 
US$2,611 million, 80 percent of which was made within free zone parks 
and 20 percent through single factory zones (called ZFEs in the 
Dominican Republic). This was equivalent to about 23 percent of the 
total FDI stock in the country at that time (CNZFE 2009). In 2002 and 
2003, more than 90 percent of all FDI in the Dominican Republic went 
into the FZs (World Bank 2006). By the end of 2008, the main part of 
FDI in FZs was concentrated in textiles and garments (33 percent), which 
was followed by tobacco (19 percent). In terms of investment source, at 
the end of 2008, 46 percent of the FDI stock had its origin in the United 
States, followed by 26 percent from the Dominican Republic, 6 percent 
from the United Kingdom, and 5 percent each from Canada and Sweden. 
Although most of the initial investments in the FZs came from foreign 
companies, Dominican Republic domestic investors later became impor-
tant sources of investment, mainly as subcontractors in the apparel sector 
as well as developers of industrial parks.
Between 1995 and 2004, the number of FZ industrial parks grew 
from 35 to more than 60. The number of companies operating in the 
FZs also grew by about 20 percent over this decade, reaching a high of 
569 in 2004. After this time, both zones and firms began to decline, with 
Figure 7.2 Free Zone Value Added (US$m) and Contribution to GDP, 1995–2008 
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at least 10 zones (most of them housing only one or two firms) closing 
since 2004.
Exports. Exports from the FZ program grew more than 10 percent 
annually between 1995 and 2000, reaching nearly US$4.8 billion. The 
contribution of the FZ program to total exports in Dominican 
Republic is one of the highest anywhere in the world. At its peak in 
2001, the FZs accounted for 81 percent of national merchandise 
exports.8 FZ exports have been stagnant since that time, however, 
actually declining by 2008 to US$4.5 billion. In parallel, the FZ con-
tribution to total national exports has fallen sharply to 65 percent in 
2008 (see figure 7.3). 
Decomposing the FZ exports to isolate the impact of the all-impor-
tant textile and apparel sector results in a striking picture. As shown in 
figure 7.4, which presents the relative growth of textile and nontextile 
sector exports from 1995 through 2008, the apparent flat trend in FZ 
exports masks a major underlying dichotomy. Textile and apparel 
exports began to decline from 2000, and the pace of collapse acceler-
ated sharply after 2004. At the end of 2008, textile exports had declined 
33 percent since 1995 and stood at less than half their 2000 peak. For a 
sector that was responsible for well over half of all FZ exports over the 
Figure 7.3 Free Zone Exports (US$ million) and Share of National Exports
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past decade, this represented a massive shock to the program, and the 
economy more widely.
Figure 7.5 sets out clearly the level of decline in the Dominican 
Republic’s position as a textile and apparel sector exporter to the 
United States. The first graph shows that exports of knitwear to the 
United States fell by more than half between 2004 and 2008, as 
the Dominican Republic was replaced mainly by Asian exporters, as 
well as Nicaragua. Although most other producers in the region also 
experienced declines, none was as deep as in the Dominican Republic. 
The graph on the right suggests that this pattern is deepening through 
the recent global crisis. The Dominican Republic not only experienced a 
much deeper decline in textiles and apparel exports to the United States 
in 2009 than most other countries, but it continued to face declining 
exports in 2010, whereas almost all other countries experienced consid-
erable recovery.
The key question is whether the FZ program, which was heavily 
reliant on one sector (textiles and garments) and one market (the 
United States) can diversify and upgrade itself, in the face of commod-
itization and increasing competition in this sector. Figure 7.4 shows 
that nontextile exports have grown rather well, offsetting much of the 
decline in textile exports. What also is clear, however, is that the growth 
Figure 7.4 Index of Free Zone Exports: Textile versus Nontextile (1995 = 100)
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of nontextile activities may stem from the decline in exports, but it is 
doing little to absorb the workforce shed from the garment sector.
Employment. Figure 7.6 illustrates the growth in employment in the 
Dominican Republic FZs over the life of the program. Up until the early 
1980s, employment was relatively modest. But from then it took off rap-
idly, growing at an average of more than 13 percent annually between 
1985 and 2000, when it peaked at close to 200,000. It has since fallen 
rapidly, shedding more than 80,000 jobs. At its height, the FZ program 
was responsible for 10 percent of total employment in the country and 
38 percent of manufacturing sector jobs, but the program has since 
declined to account for around 30 percent of total manufacturing 
employment.
It is worth noting that the large growth in employment until recent 
years came also in parallel with ongoing, robust growth in total factor 
productivity (TFP). FZ companies grew TFP 3.4 percent annually between 
1975 and 2004, a level which is high by international standards and was 
five times greater than the growth achieved by Dominican Republic firms 
outside the free zones (World Bank 2006).
Other challenges to the FZ program. In parallel with the problem of 
structural adjustment, the FZ program also must cope with an additional 
factor that may limit its scope to react to the challenge—compatibility 
Figure 7.6 Evolution of FZ Employment, 1969–2008
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with the WTO. The tax exemptions that are at the heart of the FZ regime 
are not compatible with the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures (SCM) signed under WTO. In 2002, the Dominican Republic 
notified the WTO of the subsidies and requested an extension of the 
transition period allowed by the agreement (WTO 2002). In September 
2007, the Dominican Republic requested continuation of the extension 
relating to Law No. 8-90 (WTO 2007c; also see WTO 2007a, which 
contains an updating notification of subsidies under Law No. 8-90), in 
accordance with the procedure adopted by the General Council in favor 
of certain developing-country members (WTO 2007b). According to this 
procedure, the members concerned undertook to eliminate export subsi-
dies by December 31, 2015, at the latest and to submit an action plan for 
this purpose in 2010. By amending the FZ Law and abolishing the local 
content requirements and restrictions on sales in the domestic market, as 
well as the 25 percent export performance requirements on several prod-
ucts, the Dominican Republic authorities believe that Law No. 56-07 
represents a step forward in bringing domestic legislation in line with the 
SCM. Of course, much remains to be done to bring the program into 
compliance.
The Policy Response
The Dominican Republic government has taken some steps to respond to 
these challenges. These responses should help, but the balance of initia-
tives taken appear to be designed more to bolster the existing basis of 
competitiveness on which the current free zone industry is based, rather 
than to address the structural changes that are required. This may not be 
surprising, given the strength and organization of the FZ sector and their 
effectiveness in lobbying the government. 
In an attempt to halt job losses in the FZ sector, the government 
offered in 2008 a temporary wage subsidy.9 For the first nine months of 
2008, the government offered FZ companies 2,000 pesos per worker per 
month (around US$65). This was equivalent to nearly 30 percent of the 
average salary of a low-skilled worker in the FZs. For the final three 
months of 2008, the subsidy was reduced to 1,200 pesos, after the coun-
try entered into a period of budgetary crisis. The subsidy, however, proved 
to be ineffective as companies realized it would be only temporary. 
ADOZONA (the sector’s industry association) also has proposed to 
amend the FZ Law, introducing two additional incentives: (1) exonerat-
ing all FZ employees from income tax; and (2) exonerating the tax on 
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dividends of FZ companies. The association also has proposed to reform 
the labor code to reduce severance compensation and therefore make 
firing much more economical for FZ companies. This measure is, how-
ever, unlikely to be adopted by the Dominican Republic Congress.
FZ companies that produce goods that are not produced by domestic 
companies in the Dominican Republic always have been able to sell 100 
percent of their production in the domestic market, as long as the domes-
tic value added is at least 25 percent. In recent years, the Dominican 
Republic took a number of additional initiatives to promote forward link-
ages. The most important was Law 56-07 (May 2007), which opened up 
the domestic market fully (100 percent) to FZ producers of key products, 
including textiles, clothing and accessories, hides and skins, and footwear 
and leather articles. The purpose of the amendment was to give an extra 
incentive to key sectors in which job losses have been heavy in recent 
years. Perhaps more important, it also extended the customs and fiscal 
benefits of FZs to domestic-based producers in these sectors.10 The 
amendment also opened up the possibility of FZ companies that provide 
logistical services (e.g., consolidation and storage of goods) to import and 
sell goods in the domestic market, subject to authorization by the CNZFE 
and payment of the relevant duties. Despite these incentives, sales to the 
Dominican Republic remain insignificant for most FZ companies.
Private sector initiatives are attempting to address the challenge of 
competitiveness in the apparel sector. As the Dominican Republic bene-
fited from a twin-plant scheme in the early days of its FZ program in the 
1970s, some of its major companies now are extending a similar concept 
to integrate production with plants in Haiti (see box 7.4). This strategy 
combines Haiti’s cheap labor with Dominican Republic assets (political 
stability, skilled labor, networks in established markets) and takes advan-
tage of market access programs in the United States that allow cumula-
tive value requirements between beneficiary countries.
Several public and private initiatives are attempting to address long-
term structural upgrades in the FZ sector. For example, in 2009, 
ADOZONA managed to build a consensus within the sector and with 
the government for the creation of a Fund for the Promotion of Exports 
and Investment (Decree 244-09). This special fund was created by a 
decree and was intended to include contributions from both the govern-
ment and the private sector. It is supposed to carry out international 
investment campaigns to promote investment in the FZ sector. As of 
September 2010, however, the corresponding decree has not yet been 
adopted, and the government has not budgeted any resources for the 
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Box 7.4
Grupo M Pioneered the Strategy of Production Sharing 
 between FZs in the Dominican Republic and Haiti
Grupo M was created in 1986, became a conglomerate in 1993, and during the 
1990s grew at around 12–15 percent per year for several years. With more than 
14,000 workers, it became the largest apparel conglomerate in the region, with 
up to 24 different firms located in the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and the United 
States. In the early 2000s, its annual sales averaged US$200 million. It gained the 
confidence of some of the best-known brands, such as Polo, Ralph Lauren, Liz 
Claiborne, Tommy Hilfiger, Hugo Boss, Banana Republic, Timberland, and Nike. 
Grupo M also built joint ventures with main global suppliers of zippers, chemical 
producers, and other products, and began producing intermediate products 
such as yarn, certain fabrics, and labels. Like all companies in the Dominican 
 Republic, however, it is struggling to survive in the face of rising competition 
from Asia.
In response to this challenge, Grupo M has pioneered the strategy of produc-
tion sharing with Haiti. This strategy, sometimes referred to as “twin-planting,” 
“production sharing,” or “coproduction,” involves sending the most labor-intensive 
operation (assembly) to Haiti and sending the products back to the Dominican 
Republic for finishing (washing and packaging) and export. This is being done in 
two factories in Haiti—one for Levi’s jeans and another for Sara Lee T-shirts. Grupo 
M takes advantage of lower wages in Haiti and also of its status as an LDC country, 
which allows Haitian apparel to enter duty free into the United States, even when 
the fabric is not of U.S. origin. The advantage of purchasing fabrics in Asia rather 
than the regional market is significant, as the price differential can be as much as 
30 percent. 
The CODEVI FZ, where these activities are carried out, was created with the 
support of the IFC on the border with the Dominican Republic. CODEVI is a private 
zone owned and operated by Grupo M. After a number of problems in the start-
ing stages, particularly related to labor difficulties, the project has expanded well 
over the past five years. More than 20 hectares of land have been developed, with 
more than 25,000 square meters of facilities in operation. Exports of the zone were 
expected reach US$120 m in 2009. The company already employs 4,000, and 
plans to create 5,000 more jobs in the next five years.
Source: Authors.
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fund. ADOZONA is engaged in a campaign with the government with 
the objective to develop the “export culture”—specifically, it is aimed at 
education and convincing local businesses of the importance of export 
markets and export readiness. This activity is carried out under the 
umbrella of the recently created Presidential Table for the Promotion of 
Exports (Decree 174-09). Unfortunately, here again, in the absence of 
decree of application, the first meeting of the table is pending. An agree-
ment between the national investment promotion agency and the 
national vocational training institute (INFOTEP) allocates 1 percent of 
each park’s payroll for each park’s training needs, which are defined by 
the users through the corresponding park association. 
Current Situation and Conclusions
As discussed, textile exports, which accounted for about half of exports 
value and a greater share of employment, declined by more than 
50 percent in the past five years alone. Yet, there is some evidence that 
the FZ sector has managed to attract new and competitive industries. In 
the past five years, exports of medical equipment and pharmaceuticals 
have increased two and a half times and electronics by 50 percent—
these two sectors are now each responsible for almost as many exports 
as the textile and garments sector. Similarly, the jewelry and tobacco sec-
tors, which grew at 54 percent and 44 percent over this period, respec-
tively, are increasingly important to the Dominican Republic economy. 
The services sector is also becoming an important part of the FZs. The 
Dominican Republic’s first call center (employing just 100 workers) was 
established only in 2006; by 2009, the sector now employed more than 
5,000 employees. In parallel with the growth in these nontraditional sec-
tors, the Dominican Republic has experienced a rapid growth in the value 
added share of exports. Although this figure stayed steady between 
30 percent and 32 percent throughout the 1980s and 1990s, it began 
to rise at the end of the 1990s and neared 50 percent by 2005 (it has 
since fallen slightly to 44 percent). Within the textile and apparel sec-
tor, too, there is evidence of upgrading, with large firms like Grupo M 
and Bratex having developed full-package operations, including prepro-
duction services and sourcing. 
The financial crisis has caused a widespread and steep decline not only 
in textiles and apparel but also throughout all FZ manufacturing sectors. 
Exports of textiles and apparel declined by more than 25 percent in 
2009, and an even faster decline has been experienced in jewelry 
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(–59 percent) and electronics (–51 percent).11 This suggests that the prob-
lem is not simply one of the MFA phaseout or of the global economic 
crisis, but rather a more fundamental problem of competitiveness (and 
the limited scale of upgrading in the Dominican Republic’s FZ sector). 
The challenges being faced by the Dominican Republic highlight the 
classic problems of many export-processing programs worldwide. In addi-
tion to weak infrastructure, particularly the instability and cost of electri-
cal power, the export sector faces structural challenges, including (1) an 
overreliance on trade preferences and narrow export markets; (2) poor 
linkages with the local economy, which prevent the program from facili-
tating dynamic gains that could contribute to economywide upgrade; 
(3) failing to recognize or act on the links between social upgrading and 
sustainability of the FZ program. Each of these challenges is summarized 
in the following sections.
Overreliance on Trade Preferences
Trade preferences have played a critical role in the development of the 
FZ program in the Dominican Republic. In 1984, the Dominican 
Republic became beneficiary of the CBI launched by the United States 
under the legislation of the CBI-II (Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery 
Expansion Act). This initiative granted the Dominican Republic duty-
free access to the United States market for most products until 1990. Ten 
years later, in 1994, the United States and Canada signed the NAFTA. To 
offer the Caribbean countries similar trade benefits, the Caribbean Basin 
Trade Partnership Act offered these countries “textile parity” with NAFTA 
partners in 2000. The Dominican Republic also joined the CACM in 
1998 by signing bilateral FTAs between each member. In May 2004, the 
United States signed CAFTA and, in August, DR-CAFTA, which entered 
into force in the Dominican Republic in March 2007. In textiles and gar-
ments, DR-CAFTA expanded the CBI legislation by eliminating duties on 
nearly all textiles and garment imports assembled from components 
made in DR-CAFTA countries and the United States. The Dominican 
Republic has had preferential access to the European market since the 
Lomé Convention of 1975 (now under the Cotonou Agreement), and 
consolidated in a two-way trade preference scheme in the EPA signed in 
2009. Until recently, however, its focus has been almost exclusively on 
the U.S. market, a dependency that has been exposed as a significant 
vulnerability during the recent crisis.
Although trade preferences clearly have been critical in catalyzing 
the Dominican Republic’s FZs, they also can be criticized for having 
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contributed to complacency, both in terms of market focus and more 
broadly in terms of competitiveness. Although the textile and apparel 
sector remains relatively highly protected in many markets, the trend 
in tariff and quota protection has moved inevitably downward, even 
through the crisis. As such, the Dominican Republic’s preferential 
advantage in market access continues to erode steadily. The shift in mar-
ket share toward Asian manufacturers following the elimination of quo-
tas at the expiration of the MFA (as shown in figure 7.5) is illustrative 
of the declining value of trade preferences in underpinning competitive-
ness in the FZ’s traditional labor-intensive assembly operations. The cost 
of productivity gap is now too wide to be closed by the ever-diminishing 
scope of these preferences.
Failure to Integrate with the Local Economy
Despite many efforts made over the years, a critical failing of the 
Dominican Republic FZ program has been its inability to forge effective 
links between the FZ sector and the rest of the economy. This has been 
one of the main factors inhibiting the FZs from diversifying and upgrad-
ing. In terms of forward linkages, the FZ legislation is fairly conducive to 
supporting integration with the local market. FZ companies always have 
been free to export up to 20 percent of their production to the Dominican 
Republic domestic territory, provided they pay all relevant tariffs and 
taxes that imports from other countries incur. In addition, the import 
duty assessment on these exports does not take into account the value of 
any domestic components used and other value added (e.g., through 
labor, utilities, etc.). In 2008, however, only 12 FZ companies sold into the 
Dominican Republic market, making the Dominican Republic only the 
13th most important market for FZ companies.12
The legislation is relatively favorable to supporting backward integra-
tion of FZs into the local economy. Suppliers from the domestic economy 
to FZ companies are exempt from import duties on the raw materials 
used in this production. This allows them to at least be on equal footing 
with competitors supplying the zones from outside the Dominican 
Republic. From the early days of the program, however, it was apparent 
that FZ companies imported virtually all their manufacturing inputs. The 
U.S. trade preference program for the apparel industry was designed to 
ensure that key inputs were sourced from the United States. Even after 
the CBI in 2000, which allowed apparel producers to use inputs from all 
countries within the Caribbean, linkages have remained low (even at a 
regional level). The lack of supply links went beyond textiles and 
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extended to capital equipment and even basic packaging materials. In the 
apparel sector, local spending (encompassing material inputs, capital 
equipment, water, electricity, and statutory payments of Social Security 
and training) in the early 2000s accounted for only 1.5 percent of the 
export value of FZ companies (Sanchez-Ancochea 2006).
The Dominican Republic government, with the support of the U.S. 
Agency for International Development, set up a program in the 1990s to 
develop backward linkages with EPZs. Feasibility studies revealed abun-
dant EPZ demand for textiles, precision plastic parts, metal stamping, 
machine shops, and tool, mold and die making. The program also revealed 
the main reasons why backward linkages failed to develop, including the 
following: (1) the capital or intermediate goods required by FZ producers 
frequently did not exist in the Dominican Republic; (2) some local 
manufacturers who did produce the goods required frequently had little 
interest in supplying FZs because they were satisfied with current opera-
tions and profitability levels of a protected local market; and, most impor-
tant, (3) local producers generally failed to meet market standards for 
price, quality, and delivery terms. With the benefits of duty-free import 
and relatively low transport costs in and out of the Dominican Republic, 
FZ companies generally have little incentive to purchase local inputs.
In the absence of these linkages, however, FZ operators are losing out 
on significant potential to benefit from the development of dynamic local 
clusters of suppliers, customers, and supporting services. In successful FZ 
programs—for example, Malaysia and the Republic of Korea—the devel-
opment of strong local clusters is acknowledged as making a significant 
contribution to the successful upgrading of FZ-based manufacturers by 
giving them access to competitively priced, world-class quality inputs.
Lack of Attention to Skills Development and Wider Social Upgrading
The FZs have been criticized for not having contributed significantly to 
the upgrading of the workforce, relying instead on low-skilled, low-wage 
workers, with little interest or incentive to move these workers upward. 
Although the FZ law states that the national labor law applies in FZs 
(including the requirement to make Social Security contributions), it 
does make some special provisions for wages in the zones. Specifically, 
minimum wage is lower in the FZs and profit-sharing (compulsory in the 
domestic market) is not required. In practice, wages in the FZs are, on 
average, significantly above the minimum wage: the average wage in 
2008 for a laborer was around Dominican peso (RD$)7,000 monthly 
while the minimum wage was RD$4,900. However, wages in the FZs are 
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consistently lower than for the Dominican Republic economy overall—
more than 15 percent for male workers and more than 20 percent for 
female workers (World Bank 2006). This is, however, likely driven mainly 
by the low-skilled, labor-intensive nature of work in the FZs relative to 
the overall economy. In addition, for unskilled workers, real wages (in U.S. 
dollars) in the FZs has been largely stagnant over the past 15 years.
The FZ program does have close links with INFOTEP, and a formal 
training program is available for workers at FZ companies. According to 
data from CNZFE, in 2008, 25,555 workers were enrolled in INFOTEP 
training programs—this is equivalent to about 20 percent of all workers. 
The training is relatively limited in scope, however, and the average train-
ing time per participant was less than one hour. 
Some of the blame for the poor skills development can be attributed 
to the FZ enterprises (and is linked to the issue of poor integration), 
although much of this failure derives from the wider policies of the 
Dominican Republic government, particularly its failure to invest in 
social spending (including education). In fact, the Dominican Republic 
has long had one of the lowest levels of government social spending in 
Latin America—for example in 2001, social spending was 7.6 percent of 
GDP in the Dominican Republic, in comparison to Costa Rica, which by 
that time had contributed 20 percent of its GDP toward social spending 
for several decades (Sanchez-Ancochea 2006).
Despite the skills problems, evidence from the structure of the FZ 
workforce suggests that there has been some relatively significant struc-
tural upgrading over the past decade. The share of skilled workers (tech-
nicians) rose from only 7 percent of the FZ workforce in 1998 to 
12 percent in 2008. Meanwhile, the share of unskilled workers declined 
from 90 percent to 81 percent. Whether this change reflects active 
upskilling within the existing workforce or merely reflects the structural 
change of industries within the FZs (or more specifically, the decline in 
textiles) is unclear. Whatever the case, what is clear is that demand for 
skilled labor continues to rise in the FZs, even while unskilled labor has 
collapsed (down more than 40 percent in the past decade).
The role of the FZs as a significant source of job creation is likely to 
be limited in the future. Certainly, the traditional FZ strategy based pri-
marily on proximity to the U.S. market, strong fiscal incentives, and 
cheap, low-skilled labor is proving to be unsustainable. Only the compa-
nies that build competitiveness on product quality and innovation are 
likely to remain competitive in the FZ sector in the years ahead. Achieving 
this competitiveness will require greater attention—by FZ firms, the FZ 
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 sector, and the government—to upgrading the skills and technology base 
of the country and to developing more sustainable sources of competitive 
advantage.
Notes
 1. Exports from Costa Rica, whose wages are higher than those in the 
Dominican Republic, declined by an even more rapid 38 percent during this 
period.
 2. This law, however, was not designed specifically to support the Gulf and 
Western investment. Rather, the law was really an import-substitution 
 vehicle—it did not specifically define an FZ regime, rather it established the 
zero tax incentive package for companies who exported at least 80 percent of 
their production.
 3. Average of Thailand, Sri Lanka, Philippines, China (World Bank 1988, cited 
in Kaplinsky 1993).
 4. Most studies, however, have found that wages in the zones are, on average, 
well above the national minimum wage, particularly when overtime and pro-
ductivity bonuses are included.
 5. Value added tax known as Impuesto de Transferencia a los Bienes in the 
Dominican Republic.
 6. The area around Santiago is the most important agricultural region in the 
Dominican Republic. The city has developed a major services economy, 
which is critical to provide the business services and support required by 
manufacturers in the free zones.
 7. Two public parks that were created by the Consejo Estatal del Azucar (the 
state-owned sugar corporation) were transferred to a publicly owned bank, 
Banco de Reservas, under whose ownership they remain. The rest of the  public 
parks are under the responsibility of Proindustria.
 8. This excludes receipts from tourism.
 9. See Decree No. 552-07, creating the Employment Protection and Creation 
Fund with the aim of preventing job losses in free zones, of October 8, 
2007.
 10. Including duty-free imports and exemption from corporate and value-added 
taxes.
 11. Data on apparel and electronics are from the first half of 2009 only.
 12. By contrast, 366 companies sold to the United States, 45 to Puerto Rico, 
44 to Spain, 36 to Germany, and 27 to Haiti (CNZFE 2009).
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Introduction
Recognition is growing that technological innovation is central to eco-
nomic growth and development both in high-income and developing 
countries (Aghion and Howitt 1998; Fagerberg, Srholec, and Verspagen 
2009). Innovation should be understood as the implementation of new or 
improved products, processes, marketing, or organizational methods in 
business practices and workplace organization (OECD 2005). Importantly 
for developing countries, “new” is meant in a relative sense, insofar as 
innovation can be as much about applying existing global technologies 
that are new to the local context or bringing small improvements to exist-
ing technologies (incremental innovation) as it is about the creation of 
“new-to-the-world” innovations (radical innovations).
Against this backdrop, FDI, trade, and innovation are likely to be 
closely intertwined and mutually beneficial for development. Indeed, 
trade and FDI represent an opportunity for less developed economies to 
access high(er) technology goods and services, as well as to become famil-
iar with innovative processes and demanding markets.
Since the 1990s, economic globalization (Bhagwati 2004) and, in 
particular, the lowering of transportation costs and the fragmentation of 
the production chain (Friedman 2005; Porter 1990; Saxenian 1999) have 
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increased the opportunities for developing countries to receive FDI and 
increase trade. In parallel, the use of SEZs as a policy tool to attract FDI 
and promote trade has expanded rapidly, particularly in developing 
countries. The examples of some countries in East Asia have forcefully 
demonstrated the catalytic role that SEZs can play in diffusing technolo-
gies and stimulating innovation in the domestic economy, and in 
 facilitating opportunities to climb up the value added chain. However, 
the failure of many SEZ programs in the developing world to go beyond 
basic, low-wage assembly activities suggests that the basic instrument of 
SEZs alone may not be sufficient to foster innovation. Beyond the core 
role of SEZs in fostering openness to trade and investment, further con-
ditions are required, and these most likely extend beyond the spatial 
confines of the SEZs and into the wider domestic economy.
This chapter explores the possible preconditions and policy recommen-
dations required for SEZs to support innovation in developing countries. 
First, it highlights the channels through which SEZs may positively influ-
ence innovation. Second, it underlines some policy initiatives and capabili-
ties that seem to strongly condition the development of innovation through 
SEZs. Third, it advocates a step-by-step approach in designing SEZs, build-
ing on the example of successful experience in East Asian countries.
SEZs as an Instrument for Innovation
In developing countries, SEZs often are associated with low wages and 
low-skill production capabilities that typically are set up to build on the 
comparative advantage of cheap labor to expand the export base. 
Experience shows, however, that in addition to the direct economic ben-
efits that can be derived from boosting trade, including employment 
generation and increasing exports, SEZs also can carry indirect economic 
benefits, which in turn can drive local innovation. Indeed, while attracting 
“content-rich” FDI and stimulating trade, SEZs tend to favor the acquisi-
tion of international knowledge and know-how, which are crucial to the 
development of innovation capabilities. Furthermore, the local interac-
tions set in motion by SEZs appear particularly well-suited to innovation, 
which greatly benefits from local-level interactions.
In Addition to Boosting National Accounts, Foreign Investment, and 
Trade, SEZs Can Have More General Benefits for Development
From a host country’s perspective, the benefits of SEZs can fall into two 
categories: (1) direct benefits, which straightforwardly and quantitatively 
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affect current account and public finance developments, via export 
growth and foreign exchange earnings, FDI, and increased government 
revenue; and (2) indirect, or dynamic, benefits, which include skills 
upgrading of workforce and management, technology transfer, backward 
linkages with domestic firms, demonstration effect, export diversification, 
and knowledge of international markets. These effects are listed in 
table 8.1. The majority of these indirect benefits may crucially nurture 
ingredients that are needed for innovation in the context of development 
or economic catching-up.
According to modern innovation systems theory, innovation and 
technology development at the aggregate level are essentially the 
result of an interactive process involving a set of actors and institu-
tions at the micro level, whose activities and interactions initiate, 
import, modify, and diffuse knowledge and new technologies (Freeman 
1987). The key ingredients in this process include firms, human capi-
tal (thus skills), and technology or new knowledge, all of which can be 
stimulated by SEZ-linked interactions In this respect, successful SEZs 
are those that prove able to sustain development in the medium to 
long term while influencing production processes throughout the 
whole economy, beyond the positive impact derived from direct trade 
benefits (box 8.1).
Table 8.1 Direct and Indirect Benefits of SEZs
Direct benefits Indirect benefits
Balance of payments
– Foreign exchange earnings
– Export growth
– FDI
Public finance
– Government revenue
Organizational benefits
– Testing field for wider economic reform
– Demonstration effect
– Export diversification
Technological capabilities and know-how
– Skills upgrading
– Technology transfer
– Enhancing trade efficiency of domestic firms
Source: Author.
Note: FDI = foreign direct investment.
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Box 8.1
The First Modern SEZ, Shannon, Ireland
Shannon, Ireland, as the most Western point in Europe, had been the necessary 
airport stop for American-bound planes since the start of commercial trans-
Atlantic aviation. At the end of the 1950s, with the technological developments 
of the jet engine, Shannon airport was to be removed, in less than a year, from 
the schedules of many of the airline companies landing there: a likely devastat-
ing blow for the local economy. The foundations for the first modern SEZ were 
laid with a great sense of urgency.
This crisis led to the creation of both the SEZ and a related managing 
 company, SFADCo (Shannon Free Airport Development Company). SFADCo’s 
legal framework gave it considerable freedom of action, and under its terms of 
 reference, the company’s mandate was wide enough that it was to contribute 
to the development of Shannon and its region. Indeed, SFADCo achieved 
 considerable notice in the early days as a developer of tourist sites with the aim 
of attracting tourists to replace the decline in transit passengers. This included 
restoration of castles and the popular “rent an Irish cottage”  program.
SEZ development was from the outset based on airport-related services, 
such as repairing and maintaining aircraft, as well as manufacturing, industry, 
and trading operations, which contributed to the use or development of the 
airport. Although many of the first operations failed, some emblematic efforts 
were a great success. The importance at this time was the demonstra-
tion  effect.
In the following decades, the continued success of the SEZ was ensured by 
(1) a highly integrated and coordinated approach to development; (2) focus on 
learning: direct training programs were provided by SFADCo for industry, and 
skills learned in factories at Shannon flowed subsequently to Irish industry— 
also, and important for future orientations (such as the set-up of the National 
Technology Park), partnerships were set up with a specially established univer-
sity (University of Limerick); (3) trial and error was the norm in setting up new 
industries and companies, underlining a typically pragmatic approach; and (4) a 
rapid harmonious social and cultural change at the local level. Thanks to the 
partnership with the University of Limerick, the SEZ also supports the National 
Technology Park. Shannon continues to attract investors, more than 50 years 
 after its foundation.
Source: Callanan (2000).
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Trade and FDI Flows Attracted by SEZs Constitute Major
Channels for Tapping into Global Knowledge and Know-How
Much of the economic and social progress of the past few centuries has 
been due to, or is associated with, technological innovation. As measured 
by TFP, the latter factor explains much of the differences in both the level 
and growth rate of income across countries (Easterly and Levine 2001; 
GEP 2008). In this regard, one of the problems faced by most developing 
countries is their inability to generate radical, new-to-the-world innova-
tions. Overall, most of the world’s commercial technology and R&D 
remains highly concentrated in a small number of countries (France, 
Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States), although 
the nonmember countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development’s (OECD) share of the world’s R&D has been increas-
ing rapidly (OECD 2010). Furthermore, a large share of the world’s com-
mercial technology is produced by MNCs, most of which are headquartered 
in these same high-income countries.
Given the shortage of advanced technological competencies in devel-
oping countries, the vast majority of technological progress needs to occur 
through the adoption and adaptation of preexisting but new-to-the- 
domestic-market technologies. In this respect, as an effective policy tool 
to attract FDI and boost trade, SEZs may dramatically increase  developing 
countries’ exposure to foreign technologies, know-how, and knowledge.
The main transmission channels of foreign knowledge and technology 
are trade (imports and exports), the acquisition of foreign technology 
licenses, and FDI.
• Imports of goods and services that include embodied technology, and in 
particular capital equipment (Coe, Helpman, and Hoffmaister 1997), 
can be important conduits for the international transfer of technology 
and diffusion of innovation. The role of capital goods in particular has 
been supported by a number of empirical studies (Eaton and Kortum 
2001; Keller 2004), as well as many case studies (Chandra 2006).
• Export contacts, notably with more developed countries, which may 
 include forced adoption of higher standards and new specifications, con-
tact with more demanding consumers, and exposure to new ideas, can 
constitute a “learning by exporting” effect that may drive domestic 
 innovation. Although empirical studies are ambiguous as to the existence 
of this effect,1 a wealth of anecdotal evidence addresses the topic.
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• Acquisition of technology licenses grants a licensee the right to utilize 
specific technologies, patents, software, know-how, or product designs 
to produce them commercially. Licensing enables the rapid acquisi-
tion of product and process know-how, also allowing local adaptation 
and modification. Some studies have found that patent purchases 
can be more effective than R&D to increase productivity, particularly 
in developing countries with low R&D productivity, but licensing 
 requires a significant level of technological capability. Interestingly, 
about three-fourths of the registered payments to the United States 
for technology sales in 2005 were made by foreign affiliates of U.S. 
firms (OECD 2009).
• FDI is a major source of process technology and learning by doing 
opportunities for individuals in developing countries. Over the last 
15 years, FDI inflows to developing countries have almost doubled 
as a percentage of GDP. At the same time, the competition, stan-
dards, and knowledge of foreign markets that foreign firms bring to 
the domestic market can have important spillover effects. Spillovers 
refer here to technology “leakages” from MNCs to local firms in the 
same industry. Such so-called horizontal spillovers can take place in 
a number of ways: (1) local firms may be able to learn by observing 
and imitating; (2) employees may leave MNCs to join local firms, 
bringing along new technology and management know-how; and 
(3) MNCs may provide public knowledge and know-how that also 
can be enjoyed by domestic firms.
The Localized Nature of Innovation Highlights the 
Importance of SEZs 
The fact that innovation tends to be spatially polarized is not new: see 
Alfred Marshall’s “industrial districts” at the end of the nineteenth century; 
Joseph Schumpeter’s “innovation clusters”; Eric Dahmen’s “development 
blocks” and Francois Perroux’s “development and growth poles” in the 
1950s; and, more recently, economic geographers’ and economists’ indus-
trial and high-technology agglomerations and “new economic geography.” 
Indeed, research suggests that face-to-face interactions and the constitu-
tion of a local community of researchers and entrepreneurs are crucial to 
the transmission of knowledge and the developments of innovative activi-
ties (Storper and Manville 2006). This local dimension of innovation is 
explicitly taken into account by current innovation policies, which lay 
increasing emphasis on the creation of “clusters” or “science parks.”
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Against this backdrop, although in theory the benefits derived from 
FDI and trade can be obtained at any location in the country, the fact that 
they may be concentrated in a single geographic location, as is typically 
the case in SEZs, can be strongly beneficial for innovation. Indeed, the 
concentration, proximity, and density (Florida and Gates 2001) offered 
by SEZs, all the more if located close to a city or urban area, may be 
crucial to facilitate the exchange of knowledge and technologies between 
people and firms. Overall, in boosting knowledge acquisition from abroad 
and enabling exchanges between people and firms at the local level, SEZs 
may constitute an important tool for the development of innovative 
capacities in developing countries.
The Need for Absorptive Capacity and Local Linkages
By tapping into global knowledge and plugging into the local economy, 
SEZs can be expected to efficiently foster innovation. Observation sug-
gests, however, that the indirect benefits highlighted above have only 
been fully exploited in a few, mainly East Asian, SEZs. In the majority of 
cases, the beneficial impact of SEZs seems to have been restricted to their 
direct impact on trade flows, and most SEZs never get beyond the basic 
assembly-type manufacturing activities. In this respect, the success of 
SEZs in stimulating innovation and encouraging technology transfer 
appears to depend on the following conditions and features of the domes-
tic economy: (1) domestic technological capabilities, both of firms and of 
individuals; (2) the partial integration of the SEZs in the local economy 
(Johansson and Nilsson 1997; Omar and Stoever 2008), and (3) a strate-
gic geographic location for the SEZs.
Increasing Domestic Technological Capabilities
As an extensive empirical and academic literature points out, openness to 
trade seems to constitute a necessary but not a sufficient condition to 
bolster local innovation in developing countries. Indeed, even if knowl-
edge and technology are likely to be transmitted through trade and FDI, 
national technological capabilities have been identified as important con-
ditions without which knowledge is not effectively absorbed and used 
domestically. These concepts have been developed by Abramowitz 
(1994), Kim (1980), and Lall (1992), as well as more recently in Fagerberg, 
Srholec, and Verspagen (2009).
“Technological capabilities” refer to the ability to develop, search for, 
absorb, and exploit knowledge commercially (see, notably, Fagerberg, 
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Srholec, and Verspagen 2009). These capabilities generally are thought to 
cover (1) the skill level in the economy, including not only general educa-
tion but also managerial and technical competences; (2) national research 
and development efforts and technical personnel working in their fields; 
and (3) the ability of firms to finance their innovative endeavors.
• Training the SEZ workforce on the job and, in parallel, upgrading the 
national education system can have important benefits for the overall 
skill level.
• A strong point of many of the more successful SEZs was this concomi-
tant development of an increasingly well-trained SEZ workforce, most 
often accompanied by major efforts involving the national education 
system. In 1968, for example, 57 percent of the SEZ workforce in 
 Taiwan had only elementary school training. In 1990, 87 percent had 
more than elementary training. In the 1970s in the Republic of Korea, 
80 percent of the workforce had completed middle school. This pro-
portion was 95 percent in 1990. In terms of gender, these figures are 
even more dramatic. In the 1970s, only 20 percent of women working 
in SEZs in the Republic of Korea had completed high school, as com-
pared with more than 95 percent today. Table 8.2 gives examples of 
on-the-job training provided in some SEZs.
Other initiatives include giving training to local companies outside 
the SEZs. For example, SFADCo in Ireland provided direct training for 
local industry outside the SEZs during the early 1960s (Callanan 2000). 
China, among others, has been more encouraging of joint ventures than 
inward FDI in its desire to maximize knowledge and technology  transfer 
to local agents (Hoekman and Javorcik 2006). It seems, however, that 
China’s experience may rest on stronger bargaining power of a large 
economy (Wei 2000). As a consequence of training efforts, a locally 
high-skilled workforce will be more likely to attract high- technology 
investments.
In addition to the formal education system and on-the-job training, 
domestic R&D capacity and technical personnel are important in deter-
mining an economy’s capacity to absorb technologies from abroad. 
Gradual buildup of R&D capacity facilitates the imitation and adapta-
tion of foreign technologies and improves the extent to which positive 
spillovers from FDI and trade accrue to the rest of the economy 
(Fagerberg 1988). Indeed, a stock of researchers or technical personnel is 
often necessary to understand and evaluate technology, and the higher 
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Table 8.2 Training for Workers in SEZs
Country Training provided
China (Shenzhen) Three months of on-the-job training for operators (one month for 
class and two months for production practice); more than 80 adult 
education institutes (1990) but weak links between needs of 
 enterprises in the EPZ and skills provided.
Republic of Korea 
(Masan)
Three months of on-the-job training for operators; overseas training 
for skilled workers (mainly in Japan).
Malaysia Three months of on-the-job training for operators; Quality Control 
 Cycles with monetary and other incentives (gifts, medals and com-
mendation letters, etc.) for identifying problems and suggesting 
ways of solving them); little training for computer programming, 
technical engineering, and design work.
Mauritius Three months of on-the-job training for operators (trainee status: 
75 percent minimum salary); lack of trained intermediate workers.
Philippines One day to a few weeks of on-the-job training for operators; some 
firms (Japanese) rotate operators to make them familiar with 
 between 10 and 18 interrelated tasks (three-month rotation).
Sri Lanka One to three months of on-the-job training for operators. 
Taiwan, China
(Kaohsiung)
Three months of on-the-job training for operators; cooperative 
 training programs between school/college and the firm in the EPZ. 
School/college provides the general education and the firms 
 provide special technology training; some overseas training.
Thailand
(Lat Krabang)
Three months of on-the-job training for operators; off-the-job 
 training; study and experiment in the classroom and laboratory for 
some workers; overseas training (at parent company) for core 
 employees in management and technology.
Source: Kusago and Tzannatos (1998).
and more sophisticated the technology, the greater specialization and 
sophistication needed by researchers. The Republic Korea is an interest-
ing case in this respect, having started with a very low R&D level, which 
gradually was built up as the country developed, moving from imitation 
and low value-added manufacturing to high value-added products (see 
figure 8.1).
Interacting with the Domestic Economy
Many SEZs have remained islands isolated from their host economy, and 
in consequence, have not played the catalytic role in stimulating innova-
tion played by many of the more successful SEZs. Remaining an island 
does not imply that the SEZs have not succeeded on some counts: they 
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often have generated much-needed employment at the local level and 
have succeeded in attracting FDI and foreign exchange. They have not 
been able to use this success to stimulate local enterprise upgrading. 
Gradual interaction of the SEZs with domestic firms, notably through 
backward linkages and labor circulation, can increase a domestic firm’s 
capabilities to compete, if the business climate outside the SEZs is gradu-
ally reformed.
Facilitating backward linkages. Getting SEZs firms to source materials 
locally—so-called backward linkages—is beneficial to the local economy 
in terms of increased output and employment and improved production 
efficiency, technological and managerial capabilities, and market diversi-
fication. Lall (1980) notes that such linkages can take several forms. An 
MNC physically located within an SEZ may help prospective suppliers 
outside the SEZs set up production capacities, provide technical assis-
tance and information to raise the quality of suppliers’ products, or 
provide training and help in management and organization (UNCTAD 
2001). SEZ companies may want to link to local suppliers for multiple 
reasons, among which are to achieve lower production costs, increase 
specialization, and better adapt technologies and products to local 
 environments.
Although these linkages can be extremely important, the onus of 
developing them should not be on the firms inside the SEZs. Experience 
shows that, when this has been the case, it has not succeeded (see 
box 8.2). Furthermore, imposing local content and other burdensome 
requirements is often impracticable because of intense competition 
between SEZs (FIAS 2008). Host governments, however, can create 
attractive conditions, facilitate contacts, and provide various direct or 
indirect incentives that make it cost-effective for foreign companies in 
SEZs to get supplies from local sources. The Republic of Korea’s 
 outsourcing program is one example and, in Shenzhen, SEZ adminis-
trators provided individually tailored directories listing prospective 
domestic suppliers.
Several authors contend that the ease of setting up backward linkages 
is constrained either by prevalent local industrial development (FIAS 
2008; ILO 1998) or by sectoral specialization. Jenkins, Esquivel, and 
Felipe Larrain (1998) provide a statistically significant econometric link 
between backward linkages and the country’s level of industrialization, 
although the causality of this link is not demonstrated (Omar and Stoever 
2008).2 In terms of sectoral favoritism, it often is argued that some 
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 sectors are more receptive to the development of backward linkages than 
others. Some authors explain that, because of the very nature of manu-
facturing, the electronics industry should generate more linkages with the 
domestic economy. Others contend that linkages are difficult to establish 
in any industry, but particularly in the textile industry (Basile and 
Germidis 1984; ILO 1998). The accumulated experience of some coun-
tries could support these assertions. However, many of the most success-
ful SEZs initially attracted labor-intensive industries with relatively 
unsophisticated technologies (in textiles and electronics), which required 
unskilled workers, and then upgraded to more technology-intensive and 
Box 8.2
The Development of Backward Linkages:
A Successful and Less Successful Example
The Republic of Korea: When the Masan Zone began operations in 1971, domes-
tic firms supplied just 3.3 percent of materials and intermediate goods to firms in 
the zone. Four years later, they supplied 25 percent and, eventually, 44 percent. 
Consequently, domestic value added increased steadily from 28 percent in 1971 
to 52 percent in 1979. In all, the evidence indicates that the Korean government 
successfully encouraged backward linkages with local industries and subcontrac-
tors. Local companies supplying EPZ firms had preferential access to intermediate 
and raw materials. The zone administration also provided technical assistance to 
subcontracting firms.
Dominican Republic: During the 1980s, the share of domestic value added in 
total output decreased. In the early 1980s, it was between 40 and 45 percent, but 
toward the end of the decade, it was just 25 to 30 percent. There were few back-
ward linkages between domestic firms and industries in SEZs. One reason was the 
lack of government interest and incentives. Until 1993, to sell products to firms in 
these zones, domestic firms needed an export license, which was difficult to 
 obtain. In addition, even though the legislation stated that firms could recover 
import duties paid for materials used in products sold to EPZ firms, in practice they 
were  almost never able to do so. The Dominican industrial sector’s lack of com-
petitiveness with respect to quality, timing of delivery, and price also contributed 
to the absence of linkages.
Source: Author, based on Jenkins, Esquivel, and Felipe Larrain (1998).
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higher value added sectors. These successful SEZs proved extremely good 
at moving away from the low-skilled, labor-intensive industries of their 
first years of operation. New garment industries were not allowed in 
Taiwan, China’s EPZ as of 1974, for example.
Enhancing labor circulation. The literature has paid little attention to 
the role of labor turnover from SEZs as a channel for the diffusion of 
technology and processes to the domestic economy. It seems, however, 
that labor turnover can be significant for transferring technology and 
managerial know-how to domestic firms. For this reason, some countries 
(see box 8.3) have used fixed-term nonrenewable two- to five-year 
 contracts for local managers in SEZs. Furthermore, because of a strict 
labor policy as well as voluntary departure, many employees left SEZs to 
create rival firms.
Reforming the business climate. Improving the general business climate 
of the host country is essential for developing a catalyst SEZ (FIAS 2008). 
Indeed, SEZs’ medium- to long-term viability and their capacity to 
Box 8.3
SEZs and Labor Circulation: A “Domestic Diaspora”?
In the Masan Zone in the Republic of Korea, an estimated 3,000 to 4,000 people 
received specialized training, either in the zone or abroad (mainly Japan), and half 
of these employees eventually left the zone to work in local electronic firms. 
In Taiwan, China, under government guidance, personnel from firms in the 
zones were placed at potential suppliers’ factories to offer advice on production 
methods and quality control.
Shannon, Ireland, had high labor turnover between the SEZs and the domes-
tic economy, with many managers leaving to create competing firms outside 
the SEZs.
In Shenzhen, China, workers were appointed by the government for a three-
year term and then were required to leave the zone. Many managers subsequent-
ly started their own firms, capitalizing on experience gained in the SEZs. This put 
competitive pressure on firms within the SEZs to innovate or disappear.
Sources: Callanan (2000); Jenkins, Esquivel, and Felipe Larrain (1998); Leong (2007).
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stimulate local dynamics appear to require domestic business reforms 
when the SEZs is designed or shortly afterward.3 This ensures that entre-
preneurs can set up firms outside the SEZs to collaborate or compete 
with SEZs companies. Improving the business climate means improving 
the quality of regulation on such topics as starting a business, dealing with 
construction permits, employing workers, registering property, getting 
credit, protecting investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing 
contracts, and closing a business (World Bank 2010) (see box 8.4).
The example of Shenzhen offers interesting insights into the techno-
logical upgrading of SEZs and the stimulation of innovation in the 
domestic economy. After testing business climate reforms in the SEZs, 
the Chinese government launched nationwide reforms to match or emu-
late the business climate tested within the zone. Exports from the SEZs 
to the domestic economy were authorized.
The Importance of Strategic Location
Many governments have established SEZs in rural areas, responding to 
the need to create employment and economic opportunities in these 
areas. These SEZs, however, have often failed to become catalysts for 
innovation and technological upgrading.
Box 8.4
A Tale of Two Countries: Investment Climate Reform
India’s Kandla, the first SEZ in Asia, was set up in 1965, and the first SEZ in China 
was set up in 1980. Being the first mover gave little advantage to Kandla, however, 
and China’s SEZs, particularly Shenzhen, have been a phenomenal success.
One major difference between the early Indian and Chinese SEZs is that India 
had heavily protectionist policies and its share of world trade slipped from 2 per-
cent in the 1950s to less than 0.5 percent in the 1980s. In contrast, China’s SEZs 
were test beds for implementing wide-ranging economic reforms and trade 
 liberalization in the rest of the country. Thus, SEZs in India remained isolated 
 enclaves, whereas SEZs in China were rapidly overtaken and threatened by 
 domestic competitive firms and, to remain relevant, they had to become more 
technology intensive, become more business friendly, and offer better services 
to firms.
Source: Leong (2007).
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Several studies (FIAS 2008; Wei 2000) have insisted on the impor-
tance of the geographic location of the SEZs. Indeed, an SEZ in a city or 
periurban area has easier access to firms, capital, and skilled labor and 
can integrate with other firms more easily. For example, while the 
maquiladoras traditionally have purchased no more than 3 percent of 
their overall material inputs from Mexican sources, the maquiladoras of 
Mexico’s three largest metropolitan centers, Mexico City, Guadalajara, 
and Monterrey, procured 31 percent, 16 percent, and 10.5 percent, 
 respectively, of their inputs from domestic sources (MacLachlan and 
Aguilar 1998).
Also, the geographical proximity to a city or rapidly developing region 
has proven important for SEZs to support innovation activities in East 
Asia: In China, these include Shenzhen (next to Hong Kong, China), 
Zhuhai (next to Macau SAR, China), Xiamen and Shantou (across the 
Taiwan Strait opposite Taiwan, China), and Pudong (next to Shanghai). 
In the Republic of Korea, these include Masan (next to Masan port, not 
far from Busan). In Taiwan, China, these include Nanzih (next to 
Kaohsiung) and Taichung (next to Chuanghua).
Overall, the success of SEZs in fostering innovation in developing 
countries seems crucially determined by the absorption capabilities of 
the domestic economy. This pleads the case for encompassing targeted 
innovation policies, aimed at creating optimal conditions to domestically 
accompany openness to trade and FDI.
A Staged Approach to Building an Innovative SEZ
Domestic technological capabilities and linkages with domestic firms take 
significant time and effort to build up (Fagerberg, Srholec, and Verspagen 
2009). In a context of scarce resources, these often require careful priori-
tization. Based on examples from some of the most successful Asian cases, 
most notably Shenzhen, this section advocates a step-by-step strategy for 
setting up an SEZ and highlights accompanying policy measures aimed at 
gradually building up technological capabilities and opening up and link-
ing the SEZ to the domestic economy.
SEZ Inception: Infrastructure Development
and the Business Environment
The development of a world-class infrastructure and business environ-
ment is the first step in the design of an SEZ. This step is all the more 
important given the fierce international competition to attract manufac-
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turing investment in SEZs. As an example, more than two-thirds of the 
FDI received by the Shenzhen SEZs went into tourism and real estate 
development in 1981, and only 16.3 percent went to manufacturing 
activity. Although industrial growth was the goal of the SEZ, pragmatism 
prevailed among investors confronted with the poor quality of infra-
structure (unreliable water and electricity, lack of housing and commu-
nication links), and real estate development also had a shorter return 
period and smaller profit margins. Lack of efficient legal and financial 
systems deterred many potential investors from undertaking large-scale 
manufacturing investments. The government responded to such undesir-
able outcomes by making massive investments in infrastructure and 
improvements in the business environment, hence reversing the course 
of events.
Labor-Intensive Manufacturing
Developing labor-intensive manufacturing activities linked to domestic 
production capabilities is typically the second step in the development of 
an SEZ. This step can be one of intense learning and can increase basic 
technological capabilities, provided that the proper channeling of capital 
inflows and appropriate regulatory guidance is given.
In 1982, in Shenzhen, the SEZ authorities issued strong guidelines 
to foreign investors on which sectors FDI should focus. Interestingly, 
Shenzhen initially aimed to attract high-technology firms, but prag-
matically dropped the term “high-technology” for “some technology” in 
its requirements for manufacturing FDI, which was in greater accord 
with the absorptive capacity of the area. Small manufacturing (mainly 
processing and assembly) enterprises in mature industries were set up, 
based on differential wage costs. Cheap labor combined with guaran-
teed production capability involved only minor technological adapta-
tion capability. “Exports” of these manufactured products started to be 
allowed on a restricted basis to the domestic market. Here, the needed 
technological capability was in adapting the manufactured products to 
the domestic market: changing the product to suit domestic market 
conditions and demands, adapting the product or process to take into 
account special features of local material supply, and adapting prod-
ucts to local conditions (climate, temperature, etc.). Seventy percent of 
the enterprises in the SEZ were upgraded technologically over a 
10-year period (Liu 2002). If the appropriate linkages are not made 
and technological capabilities are not built up, SEZs may give lacklus-
ter results (see box 8.5).
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Figure 8.2 is a schematic of the transition between an island SEZ, 
typically one exemplified by many SEZs, in which linkages to the domes-
tic economy are severely limited or inexistent, and a catalyst SEZ, in 
which technological capabilities are being upgraded and domestic link-
ages are created.
Technology-Intensive Manufacturing
The third step—transitioning to high(er) technology manufacturing—
was gradual in all East Asian SEZs, particularly in view of the fact that 
technological capabilities take quite some time to build up. In the case of 
Shenzhen, the transition to technology-intensive manufacturing was 
brought on naturally by two factors: the cost of land, making it no longer 
a place for labor-intensive manufacturing industries; and increasing com-
petition from mainland China and other SEZs, including firms set up 
outside the SEZs by former employees. Through a number of deliberate 
government policy reorientations, FDI for high-technology firms was 
Box 8.5
SEZs in Cambodia
FDI has grown at a high rate over the past decade, with $10.9 billion coming into 
Cambodia in 2008, playing a key role in employment. The initiatives taken to 
 maximize linkages to the MNCs and foreign-invested enterprises to upgrade the 
 domestic technology and knowledge base have remained scarce. Importantly, 
the impact of the significant FDI Cambodia receives on technology transfer and 
spillover appears to be negligible. SEZs are an important part of the country’s 
economic development because they bring infrastructure, jobs, skills, and 
 enhanced productivity. Since 2005, the Royal Government of Cambodia has 
 approved a total of 21 SEZs. Of the 21, only 6 have commenced operations as of 
early 2010. Virtually no policies, mechanisms, or incentives are in place to encour-
age foreign firms to engage in technology or knowledge transfer to local compa-
nies, or to collaborate with local companies. In interviews with the SEZs in Phnom 
Penh, it appeared that little interaction existed between firms in the SEZs and 
 local universities or technical institutes; firms occasionally train their low-skilled 
workers in-house. Highly skilled workers and managers usually are brought in 
from the respective country of origin. Inputs and technology also are imported.
Source: Author, based on Zeng and White (2010).
200       Special Economic Zones
encouraged by (1) incentives, such as tax holiday extensions, priorities for 
public utilities, and opening of domestic market; (2) infrastructure sup-
port and technology support services, including quality support services 
through the Shenzhen Quality Assurance Centre and funded by 
Shenzhen Technology Monitoring Bureau to help manufacturers build 
quality into their design, management, and production systems; (3) pro-
ductivity enhancement services (lab facilities, specialized training, con-
sultancies); (4) information services, most notably, the Technology 
Market Center in 1993, and information on new technology for indus-
trial firms; and (5) strong laws and regulations protecting intellectual 
property rights (IPR).
In the case of Taiwan, China, the transition to technology-intensive 
manufacturing was done in part through regulation: New garment indus-
tries were not allowed in Taiwan, China’s EPZ as of 1974, for example 
(see table 8.3). Figure 8.3 illustrates the transition between the second 
and third steps in the development of an SEZ. The figure shows the grow-
ing linkages with domestic firms leading to greater competitive pressure 
from them in the technology-intensive stage.
Conclusion
This chapter has attempted to clarify how SEZs can stimulate innovation 
and advocate proactive and sequential policies to facilitate domestic 
absorption of foreign technological know-how.
Developing an SEZ that boosts technological change and innovation 
can be rewarding for developing-country governments. However, devel-
oping an SEZ that drives innovation potentially involves a relatively 
coordinated set of medium-term policies, many of which attempt to 
Figure 8.2 Island to Catalyst SEZs
FDI
Domestic firms
SEZ SEZ
X FDI
reforming national or “host” economy
national or “host” economy
X
labor 
technology 
skills
Source: Author.
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upgrade domestic conditions (see table 8.4). These policies may include 
fostering linkages and spillovers between firms in the SEZs and firms 
outside, in particular, by building domestic capabilities in local firms and 
training a domestic labor force to take advantage of spillovers. Fostering 
labor circulation from the SEZs to the domestic economy can generate 
positive spillover effects. Experience suggests that reforms of the domes-
tic investment climate, to emulate to some extent that of the SEZs, can 
help domestic firms develop. Finally, it is important to choose the location 
of the SEZs carefully.
Table 8.3 Staged Approach to the Development of an SEZ: The Shenzhen Case
Stage Inception Labor-intensive Technology-intensive
Comparative 
advantage
Incentive package 
for FDI; location 
specific 
 advantage
Low-cost labor surplus; 
location-specific 
 advantage; huge 
 domestic market; 
 incentive package 
for FDI
Low-cost highly edu-
cated labor; accumu-
lated skills and capital; 
huge domestic 
 market; FDI with ad-
vanced technologies
Main prod-
ucts and 
sectors
Tourism and real 
estate develop-
ment
Toys, clothes, and 
 bicycles
Computers, switches, 
integrated circuits
Source of 
technology
None Hong Kong, China Industrial countries
Role of 
government
Infrastructure 
building; Institu-
tional reforms
Help firms find employ-
ees nationwide to keep 
the competitive posi-
tion; faced with other 
low-cost competitors
Technology infrastruc-
ture building; protec-
tion of intellectual 
property rights
Source: Wei (2000). 
Note: FDI = foreign direct investment.
Figure 8.3 SEZs from Linkages and Technological Capabilities to Upgrading
Domestic firms SEZ
FDI
reforming national or “host” economy:
-upgarding local skills/firms
-reforming business environment
X FDI X
competitio
n
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 tech upgr
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technology 
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Notes
 1. Notably, because firms that export typically make deliberate decisions before 
exporting in terms of investment training and technology, the before and after 
effects are likely to be smaller.
 2. Some data from Taiwan, China, are interesting in this respect.
 3. The World Bank’s regular Investment Climate Assessment and Doing Business 
reports can provide useful guidance to necessary national reforms.
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C H A P T E R  9
Early Reform Zones: Catalysts 
for Dynamic Market Economies 
in Africa
Richard Auty
Context
This chapter proposes the concept of an Early Reform Zone (ERZ) as a 
policy tool for restructuring rent-distorted economies in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. The ERZ is a second-generation SEZ that immediately provides 
three critical postreform conditions—world-class infrastructure, business-
friendly services, and property rights and the rule of law—within dis-
torted economies to rapidly expand a dynamic market economy. Most 
economies in Sub-Saharan Africa were badly distorted by decades of 
patronage-driven rent cycling (Ndulu et al. 2008), whether the rent ema-
nated from natural resources, foreign aid (a geopolitical form of rent), or 
manipulation by governments of relative prices (regulatory rent). The 
emerging theory of rent cycling demonstrates that patronage-driven rent 
deployment not only distorts the economy but also entrenches powerful 
rent-seeking groups that oppose reform and trigger growth collapses 
(Auty 2010).
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The political legacy of rent cycling explains why recovery from the 
growth collapses of the 1970s and 1980s has been protracted for many 
Sub-Saharan African economies: rent recipients oppose economic restruc-
turing because it shrinks their scope for rent extraction. The opposition 
of rent recipients therefore requires that economic reform be expressly 
complemented by a political strategy to manage the opposition. In con-
trast to the first-generation EPZs, the ERZ eschews subsidies and is not 
time constrained. This approach is taken to discourage rent-seeking activ-
ity. Moreover, the ERZ also forms part of a specific development strategy 
to steadily extend reform throughout the economy and simultaneously 
build a proreform political coalition that, as the relative size of ERZ activ-
ity expands, becomes politically strong enough to neutralize the distorted 
rent-seeking economy. 
This chapter argues that the required political dimension can be most 
effectively provided by the ERZ playing a critical role within a dual-track 
reform strategy (Lau, Qian, and Roland 2000). In fact, key elements of 
ERZs can be identified in some first-generation SEZs that were deployed 
successfully as part of dual-track reform strategies in China, Malaysia, and 
Mauritius to simultaneously restructure distorted economies and shrink 
rent-seeking activity through the medium and long term. Most African 
efforts to deploy SEZs occurred later, but rather than benefiting from the 
experience of others, they frequently have disappointed because they 
failed to provide the basic needs of a dynamic competitive economy. 
Even when fiscal stabilization and trade opening were finally secured in 
most Sub-Saharan African economies from the late 1990s, the results still 
were disappointing because reformers neglected to establish a business-
friendly environment along with a proreform political coalition. 
Deficiencies have included unreliable electricity and water services, 
excess regulation, rent-seeking customs agencies, unsuitable locations, 
and high-cost, low-productivity labor supplies (Farole 2010). The ERZ 
expressly seeks to overcome such coordination failure by concentrating 
activity within geographic zones in which services are provided by a 
reputable commercially oriented management company that promotes 
rapid expansion of both the firms and their interests. For those Sub-
Saharan African economies that have progressed further with economic 
reform, ERZs can attract FDI and incubate dynamic internationally 
 competitive firms that eventually will challenge established monopolies 
in the unreformed sector, forcing them to compete or shut down. The 
ERZ therefore becomes a catalyst for reform of the initially much larger 
rent-distorted economy not only through its internal expansion and 
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demonstration effect on adjacent firms in the distorted economy, but also 
through the establishment of additional ERZs. 
The dual-track strategy recently acquired greater interest for African 
economies because China is contributing to seven economic zones in the 
continent, partly to encourage the globalization of Chinese firms, and it 
may extend the total number (Brautigam and Tang 2010). The Chinese 
experiment is partly a response to the disappointing track record of most, 
but not all, previous SEZs in Sub-Saharan Africa. Watson (2001) attri-
butes the failure of the continent’s EPZs other than Madagascar (and 
Mauritius) to implementation failures rooted in deficient infrastructure, 
unstable incentives, and inadequate government services (including 
export zone management). He might have added macroeconomic instabil-
ity as a fourth cause of failure because macroeconomic conditions dete-
riorated in many Sub-Saharan African economies through the 1970s, and 
improvements in most economies were delayed (by entrenched rent-
seeking interests) into the late-1990s. 
Cling, Razafindrakoto, and Roubaud (2005) contrast the robust suc-
cess of EPZs in Madagascar (until recently) with failures elsewhere in the 
continent, such as Senegal, Cameroon, Kenya, and Zimbabwe. Glick and 
Roubaud (2006) demonstrate the beneficial employment outcomes of 
the Madagascar EPZs, which predominantly employ young, semiskilled 
female workers. The workers earn significantly more than their counter-
parts in the informal sector and are remunerated at a similar rate to men, 
improving gender wage equity. Glick and Roubaud also report that EPZ 
jobs are comparable to (and some superior to) jobs elsewhere in the for-
mal sector, although long hours and high worker turnover restrict the 
EPZ as a source of long-term employment. However, Cling, Razafindrakoto, 
and Roubaud (2005) also confirm the importance to successful zones of 
stability, including a sound macroeconomic environment, which few gov-
ernments in Sub-Saharan Africa could sustain through the 1970s and 
1980s, but more have managed since. Provided that macrostability is 
achieved, not least in regard to the real exchange rate, ERZs are designed 
to address the criticisms of first-generation SEZs. 
This chapter is presented in four sections. The next defines the ERZ in 
the context of related spatial policy tools for economic restructuring and 
identifies, and corrects, a basic confusion in both the terminology of zones 
and zone objectives. The following section analyzes the successful experi-
ences with first-generation SEZs in China, Malaysia, and Mauritius, not-
ing how their SEZs functioned as catalysts for economywide economic 
reform. The next section explains how ERZs can avoid the generally 
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disappointing outcomes of first-generation SEZs in Africa. The final sec-
tion summarizes the policy implications for economic reform in Sub-
Saharan Africa.
The Confused Definitions and Aims of Special Economic Zones 
The term SEZ embraces a wide range of spatial policy tools that often 
are defined inadequately so that they elicit much confusion and inaccu-
rate stereotyping. Although ERZs share some characteristics with growth 
poles and EPZs, which are the two the most common variants of SEZs, 
they differ from them both in significant ways. Basically, ERZs are geo-
graphic areas located within distorted economies, which have yet to 
establish effective competitive markets. Within the ERZs, postreform 
conditions (world-class infrastructure, business-friendly services, and 
property rights and the rule of law) immediately apply. The fundamental 
objective of ERZs is to quickly establish the conditions of a fully 
reformed competitive market economy for investors within specific geo-
graphic zones inside an otherwise-distorted economy. In contrast to 
EPZs, which characterized the first-generation SEZs (first appearing in 
the 1960s), ERZs eschew subsidies because the success of many devel-
oping-country SEZs has reduced the risk for second-generation entrants. 
Experience elsewhere (some of which is elaborated below) shows that if 
coordination failures are overcome and world-class infrastructure is con-
centrated in professionally managed ERZs, then new entrants do not 
require subsidization. The basic point of the ERZ is to establish com-
petitive world-class firms immediately rather than to nurture them from 
infant status.
In addition, the ERZ is executed as part of an economy-wide dual-
track strategy, which adds the essential political component that the 
reform of distorted economies requires to be effective. The strategy rec-
ognizes that the top-down economic reform of such economies is likely 
to be undermined by the beneficiaries of rent-seeking, because reform 
extends competitive markets, which reduce their scope for rent-seeking 
activity. The dual-track reform strategy manages this risk to incumbent 
governments by using ERZs to kick-start a dynamic market economy, 
which forms Track 1 and rapidly expands employment, skills, taxes, and 
exports. Track 1 initially is modest in size, but it builds a proreform 
political coalition that can eventually take on opponents of reform 
and neutralize or co-opt them. Meanwhile, reform proceeds slowly in 
the rent-distorted sector (Track 2) to avoid early confrontation with 
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 rent-seekers, which a reforming government is likely to lose. Successful 
dual-track economic reform in economies as diverse as China, Malaysia, 
and Mauritius shows that SEZs can grow a dynamic market economy 
within 15 years to a scale that dominates the total economy, while also 
nurturing a proreform political coalition capable of managing rent-seek-
ing interests in Track 2.
Compared with alternative spatial policy options, ERZs avoid the 
problems of overambitious scale that plagued most first-generation 
growth poles (Parr 1999). The initial wave of growth poles was discred-
ited. Like ERZs, they sought to overcome coordination problems, but 
they went further by attempting to capture agglomeration economies 
by concentrating activity geographically. In practice, the optimum scale 
of growth poles proved so large that it outstripped domestic imple-
mentation capacity, squandering the potential economic benefits, as 
most arrestingly in the case of Republica Bolivariana de Venezuela’s 
Ciudad Guayana (Auty 1990, 227–48). Meanwhile, in the theoretical 
literature, Murphy, Shliefer, and Vishny (1989) clearly do not appreci-
ate the real-world impracticality of the successful coordination of the 
massive investment required by an industrial push (Auty 1994) that is 
beloved by balanced-growth enthusiasts. The heyday of first-generation 
growth poles was in the 1970s when they were extensively, and invari-
ably unsuccessfully, used to revive economic activity in lagging regions 
(Parr 1999).
The EPZ has proved more resilient than growth poles, but it has had 
geographically mixed outcomes, with better results in Asia and Central 
America than in Sub-Saharan Africa and South America (Watson 2001; 
Jayanthakumaran 2003). For example, cost-benefit analysis undertaken for 
EPZs in six Asian countries in the 1990s identified positive rates in all of 
them except for the Philippines, where the Marcos government mistakenly 
conferred overgenerous subsidies at the outset (table 9.1). But although 
most first-generation EPZs failed in Sub-Saharan Africa, not all did so.
Five systemic criticisms of EPZs can be easily explained and dis-
missed because EPZs evolve and mature, which greatly strengthens 
their economic benefits. The criticisms therefore apply mainly to the 
many zones in Sub-Saharan Africa that failed to move beyond the early 
stages. Effectively implemented EPZs that manage to mature neutralize 
the standard criticisms, namely, that wages are low, skill transfer is neg-
ligible, net export earnings are significantly less than gross export earn-
ings, foreign firms squeeze rent from incentives and relocate when the 
incentives expire, and tax incentives cut government revenue. Because 
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SEZs absorb unemployed labor and that is a useful net gain in itself, 
this feature undercuts the first criticism. The second criticism is inac-
curate for EPZs that mature: there is incontrovertible evidence from 
China, Malaysia, and Mauritius that over the long term, successful 
EPZs raise skills and productivity, whereas rent-distorted economies 
struggle. Finally, the ERZ is expressly designed to avoid the three 
remaining criticisms of EPZs. First, ERZs expand rapidly so that even if 
value added is a modest share of enterprise revenue, the aggregate 
value added quickly becomes substantial and linkages proliferate with 
adjacent Track 2 activity. Second, the ERZ offers a competitive incen-
tive regime rather than subsidies, which may have been necessary for 
the first-generation SEZs in developing countries but no longer are 
needed. Consequently, the risk of nurturing rent-seeking is diminished. 
Third, ERZs generate taxes from the outset in addition to foreign 
exchange from exports, technology transfer, and skills. In fact, because 
the five criticisms apply to failed EPZs, in that specific context, they 
may be correct.
Perhaps most important, ERZs aim not only to create employment, 
exports, and taxes, but also to incubate dynamic competitive firms capa-
ble of rapidly developing and harnessing new ideas to drive welfare 
improvements, an achievement central to sustaining gains in African wel-
fare. The new competitive enterprises in the Track 1 ERZs generate posi-
tive spillovers for adjacent Track 2 activity within the distorted economy. 
Table 9.1 Export Processing Zone Performance, Six Asian Economies 
(percent)
Korea, 
Rep. of Malaysia Sri Lanka Philippines Indonesia China
EPZ jobs/total jobs, 1995 n.a. 2.1 4.4 0.3 n.a. 12.0
EPZ foreign profit/ total 
profit, 1995 n.a. 100.0 60.0 70.0 n.a. 30.0
EPZ exports/total manu-
factured exports, 1980s 1.0 49.0 44.0 16.0 n.a. 12.0
EPZ net export/total 
exports, 1980s 53.2 33.0 27.9 26.2 62.4 16.4
EPZ FDI/total FDI, 1980s 4.0 13.4 73.8 22.6 5.5 11.6
Domestic raw material/
total EPZ raw material 34.0 4.0 5.3 6.0 41.0 n.a.
Economic internal rate 
of return 15.0 28.0 23.0 –3.0 26.0 10.7
Source: Jayanthakumaran (2003), 59 and 61.
Note: EPZ = export-processing zone; FDI = foreign direct investment; n.a. = not applicable.
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The central goal of the ERZ is the proliferation of internationally com-
petitive firms throughout the economy. This enables the distorted econ-
omy in Track 2 to experience relative decline, and its capital and labor can 
be absorbed progressively into a modern market economy that expands 
from Track 1. In contrast to most first-generation SEZs, including growth 
poles and EPZs, ERZs are not specifically targeted at attracting high-tech 
activity or at reviving depressed regions but rather at attracting invest-
ment by dynamic companies. The ERZ makes no attempt to pick winners 
in terms of product, source of investment, or intended geographic 
 market. 
In the context of Sub-Saharan Africa, the ERZ simply aims to encour-
age a rapidly expanding number of firms to efficiently employ African 
land, labor, skills, and capital. To date, companies have been deterred by 
the absence of the basic conditions required to establish and sustain effi-
cient production in Africa, not least business-friendly regulation and 
institutions. The ERZ seeks to rectify these shortcomings by establishing 
such conditions immediately, thereby creating a catalyst for the rapid dif-
fusion of a dynamic market economy capable of sustaining economic 
growth by raising productivity, an outcome most but not all distorted 
economies have found elusive (World Bank 2009). 
Until the proreform political coalition has grown strong enough to 
see off opponents of reform, the ERZ is vulnerable to the policy capture 
that would turn it into just another agency to facilitate rent-seeking 
activity, as occurred with the Russian SEZs (Tuominen and Lamminen 
2009). Most firms within the first-generation Russian SEZs located to 
escape taxation and showed little interest in being internationally com-
petitive. They did not sustain their activity when the time-constrained 
subsidies expired. In short, most Russian ERZs simply generated rents 
for less than dynamic companies. The defense against policy capture is 
the formation at the outset of a prozone political coalition, which has a 
vested interest in the success of the zone. The coalition includes not only 
local workers and local government leaders that stand to gain directly 
from the ERZ’s success, but also investors in the ERZ infrastructure, 
which for Sub-Saharan Africa include international financial institutions 
(IFIs) like the Asian Development Bank and World Bank. The participa-
tion of the IFIs creates a real risk of painful reprisal should a government 
fail to ensure that legal contracts are upheld. In addition, recent  evidence 
from Russia with regard to Rosneft’s acquisition of some of the Yukos 
hydrocarbon company’s assets indicates that extranational courts can 
penalize asset confiscation (Economist 2010). Finally, WTO membership 
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provides a further means of increasing the risk of painful retaliation 
for failure to uphold contracts. In the last resort, however, investment 
risk cannot be entirely eliminated, only minimized and perhaps insured 
against.
Examples of Successful SEZs 
Three cases of successful deployment of SEZs are examined in this 
 section. Mauritius is analyzed as an early pioneer of the dual-track SEZ 
strategy, demonstrating clearly how SEZs can (1) adjust to changing 
competitive advantage by improving workforce skills; (2) drive econo-
mywide structural change; and (3) strengthen a progrowth political 
coalition until it outweighs the rival interests that benefit from rent 
distortion. Malaysia confirms the capacity of economic zones to pro-
mote a dynamic market economy and also shows that textile manufac-
ture is not the sole route by which this is achieved. Moreover, Malaysia 
demonstrates how SEZs can diversify an initially resource-rich econ-
omy into a manufacturing-driven economy. Mauritius and China have 
resource-poor economies, which rent-cycling theory shows act to 
strengthen elite incentives to promote sustained economic growth. The 
case of China most dramatically reveals the strength of the spillover 
effects from SEZs.
Mauritius: How the Zone’s Comparative Advantage Evolved
Mauritius illustrates how an economic zone functioning within a dual-
track strategy can dramatically change the fortunes of a small remote 
economy. As a sugar mono-crop island economy, Mauritius faced a 
Malthusian situation in the 1960s in the face of rapid population growth 
and emerging land scarcity. Quickly appreciating the limits of industri-
alization by import substitution, the government established an SEZ in 
1971 primarily to absorb surplus labor. It initially attracted capital from 
Hong Kong, China, where investors sought to surmount EU and U.S. 
quotas and tariffs on textile exports by supplying these two major mar-
kets from Mauritius. In addition, local sugar planters invested part of a 
sugar price windfall in 1972–1975 in the SEZ to diversify their options 
(Findlay and Wellisz 1993). Finally, as part of its Track 2 strategy, the 
government of Mauritius used some of the extra tax revenue from the 
sugar boom to undercut radical opposition to market-driven growth by 
increasing social spending from 6 percent of GDP to 10 percent of GDP 
through the 1970s. The dual-track policy drove per capita GDP at 
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6  percent annually through the 1970s and eased the simmering social 
tension of the 1960s.
Mauritius’ SEZ joint ventures of the 1970s gave way in the 1980s to 
mainly domestic investment, specializing in textiles. Once surplus labor 
was absorbed and real wages began rising, however, low-value textile 
items were relocated offshore to Madagascar, allowing Mauritius to focus 
on higher value products such as textile design, spinning, weaving, and 
knitting. This outcome flatly contradicts the criticism that SEZs merely 
employ low-wage labor. At its peak, the Mauritius textile industry was the 
second-largest world producer of knitted textiles; the third-largest 
exporter of pure wool tissues, and the fourth-largest exporter of T-shirts 
to Europe. The zone employed 60,000 workers in 500 firms generating 
$1.2 billion in exports. A state enterprise serviced the SEZs and included 
among its functions the provision of such externalities as training, invest-
ment credits, and negotiation of trade agreements. In 1985, 14 years after 
the start-up, the government replaced the SEZ tax holiday with a 15 
percent profit tax along with incentives to export for import substitution 
firms within Track 2. By then, the two tracks had all but merged.
SEZ expansion drove Mauritius per capita GDP at 5.7 percent annu-
ally through the 1980s as rapid passage through the demographic transi-
tion cut population growth to 1 percent. Manufactured exports rose from 
one-quarter of the total in 1980 to two-thirds in 1990, ending sugar’s 
dominance. SEZ employment tripled and, by 1990, national unemploy-
ment fell to 4 percent from 21 percent, creating labor shortages that 
strengthened pressure on firms to diversify into more productive activity. 
By the mid-1990s, Mauritian textile wages were four times those of 
China and Vietnam and prompted diversification into information tech-
nology within the evolving SEZ (Chernoff and Warner 2002). Services 
increasingly drove the economy: tourist arrivals quintupled to 700,000 in 
2003, and financial services rapidly expanded. Moreover, the government 
used the sustained economic buoyancy to restructure the once-dominant 
sugar industry as WTO rules phased out sugar’s geopolitical rent over 
2001–2009.1
From 1971 onward, Mauritius’ SEZ attracted competitive manufac-
turing as part of a dual-track economic reform that postponed confronta-
tion with pro-redistribution political forces, including the powerful 
unions in the initially dominant sugar industry until the dynamic sector 
was sufficiently strong, both economically and politically, to absorb sur-
plus labor from the lagging sector and also to reform it. Interestingly, 
Mauritius’ experience paralleled that of Malaysia after the Malaysian 
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government established free trade zones in 1971, but electronics were 
initially the key export product there, rather than textiles.
Malaysia: Zones Facilitate the Shift from Resource-Driven to 
Skill-Driven Development
Like Mauritius, Malaysia realized the limits of import substitution indus-
trialization well before most other developing economies, and its govern-
ment embraced export industry, despite the country’s richly diversified 
natural resource endowment. The motivation for change was the inability 
of infant industry, which proved to be capital intensive, to contribute 
significantly to unemployment alleviation, which was critical for improv-
ing the lagging welfare of the majority native Malay population. From 
1968 onward, the government began encouraging export manufacturing 
because it was more labor intensive. It offered export manufacturers 
reduced taxation linked to export performance and domestic content; tax 
deductions on export promotion expenses; accelerated depreciation 
when more than 20 percent of production was exported; and preferential 
rates on government export financing and insurance (Salleh and 
Meyanathan 1993, 9). In 1971, free trade zones were established, which 
were deemed outside Malaysian territory for the purpose of customs and 
excise duties. They conferred duty-free imports of capital and inputs for 
goods that were processed for export. Land within the zones was leased 
to firms at below-market rates, but firms normally built their own facto-
ries rather than leasing them. In addition, company tax relief was pro-
vided for specified periods. 
Foreign investors in Malaysia through the 1970s were mainly from 
the United States and Japan, but in the 1980s Taiwan, China, rose to 
prominence and contributed more than one-third of Malaysia’s FDI. 
Electronics exports were initially a key component in Malaysia’s rapid 
manufacturing expansion. Like Mauritius’ textiles, Malaysian electronics 
initially absorbed cheap labor but subsequently became technologically 
more sophisticated and, by the late 1980s, they generated one-fifth of all 
manufacturing employment and half of industrial exports. During 
1982–93, the share of manufacturing in Malaysian exports jumped from 
22 percent to a dominant 74 percent, and the composition of manufac-
tured exports switched toward telecommunications (Islam and 
Chowdhury 1997, 228). The resulting growth in the contribution of 
exports to industrial output steadily reduced the economywide average 
effective rate of protection from 45 percent in 1969 (itself modest by 
developing-country standards at the time) to 31 percent in 1979 and 
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17 percent in 1987 (Edwards 1990), just 16 years after the SEZs were 
established. The Mahathir government rashly launched a heavy industry 
drive in the early 1980s, just as the Republic of Korea was reacting 
strongly against that policy and the social and economic costs it had 
imposed on the majority of the population. Much Malaysian heavy 
industry was prone to rent-seeking and required prolonged adjustments 
to mitigate the worst consequences. Fortunately, the export manufactur-
ing sector proved sufficiently resilient to absorb the costs of Malaysia’s 
ill-judged heavy industry drive. Malaysia not only confirms the viability 
of the dual-track strategy and the speed with which economywide 
reform can be achieved but also demonstrates that the strategy can work 
in a natural resource–abundant economy as well as in resource-poor 
economies like Mauritius and China. 
China: The Mechanism of the SEZ Spillover to 
the Rent-Distorted Sector
China provides a sterner test of the viability of the dual-track strategy in 
a strongly distorted economy within which central planning had repressed 
markets for three decades. Although the Chinese economy was less dis-
torted than that of the USSR when their respective governments com-
menced reforms (de Melo, Denzier, Gelb, and Tenev 2001), the process 
of economic reform still encountered strong vested interests within the 
dominant state-owned industrial sector. This opposition prompted the 
Chinese reformers to eschew top-down big-bang reform for gradual 
reform that first reformed agriculture and then, using SEZs in the south-
eastern coastal region, reformed industry to create employment and 
attract foreign investment, notably from the adjacent economic agglom-
erations Hong Kong SAR, China, and Taiwan, China. China also clearly 
illustrates the demonstration effect of the SEZs on firms in the adjacent 
rent-distorted economy. 
The Chinese SEZs were formally established in 1980 to restructure 
the economy by tapping into foreign investment and expertise. The gov-
ernment aimed to test a controlled economic liberalization after three 
decades of central planning and economic autarky. China initially estab-
lished four zones on the coast: three in Guangdong province close to 
Hong Kong SAR, China, at Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shantou; and one at 
Xiamen in Fujian, close to Taiwan, China. The number of zones increased 
through the 1980s and 1990s to 200 with varying structures, ranging 
from free commercial zones to free industrial zones and technology parks. 
Of all China’s principal regions, the neglected southern coastal region 
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initially was well placed to sustain dual-track reform. The south coast 
region had little obsolete industrial capital because of neglect under cen-
tral planning; it was well located to capture spillover effects from the 
adjacent dynamic market economies of Hong Kong, China, and Taiwan, 
China; and as a resource-poor region, the absence of natural resource 
rents incentivized provincial and local governments to promote wealth 
creation so they could provide employment and eventually expand the 
tax base.
Throughout the 1980s, the SEZs combined lower central taxation 
with enhanced infrastructure investment to attract foreign capital invest-
ment first to the original reform zones and then to additional zones 
established along the coast (Litwack and Qian 1998). From the early 
1990s, the tax benefits were removed from the zones, although invest-
ment in superior infrastructure continued to be concentrated, albeit in a 
larger set of zones. From 1994, taxation was equalized across regions, and 
government attention shifted from the coast to stimulating the lagging 
interior regions. Moreover, government efforts also sharply intensified to 
reform the large SOEs (the principal consumers of regulatory rent) in 
Track 2 (Farole 2010), which no longer dominated industrial production 
but a decade earlier had received a disproportionately high share of capi-
tal investment and had been sufficiently powerful politically to discour-
age top-down economic reform.
The SEZ strategy contributed strongly to China’s rise to become a 
leading world exporter of manufactured goods and the principal recipient 
of FDI among the developing economies. During 1979–95, the SEZs 
helped China attract 40 percent of all FDI to developing countries, of 
which the coastal areas received 90 percent. Guangzhou alone drew 
40 percent of Chinese FDI, which with the two other local SEZs, lifted 
the local share of FDI to 50 percent. Importantly, the gains were made 
rapidly: whereas the south coast region occupies 5 percent of China’s 
land area and held 19 percent of the population, by the mid-1990s, it 
generated 32.7 percent of national GDP, which represented a gain in 
share of 8.5 percent of national GDP during 1980–1995 (Golley 1999). 
China experimented not only with economic incentives but also with 
different forms of enterprise. The rise of new more flexible enterprises 
resulted by the mid-1990s in the expansion of township and village 
enterprises (TVEs), which were basically local devices to absorb surplus 
rural labor in self-supporting employment. TVEs accounted for two-fifths 
of China’s manufactured output, mostly for the domestic market. In 
addition, however, joint ventures grew to 15 percent of manufactured 
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output, but they generated half of all China’s consumer goods and two-
fifths of its exports; MNCs produced half of all exports, worth 9 percent 
of GDP (Gang 2001). 
The SEZ experiment began to transform the Track 2 economy. It 
rapidly turned the Zhu Delta around Guangzhou into the second of 
three major Chinese agglomerations, with the established zone in the 
Chang Delta centered on Shanghai and the third in the Bohai Triangle. 
The agglomerations began exerting beneficial spillover effects on local 
SOEs. Johnston (1999) shows that provinces hosting one of the three 
agglomerations also hosted dynamic competitive manufacturing, 
whereas provinces outside the agglomerations did not, including coastal 
provinces outside the three agglomerations. Table 9.2 demonstrates 
that agglomerations developed shares of non-SOEs and profits in excess 
of their share of urban population. Interestingly, however, the profit-
ability of SOEs in the agglomeration provinces was disproportionately 
higher than that of SOEs elsewhere. The higher ratio of viable SOEs in 
the agglomerations confirms positive spillover effects from adjacent 
market enterprises. The ratio of the share of SOE profits to the share 
of SOEs in the interior regions remote from the three agglomerations 
is significantly lower (see table 9.2), with the exception of three 
resource-based activities (Henan oil and coal, Heilongjiang oil, and 
Yunnun tobacco).
Aslund (1999) argues that such rapid extension of local competition 
as occurred in China reduces scope for rent-seeking by government offi-
cials. Because growing competition between firms in adjacent authorities 
shrinks the regulatory (government-created) rents, local officials thereby 
acquire an incentive to pass residual claims, for example, from underem-
ployed workers, on to enterprise managers to avoid incurring onerous 
social support charges (Li, Li, and Zhang 2000). Officials need to improve 
efficiency incentives for local enterprises so that they can bear the extra 
Table 9.2 Ratio of Firms, Workers and Profits to Urban Population Share, 
Chinese Regions, 1996
Urban 
population (%)
Non-state enterprise ratios State enterprise ratios
Firms Workers Profits Firms Workers Profits 
Coast south 27.25 1.15 1.20 1.88 0.78 0.60 0.97
Coast north 23.35 0.82 1.00 0.99 0.83 0.98 1.35
Center 43.45 1.01 0.90 0.54 1.19 1.21 1.33
West 4.95 0.91 0.80 0.18 1.59 1.47 0.20
Source: Johnston (1999), 13.
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social responsibilities, which can be achieved by replacing SOEs with 
more efficient private firms (including MNCs) or initially at least with 
profit-sensitive cooperatives like the TVEs. The pressure for proefficiency 
change is sensitive to the tax rate, however, which exerts an inverse-U 
effect, because high taxes repress the incentives of management to be 
efficient, whereas low taxes diminish government interest in boosting 
enterprise efficiency (the fruits of which yield taxes).
The final part of the competitive spatial dynamic triggered by SEZs 
worked by encouraging the non-SOE managers to demand both legisla-
tion to fully safeguard private property rights and independent courts to 
enforce contracts that are free of government manipulation (Li, Li, and 
Zhang 2000). Consistent with this thesis, Li, Li, and Zhang (2000) show 
that privatization spreads faster in cases in which competition is most 
intense, that is, in simple undifferentiated products and in the presence of 
sharply falling transport costs, which characterized the south coast region 
in the 1980s and 1990s. Li, Li, and Zhang (2000) also find that privatiza-
tion occurs faster among lower tiers of government. In the absence of 
scale economies in local enterprises, local TVEs face intensifying competi-
tion sooner than large national SOE monopolies, thereby facilitating 
entry by new small firms. Additionally, local officials have less administra-
tive and legal leverage with which to protect firms than higher tiers of 
government. However, the relevance of this particular facet of Chinese 
reform for natural resource-rich African economies (which most are) is 
potentially undercut by the fact that, as a resource-poor economy, the 
Chinese elite had a strong incentive to grow the economy by efficient use 
of capital and labor, rather than by relying on politically driven (and per-
sonally enriching) rent cycling (Auty 2010). This is why the case of 
resource-rich Malaysia is particularly instructive for African economies.
Most critically, in all three successful country cases, the first-generation 
SEZs proved effective catalysts for establishing or sustaining dynamic mar-
ket economies (Track 1) that acquired the capacity to transform lagging 
sectors within the initially dominant rent-distorted economy (Track 2), an 
outcome that all three countries achieved within the space of just 15 to 
20 years. 
The Potential Role of ERZs in Sub-Saharan Africa
ERZs set the bar higher for potential investing companies than the first-
generation SEZs by eschewing subsidies and encouraging efficient and 
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competitive enterprises from the outset. Rather than subsidizing firms 
through an “infant” start-up phase, Fafchamps, El Hamine, and Zeufack 
(2008) find from research in Morocco that firms thrive by learning from 
meeting foreign demand, which is discerning, rather than by “production 
learning” as a consequence of first reducing costs in the domestic market. 
This approach in turn results in export firms commencing overseas sales 
shortly after their start-up. These firms also benefit from some degree of 
foreign ownership, and most importantly from being productive at the 
outset rather than following an infant industry learning curve. A well-
executed ERZ is designed to reduce the risk for second-generation SEZ 
firms, although that risk is systematically reduced by the very success of 
first-generation SEZs.
Economic geography reinforces the rationale for promoting ERZs 
within the economies of Sub-Saharan Africa because ERZs can help them 
to tap into spillovers from overseas urban agglomerations that their own 
economies will be unable to generate for several decades. Few economies 
in Sub-Saharan Africa apart from South Africa and Nigeria are likely to 
grow cities of a sufficient size and economic structure to capture the 
agglomeration economies. However, the smaller Sub-Saharan African 
economies can build links to such agglomerations just as Mauritius did in 
the 1970s with Hong Kong, China; and Malaysia did with Japan and the 
United States. In contrast, the sheer scale of the Chinese market allowed 
that country to quickly promote its own agglomerations, although it did 
so by initially tapping into spillovers from Hong Kong, China (Zhu Delta) 
and Taiwan, China (Zhang Delta). The smaller African economies can 
benefit from agglomeration spillover effects if clusters of same-firm 
activities emerge within ERZs that secure localization economies. 
Localization economies are more specialized than the agglomeration 
economies and enhance the efficiency of firms by achieving the modest 
thresholds required to sustain local pools of specialized labor and services, 
and specific production inputs, and also by providing high exposure to 
innovative ideas. Viewed within this spatial context, the ERZ is an effec-
tive vehicle to nurture the localization economies and confer an advan-
tage over African economies that lack ERZs. Consequently, the spillover 
from the agglomerations is not through physical proximity, because such 
effects attenuate rapidly, but rather from contact with firms in such 
agglomerations as their suppliers, which can create localization econo-
mies through which best business practice and standards diffuse to the 
local economy.
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In this context, control of operating conditions appears to underlie the 
Chinese strategy of systematically expanding SEZs in Africa (World Bank 
2010) rather than any conscious intention to establish catalysts of reform 
in rent-distorted economies. Brautigam and Tang (2010) identify multi-
ple objectives for the Chinese economic zones, which center on facilitat-
ing export diversification by Chinese companies. The advantages for 
China include (1) helping inexperienced small and midsize firms gain 
overseas experience; (2) facilitating China’s domestic restructuring by 
relocating mature industries offshore; (3) surmounting barriers to 
Chinese exports to Europe and North America; (4) tapping into econo-
mies of scale for overseas investment; and (5) creating markets for 
Chinese-made machinery. Chinese firms receive incentives that include 
grants, long-term loans plus subsidies on loans, and subsidies on up to 
one-third of some preparation costs. Host governments are also expected 
to extend concessions, such as tax holidays, duty waivers, and relaxed 
labor laws, which they have done with different levels of enthusiasm in 
different countries. Although the zones are open to domestic and non-
Chinese foreign firms as well as Chinese firms, the latter have tended to 
dominate. Most zones remain in an early stage of development and 
maturation is projected at a decade. Chinese firms report problems aris-
ing from policy fluctuations, deficient service provision, and inadequate 
infrastructure beyond the zones. African agencies express concern over 
potential abuses, such as relabeling products made in China for export 
and labor exploitation.
A further policy option for those African economies in which mining 
is important is to harness the potential to create ERZs presented by major 
mining projects operated by international mining companies. International 
mines resemble ERZs by functioning as enclaves of efficiency within 
underperforming economies. The massive scale of the sunk investment 
made in mining renders it imperative for the mining company to negoti-
ate, as a precondition of such investment, conditions of operation that 
ensure the efficient application of capital, labor, and technology. Such 
mines and oil wells can form the nucleus of ERZs through a modification 
of the standard corporate social responsibility policy. Experiments by, 
among others, BP in Azerbaijan (Auty 2006) suggest that if international 
mining firms reorient their corporate social policies away from filling gaps 
in infrastructure that central governments should provide, and instead 
substitute the encouragement of new enterprise formation around the 
mining area, then the mineral enclave effectively expands into an ERZ. 
BP shared infrastructure and gave advice to new entrants, while also 
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assisting with finance and legal guidance. The mining area nurtures new 
economic activity that can continue to operate after mining is exhausted, 
helping to sustain the local economy. The proposed shift in corporate 
social responsibility policy encourages local entrepreneurs to establish 
both mine-related and unrelated businesses. The policy helps to build 
local social capital (BP cooperated with the Open Society Foundation to 
achieve this in Azerbaijan) within the mining region to strengthen the 
lobbying capacity of local governments and businesses for legitimate cen-
tral government assistance.
Conclusions: ERZs and Economic Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa
Effective economic reform of rent-distorted political economies demands 
a political component to overcome policy capture by rent recipients. This 
chapter argues that African governments can achieve this through a vari-
ant of the dual-track strategy, within which second-generation SEZs, 
defined as ERZs, play a critical role. Elements of such a strategy can be 
detected in successful reforming economies as diverse as resource-poor 
Mauritius and China and resource-abundant Malaysia. The dual-track 
strategy postpones confrontation with the rent-seeking opponents of 
reform in the rent-distorted economy (Track 2), and it accelerates the 
emergence of a dynamic market economy within ERZs, which comprise 
Track 1. The Track 1 ERZs immediately provide world-class infrastruc-
ture, effective business-friendly services and incentives, and institutional 
safeguards for property rights and the rule of law. The effective coordina-
tion and delivery of this efficient business environment mean that, unlike 
the first-generation SEZs, the ERZ firm does not require subsidies. The 
successful expansion of dynamic internationally competitive firms in 
Track 1 also builds a strong proreform political coalition that can eventu-
ally neutralize rent-seeking elements and confer strong and positive spill-
over effects on economic activity in Track 2.
Mauritius demonstrates the basic dynamic of ERZs, which Malaysia 
confirms, and China most clearly shows the beneficial spillover effects of 
ERZs on the distorted economy in Track 2. SEZ activity in all three 
economies achieved sufficient scale to accomplish radical restructuring 
within 15 to 20 years of their launch. Given the many obstacles to busi-
ness formation in Sub-Saharan African economies that are the legacy of 
decades of economic distortion, the ERZ seeks to kick-start the emer-
gence of a dynamic market economy. The ERZ geographically concen-
trates the principal components of a business-friendly environment and 
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leaves the rest of the economy to progress through subsequent spillover 
effects.
Most economies in Sub-Saharan Africa are too small to develop cities 
large enough to create agglomeration economies. The ERZ can build 
localization economies that link to global agglomerations in North 
America, Europe, and Asia, and thereby provide access to the stimulus to 
raise productivity that such agglomerations generate. In this way, the ERZ 
not only facilitates reform but also diffuses productivity-driven growth 
throughout the reformed economy. Ironically, the ERZ turns the much-
criticized economic enclave into a virtue by first tapping into the advan-
tages of the enclave to incubate dynamic competitive firms in isolation 
from the distorted economy and subsequently allowing the enclave 
through its spillover effects to gradually incorporate the rest of the 
economy into global best practice.
Note
 1. Mauritian sugar production costs under the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement 
were 25 percent above world levels and reform aimed to cut them from 
US$0.40/kilogram to US$0.26/kilogram by increasing the average  factory 
size, mechanizing cane production, and releasing marginal land for tourism 
and information technology (IMF 2002).
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Planned Obsolescence? Export 
Processing Zones and Structural 
Reform in Mauritius
Claude Baissac
Introduction
This case study first summarizes the conditions within which the 
Mauritius Export Processing Zone (MEPZ) was established and the initial 
policy objectives at its root. It then reviews the major national policy 
changes that occurred in the early 1980s and how these affected the zone. 
Following this review, it provides an overview of the MEPZ’s perfor-
mance since its early days and explores the current challenges being faced 
by the program. Finally, it analyzes the relationship between the MEPZ 
and broad economic reforms and develops conclusions.
The Policy Environment
Context and Objectives
Following independence in 1968, Mauritius chose a social-democratic 
path, with a welfare state providing free universal education and health 
care. Economic production, however, remained in the hands of a narrow 
elite, highly concentrated in the sugar sector. The MEPZ was created in 
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1971 in the context of an import-substitution development strategy 
meant to decrease the economy’s heavy reliance on sugar exports, which 
accounted for 75 percent of exports at the time, and the macroeconomic 
vulnerabilities this created. Within the broader economic strategy, MEPZ 
was very much an ad hoc and secondary instrument focused on absorbing 
surplus labor, with unemployment standing at more than 20 percent and 
the labor force growing at 3 percent per year. There had been widespread 
concerns over the long-term socioeconomic and political viability of the 
island, and these concerns fed into policy formulation and political 
arrangements.
The exact origin of the MEPZ idea is somewhat disputed. According 
to Dommen and Dommen (1999) it originated in a Swiss-Mauritian 
entrepreneur, José Poncini, who opened a factory assembling watch jew-
els from imported components using imported machinery in 1965. 
Poncini obtained permission from the Mauritian authorities that all 
imports would escape duties provided the final product would be 
exported. This was the catalyst for the creation of the MEPZ some six 
years later. Paturau (1988) argues that the key initiator was Professor Lim 
Fat of the University of Mauritius, who proposed the creation of an EPZ 
in a lecture after a visit to Taiwan, China, in 1969.
If the role of economic entrepreneurs has been widely acknowledged, 
so are those of Prime Minister Seewoosagur Ramgoolam and Foreign 
Minister Gaëtan Duval. Duval had been leader of the main opposition 
party, the Parti Mauricien Social Democrate (PMSD), and opposed inde-
pendence out of concerns it would jeopardize the position of his con-
stituencies, the French and Creole ethnic minorities. In 1969, the PMSD 
joined Ramgoolam’s Mauritian Labor Party to form a coalition govern-
ment, until both parties were defeated by Paul Beranger’s party in 1982, 
the Mouvement Militant Mauricien (MMM).1 Although Ramgoolam 
advocated import-substitution, Duval, concerned about further economic 
marginalization for the Creoles, strongly supported a labor-intensive, 
export-oriented approach. This demand contributed to support for the 
passing of the Export Processing Zone Act.2 As Roberts (1992, 100) 
notes, regardless of its paternity, “Whoever first brought up the idea of an 
EPZ for Mauritius, the (Government of Mauritius) is clearly responsible 
for the steps that led to its creation.” 
Initial investors were primarily Hong Kong, Chinese firms seeking to 
bypass European tariffs and quotas by taking advantage of the country’s 
preferential access to the European market. European firms soon joined 
in, attracted by the country’s bilingual population (French and English). 
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From the start, domestic firms invested significantly in the zone, at first 
in joint ventures with foreign firms. This investment was allowed by gov-
ernment to limit capital flight. Domestic investment originated from the 
sugar rent, which resulted from the European guaranteed prices and a 
series of bumper crops. The zone experienced rapid initial growth, with 
export growth averaging 9 percent per year between 1972 and 1977. By 
1977, the MEPZ employed nearly 20,000 and generated about 50 per-
cent of domestic capital investment. 
Economic Crisis and Restructuring 
From the mid-1970s, however, government expenditures increased signif-
icantly—by about 18 percent per year—notably, through large-scale 
public sector hiring, wage increases, and food subsidies in the context of 
serious political instability.3 The currency rose as the country experienced 
the effects of Dutch disease, resulting from escalating sugar prices. As 
sugar prices declined after 1975 and the international economic situation 
combined to hit the economy hard, the government deficit rose rapidly. 
Investment dried up, growth collapsed to less than 2 percent in 1979, and 
foreign reserves all but disappeared.
In 1978, the government called the IMF for emergency assistance. 
A series of bad crops hurt sugar production badly and more emergency 
measures were required, including devaluation. In 1981, the World Bank 
intervened in a context of continued economic crisis and political insta-
bility. Stabilization and structural adjustment programs targeted the bud-
get deficit and mounting public debt. The productive sector was 
liberalized. The economy decisively turned away from import-substitu-
tion to export-led growth by the 1982 socialist government. 
With this move, the EPZ became a pillar of the development strategy. 
The objective was a diversified economy initially based on three private 
sector-led pillars: (1) sugar, (2) the MEPZ, and (3) tourism. This strategy 
paid off, and the MEPZ experienced explosive growth from 1983 onward 
(see overview of performance section below). In 1985, it overtook sugar 
as the primary export earner and employer. Employment in the MEPZ 
reached nearly 90,000 in 1989, helping to reduce unemployment to less 
than 3 percent from more than 14 percent in 1984. Principal export 
markets were France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom. Later, 
with the implementation of the African Growth and Opportunity Act, 
the U.S. market became an import destination for Mauritian exports.
From the late 1980s onward, the government actively promoted new 
sectors while pursuing improved efficiency in existing ones. For instance, 
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in the sugar industry, it encouraged consolidation, despite the negative 
impact on employment. Tourism was significantly expanded, with new 
hotels, investment in the flag carrier Air Mauritius, and extensive promo-
tion. The government also pushed for greater productivity in the EPZ.
The launch of the offshore financial sector and the free port in the 
early 1990s, and then the Cybercity/ICT initiative in the early 2000s and 
the integrated resort scheme in the mid-2000s, represented continuation 
in the launch of specialized economic tools capable of ensuring balanced 
growth, employment, and sustainability in changing international trade 
and investment conditions.
Overview of MEPZ Performance
The government produces regular in-depth data on the economy and the 
EPZ. This section highlights the MEPZ’s key performance indicators 
since 1973.4
Firms and employment demographics have been closely related over 
the life of the zone, with average employment per firm remaining 
between 130 and 200, showing a progressive decline over time (see 
 figure 10.1). The curve shows a number of distinct phases: (1) rapid 
Source: Government of Mauritius, Mauritius Productivity and Competitiveness Indicators: 1999–2000 (Port Louis, 
Mauritius: Central Statistical Office, 2010).
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growth until 1976, (2) slow growth between 1976 and 1983, (3) explo-
sive growth between 1983 and 1988, (4) stabilization between 1989 and 
1991, (5) decline between 1992 and 1997, (6) recovery in 1998–2002, 
and (7) continuous decline since 2003. As at December 2009, employ-
ment was at its lowest level since 1986.
Investment (in 1982 prices, starting in 1979) shows greater variability 
within the same general trend (see figure 10.2): (1) decline between 1979 
and 1982; (2) explosive growth between 1983 and 1989; (3) decline 
between 1990 and 1992; (4) cycles of recoveries and declines between 
1993 and 2003; (5) strong recovery between 2004 and 2007, that year 
being the highest recorded; and (6) collapse with the global economic 
crisis in 2008 and 2009.
Export performance (see figure 10.3) and value added in constant 
prices (1982) again has followed a similar general trend.5 Value added 
peaked at 3.2 billion rupees in 2001.
Sectoral data are available only since 1992. The most remarkable facts 
are (1) the absolute dominance of the apparel sector; (2) its continued 
decline in relative and absolute terms in relation to the number of firms, 
employment, and exports; and (3) the absence of one or several sectors 
compensating for this decline. Indeed the growth of emerging sectors 
Figure 10.2 Investment Data
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Figure 10.3 Exports 
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Source: Government of Mauritius, Mauritius Productivity and Competitiveness Indicators: 1999–2000 (Port Louis, 
Mauritius: Central Statistical Office, 2010).
such as fish products, and to a lesser extent gems and jewelry, has so 
far proven insufficient, notably in terms of export performance and 
employment.
Figure 10.4 clearly illustrates the dependency of the MEPZ on the 
apparel sector. Not surprisingly, as the Mauritian economy has continued 
to diversify over the past decade the MEPZ has declined in relation to the 
rest of the economy. Manufacturing as a whole, which is highly concen-
trated in the MEPZ, represented 24 percent of GDP in 1998; it declined 
to just 18.6 percent by 2006. 
Although these figures indicate secular decline, closer analysis shows 
that nuance may be required in interpreting the implications of these 
trends for the future of the MEPZ. For example, evidence indicates that 
the productivity of labor has not declined when measured through the 
zone’s export intensity (exports and employment). As shown in  figure 
10.5, export intensity has increased steadily since 1987, although it 
decreased during the early part of the boom. This suggests that efficiency 
in labor utilization decreased as labor costs were low, given its abundance. 
Data show the same trend when measuring the productivity of labor 
through value added. It follows a curve closely aligned to that of export 
intensity. The productivity of firms shows a similar trend. 
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Source: Government of Mauritius, Mauritius Productivity and Competitiveness Indicators: 1999–2000 (Port Louis, 
Mauritius: Central Statistical Office, 2010).
Figure 10.4 Sectoral Share of Exports
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Similarly, the export productivity of investment has shown resiliency, as 
demonstrated in figure 10.6. This indicator experienced rapid decline in 
1979–1981, remained low in the early part of the boom years, and subse-
quently recovered. It fell after 2000, but recovered from 2004 onward. 
The government’s drive toward greater productivity (see box 10.1), 
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Box 10.1
Targeting Productivity Improvements in the EPZs
The government of Mauritius created the Export Processing Zone Development 
Authority (EPZDA) in 1992 to support technology acquisition, skills development, 
and efficiency improvement. EPZDA, together with the Mauritius Export Develop-
ment and Investment Authority (MEDIA), was absorbed in the Mauritius Industrial 
Development Authority in 2000, replaced in 2005 by Enterprise Mauritius. Also, in 
1999 the government launched the National Productivity and Competitiveness 
Council (NPCC), a tripartite body whose goal is to “stimulate and generate produc-
tivity and quality consciousness and drive the productivity and quality move-
ment in all sectors of the economy with a view to raising national output and 
achieving sustained growth and international competitiveness” (NPCC Act of 
1999). In 2003, the government launched the Textile Emergency Support Team, 
cochaired by government and business, and focused on restructuring the indus-
try through (1) productivity enhancements; (2) financial management and debt 
restructuring; and (3) international marketing. 
Source: Author.
Figure 10.6 Measures of Export Productivity
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which increased in 1992, clearly has had an impact as export intensity in 
2008 was 2.4 times and the export productivity of investment was 3.4 
times that of 1985.
Today’s Challenges 
Current challenges to the export processing zone include (1) relatively 
low and unstable FDI, (2) rising labor and operating costs, (3) increased 
competition from LDCs in a liberalizing trade environment, and (4) 
absence of an industrial sector capable of replacing apparels as an 
employment-intensive alternative.
FDI
FDI has rarely exceeded 5 percent of GDP. Even during the MEPZ boom 
years, it exceeded this mark only in 1990 and 1991. On the one hand, it 
is possible, given the evidence that the presence of multinationals fosters 
technology transfers, that this low attraction of FDI has affected the 
 performance of the MEPZ, and the island’s growth and development 
path as a whole. On the other hand, it is possible that this lack of FDI has 
exerted pressure on the government and the domestic sector to acquire 
technology through other means, including contract manufacturing, joint 
ventures, vocational training, and the acquisition of up-to-date produc-
tion technologies. This is supported by data. Indeed, although FDI has 
been low, domestic private sector investment has never been below 
15 percent of GDP since 1985 and has often been over 20 percent.
Cost Structure
Unlike many countries that have embarked on EPZ strategies, Mauritius 
has not been aggressive in seeking to keep real wages low through labor 
market and exchange rate policies. Mauritius’ wages were 25 percent of 
those of Hong Kong, China, and Singapore in the early 1980s. They have 
increased rapidly since then. For instance, wages in the EPZ more than 
doubled between 1992 and 2004, although they remained lower than in 
the rest of the economy. In 2002, Mauritius’ labor costs were significantly 
higher than those of major apparel producers.6 To partly compensate, a 
regional division of labor between Mauritius and Madagascar has devel-
oped since the 1990s, controlled by Mauritian firms.7 Labor costs in 
Madagascar were one-third of those in Mauritius. This overseas expansion 
of Mauritian firms has continued, with apparel groups operating in South 
and East Asia.
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From a competitiveness standpoint, Mauritius long benefited from 
wise utilization of the preferential trade agreements it secured from the 
American and European markets. It capitalized on the African, Caribbean 
and Pacific Sugar Protocol from 1975 to September 2009, when it 
expired. It also capitalized on the MFA, which expired in January 2005. 
Although it actively opposed the end of these frameworks, it also sought 
to prepare its industries for the new order, as well as its economy—notably 
through productivity-enhancing measures and the launch of new sectoral 
initiatives (such as the Cybercity and the conversion of least productive 
sugar-producing lands to other uses). Nevertheless, the competitiveness of 
Mauritius’ apparel industry has declined, notably for lower cost and 
higher volume items. From 2003 on, the MEPZ lost some key foreign 
investors and more than 25,000 jobs. Most of these investors transferred 
their operations to China. The recovery of exports and investment in 
2004, however, shows some resiliency as a result of markets diversifica-
tion, notably toward the European Union and regional markets like South 
Africa and Madagascar.
Diversification
Efforts to diversify within the EPZ have had limited success, and the 
zone’s core activities have remained largely concentrated on apparel. 
Endeavors to increase textile manufacturing have born limited results. 
Diversification has essentially taken place “outside” of the MEPZ, although 
the fish-product sector, part of an expanding cluster called the seafood 
hub, has shown remarkable growth. With an economic value added of 
more than US$320 million in 2007, it combines activities such as licens-
ing and services of fishing vessels, aquaculture, exports of unprocessed fish 
and processed fish, and more. Inside the MEPZ, the focus has been spe-
cialization and increased productivity. Most of the diversification has 
taken place outside of manufacturing and processing altogether, particu-
larly in the growth of the services sector, including ICT services, financial 
services, and the well-established tourism sector.
Although challenges exist, there is evidence of adjustment outside the 
traditional MEPZ sector and of resiliency within it. This is supported by 
Ancharaz’s (2009) detailed analysis of Mauritius’ revealed comparative 
advantage against China for the island’s 10 main apparel exports for the 
period 2000–2007. It managed to maintain competitiveness, and in some 
cases to increase its competitiveness, in products like knitted T-shirts and 
shirts, blouses, and shirt blouses. While other products have suffered, new 
products have emerged. Thus, evidence indicates that the diversification 
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failure has been somewhat mitigated by the productivity gains and the 
growth of Mauritian-owned companies that have attained autonomy 
from the foreign companies they used to be partners with. Today, 
Mauritius is the world’s second producer of knitwear, the third exporter 
for pure wool garments, and the fourth supplier of T-shirts to the 
European market.
The MEPZ and Economic Reform
Although the MEPZ started in the early 1970s and achieved impressive 
results during its first decade, it rose to international prominence during 
its “boom” time of the mid-1980s, attracting much policy attention and 
becoming a valued subject of research and analysis. The question of the 
relationship between the MEPZ and economic reform has also been well 
researched, notably, since the late 1980s. The Mauritius case has attracted 
the attention of distinguished institutions and economists, who have 
explored this relationship both for the sake of assisting the island’s eco-
nomic development and that of deriving useful generalizations.
In considering the many assessments of the MEPZ, it is possible to 
summarize the key question many researchers have attempted to 
answer as follows: Was the MEPZ a manifestation of reform, or was it the 
cause of it?
Setting aside the question of the cost benefit of the MEPZ and its 
net contribution to Mauritius’ relatively rapid economic growth 
(cf. Gulhati and Nallari 1990; Jaycox 1992; Sawkut et al. 2009; World 
Bank 1989), perhaps the most important impact of the MEPZ was in 
the political economic context, as a catalyst for reforms in the country. 
For these perspectives, the EPZ is a manifestation of this export- 
oriented strategy, formulated and implemented by a strongly develop-
mental state.
This export-oriented approach has been taken up by previous 
researchers. For example, Kearney (1990) argued Mauritius’ economic 
success could be attributed to its government having replicated the strat-
egy of the so-called newly industrializing countries (NICs), with policy 
makers being “pragmatic, bold, innovative, and closely attentive to the NIC 
experience” (Kearney 1990, 207), and the government being the coun-
try’s “leading entrepreneur.” To Meisenhelder (1997, 288), the export-
oriented strategy chosen by government cannot be reduced to structural 
adjustment, but rather it represents an indigenous reform endeavor that 
is the expression of the existence of a developmental state, characterized 
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by “a capable and relatively autonomous state bureaucracy . . . it was local 
bureaucrats—with the help from academics and the Meade report—who 
recognized the potential of export-led industrialization for the creation 
of economic growth, and who used state authority and resources to 
implement it.”
This theme of the Mauritius developmental state has been a regular 
feature. Carroll and Carroll (1997) note the essential role of a competent 
bureaucracy, capable of formulating policies (either in response to 
demands or in anticipation of them), obtaining support, and implement-
ing them. Evidence of this is found in the political and legislative process 
that established the MEPZ and described above in “The policy environ-
ment.” It is worth mentioning that the government—once Ramgoolam 
was won to the cause—worked with little initial support from its own 
ranks, including labor and business, and needed to address resistance to 
the project. Particularly opposed to the EPZ solution were the sugar bar-
ons, who were at the helm of the largest sector of the economy, and the 
virulent MMM, for different reasons. Although the first group was con-
cerned about the negative consequence of the EPZ on labor supply and 
cost, the second opposed further inserting Mauritius within the interna-
tional capitalist system. In addition to convincing these groups that the 
EPZ would “ultimately benefit all Mauritians” (Roberts 1992, 101), the 
government had to win assent from the legislature.
In addition to its strategic role, government and the state apparatus 
took a central role in implementing the EPZ and adapting it over the 
years. As described by Bheenick and Shapiro (1991),
The government soon realized that it would have to strengthen the capacity 
of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry to make the EPZ approach work. 
To bolster its staff size and expertise, assistance was secured under bilateral 
and multilateral foreign aid programmes. This facilitated the creation of new 
cells for projects evaluation, monitoring, investment promotion, export mar-
keting, funding of projects, and provision of insurance to protect exporters 
against defaults by importers. While foreign consulting firms were initially 
used, they were replaced as soon as Mauritian authorities gained needed 
experience. (264–65)
Measures taken included the creation within the Ministry of Industry 
of an Industrial Coordination Unit in charge of simplifying the invest-
ment process in the EPZ, and later, MEDIA, a parastatal organization 
whose mission was to promote exports, engage in investment promotion, 
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develop and operate industrial estates, and plan and implement export-
oriented manufacturing.
Dommen and Dommen (1994, 25) have argued that, in all, the choice 
of export-oriented growth and its early implementation through the 
MEPZ led to an increase in state involvement in economic management. 
Although the Ramgoolam government of the 1970s was keen on leaving 
“the choice of industry to the imagination of the private sector, limiting 
Government’s role to setting the legal and policy environment, the 
Jugnauth government has been willing to take initiatives in pointing 
directions for the private sector.”
From this perspective, it is evident that the creation of the MEPZ rep-
resented reform: it constituted the principal policy instrument through 
which the island transitioned from an import-substitution growth model 
to a dual economic regime.
Although this is undoubtedly true, one should not overstate the case 
of a “grand reform strategy.” As indicated in “The policy environment,” 
the MEPZ was at inception a “problem-solving tool” given the specific 
function of absorbing labor surplus within an economic (and political 
economic) enclave. Evidence of that exists in the fact that the two 
development plans of the period (1971–1975 and 1975–1980) do not 
give any clear indication of a shedding of a replacement of import-
substitution with export-oriented growth. Furthermore, evidence is 
provided by the fact that protection remained high. According to 
Subramanian (2009),
During the 1970s and 1980s, Mauritius remained a highly protected econ-
omy: the average rate of protection was high and dispersed. In 1980, the 
average effective protection exceeded 100 per cent, and although this dimin-
ished by the end of the 1980s, it was still very high (65 per cent). Moreover 
until the 1980s, there were also extensive quantitative restrictions in the 
form of import licensing, covering nearly 60 per cent of imports... An alterna-
tive scheme of classification that has been devised in the IMF ranked 
Mauritius as one of the most protected economies in the early 1990s. (15)
This is a critical part of the story of the political economy impact of 
the zones. MEPZs did not represent liberalization across the board; 
rather, they coexisted with a strategy of import-substituting industrial-
ization. Indeed, this was the necessary political balance required to 
appease the traditional industrial elites that opposed reform. As Rodrik 
(2004) notes,
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The creation of the EPZ generated new profit opportunities, without taking 
protection away from the import-substituting groups. The segmentation of 
labor markets was particularly crucial in this regard, as it prevented the 
expansion of the EPZ (which employed mainly female labor) from driving 
wages up in the rest of the economy, and thereby disadvantaging import-
substituting industries. New profit opportunities were created at the margin, 
while leaving old opportunities undisturbed. (12)
If there was a grand reform strategy toward export-oriented growth, it 
was piecemeal and pragmatic—spurred in part by the following:
• The structural reforms of the late 1970s and early 1980s.8 Restraints on 
government expenditures and the reform of the incentive structure 
played a key role in the post-1984 prosperity.
• The success of the nontraditional export sector (i.e., the EPZ). And this 
strategy did not simply equate to lesser state intervention.
For Rodrik (2004), the island’s development path has represented an 
incarnation of the transitional growth model combining “elements of 
orthodoxy with unorthodox institutional practices,” a path shared with 
the likes of China; the Republic of Korea; and Taiwan, China.
Conclusion
Static versus Dynamic Impact
Conventional economic assessments and cost-benefit analyses, while 
useful in their own right, may be too narrow in their focus when trying 
to assess the MEPZ situation. This is because they fail to quantify some 
of the critical dynamic impacts that successful zones programs can 
catalyze, particularly those involving political-economic processes of 
reform.
Ultimately, it is speculation to imagine a counterfactual scenario for 
Mauritius, but it is not counterintuitive to advance the hypothesis that 
without the MEPZ, or with a “cheaper” MEPZ, or with an MEPZ with 
higher wages in the 1970s and 1980s, it is probable that its growth rate 
would have been lower. Beyond the reduced static impact, its dynamic 
impact would have been less. This in turn would probably have had 
negative consequences on the island’s overall strategy of diversification, 
would have maintained high dependency on sugar, and may have led to 
continuing Dutch disease, capital flights, and sociopolitical instability.
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This is not to say that resources could not have been better utilized. 
Evidence suggests that they could have been. But excluding the dynamic 
perspective, the analysis thus misses the key point of the Mauritian 
 experience: the impact of the MEPZ on the island’s path from colonial 
monoculture to a sustainable, diversified economy operating within the 
international economic system achieving high rankings in political, 
 economic, and social governance. The zone has played an immense role 
in the secular transformation of the island, attracting FDI, generating 
massive technology transfers, integrating Mauritius into global  commodity 
chains, and leading the way toward the creation of a series of growth 
poles (the Freeport, the International Banking Center, the Integrated 
Resort Scheme, the Cybercity, the new SEZ, etc.) whose combined effect 
has been enormous.
Also of fundamental importance has been the contribution of the zone 
to political stability, through the provision of employment and the cre-
ation of a “virtuous cycle” of growth and development. Overall, the 
MEPZ has acted as an important contributor to transforming the island 
into Africa’s premier country in many comparative rankings. It has con-
sistently ranked first in the Mo Ibrahim Index on African Governance. It 
has topped the World Bank’s Doing Business Index in Africa, improving its 
global position to 17 in 2010. The social benefits of these changes have 
been enormous, and some part of these benefits is directly and indirectly 
imputable to the MEPZ.
The Long-Term View
Indeed, the MEPZ represents one phase in the island’s secular path, but 
it is one that has been critical to its long-term development. The island’s 
economy has experienced four principal phases in its economic history 
since the mid-19th century: (1) export-oriented colonial monoculture 
(before the mid-1950s); (2) a mix regime of import substitution and 
export monoculture (between the mid-1950s and circa 1981); (3) export-
led growth (between circa 1981 and circa 2005); and (4) toward the open 
economy, the “duty-free island” initiative (since circa 2005).
The latest strategy represents a radical break with the previous para-
digm that provided a set of sector-specific special regimes and associated 
infrastructure while the domestic economy remained relatively protected 
by tariff barriers, quotas, restrictions on investment and activities, and a 
relatively high tax burden. This evolution aims at turning Mauritius toward 
the Singapore and Hong Kong, China, model, in which the entire economy 
creates a low-tax environment acting as a trade, financial, tourism, and 
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specialized-manufacturing platform. This latest restructuring is critical, as 
the new international trading order and the global recession have affected 
Mauritius hard: the national growth rate has been below 5 percent for 
three consecutive years for the first time in a generation.
This restructuring is progressive, with tax and trade measures being 
implemented slowly. One such policy has been the harmonization of the 
tax regime, whereby EPZ and domestic corporate tax rates have been 
aligned at 15 percent. Another is trade policy, through which the average 
tariff has decreased from 19.9 percent in 2001 to 6.6 percent in 2007. 
In the intervening period, however, tariffs have increased for some com-
modities manufacturing in Mauritius.9
As for the future, it is likely that even as the world economy recovers 
the apparel industry will not return to Mauritius in the numbers observed 
in the past. Although this will present a significant challenge, adaptation to 
changing international conditions is in the makeup of the MEPZ, and the 
relative decline of the zone has been integrated into government policy 
and private sector strategy. Thus, while the size of the MEPZ will continue 
to decline in absolute and relative terms, it will increase its focus on spe-
cialized and high-end products, with Mauritian firms continuing to lead 
the way. If it is unlikely that other sectors of the MEPZ will compensate 
for the decline in firms and employment, sectors outside of the MEPZ will 
partially do so. For instance, the food-processing industry has experienced 
significant growth. So, too, have financial services, whose share of GDP has 
been more than 10 percent since 2003. This is more than tourism.
Some will see in the relative decline of the MEPZ proof of its nonsus-
tainability, but this decline also may be interpreted as the very proof of 
its success. The MEPZ will have achieved the secular role it was assigned 
in the early 1980s, following its unexpected growth in the 1970s. The 
MEPZ it will have played a key catalytic role at two levels: (1) it fostered 
high private domestic investment in export-oriented nontraditional 
manufacturing, which resulted in a dynamic private sector opened to the 
world economy and investing in foreign countries (including in EPZs and 
SEZs) to maintain its competitiveness; and (2) it encouraged the govern-
ment to commit to further economic diversification and progressively 
open the economy to trade and investment. China’s choice of the island 
as a location for one of its five African Trade and Economic Cooperation 
zones is testimony to its unique position in Africa.
It is worth quoting Subramanian (2009):
In the face of these challenges, the question often posed is: what will Mauritius 
do next? What industries or services will replace the inevitable decline of 
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sugar and clothing? While these may be interesting questions, they are almost 
certainly the wrong ones for outsiders to ask. The key point is that Mauritius 
has reached a stage of development and maturity and sophistication that, long 
before the outside world had even recognized the looming challenges, the 
Mauritian domestic system had started the necessary processes to confront 
them. Whether Mauritius upgrades into high-value added financial services or 
information technology (this is already happening), one can be confident that 
Mauritius will figure out a way. The world can, in fact, stop worrying about 
Mauritius because it has demonstrated the ability to worry for itself. (22)
Notes
 1. Political parties did and continue to have either English or French names, 
depending on their main constituencies and sources of ideological inspiration. 
MMM used Creole, and not French, as its political language.
 2. The 1971 4-year Plan for Social and Economic Development, 1971–1975, the first 
of a long series of such plans, explicitly recognized the limited impact and scope 
of ISI: “Industrialisation, apart from the processing of agricultural crops—sugar 
and tea—for export, has been almost wholly geared to meeting the require-
ments of the small domestic market and therefore limited in scope” (pp. v–vi).
 3. The governing coalition of the MLP and PMSD confronted the MMM from 
1971 on with expansionary social spending on the one hand and repression 
on the other, declaring a state of emergency that was lifted only in 1975. At 
the time, the MMM was calling for the nationalization of the sugar industry 
and radical social changes.
 4. The prices used here are constant prices, based on 1982 value in Mauritian 
rupees. Although this provides a “real” perspective into the performance of 
the zone, it significantly undervalues its performance at current prices.
 5. No data are available for 1973–1976 constant prices.
 6. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit (cited by Ancharaz 2009), 
Mauritius labor costs in the clothing industry were US$1.25 per hour, versus 
US$0.39 in Bangladesh, between US$0.68 and US$0.88 in China, US$0.77 
in Egypt, US$0.38 in India, US$0.38 in Kenya, US$0.33 in Madagascar, 
US$2.45 in Mexico, US$1.38 in South Africa, and US$0.48 in Sri Lanka.
 7. In 2000, it was estimated that two large Mauritian firms, Floreal and CMT, 
employed 9,000 workers in Malagasy EPZ factories.
 8. Bowman (1991, 122) advanced that “the sustained commitment of the 
Mauritian government and the political opposition to the structural adjustment 
program set the stage for a resounding economic performance in the middle 
and late 1980s.”
 9. Footwear, apparel, sugar products, and beverages, for instance.
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Sustainability: Emerging Issues for SEZs

247 
Introduction
It is impossible to discuss the full developmental and social consequences 
of SEZs2 without considering the gender dimension. Women constitute 
more than 50 percent and in some cases 90 percent of employment in 
SEZs in developing countries. Given such high levels of female employ-
ment in SEZs and the important role of SEZs in developing-country 
exports, we can fairly conclude that export-oriented industrialization 
over the past 30 years has been a distinctly gendered process. The pur-
pose of this chapter is to describe and explain the remarkable degree of 
“feminization”3 of work in SEZs in the recent era of export-oriented 
industrialization. The following section discusses the scholarly literature 
on trade and the feminization of labor. The third section offers a synthetic 
theory of feminization, building on the extensive research on industrial 
upgrading in global value chains. The fourth section reviews the evidence 
of the female intensity of SEZ employment. The fifth section presents the 
main characteristics of the quality of female employment in SEZs, and 
the sixth section attempts to explain recent trends of the defeminization 
of labor in manufacturing. The final section discusses the policy implica-
tions of the analysis and concludes.
The Gender Dimension of Special 
Economic Zones1
Sheba Tejani
C H A P T E R  1 1
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Background on Trade and Gender
The link between trade openness and gender was first made when women 
were drawn into paid employment in manufacturing in unprecedented 
numbers in Puerto Rico, Ireland, and the East Asian first-tier NICs as they 
pursued export-oriented growth in the 1960s and 1970s. As these coun-
tries promoted light, labor-intensive manufacturing industries, such as 
textiles, clothing, leather, and footwear in EPZs, the female share of 
employment rose in may cases to well over 70 percent, a much higher 
proportion than in the economy as a whole. Later, as developing countries 
in Southeast Asia, South Asia, Latin America, and Eastern Europe 
adopted export-oriented industrialization, trade expansion became 
strongly associated with a demand for female labor. Industrialization in 
low-income countries was characterized as both “female-dependent as 
well as export-led” (Joekes 1999, 36; also see Joekes 1995). Kusago and 
Tzannatos (1998), for instance, report the high proportion of female 
labor in SEZs in the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Mauritius, Philippines, 
and Sri Lanka in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Joekes (1999, 35) sums 
up the situation: “In effect, in developing countries, new job openings 
for women have been dependent on the expansion of production for 
exports, and formal sector manufacturing employment opportunities 
for women in developing countries are now concentrated in production 
for exports.”
In fact, it was argued that trade liberalization, rising international 
competition, and labor deregulation had led to a “global feminization 
of labor” in which women were being substituted for men across sec-
tors and employment categories (Standing 1989, 1999). A number of 
other studies confirmed these findings of a positive correlation between 
greater trade openness or export orientation and the feminization of 
labor (e.g., see Cagatay and Berik 1990; Cagatay and Ozler 1995; Ozler 
2000; Wood 1991).
Many of the women employed in export-oriented manufacturing were 
previously agricultural or informal workers, such as in East Asia, or were 
entering the labor force for the first time as in Latin America (Horton 
1999). Although the wages they earned might have been lower than men, 
paid employment allowed women relatively stable access to cash income 
that otherwise might not have been available in the informal or agricul-
tural sector. Women’s entry into export-oriented manufacturing thus has 
been described as a double-edged and contradictory phenomenon, in 
which some structures of gender inequality have eroded even as others 
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have been constructed anew (Elson 2007, 8). Evidence indicates that 
access to paid employment increased women’s self-confidence and asser-
tiveness and led to an improvement in their influence and standing in the 
household (Jayaweera 2003, cited in Elson 2007; Kabeer 2000; Zhang 
2007). Factory employment afforded women opportunities to exit the 
sphere of familial control as well as situations of domestic violence, to 
gain financial independence, and to expand their personal autonomy and 
life choices. But social norms dictate that women do not always control 
the income they earn, and paid work adds to the household work for 
which women assume primary responsibility, leaving them less time for 
rest and leisure. Besides, women generally remained confined to low-paid 
and low-productivity activities in export-oriented manufacturing that 
had harsh working conditions and few opportunities for advancement. 
These issues are explored further below.
Reasons for the Feminization of Labor 4
What are the reasons for this feminization of export-oriented produc-
tion? One view is that the gender wage gap5 has led to a high demand for 
female labor in an environment of rising international competition. Early 
observers commented that firms preferred women for export-related 
production because they provided cheap labor and because gender stere-
otypes attributed women with dexterity (“nimble fingers”), docility, and 
submissiveness—traits that employers considered desirable for labor 
intensive work (Elson and Pearson 1981).6 Standing (1989, 1999) claimed 
that employers seeking to expand exports hired women to lower labor 
costs in the face of severe international competition, to raise flexibility in 
response to fluctuations in product demand, and to minimize the bar-
gaining power of workers on issues of working conditions, overtime, 
workplace safety, and collective bargaining.
More recently, Seguino (2000a) has shown the gender wage gap to be 
particularly relevant to the rapid export and GDP growth of East Asian 
countries for the period 1975 to 1995.7 She shows in some detail that 
“[l]ow female wages have spurred investment and exports by lowering 
unit labor costs and providing the foreign exchange to purchase capital 
and intermediate goods which raise productivity and growth rates” 
(Seguino 2000a, 27). In a cross-country study, Busse and Spielman (2006) 
find that gender wage inequality is positively correlated with comparative 
advantage in labor-intensive production or that countries with a higher 
gender wage gap have higher exports of such goods. Mitra-Kahn and 
Mitra-Kahn (2007) report that the relationship between gender wage 
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inequality and growth for 20 developing countries is nonlinear: during 
the early stages of export-oriented (and labor-intensive) industrialization, 
wage inequality is positively related to growth, but at later stages, it may 
hurt growth. Ghosh (2002, 20) argues that the feminization of labor in 
East Asia was highly dependent on the “relative inferiority of remunera-
tion and working conditions” of women. As evident in table 11.1, a sub-
stantial gender wage gap still exists in the manufacturing sector in many 
countries, although it has mostly narrowed over time.
Apart from the gender wage gap, gender norms and stereotypes 
 segment workers into particular types of economic activities on the basis 
Table 11.1 Female Wages as a Percentage of Male Wages in Manufacturing
Country 1985 1990 1998 2001
Transition Economies
Bulgaria 73 706
Georgia 63 63
Hungary 695 736
Latvia 88 84
Asia
Hong Kong SAR, China 69 61 65
Malaysia 49 50 634
Myanmar 99 96 1125
Republic of Korea 47 50 56 58
Singapore 55 58 59
Sri Lanka 70 88 83 86
Indonesia 92
Philippines 80 90
Thailand 642 72
Latin America
Costa Rica 74 74 80 816
El Salvador 81 94 75 92
Brazil 511 54 59 61
Mexico 71 70
Middle East
Bahrain 83 62 45 445
Egypt, Arab Republic of 68 68 69 75e
Jordan 62 57 60 68e
Sub-Saharan Africa
Botswana 54 526
Kenya 76 73 48
Swaziland 72 88 873
Source: UNCTAD (2004), table 5; expanded by author using ILO (2009).
Note: 1 = 1988; 2 = 1991; 3 = 1995; 4 = 1997; 5 = 1999; 6 = 2000.
The Gender Dimension of Special Economic Zones       251
of sex and contribute to the feminization of export-oriented production. 
The segmentation of occupations by sex remains a pervasive and global 
phenomenon.8 Mechanisms such as the gender-typing of jobs as “mascu-
line” or “feminine,” differentiating the abilities and roles of workers on the 
basis of sex during recruitment and promotion, and devaluing the work 
done by women both create and reproduce social hierarchies in the work-
place. Thus, the belief that women are dexterous, docile, and unsuitable 
for “heavy” or technical work leads to their recruitment in labor-intensive 
activities that have lower pay and fewer opportunities for advancement.9 
Gender hierarchies that elevate males to “breadwinner” status while 
 designating females as secondary income earners also confine women to 
low-wage and insecure jobs while placing men in positions with better 
prospects (Seguino, Berik, and Rodgers 2010, 6). Women have rapidly 
closed the gender gap in education at the primary and secondary level so 
the argument that they lack the necessary skills to perform in higher skill 
occupations is not a sufficient explanation for this segmentation (for an 
exploration of this issue, see Tejani and Milberg 2010). Instead, persistent 
discrimination against women in the labor market is the more likely 
explanation.
The argument can then be made that export-oriented industrializa-
tion became female dominated because its sectoral composition was 
low value added and labor intensive, which lent itself to the segmenta-
tion of work by sex. This is confirmed by Caraway (2007, 155) who 
shows that feminization in the aggregate is the result of the balance of 
employment between labor- and capital-intensive sectors in manufac-
turing and that early export-oriented industrialization was female inten-
sive because it was labor intensive. In fact, the segmentation of women 
within labor- intensive export industries, in which the price elasticity of 
demand is high, can keep women’s wages artificially low by restricting 
their bargaining power (Seguino 2000b, 1214). Historically, too, the 
feminization of labor has been associated with a downgrading of status 
and pay in such professions as clerical work (Horton 1999, 574), nurs-
ing, and teaching.
In sum, the feminization of SEZ production is attributed to three 
broad factors in the literature: women’s relative “cheapness” owing to the 
gender wage gap, rising international competition, and gendered norms 
and stereotypes that segment work by sex and assign women to low-skill 
and low-paying work.
Finally, we focus here on the impact of gender inequality on trade to 
explain why export-oriented production has been female intensive, 
although the causality can run in both directions in the literature. A  number 
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of studies find that increasing trade openness leads to a fall in gender 
inequality (see Black and Brainerd 2004; Brainerd 2000; Gray, Kittilson, 
and Sandholtz 2006; Oostendorp 2004), whereas others find that it hurts 
women in terms of employment, wages, and education (see Baliamoune-
Lutz 2006; Berik, Rodgers, and Zveglich 2004; Chamarbagwala 2006; 
Kongar 2007; Kucera and Milberg 2000; Menon and Rodgers 2008).
The Role of SEZs
Where do SEZs fit in this picture? The purpose of SEZs is to generate 
employment, attract FDI and new technology, provide foreign market 
access, and earn foreign exchange through the expansion of exports. 
The attractiveness of traditional EPZ models to foreign (and in some 
cases domestic) firms were the elimination of tariffs on imported inputs 
and exports, low or zero taxation of profits, and the provision of a less 
stringent regulatory environment with respect to labor laws or at least 
their relaxed enforcement (Milberg and Amegual 2008, 7). Women 
were the “unintended beneficiaries”10 of early zone development in 
Puerto Rico and Ireland. These countries were among the first to 
experiment with the export growth model and explicitly oriented their 
industrialization plans to reduce male unemployment, with Ireland 
legally requiring at least 75 percent male employment in all new invest-
ments, a condition that eventually had to be dropped (Caraway 2007, 
19). The Border Industrialization Program that created maquiladoras in 
Mexico was also initially established to generate employment for male 
agricultural workers returning from the United States to northern 
Mexico (Caraway 2007, 19). Ironically, in all three cases, zone employ-
ment became highly female-intensive.
In subsequent SEZ promotion, however, governments actively sought 
and facilitated the hiring of women for light manufacturing jobs (Caraway 
2007, 20; Lutz 1988), including publicizing the virtues of “oriental 
female” workers in investment brochures (Elson and Pearson 1981, 93) 
and ensuring that their wages remained low. As Salzinger (2003, 10, 11, 
15) argues, official and global corporate rhetoric at the time firmly estab-
lished the “trope of productive femininity” in the labor-intensive indus-
tries of SEZ production, so that the feminized East Asian model was 
deliberately emulated in other countries. This trope of productive femi-
ninity has currency to this day, as SEZs, which continue to specialize in 
light manufacturing, also remain largely female dominated.
As SEZs have upgraded their productive activities over time, how-
ever, their female intensity of employment has tended to decline. This 
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decline highlights the fact that the feminization of employment is a 
historically specific and contingent phenomenon in which women 
tend to predominate in some occupations during particular periods in 
time.11 Some other limits to the feminization of labor include worker 
resistance, including the actions of male-dominated unions that seek 
to exclude women from formal employment,12 a closing gender wage 
gap that may result in a falling demand for female labor, and the will-
ingness of males to accept “feminized” or insecure, low-paying and 
flexible positions (in this regard, see Barrientos, Kabeer, and Hossain 
2004, 6).
The Economics of Female-Intensive Production in SEZs
In this section, we develop a more general argument about the role of 
women in SEZ employment, by linking feminization to the changing 
structure of world trade that has occurred with the evolution of global 
value chains (GVCs). Production has become increasingly fragmented 
and internationalized, with different activities being carried out in dispa-
rate locations and coordinated increasingly through GVCs. Kaplinsky 
(1998, 13) describes a GVC as “the full range of activities that are 
required to bring a product from its conception, through its design, its 
sourced raw materials and intermediate inputs, its marketing, its distribu-
tion and its support to the final consumer.” The rapidly growing share of 
intermediate goods in world total merchandise trade is evidence of this 
phenomenon. For the period 1988 to 2006, world trade of total merchan-
dise tripled (grew by 300 percent), while the intermediate goods compo-
nent of total merchandise trade quadrupled (grew by 400 percent) 
(WTO 2008, chart 13, 102).
But what drives a firm’s decision to subctontract? Milberg (2004, 
60–61) suggests that firms engage in arm’s-length subcontracting, rather 
than intrafirm trade, when the expected cost savings from the former 
exceed rents from internalization, which is more probable when inter-
mediate product markets are, or can be made, highly competitive.13 
Fostering downstream competition allows lead firms to shave supplier 
margins, keep supply conditions flexible, and transfer risks onto produc-
ers, perpetuating asymmetric market structures that distribute value 
added across the chain in a highly skewed fashion.14 When externaliza-
tion itself fosters competition among suppliers, the asymmetry of market 
structures can be considered endogenous to the lead firm’s strategies 
(Milberg 2004, 61).
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SEZ policies have no doubt spurred this trend of externalization 
among transnational firms by offering the institutional set-up in devel-
oping countries within which costs can be kept low. But developing 
countries are integrated into GVCs at the low value added segment 
and “tend to have the most commodified, fragmented and cost-driven 
portion of the production system,” whereas lead firms situated mostly 
in industrial countries retain the high value added segments (Gereffi 
2005, 47). This asymmetry persists over time for a number of reasons: 
significant entry barriers at higher ends of the chain, capital mobility 
and the credible threat of firm exit when costs (including wage costs) 
rise, and low tariffs (especially through SEZs) (Milberg 2004, 67). 
Despite the notable success of first-, and to a lesser extent, second-tier 
East Asian NICs in upgrading industrially,15 most SEZ production 
remains concentrated in textiles and electronics (Milberg and Amengual 
2008). In fact, the entry of a large swathe of developing countries into 
these low value added activities has led to a “fallacy of composition” 
effect (Milberg and Amengual 2008, 27), resulting in a flood of 
imports into industrial countries and rapidly falling prices16 (Gereffi 
2005, 12). The fact that developing countries still face falling terms of 
trade despite having switched to manufactures to avoid the commod-
ity trap that Prebisch (1950) and Singer (1950) warned of approxi-
mately 60 years ago is perhaps emblematic of the global asymmetry in 
trading relations.17
How is gender implicated within this asymmetrical market structure? 
Given their position in GVCs, producers in developing countries are 
under great pressure to deliver high-quality products at low cost and 
under tight shipping deadlines to lead firms (Barrientos 2001, 5). With 
just-in-time delivery systems and seasonal demand peaks, GVCs also 
demand a high degree of supply flexibility on the part of producers. The 
feminization of labor in SEZs plays a critical role in meeting the demands 
of lead firms in GVCs and protecting their rents by providing a relatively 
cheap and flexible source of labor for suppliers. As Barrientos (2001, 8) 
points out, producers located at the weakest positions in the value chain 
hierarchy are the most likely to use female labor to deal with the risks of 
price fluctuations and supply volatility. Gender discrimination crowds 
women into the low value added segment of the chain and puts them in 
the position of effectively absorbing those risks. Thus, a link exists 
between the asymmetry of market relations between lead firms and sup-
pliers in GVCs and the segmentation of women in labor-intensive indus-
tries generally located in SEZs. Although employment in GVCs can 
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provide women much-needed income-earning opportunities, the 
 structural import of gender segmentation within the value chain  hierarchy 
cannot be denied.
Because of women’s position within the structure of GVCs, they are 
particularly vulnerable to fluctuations in export demand and job loss. In 
the present crisis, female workers who form part of the flexible workforce 
in labor-intensive industries have been particularly hard-hit with the 
decline in exports in apparel, footwear, and electronics (Sirimanne 
2009, 6). The segment of export activity in which women are concen-
trated is also highly competitive: China’s low unit costs in apparel have 
seriously undermined the industry in Mexican maquiladoras (Sargent and 
Matthews 2008) with the result that female intensity in EPZ employ-
ment has markedly declined. A number of low-income countries, includ-
ing some in Africa, have experienced a decline in export output with the 
end of the MFA, with many low-skilled female workers losing jobs as a 
result (ILO 2005).
Evidence on Gender in SEZs
Exports and Employment
As mentioned in chapter 1, there has been a virtual explosion of SEZs in 
developing countries since 1975 with the most rapid expansion taking 
place in the last 20 years. In 2006, 130 countries operated 3,500 zones 
and employed roughly 66 million people around the globe, with China 
alone employing 60 percent of all workers (Boyenge 2007). More 
recently, India passed a controversial SEZ law that is estimated to add 
another 250 zones and 150,000 workers to that number (Murayama and 
Yokota 2008, 23). At the same time, zone models have expanded from 
being manufacturing assembly-type operations to ones that are dedicated 
to services such as high-tech, finance, logistics, and even tourism (ILO 
2008, 2). SEZs are being used to capture markets in business services, IT, 
and IT-enabled services in countries that have higher skilled workforces, 
such as India, Russia, and China, although they are not particularly 
employment intensive (Milberg and Amengual 2008, 7). In terms of 
scope, SEZs might be enclave type or focused on a single industry, such 
as jewelry or leather; focused on a single commodity, such as coffee; or 
house only a single factory or company (ILO 2003, 2).
Table 11.2 presents zone exports as a percentage of total exports for 
2002 and 2006 for a selection of countries. Zone exports account for a 
bulk of total exports for most of the countries reported. Countries such 
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as Bangladesh, Madagascar, Colombia, and the Maldives experienced a 
significant expansion of zone-related exports even during this brief 
period, whereas the Philippines, Mexico, Tunisia, and Mauritius experi-
enced the reverse trend. Employment in SEZs also expanded moderately 
in Bangladesh, Malaysia, Honduras, and Nicaragua, while it stayed stable 
in most other countries except for Mexico, Sri Lanka, and the Dominican 
Republic (see table 11.3). Despite the rapid expansion of zones, in most 
regions, direct employment in SEZs does not account for a significant 
proportion of total employment globally at 0.2 percent (Engman, 
Onodera, and Pinali 2007, 29). However, their social impact can be sig-
nificant in pockets of unemployment or underemployment (Engman, 
Onodera, and Pinali 2007, 29), as well as in smaller countries such as 
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Mauritius, where the SEZ share of total 
employment is substantial (Aggarwal 2007, 7). In China, the growth of 
SEZ employment alone contributed to 49 percent of total employment 
growth from 1995 to 2005 (ILO 2008, 5), highlighting the strategic use 
of zones in generating employment in the country.
Table 11.2 SEZ Exports as a Percentage of Total Exports
Country 2000 2006 Change (Percent points)
Philippines 87 60 –27
Malaysia 83 83 0
Mexico 83 47 –36
Kenya 80 87 7
Gabon 80 80 0
Macao SAR, China 80 80 0
Zimbabwe 80 80 0
Vietnam 80 80 0
Dominican Rep. 80 80 0
Tunisia 80 52 –28
Mauritius 77 42 –35
Morocco 61 61 0
Bangladesh 60 76 16
Costa Rica 50 52 2
Haiti 50 50 0
Madagascar 38 80 42
Sri Lanka 33 38 5
Cameroon 32 33 1
Maldives 13 48 35
Colombia 9 40 31
Source: Boyenge (2003, 2007).
Note: The global crisis that started in 2008 has significantly affected export volumes in some of these countries.
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SEZs remain highly female intensive in general with countries such as 
Bangladesh, Jamaica, and Nicaragua displaying a female share of employ-
ment close to 90 percent. For the period 2000–2003, the average female 
share of employment in SEZs in the sample of countries in table 11.3 
was 69 percent; this increased slightly to 71 percent because of a rise in 
the number of women employed in Bangladesh and Honduras in 2005–
06. When compared with the share of female employment in nonagricul-
tural employment, the high female intensity of SEZs is all the more 
revealing (see figure 11.1) and the segmentation of women in export-
related employment is quite starkly evident. In countries such as Bahrain 
and Morocco, the female share of employment is low in comparison to 
other regions, although it is still high relative to female nonagricultural 
employment; a fact explained by sociocultural norms that keep female 
labor force participation there low. In India, female employment in SEZs 
has shown a declining trend from 1981 (46.5 percent) to 2003 (36.9 
percent), although it is still much higher than formal sector employment 
Table 11.3 Total Employment and Female Share of Employment in SEZs
2000–2003 2005–2006 Change over the period
Country
Total 
employment
Percent 
female
Total 
employment 
Percent 
female
Total 
employment 
(%)
Female 
share (%)
Bangladesh 2,138,341 62 3,438,394 85 0.6 23
Mexico 1,906,064 60 1,212,125 60 –0.4 0
Philippines 820,960 74 1,128,197 74 0.4 0
Sri Lanka 461,033 78 410,851 78 –0.1 0
Malaysia 322,000 54 491,488 54 0.5 0
Dominican 
Republic 181,130 53 154,781 53 –0.2 0
Honduras 106,457 67 353,624 75 2.3 8
Guatemala 69,200 70 72,000 70 0.0 0
Nicaragua 40,000 90 340,000 90 7.5 0
Korea, 
 Republic of 39,000 70 39,000 70 0.0 0
Malawi 29,000 51 29,000 51 0.0 0
Kenya 27,148 60 38,851 60 0.4 0
Jamaica 20,000 90 20,000 90 0.0 0
Panama 14,900 70 18,000 70 0.2 0
Haiti 10,000 69 10,000 69 0.0 0
Cape Verde 1,141 88 1,180 88 0.0 0
Source: Boyenge (2003, 2007).
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for women in the economy (Aggarwal 2007, 20–21). Some authors attri-
bute the low proportion of women in Indian SEZs to the willingness of 
male workers to take up the same positions (Murayama and Yokota 2008, 
25). Although the exact proportion of women working in SEZs in China 
is not available, Fu and Gao (2007, 33) find that the share of female 
employees in foreign-funded enterprises (most of them situated in SEZs) 
has fluctuated between 50 and 55 percent from 1995 to 2005, while the 
Figure 11.1 Female Share of SEZ Employment and Nonagricultural Employment, 
2005–06
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ratio of female to male workers employed in all enterprises dropped from 
40 to 36.5  percent  during the same period. Ngai (2004, 30) reports that 
young migrant female workers accounted for around 90 percent of work-
ers in light  manufacturing industries in the Shenzhen SEZ.
Figure 11.2 presents more recent data on the female intensity of SEZs 
in African countries separately. Zones in Kenya, Lesotho, and Tanzania are 
female dominated with the median shares of female employment at 
around 60 percent. Ghana and Nigeria are noteworthy in that they are 
the only two countries in our sample for which the female share of 
employment in SEZs is lower than that in nonagricultural employment 
as a whole.
Sectoral Distribution of Female Employment
As mentioned earlier, the predominant exports from SEZs are textiles, 
garments, electrical, and electronic goods (Cling and Letilly 2001, 12; 
ILO 2003, 3), which explains their continuing female intensity.18 The 
distribution of women’s employment across SEZs in 10 countries, 
 including six in Africa, shows a clear pattern in figure 11.3: Women 
Figure 11.2 Female Share of SEZ Employment and Nonagricultural Employment 
in African Countries, 2009
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 predominate in light  industries that are gender-typed as female, such as 
garments, electronics, and textiles, while their share of employment is 
reduced quite starkly in chemicals, wood products, and metals. The lack 
of comprehensive statistics on female employment disaggregated by sec-
tor and industry in SEZs globally poses a challenge, although case studies 
provide ample evidence at the country or SEZ level of the concentration 
of women in particular activities.
In general, women tend to predominate in the low-paying and low 
value added segment of export production. In Madagascar, for instance, 
64 percent of the enterprises in SEZs were in the textiles and clothing 
industry and they engaged a workforce that was 71 percent female (ILO 
2005, 47). Similarly, in Bangladesh, the female share of employment in 
the garment industry of the Dhaka EPZ was 72 percent, while it was 
23 percent in the nongarment industry (Zohir 2001, 13). In Sri Lanka, 
Figure 11.3 Female Share of Employment in SEZs by Sector, Select Countries, 2009
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76 percent of the female respondents in a survey of EPZs were employed 
in garments or textile factories and a similar proportion were engaged in 
low-status positions, such as machine operators, packers, and helpers 
(Hancock, Middleton, and Moore 2009, 15). Cling and Letilly (2001, 13) 
report that employment in textiles and clothing in SEZs comprised 
77 percent of employment in Tunisia, 66 percent in Sri Lanka, 55.5 per-
cent in Mauritius, and 49 percent in Madagascar in the mid-1990s. 
Electronic goods predominate in SEZ production in relatively higher 
income countries, such as the Republic of Korea; Taiwan, China; Malaysia; 
and Mexico (Cling and Letilly 2001, 13), where they also form a high 
proportion of female employment. In terms of occupation, women gener-
ally have generally been concentrated in low-skill, assembly-type jobs in 
SEZs, while their share of managerial positions has been relatively much 
lower, as seen in figure 11.4.
Figure 11.4 Female Share of Employers and Managers, Select Countries, 2009
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Quality of Female Employment in SEZs
Flexibility of Employment
Employment in export industries has provided women previously 
 unavailable formal earning opportunities, especially in China, where 
young female workers who flock to the cities in search of work have 
earned the epithet of “factory girls” (Chang 2008). In many cases, espe-
cially for low-skill workers, no alternate employment opportunities were 
available, such as in the Vishakhapatnam SEZ in India (Aggarwal 2007, 
19), or self-employment did not provide a stable source of income even 
though it paid more (Fussell 2000). Yet, the irony is that even this form 
of “stable” formal employment has been flexible and informal to a degree. 
In the Shenzhen Zone in China, young female migrant workers lack the 
right to stay in the city and cannot be classified as formal workers no mat-
ter how long they have worked in the zone. They remain classified as 
peasant workers and have “ambiguous citizenship rights and weak bar-
gaining power” (Ngai 2004, 30).
In fact, formal employment in the zones has layers of informality. In 
the Noida EPZ in India, employment conditions and wage levels 
resemble those of the urban informal economy (Murayama and Yokota 
2008, 29), whereas in the Madras EPZ, female workers are paid wages 
far below the minimum wage. Fu and Gao (2007, 32) find that the 
number of development zones in China has a strong correlation with 
the share of informal employment in different regions. In addition, 
recruitment in SEZs is not always a formal process, and the rights of 
workers with respect to recruitment and dismissal are not always 
respected (ILO 2008, 5, 6). Employees in zones also tend to have a 
high rate of turnover with an average career of no more than five years 
because of the use of fixed-term contracts and the intensive nature of 
work (ILO 2003, 7).
Wages and Working Conditions
SEZs have been created as islands of duty-free, tax-free export-oriented 
production in developing countries, but they were also known to offer a 
more relaxed environment with respect to labor regulation to attract 
foreign investment. Labor laws within SEZs now appear to be the same 
as in the rest of the country, although some countries such as Algeria, 
Cameroon, and Mauritius have exceptions in their national legislation 
with respect to issues such as overtime, wages, and duration of work in 
SEZs, while others, such as Djibouti, Panama, and Zimbabwe, have 
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 different labor laws altogether (ILO 2008, 7). Still, in an ILO (2001) 
survey, approximately 28 percent of respondents in 19 countries reported 
that laws within SEZs differed in some way from those outside, including 
more overtime work, lack of retirement provisions, less favorable leave 
terms, exemption from occupational safety provisions, and prolonged 
temporary contracts (cited in Engman, Onodera, and Pinali 2007, 30). 
Although there has been some movement forward in harmonizing laws 
within and outside zones, the main problem in SEZs remains government 
indifference toward the enforcement of laws and the lack of resources or 
capacity for monitoring and supervision (Milberg and Amengual 2008, 
58–9). For instance, Vietnam’s labor laws, which were drafted in consulta-
tion with the ILO, include the strongest protection for workers’ rights 
and for gender equality in the region, but the lack of enforcement and 
monitoring means that many of those provisions simply remain on paper 
(Farole 2010).
We present some general characteristics with respect to work and 
working conditions in SEZs, although considerable variations exist 
between countries, zones, and industries. First, SEZs offer higher or simi-
lar wages and benefits as compared with other sectors of the economy, 
but the gender wage gap as well as other forms of discrimination persist. 
Second, SEZs are characterized by much longer and frequently illegal 
working hours as compared with other sectors of the economy (Milberg 
and Amengual 2008, 61). Third, the rights to freedom of association and 
collective bargaining are seriously impaired (ICFTU 2004). We will dis-
cuss each by turn as well as discuss gender-related concerns.
Based on country studies, the ILO (2008, 6) reports that wages in 
SEZs appear to be at the same level or higher for equivalent work in the 
rest of the economy. Studies on Bangladesh, Madagascar, Costa Rica, 
Honduras, and Sri Lanka indicate that wages in zones generally tend to 
be higher than in sectors outside zones, although which control group is 
being used for the comparison is critical (for a summary, see Milberg and 
Amengual 2008). However, wage and nonwage discrimination against 
women is a continuing reality within SEZs (ILO 2008, 4).19 This is the 
case for, instance, in SEZs in Honduras where women earn less than men 
for comparable work (Ver beek 2001) and in Madagascar where the 
average female wage is lower than the male, with the gap rising from 
8 percent for low-skill work to 20 percent for managerial positions (ILO 
2008, 4). In Bangladesh, women not only earned less than men because 
of their segregation in low-skilled work, but more women also left their 
jobs for reasons of low pay than did men (Zohir 2001). The question 
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remains as to whether employers in SEZs provide workers with a livable 
wage even if they do comply with minimum wage laws (Milberg and 
Amengual 2008, 35).
Excessive overtime appears to be an endemic feature of employment 
in SEZs. Overtime work is often mandatory because of the requirements 
of GVCs, seasonal demand peaks, and stringent shipping deadlines. 
Refusal to comply with long hours of work can result in dismissal or 
retaliation (ILO 2008, 6). In Madagascar, female employees in the zone 
worked for 209 hours in a month on average, as compared with 168 hours 
in the non-EPZ private sector and 147 hours in the public sector (Glick 
and Roubaud 2006). Based on the Fair Labor Association’s workplace 
code of ethics, garment factories display the most number of violations 
with respect to hours of work, overtime compensation and wages20 fol-
lowed in second place by noncompliance on health and safety codes 
(Rodgers and Berik 2006, 62).21
Perhaps the most critical issue with regard to employment in SEZs, 
and one that has a bearing on all the others, is the restriction of the right 
to freedom of association and collective bargaining. Although most coun-
tries legally recognize the rights of workers to join unions, severe limita-
tions are frequently placed on these rights in practice. Workers are 
unable to organize effectively due to the discrimination and harassment 
they face from employers when they engage in union-related activities, 
including unfair dismissal and suspension, blacklisting of union members, 
and even physical violence (Gopalkrishnan 2007, 1). It is also difficult in 
many cases for existing unions to gain physical access to firms and work-
ers inside SEZs (ILO 2003, 8) and repression of union-related activity is 
widespread, as studies on Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Jamaica, and 
Sri Lanka have shown (Milberg and Amengual 2008, 33).
Gender-based discrimination in SEZs also comes in the form of hiring 
and benefits, career development, and women workers’ rights in relation 
to working hours, pregnancy, maternity leave, and children (ILO 2003, 9). 
Firms in SEZs have displayed a tendency to employ young, unmarried 
women and to discriminate against married women and women with 
children, although the profile of SEZ employees has changed to some 
extent over time. Mexico is an infamous example of firms in SEZs requir-
ing women to take pregnancy tests before recruitment, a practice that 
was eventually prohibited by law (ICFTU 2004, 12). This practice still 
appears to be in force in the Dominican Republic; however, in the 
Philippines, women have been made to resign after becoming pregnant 
and have not been allowed to return to work subsequently (ICFTU 
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2004). There are frequent reports of sexual harassment and abuse22 in 
SEZs and even mandatory HIV screening requirements in some cases 
(ICFTU 2004).
Some Initiatives to Improve Compliance on Labor Issues in SEZs
Different efforts have been made to address some of the persistent 
 problems with respect to the quality of employment in SEZs as well as 
to enhance compliance and monitoring of labor laws. They have enjoyed 
varying degrees of success. We briefly present three noteworthy initiatives 
here.
Under the U.K. Ethical Trade Initiative and the U.S. Apparel Industry 
Partnership, both multistakeholder initiatives, lead firms in the North 
have adopted voluntary codes of conduct to work with suppliers that 
observe certain minimum labor standards, which has helped improve 
labor conditions in some value chains (see Barrientos 2000; Smith and 
Barrientos 2005). For instance, in Lesotho, working conditions in textiles 
and clothing factories improved notably as global buyers imposed codes 
of conduct on suppliers and monitored their enforcement in factories 
(Farole 2010). Still there are limits to private and voluntary regulation 
and monitoring and they cannot be a substitute for broader developmen-
tal strategies that address issues of labor law compliance in supplier coun-
tries (Barrientos 2000, 559).
To improve compliance on social and labor issues, the Bangladesh 
Export Processing Zones Authority (BEPZA) initiated a Labor Counselor 
Program in 2005 by which it recruited 67 counselors to pay visits to fac-
tories within the EPZ and to work with management on the correct 
implementation of labor laws and compensation practices. Perceived 
more as facilitators rather than regulators, the counselors also arbitrated 
informally between workers and management and reported existing 
problems to the BEPZA. It is reported that better implementation of the 
law through the program led to a 32 percent increase in the wages of the 
workers and to fewer worker grievances (Farole 2010).23
The ILO runs a well-known Better Factories Programme in Cambodia 
through which it monitors the compliance of garment firms on national 
labor laws and international core labor standards. It publishes the findings 
of the ILO monitors and gives firms a chance to improve their compli-
ance, after which it conducts a reevaluation and identifies by name the 
firms that do not remedy their violations in publicly available reports 
(Milberg and Amengual 2008, 38). Because the reports are available 
to international buyers who are making sourcing decisions, it acts as a 
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 pressure point for producers to comply (see www.betterfactories.org for 
more information on this program). Berik and Rodgers (2010) find that 
the program has achieved modest improvements in working conditions in 
garment factories in the country.
Defeminization of Employment
The link between export orientation and the feminization of labor has 
been critiqued and refined by researchers who argue that it is not export 
orientation per se, but rather the type of manufacturing that takes place 
within these sectors that matters for female employment. As we have 
seen, an overlap exists between the types of industries located within 
SEZs, the quality of employment in terms of low wages and flexibility, 
and the female intensity of employment. This raises the question of 
whether the gains in women’s employment are sustainable over time and 
what factors contribute to the defeminization of labor that has been 
noted in some countries.24 A number of reasons have been identified in 
the literature for this defeminization, including industrial upgrading, 
closing of the gender wage gap, cyclical factors such as recessions, and 
outsourcing to home-based workers, which leads to statistical defemini-
zation. We will consider each of these in turn bearing in mind that one 
or more of these factors might be acting to produce the given outcome 
at any time.
Industrial upgrading can be defined as the ability of producers “to 
make better products, to make products more efficiently, or to move 
into higher-skilled activities” (Pietrobelli and Rabellotti 2006, 1) and 
studies on upgrading generally tend to focus on the technological con-
tent of production and on value added (Milberg 2008, 6).25 For our 
purposes, the shift of output to more capital- and technology-intensive 
sectors as well as the production of higher value added products within 
a sector can have implications for the distribution of employment by 
sex for a number of reasons. First, as described earlier, the gender-typing 
of jobs as masculine and feminine leads to discrimination against women 
when industrial upgrading involves heavy, capital-intensive, or skilled 
work. Second, women lack access to on-the-job training and retraining 
to upgrade their skills when the skill requirements of the job change. 
This is partly due to their segmentation in what is considered unskilled 
work and partly because employers view women as “unstable workers,” 
who will withdraw from the labor force as domestic obligations mount 
(Jayasinghe 2001, 72, 73). Third, gender biases operate to segment 
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young women and girls into more “feminine” vocations in the education 
system, while reserving the heavy, technical, and often better-paid pro-
fessions for men.
Thus, Fussell (2000, 65) notes that as production became more 
technologically intensive in Mexican maquiladoras between 1983 and 
1999, the number of female operatives declined from 77 percent to 
41 percent, although total employment in maquiladoras grew rapidly 
during the period. Jomo (2009) identifies the rise of skill-intensive 
manufacturing and the likely gender-typing of new industrial jobs as the 
reason for defeminization of export-oriented manufacturing in North 
and Southeast Asia in the 1990s. Jayasinghe (2001, 77), in a study on the 
Caribbean, explains the predominance of male export workers in 
Trinidad by the fact that its major exports were minerals, fuels, and 
chemicals and work in these industries was considered heavy and more 
skilled. Further, because the few women who are employed are concen-
trated in low-skill processing jobs, where labor costs are of critical 
importance, they are rapidly losing employment as a result of mechani-
zation. Caraway (2007, 149) finds a statistically significant and negative 
relationship between capital intensity and female employment in manu-
facturing for a sample of countries in East Asia and Latin America from 
the late 1950s to mid-1990s.
Tejani and Milberg (2010) find that both the defeminization of labor 
in manufacturing in Southeast Asia and the feminization of labor in Latin 
America over the period 1985 to 2006 are driven by shifts in manufactur-
ing labor productivity and capital intensity. As proxies for industrial 
upgrading, both capital intensity and labor productivity have a statisti-
cally significant and negative relationship with the female intensity of 
employment in manufacturing over the period. Figure 11.5 reproduces 
the relationship between the female intensity of employment and manu-
facturing productivity for relevant countries.
Other scholars have argued that the feminization of labor “creates 
conditions for its own unravelling over time” because the wage differen-
tials that drive feminization tend to decrease over time as the labor mar-
ket tightens and demands for better work conditions and security gain 
momentum (Ghosh 2002, 25). That is, the demand for female labor is 
contingent on its relative cheapness; once this incentive to hire women 
disappears, firms prefer to employ men. Murayama and Yokota (2008, 
16–17) attribute the steady decline of the female share of employment 
in the Masan SEZ in the Republic of Korea from 85 percent in 1972 to 
62 percent in 2001 to massive worker resistance led by young female 
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workers in the late 1980s, which led to rapid wage increases across the 
board. Additionally, the rise of capital- and technology-intensive produc-
tion in the zone displaced female workers who were employed in labor-
intensive industries. Similarly, as the supply of female workers willing to 
work for low wages in Mexican maquiladoras in the 1980s boom fell 
because of a tightening labor market, managers were forced to recruit 
men for the same jobs (Salzinger 2003, 11).
Rubery (1998) argues that female employment is procyclical and that 
women act as a flexible “buffer” labor force to be roped into the work-
force when required and released when not. The buffer explanation 
implies that women are employed in larger numbers in periods of expan-
sion and are laid off during recessions, providing one explanation for 
defeminization. Such a buffer role is concentrated in particular occupa-
tions in industries that face competitive pressures and greater demand 
fluctuations. Kucera (2001) shows this buffer role of female workers in 
the 1960s and 1970s in Germany and Japan.26
Figure 11.5 Female Intensity of Manufacturing Employment and Manufacturing 
Value Added per Worker, Average Annual Growth, Southeast Asia and Latin 
 America, 1985–2006
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The defeminization of labor in SEZs could be related to the greater 
informalization of work and outsourcing to home-based workers as a 
result of the cost pressures on suppliers that are integrated into GVCs.27 
In the fashion garments chains, for instance, suppliers outsource the work 
to intermediaries who hire mostly home-based, and largely female, work-
ers for the job. Thus, women who were formerly employed in SEZ facto-
ries now could be located in the informal sector and working for lower 
wages with no benefits, outside the ambit of regulatory structures and 
unrecorded in labor force surveys (Carr, Chen, and Tate, 136). Thus, 
defeminization in this case is a statistical artifact and the result of pro-
ductive activities of home-based workers going unrecorded. We discuss 
some policy measures to address defeminization in manufacturing in the 
 concluding section.
Conclusion and Policy Implications
Without doubt, export-oriented industrialization has created new 
opportunities for women by drawing many into paid employment for 
the first time. The high degree of female intensity in light manufactur-
ing industries in SEZs attests to this fact. Women have, at the same 
time, served as a source of competitive advantage for firms competing 
in the international market because of (1) a persistent wage gap that 
makes women a cheaper source of labor and (2) a high degree of occu-
pational sex segmentation that perpetuates the wage gap. Within the 
framework of GVCs, this segmentation by sex serves the asymmetry of 
market structures between lead firms situated in the rich countries and 
producers in poor countries and distributes value added in a highly 
skewed fashion.
Because women’s employment has been contingent largely on their 
disadvantages in the labor market, rather than the abatement of gender-
based discrimination, the gains made in the initial phases of export- 
oriented industrialization might not be sustainable. There is clear evidence 
of a defeminization of export labor in countries that have upgraded their 
industrial structures and, in some cases, where the gender wage gap has 
closed.
The feminization of SEZ labor has been a double-edged phenome-
non: it has provided women jobs and access to income that has earned 
them other kinds of freedom, but these jobs have been poorly paid and 
insecure; they have generally not led to promotion; and when countries 
have upgraded their industries, they have hired fewer women. SEZ work 
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remains highly segmented with women crowded in a few industries in 
low value added, assembly-type operations with conditions of work that 
include long working hours, impediments to the freedom of association, 
sexual harassment, and other forms of gender-based discrimination. 
These conditions have severely limited the gains that could have other-
wise been made.
Further, with the scaling up and expansion of the SEZ model to incor-
porate a variety of activities, including information processing, financial 
services, and logistics among others, the gender dimension of employment 
in the zones is likely to be affected. In service-oriented SEZs, the nature 
of work and skill profile of workers is expected to be quite different from 
the traditional EPZ model, which involves mostly blue-collar work. 
Women have generally benefited in terms of employment gains from the 
increasing share of services in output (see GET 2009), but evidence sug-
gests that service activities also tend to be segmented by gender. Mitter 
(2003, 10–13) finds that women predominate in the low-skilled seg-
ments of IT and IT-enabled services in a number of developing countries. 
Kelkar, Shrestha, and Veena (2002, 70–71) also highlight the segmenta-
tion of women in low-skilled jobs in the IT-enabled service industry in 
India, such as in call centers and medical transcription centers. In a study 
of firms engaged in high-tech production in the Philippines, McKay 
(2006, 231) predicts that women will have little access to the high-skilled 
jobs that are finally being created in the industry as a result of entrenched 
gender norms.
What policy conclusions do we draw from these developments? The 
policy implications for SEZs can be inferred at two different levels: (1) 
protecting the rights of all workers in the zone and (2) addressing the 
various forms of gender-based discrimination that women workers face in 
particular. Perhaps the most important step in this regard would be to 
remove existing barriers to the right of freedom of association in SEZs so 
that workers can engage in collective bargaining and can organize to 
access the full range of their rights. Because trade unions have tradition-
ally been hostile to the inclusion of gender concerns, this will require a 
change in their culture and a larger role and voice for women. National 
labor laws also need to be brought in line with international labor stan-
dards to raise standards for all workers in general.
Given that zones cover a limited geographic area and generally are 
governed by a centralized zone authority, they can be used to spearhead 
innovative labor reforms that can serve as models for the rest of the coun-
try. The ILO’s Decent Work Programme, which promotes fundamental 
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rights at work, social security, social dialogue, and tripartism, can be 
implemented within an SEZ as a pilot initiative. Such proposals have 
already been made in the case of Sri Lanka and Indonesia (see 
Sivananthiram n.d.). For targeted interventions in persistent problem 
areas, the ILO’s Factory Improvement Program has enjoyed success in 
enhancing productivity and reducing overtime work in factories in Sri 
Lanka and Vietnam and has led to broad gains in job quality (Milberg and 
Amengual 2008, 56). The zone authority can enforce more regular labor 
and gender audits within the zone area by obtaining support from other 
stakeholders, including international agencies and local NGOs, and take 
steps to build the capacity of firms to properly implement labor laws, as 
the Labor Counselor Program did in Bangladesh in 2005. Furthermore, 
to address the vertical gender segmentation evident in export-oriented 
employment, zone authorities can stipulate targets for women’s repre-
sentation in supervisory and managerial positions in SEZ firms and can 
undertake affirmative action policies to promote women entrepreneurs 
within the zone. Providing accessible childcare and schooling facilities, 
creating proper mechanisms to handle sexual harassment complaints, and 
enforcing equal remuneration legislation and maternity or paternity leave 
can address some of the persistent problems with respect to gender 
 discrimination in SEZs.
It is important for policy makers to recognize that although industrial 
upgrading is a laudable policy goal to promote economic growth and 
development, it has gender consequences. National programs that pro-
mote upgrading and diversification of exports must address this gender 
dimension. Steps must be taken to update women’s skills through on-the-
job training programs to ensure advancement and retention when indus-
tries upgrade their products or processes. Zone authorities, along with 
other stakeholders, can cofinance or offer firms partial rebates for training 
schemes for higher-skilled positions that mandate the participation of 
women. The ComMark Trust funded such an initiative in the textile and 
clothing industry in Lesotho and successfully increased the participation 
of Basotho workers in supervisory positions (see Farole 2010). Zone 
authorities can institute awards to spotlight firms that have integrated 
women into technical, high-skilled, or traditionally masculinized work to 
generate incentives to change social norms and make these firms more 
attractive to international buyers. Further, governments need to actively 
promote institutions that reduce gender segmentation in the labor mar-
ket. Because segregation begins in the educational system, addressing 
systematic biases in admission policy and instruction so that women have 
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better access to technical education and vocational training would be a 
step in this direction.
Finally, the present financial crisis and the collapse of export demand 
in the European Union and United States reveal some of the pitfalls of 
pursuing export-oriented growth, and rising levels of international trade 
liberalization undercut some of the incentives to establish SEZs in the 
present environment (see Cattaneo, Gereffi, and Staritz 2010). It is 
important in this context to improve the quality of work for women, 
even as their role in the late-20th-century wave of industrialization 
inevitably shifts.
Notes
 1. The author is greatly indebted to William S. Milberg, Professor and Chair of 
Economics, New School for Social Research, who provided valuable inputs 
and advice at every stage of this paper. Thanks are also due to Tom Farole and 
Cornelia Staritz, who provided helpful comments on an earlier draft. Any 
errors or deficiencies remain the sole responsibility of the author.
 2. I use the generic term special economic zone or SEZ to denote a wide variety 
of free zones, including export processing zones, free trade zones, and wide 
area zones using the typology outlined in chapter 1 of this book. Most SEZs 
remain concentrated in manufacturing-related activities, although services 
increasingly are being incorporated into the model.
 3. Feminization here refers to the rising share of female employment in total 
employment.
 4. This section draws partially on Tejani and Milberg (2010).
 5. Or the ratio of female to male wages for similar work.
 6. In what came to be known as the “international division of labor” literature, 
scholars argued that cheap female labor in developing countries was not just 
incidental in a system of global production, but pivotal to ensuring transna-
tional profits and competitiveness. An entrenched system of gender subordi-
nation lay at the heart of women’s relative disadvantage in the labor market, 
which firms seized on to make profits. Further, it was argued, the gendered 
division of labor in the patriarchal household provided a blueprint for wom-
en’s integration into the labor market, confining them to low-paid, labor- 
intensive work (Elson and Pearson 1981; Fernandez Kelly 1989).
 7. See Seguino (2000b) for the impact of gender inequality on growth through 
the channel of exports and investment for a group of semi-industrialized 
countries in Asia and Latin America from 1975 to 1995.
 8. About one-half of the workers in the world are in occupations that can be 
classified as “male” or “female” based on the fact that at least 80 percent of 
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workers therein belong to a single sex. Further, not only are male-dominated 
occupations much more numerous than female, the latter “tend to be less 
valuable with lower pay, lower status and fewer advancement possibilities as 
compared to ‘male’ occupations” (Anker 1998, 407).
 9. But contrary to the belief that female workers are inherently compliant and 
productive, Salzinger (2003, 10) contends that ideal workers are “produced” 
through repeated invocation in managerial discourse and shop-floor practices 
that employ gendered strategies to enhance productivity. Thus, female work-
ers do not innately display the required “feminine attributes” that can be put 
to use in production, but rather, those attributes are elicited and performed 
because they serve productive interests in the factory, with multiple possi-
bilities for disruption and resistance.
 10. I borrow this term from Madani (1999), though I use it in a different spirit.
 11. See Strom (1989) for a description of the process by which U.S. office work 
became feminized in the early 20th century; also see Walsh (1997).
 12. Caraway (2007, 133), for instance, highlights the role of unions in keeping the 
female share of employment in manufacturing in Latin America tradition-
ally low.
 13. In turn, firms will internalize production processes that protect rents accruing 
from firm-specific and knowledge-based assets, which are possible to main-
tain only in an oligopolistic industry with firms that enjoy economies of scale 
and market power (Milberg 2004, 60–1).
 14. The structure of GVCs is by no means homogenous. See Gereffi, Humphrey, 
and Sturgeon (2005) for the different forms of governance and Milberg 
(2004) for an anatomy of cost markups and value added in GVCs.
 15. Gereffi (1999) documents the shift from assembly activities to “full-package 
production” and supplier-oriented production in developing countries.
 16. For the rise in imports and precipitous decline in prices of clothing in the 
United States, see Heintz (2006, 508).
 17. Ironically, the current commodities boom means a complete reversal of the 
Prebisch-Singer predictions.
 18. This does not necessarily imply a lack of dynamism, however, as upgrading 
can occur within an industry to full package production (Milberg and 
Amegual 2007, 9) and to more technologically intensive products.
 19. A recent meta-analysis of the gender wage gap showed that a fall in the 
 gender wage gap worldwide was due to the increased labor market productiv-
ity of females even as the discriminatory component of the wage gap held 
steady (Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer 2003).
 20. China fares particularly poorly on this count as compared with Asia and other 
regions (Berik 2006, 62.)
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 21. The recent fire in a garment factory in the Ashulia Industrial Zone in 
Bangladesh that killed 25 people and injured more than a 100 is a grim 
reminder of these poor safety standards (“Bangladesh Factory Fire Kills 25,” 
December 15, 2010).
 22. The ICFTU (2004) reports complaints of harassment in Bangladesh, 
Dominican Republic, Kenya, and Mexico.
 23. More recently, however, Bangladesh has been the site for great labor unrest as 
garment factory workers in EPZs in Dhaka and Chittagong protested the fact 
that firms have not implemented overdue pay hikes ordered by the govern-
ment. The protests turned violent as police clashed with the protestors lead-
ing to the death of three people and dozens of injuries (“Three killed, dozens 
hurt in Bangladesh clashes,” December 12, 2010).
 24. Barrientos, Kabeer, and Hossain (2004, 5) summarize declining trends in the 
female share of employment for a number of countries.
 25. In the GVC literature, upgrading can mean moving to a more advantageous 
position in the chain by making higher value added products or performing 
more valuable functions. And upgrading can include process, product, func-
tional, or intersectoral upgrading (see Milberg and Winkler 2008, 6–7, and 
references therein).
 26. On the other hand, downturns might motivate the search for cost-saving solu-
tions leading to the substitution of male workers with female workers and a 
rising feminization of labor. In gender-segmented occupations, female employ-
ment would be related more to secular trends in sectoral structures rather 
than to cyclical factors (Rubery 1988). It is beyond the scope of this chapter 
to identify which of these hypotheses might be operating within a given 
period of time, although they provide a useful framework for thinking about 
defeminization.
 27. See Chen, Sebstad, and O’Connell (1999) for a discussion of the limitation 
of official statistics on the informal sector.
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Low-Carbon, Green Special 
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Introduction
The climate change agenda has emerged as a core development challenge 
of our time as it became obvious that countries cannot continue a devel-
opment paradigm of the past depending on heavy fossil-fuel and green-
house gas (GHG) emissions. Deep cuts in global emissions are required 
to hold the increase in global temperature below 2 degrees Celsius (2°C), 
and this will not be possible to meet without full participation by all the 
countries.
There has been a growing consensus that all the countries have to 
participate in global efforts to fight climate change in accordance with 
the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities and respec-
tive capabilities,” as clearly stipulated in the Article 3 of the United 
Nations Convention on Climate Change. The Copenhagen Accord, 
which came out of the Climate Change Summit in December and to 
which more than 100 countries have committed, states in Article 5 that 
developing countries will implement nationally appropriate mitigation 
actions and shall communicate such actions.
To developing countries, development and climate change are two 
interlinked challenges, neither of which can be sacrificed. These countries 
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have to lift 1.4 billion people out of poverty by building factories, power 
plants, roads, buildings, and transport systems, while ensuring that they 
comply with environmental sustainability and significantly reduce their 
carbon footprints along the way. The Copenhagen Accord reflects such 
need in Article 2, bearing in mind that social and economic development 
and poverty eradication are the first and overriding priorities of develop-
ing countries and that a low-emission development strategy is indispen-
sible to sustainable development.
In this regard, exploring new ways to pursue low-carbon and green 
growth, a new development paradigm, is a big task ahead. This new 
development paradigm is meant to decouple economic growth from fur-
ther increases in GHG emissions. This paradigm also seeks to create jobs 
based on the development and deployment of clean technologies. It is 
important to come to a common understanding that shifting to a low-
carbon, green economy does not mean sacrificing competitiveness and 
economic growth; but rather, is an investment in long-term sustainable 
economic development.
Low-Carbon, Green SEZs: Overview
Special Economic Zones
SEZs have played an important role in advancing industrial development, 
attracting FDI, and creating jobs in developing countries for the last 30 
years. As climate change agenda emerges as one of the core development 
challenges, governments, developers, and companies around the world are 
increasingly demanding that SEZs also contribute to environmental sus-
tainability and GHG mitigation. Governments like China and India 
already are developing guidelines and policies for green zones, and many 
others like the Republic of Korea and Thailand are focusing on systematic 
development of eco-industrial parks.
In fact, in many countries, industrial zones are major contributors to 
GHG emissions from manufacturing, energy generation and consump-
tion, buildings, and transportation. For instance, in the Republic of 
Korea, about 650 industrial parks account for 63 percent of industrial 
emissions in the nation, according to the Korea Industrial Complex 
Corporation. This exemplifies the challenges as well as the opportunities 
that SEZs face in addressing climate change. In other words, more than 
3,000 SEZs around the globe can provide one of the best opportunities 
to tackle  climate change and reduce GHG emissions in a systematic and 
measurable way.
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What Is a Low-Carbon, Green SEZ?
There has been a strong trend to develop more environmentally sustain-
able SEZs over time, reflecting the private sector’s increasing awareness 
of and demands for environmental sustainability. Lately, as climate change 
agenda adds more emphasis on the environmental dimension of SEZs, 
similar terminologies, such as Pollution Control Zone, Environment 
Compliance Zone, Eco-industrial Zone (Park), Low-carbon Zone, Green 
Zone and others, are being used interchangeably without clear distinc-
tions. This section attempts to define “low-carbon, green SEZ” and identi-
fies its key attributes, within the spectrum of environmentally sustainable 
zones (see figure 12.1).
The environment compliance zone or pollution control zone could be con-
sidered as an early stage form of zones in this spectrum. Its main empha-
sis is on the implementation of effective measures for pollution control 
and environmental compliance, such as air pollution control, centralized 
services for sewage and wastewater treatment, hazardous waste collection 
and disposal, and environmental training programs for zone managers and 
company operations. Implementation of environmental management 
tools such as International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 14001 
Environmental Management System (EMS) may be one of the systematic 
programs to consider in these zones.
Eco-industrial zones (parks) goes beyond simple environmental 
 management to reduce the negative impact of pollution. This is a more 
advanced concept in terms of environmental sustainability. Its purpose is 
to manage the whole resource, energy, and environmental impact in an 
Figure 12.1 Spectrum of Environmentally Sustainable Zones
pollution control zone 
eco-industrial zone (park) 
low-carbon (green) SEZ 
efficient use of resources
(reuse & recycling)
GHG mitigation & carbon
footprint management
Source: Authors.
Note: GHG = greenhouse gases; SEZ = special economic zone.
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integrated manner. The Eco-industrial Park Handbook (Ernest 2001) 
developed by the Asian Development Bank states that “[a]n Eco-
Industrial Park is a community of manufacturing and service businesses 
located together on a common property. Members seek enhanced 
 environmental, economic, and social performance through collaboration 
in managing environmental and resource issues” (1). Therefore, eco- 
industrial zones reuse and recycle resources within industrial zones and 
clustered or chained industries, so that resources will circulate fully in the 
local production system. Also known as industrial symbiosis, zone 
 networks are established between companies in the zone to exchange 
waste from one company to another to be reused in another production 
process.
Low-carbon, green SEZs is the most comprehensive and advanced con-
cept in terms of environmental sustainability. Pollution control and envi-
ronment management as well as reuse and recycling of resources in terms 
of industrial symbiosis, are important ingredients of low-carbon, green 
SEZs. However, this concept goes further to more actively manage carbon 
footprint. Generally, low-carbon, green SEZs can be defined as SEZs that 
are designed, developed, and operated in a low-carbon, green, sustainable 
way, and hence they reduce the carbon footprint and effectively address 
climate change mitigation in the process of their economic and industrial 
activities in the SEZ. Some of the main attributes of low-carbon, green 
SEZs include, but are not limited to, energy supply in part using renewable 
energy sources; energy-efficiency measures, including use of energy-effi-
cient production methods for industries; construction of buildings and 
factories using “green building codes”; waste-reuse and recycling systems 
inside and outside the zone; promotion of climate-friendly investment into 
the zone and clean technology R&D and deployment; and carbon finance 
mechanisms that can be utilized to build the zone and many  others.
Why Low-Carbon, Green SEZs?
Low-carbon, green SEZs build on the proven concept of SEZs, to play a 
catalytic role by trying out new low-carbon, green measures in an SEZ set-
ting, and if proven valid, roll out into nationwide initiatives. Its clustering 
of companies and industries in an SEZ could provide multiple advantages 
not only to apply different components of a climate-friendly policy and 
investment regime, but also to target existing zones or future zones. On 
one hand, the low-carbon, green zone maximizes the effectiveness of envi-
ronmental infrastructure for industry, which otherwise could be expensive 
for individual companies. On the other hand, single zone management for 
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hundreds of companies from a low-carbon, green perspective allows for a 
huge synergy effect in various forms, such as the efficient use of low-carbon 
management expertise, the steep learning curve, and peer pressure to do 
what is right that does not exist outside the zone.
Low-carbon, green SEZs could be a useful platform to materialize a 
low-carbon development strategy that developed and developing coun-
tries tend to have consensus on in international climate change negotia-
tions. It is expected that in the near future GHG emission from 
developing countries will surpass that from developed countries. As SEZs 
have effectively driven industrial development and growth in the devel-
oping world (but following an old, high-carbon development path), this 
new trend of low-carbon, green SEZs could be a shortcut to achieve a 
low-carbon development path in developing countries around the world 
in a concrete and realistic way.
Low-Carbon (Green) SEZ Framework
Low-carbon, green SEZs can take many different forms across a wide 
spectrum of countries. Low-carbon green, SEZs have five core compo-
nents (see figure 12.2):
• GHG Mitigation Target: The economic activities inside the SEZ are 
aligned with concrete action plans for mitigation. As such, a low- carbon, 
green SEZ can establish a goal and commitment to GHG mitigation at 
the center of its overall strategy (e.g., SEZ-wide 30 percent reduction 
Figure 12.2 Main Components of a Low-Carbon, Green SEZ Framework
 mitigation
target 
LC-SEZ
sustainable
infrastructure
climate-friendly
investment generation 
low-carbon
policy framework
carbon finance
Source: Authors.
Note: LC-SEZ = low-carbon, green special economic zone.
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by 2020, renewable energy mix of 15 percent). The first step is to 
 develop a baseline using basic GHG accounting rules and inventory 
systems making it possible to monitor how much GHG emission comes 
from which source and how much emission reduction potential exists 
in each sector.
• Sustainable Infrastructure: Planning, designing, and building a zone infra-
structure using energy-efficient, resource-saving, and low-carbon meth-
ods would provide ample opportunities to reduce the carbon footprint. 
Some sources for GHG reduction include renewable energy, energy 
 efficiency, green buildings, and a waste reuse and recycling system.
• Climate-Friendly Investment Generation: Low-carbon, green SEZs can 
generate a streamlined and low-risk environment that fills in the gaps 
in the national legal framework to attract new, climate-friendly invest-
ment and technologies. To do so, it is also important to develop relevant 
investment promotion tools and methodologies to incorporate green 
elements in terms of green business targeting, incentives, intellectual 
property protection, and marketing strategy.
• Low-Carbon Policy Incentives and Regulations: Putting the right public 
policy framework in place is a critical success factor for low-carbon, 
green SEZs. Some best practices include eliminating trade and nontrade 
barriers on climate-friendly products, instituting green building codes, 
and establishing renewable energy or energy-efficiency laws (e.g., Brazil, 
China, India), which introduce a feed-in tariff system, renewable port-
folio standards (RPS) and energy-efficiency standards, tax reduction for 
green high-technology investment, and R&D support.
• Carbon Finance: A carbon finance mechanism, such as a clean develop-
ment mechanism (CDM), can provide the potential to channel new 
source of funding to develop low-carbon, green SEZs in middle-income 
as well as low-income countries.
GHG Mitigation Target
A low-carbon, green SEZ needs a clear goal and commitment to GHG 
mitigation at the center of its overall strategy. Under the general direction 
of a low-carbon development strategy, all the economic activities inside 
the SEZ need to be aligned with concrete action plans for mitigation. A 
mitigation goal can be set up in many different forms to accommodate 
the different circumstances found in each SEZ. For instance, Incheon 
Free Economic Zone in the Republic of Korea plans to set the goal of 
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 achieving an SEZ-wide 30 percent reduction of GHG by 2020 com-
pared with its business-as-usual (BAU) scenario. A more ambitious target 
could be an absolute amount of GHG reduction compared with the 
emission level at a certain point in the past (e.g., 30 percent reduction by 
2020 compared with its 2005 level). SEZs with a contained expectation 
could consider more modest targets, limiting the scope and extent of the 
target to certain sectors (e.g., 10 percent energy-efficiency improvement 
by 2020, or 15 percent of power supply from renewable energy source 
by 2020). In terms of time, the SEZ can set up a short-term (2015), 
midterm (2020), or long-term (2050) target for more visible outcomes.
The first step to introduce GHG mitigation components into all parts 
of the SEZ is to establish a GHG inventory system to monitor, report, and 
verify how much GHG is being emitted from which sources, and to 
determine how much GHG reduction can be achieved through what 
kinds of methods from which sources (see figure 12.3).
The SEZ authority needs to develop a GHG inventory guideline, 
referring to the GHG inventory guideline established by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and other internationally 
recognized institutions such as World Resources Institute, and verify the 
Figure 12.3 Trajectory of GHG Emission and Mitigation Target 
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accuracy and credibility of such data. By nature, GHG emission data are 
closely linked to energy generation and consumption data, which makes 
integrated management of such data sets more efficient. Companies and 
institutions above a certain level of annual GHG emission in an SEZ 
should be required to monitor and report their GHG emission data on 
an annual basis to the appropriate authority. According to the Copenhagen 
Accord (Article 5), developing countries are supposed to communicate 
mitigation actions, including national inventory reports, every two years. 
The SEZ authority also needs to carry out an analysis of how much GHG 
emission is projected by a certain point (e.g., 2020) according to its cur-
rent SEZ development plan (the base scenario) and to identify how 
much GHG emission reduction potential exists in each sector through a 
diverse set of mitigation measures (the policy scenario). Such analysis 
may need top-down macroeconomic modeling exercises as well as 
 bottom-up  surveys. Generally, most GHG emissions in an SEZ come 
from energy consumption, such as electricity, heating, cooling, industrial 
process, transportation, and water and waste disposal (see figure 12.4). 
power generation
industry
buildings
transportation
waste
30%
20%
30%
15%
5%
Figure 12.4 Example: Some SEZ GHG Emission Structures by Sector
Source: Authors.
Note: GHG = greenhouse gas; SEZ = special economic zone.
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Therefore, opportunities for GHG mitigation in an SEZ could lie in 
renewable energy generation, energy efficiency and conservation, green 
buildings, a sustainable transportation system, water and waste reuse, and 
recycling systems.
Sustainable Infrastructure
Planning, designing, and building zone infrastructure in energy-efficient, 
resource-saving, waste-recycling ways from the outset could provide 
ample opportunities to reduce an SEZ’s carbon footprint. Energy supply 
and demand, green buildings, and waste recycling systems are important 
examples. Such infrastructure investment would be sustainable only 
when medium- and long-term social and economic benefits surpass incre-
mental cost increases in the short term. For instance, making buildings in 
China more energy efficient would add 10 percent to construction costs 
but would save more than 50 percent on energy cost (Shalizi and Lecocq 
2009). Integrated zero-emission building designs, which combine energy-
efficiency measures with on-site power and heat from solar power and 
biomass, are technically and economically feasible, and their costs are fall-
ing (Brown, Southworth, and Stovall 2005).
First, in terms of energy supply infrastructure, providing some portion 
of electricity through renewable energy is an important element of low-
carbon, green SEZs. To meet the 450 parts per million, 2°C goal, most 
developing countries would need to boost their production of renewable 
energy. It is important to identify suitable sources of renewable energy, 
such as biomass, solar, wind, hydro, and geothermal, for certain SEZs in 
the context of national circumstances. For instance, in India, wind power 
would be one of easier options for SEZs, taking into account that the 
nation has the fifth-largest installed wind power capacity in the world. As 
a second-best option, when renewable energy is not readily available in 
terms of technical or financial feasibility, even increasing the average effi-
ciency of coal-fired power plants can reduce GHG emission. For instance, 
China has increased the average efficiency of coal-fired power plants by 
15 percent over the last decade to an average of 34 percent. Replacing 
small-scale coal-fired power plants with large-scale efficient plants over 
the last few years reduced annual CO2 emissions by 60 million tons. An 
SEZ could commit to a certain target for renewable energy supply, which 
would be higher than the national average. According to India’s Guidelines 
for Energy Conservation in SEZ (October 27, 2010), 100 percent of 
organic waste generated within SEZs should be used for in-situ power 
generation or vermi-composted, as applicable. Also, external lighting in 
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common spaces may comply with the requirement that at least 10 per-
cent of the installed load should be solar powered during the first year of 
operation, and the installed load must be extended by at least 5 percent 
annually until a target of 50 percent is achieved. The use of incandescent 
lamps is not allowed. The Vision and Roadmap for Haiti (May 23, 2010) 
prepared by the Private Sector Economic Forum of Haiti and presented 
to the government of Haiti states that in five years, 15 percent of energy 
needs to come from renewable energy sources, mostly in housing and 
industrial parks.
In the short term, the largest and cheapest source of emission reduc-
tion is increased energy efficiency on both the supply and demand side 
in power, industry, buildings, and transport. Energy efficiency offers the 
biggest source (approximately 60 percent) of emission reduction, 
according to the International Energy Agency. A range of measures can 
be taken, from simply replacing road lights with energy-efficient light-
emitting diode lights (LEDs) to bringing new energy-efficient tech-
nologies to industrial processes and managing the load profiles of 
individual industrial production. Some examples include energy- 
efficient process equipment, industrial air conditioning, electrical power, 
power transmission and distribution, heating and cooling of industrial 
and commercial space, and lighting. For instance, in India, a large poten-
tial exists to reduce the 29 percent losses in transmission and distribu-
tion to a level closer to the world average of 9 percent, which will 
smooth out peak demand and lessen the pressure to build more fossil-
fueled power plants.
Buildings provide good opportunities for GHG mitigation. For some 
large-scale SEZs with many factories and commercial and residential 
buildings, emissions from the building sector account for a considerable 
portion of total emissions. Putting energy-efficient measures into the 
design and planning stage, such as energy-efficient heating and cooling 
systems, insulation, natural ventilation, and efficient lighting, could effec-
tively reduce emissions in a sustainable way. For existing buildings, a 
dramatic change would not be possible; however, retrofitting some older 
buildings into more energy-efficient buildings actually could make busi-
ness sense in that long-term energy saving would be greater than the 
upfront investment (as seen in many of the recent retrofitting examples 
in high-income countries). An appropriate set of incentive programs 
could facilitate such investment. The SEZ authority needs to employ 
administrative action programs, such as green building codes, that can be 
enforced during the building review process to ensure that buildings 
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across the zone as a whole meet minimum standards and reduce the car-
bon footprint.
Waste reuse and recycling is a quick win through which companies 
can reap the concrete benefits upon implementation. Recycling can be 
done at the individual company level, but when it is done across multiple 
companies in low-carbon, green SEZs, the benefits can be maximized. For 
instance, a textile company, SAE-A Trading Co., installed an incinerator 
in a Nicaragua factory to utilize regenerated heat energy. The company 
completed combustion of fabric wastes and utilized steam generated by 
heating water during the ironing process to generate energy, which helped 
the company save energy costs and reduce GHG emission. The Republic 
of Korea applies the industrial symbiosis concept to its industrial parks 
(see figure 12.5). It transforms industrial parks into comprehensive and 
collective networks of waste, energy, and information exchanges. 
Source: Ban, Young Un (2010).
Figure 12.5 Example of Industrial Symbiosis Networking Map, Republic of Korea
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In terms of infrastructure planning, design, and construction, these 
actions and measures could be enforced during the master planning and 
reviewing process at the initial stage of an SEZ. The role of the SEZ 
authority is critical as a facilitator as well as a regulator to ensure that this 
happens.
Climate-Friendly Investment Generation
When basic infrastructure such as roads, electricity, and water are com-
plete and ready, the focus turns to investment generation, which will 
create business and job opportunities. To put it in a broader context of 
current global climate change negotiations, the implication of a low- 
carbon, green SEZ is quite significant. The Copenhagen Accord states 
that developed countries commit to a goal of jointly financing US$100 
billion a year by 2020 to developing countries with combined sources 
from the private and public sector. This commitment means that a sig-
nificant portion of investment generation to mitigate GHG emission could 
materialize in a setting like a low-carbon, green SEZ, considering that an 
SEZ has a more favorable investment climate in developing countries. In 
reality, such investment flows from developed to developing countries 
could take the form of FDI. In 2007, FDI accounted for 12.6 percent of 
the total gross fixed capital formation in electricity, gas, and water in 
developing countries, which was three times the amount of multilateral 
and bilateral aid (Brewer 2008).
There is an encouraging sign in the global market that the flow of 
 climate-friendly, low-carbon investment is rapidly increasing lately. 
According to World Investment Report 2010 by UNCTAD, low-carbon 
FDI is significant and its potential is huge.
The cost curve in figure 12.6 shows what actions or investment would 
be most cost-effective in delivering GHG mitigation to fully capture 
opportunities across sectors. The key issue would be how to make an 
attractive investment environment to facilitate and generate investment 
in diverse sectors to realize GHG mitigation opportunities.
Climate-friendly or green investment can be roughly defined as 
investment aiming to increase the use of clean energy from renewable 
sources, improve energy efficiency, or reduce the carbon footprint in the 
production of products or provision of services. Investment in renewable 
energy or energy efficiency is a good example. MNCs have invested mas-
sively in renewable industry of developing countries, such as photovoltaic 
production in India (BP Solar), ethanol in Brazil (Archer Daniels Midland 
and Cargill), and wind power in China (Gamesa and Vestas). According 
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to fDi Markets data (Brownell 2009), between January 2003 and August 
2009, there have been more than 1,400 cross-border greenfield invest-
ment projects in renewable energy. In terms of energy-efficiency invest-
ment, energy service companies (ESCOs) could provide energy-efficiency 
services (such as energy auditing), recommend energy-saving measures, 
provide financing to clients, and serve as project aggregators. ESCOs are 
not just limited to the high-income-country environment. In China, for 
example, after a decade of capacity building supported by the World 
Bank, the ESCO industry grew from three companies in 1997 to more 
than 400, with US$1 billion in energy performance contracts in 2007 
(World Bank 2008). Such investment in renewables and energy efficiency 
is expected to grow as more developing countries race toward a low-
carbon development path. Conversely, investment in traditional indus-
tries such as steel, chemicals, and textiles can be “greened” by bringing in 
more energy-efficient or clean technologies to reduce GHG emission and 
by “greening” some parts of the value chain with low-carbon technologies. 
For instance, a steel company, POSCO, is introducing a new eco-friendly 
FINEX technology and processes in building a new steel plant in India. 
FINEX, which POSCO has developed, is an environmentally friendly 
iron-making process that allows the direct use of iron ore fines and non-
coking coal as feedstock. As a result, the emission of pollutants will be 
drastically reduced, to levels of only 4–8 percent of traditional steel pro-
duction processes.
To institutionalize the carbon factor into the investment decision pro-
cess, the SEZ authority may require that all investment projects report 
GHG emission estimation throughout the project life cycle. Currently, all 
new real sector projects in IFC require GHG estimation before they can 
receive approval.
Attracting green FDI could draw in domestic investors in this area, 
developing further linkages with local suppliers. Clean technology 
transfer and deployment is one of the most important issues enabling 
developing countries to build capacity and fight climate change. In fact, 
an attractive investment climate for FDI could be critical to accelerating 
technology transfer and absorption (Goldberg, Branstetter, Goddard, and 
Kuriakose 2008). The Copenhagen Accord (Article 11) emphasizes estab-
lishing the technology mechanism to accelerate technology development 
and transfer. To maximize spillover of low-carbon technologies, low- 
carbon, green SEZs could explore the “clean technology center” concept, 
in which companies, local universities, and research institutes collaborate 
to develop, transfer, and deploy clean technologies through a PPP model. 
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This kind of center can become a center of excellence for innovation, 
knowledge sharing, and training for local companies and institutions. Such 
initiatives need to be coordinated with national technology policies and 
programs, and can pursue international collaboration in joint R&D with 
public support from developed countries.
For effective investment promotion efforts, it is important to incorpo-
rate the green aspect into the investment promotion tools and method-
ologies that have been developed so far. These aspects include identifying 
target industries and businesses through competitive market analysis, 
developing coherent marketing strategies, and implementing marketing 
campaigns, including investor relations activities. In many countries, how-
ever, such incorporation is not an easy task because most government 
agencies dealing with climate change and energy policies are different 
from those in charge of investment promotion and generation.
Low-Carbon Policy Incentives and Regulations
An integrated policy approach to providing an enabling business environ-
ment for low-carbon, green SEZs cannot be overemphasized. Putting in 
place an appropriate set of public policies, including incentives and regu-
lations, is a critical success factor for low-carbon, green SEZs. In the early 
stage of market development, the role of the public sector can make or 
break the success of the project. The policy framework for low-carbon, 
green SEZs can be categorized as basic, legal, regulatory, incentive, or 
institutional (see figure 12.7). Some of these issues can be applied at 
the SEZ level, whereas others need to be applied as national policy 
initiatives.
Basic Policy Framework
Fostering an environment for free trade and investment should be 
included in a basic policy framework. Eliminating trade and nontrade bar-
riers on climate-friendly products or services could be a strong merit of a 
low-carbon, green SEZ. For instance, in Egypt, the average tariffs on pho-
tovoltaic panels are 32 percent, 10 times the 3 percent tariff imposed in 
high-income member countries of OECD. In Nigeria, potential users of 
photovoltaic panels face nontariff barriers of 70 percent in addition to a 
20 percent tariff. Considering that the absorption of technologies nor-
mally occurs through imports of equipment, tariff barriers could restrict 
local learning of these technologies. Conversely, low-carbon, green SEZs 
need to apply the extraterritoriality principle—that is, they should 
be treated as outside the domestic customs territory, but eligible for 
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national certificates of origin and to participate in trade and market access 
agreements.
To facilitate local capacity building and technology transfer, a weak 
IPR regime could be an obstacle for middle-income countries. Weak IPR 
enforcement discourages foreign subsidiaries from increasing the scale of 
their R&D activities and foreign venture capitalists from investing in 
promising domestic enterprises (Branstetter, Fisman, and Foley 2005). 
Low-carbon, green SEZs could absorb foreign technologies and facilitate 
technology cooperation with foreign companies by providing a more 
predictable and stable IPR environment.
Legal Framework
Developing a conducive legal framework is fundamental to ensuring a 
transparent and predictable business environment for SEZs as well as for 
climate change mitigation. Currently, most countries with SEZ programs 
have SEZ legislation in place, and many high-income and middle-income 
developing countries have completed or are legislating comprehensive 
climate change law. In addition, many countries have established renew-
able energy or energy-efficiency laws (e.g., Brazil, China, India). These 
laws institutionalize incentives and regulations to promote renewable 
energy or energy-efficiency programs. Considering the generally accepted 
best practices for a legal framework surrounding climate change, 
Figure 12.7 Low-Carbon, Green SEZ Policy Framework 
basic
legal
incentiveregulatory
institutional
low-carbon
framework
Source: Authors.
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 renewable energy, energy efficiency, and SEZs, the key issue is how to 
incorporate low-carbon, green SEZ components into the current legal 
framework. Different countries may have different solutions. One solu-
tion is to incorporate low-carbon aspects into SEZ laws. Low-carbon ele-
ments could be required for SEZ approval and designation. Another 
solution is to include a low-carbon aspect in general climate change leg-
islation. The contents of climate change legislation vary depending on 
countries, but some (such as the Republic of Korea’s Low-Carbon, Green 
Growth Basic Law) stipulate a basis for developing a low-carbon indus-
trial cluster or complex. More fundamentally, countries need to legally 
define the meaning of “low-carbon” or “green” to prevent confusion or 
overexpansion. These terms might be used frequently to determine the 
beneficiaries of diverse incentives or regulations.
Regulatory Framework
According to conventional wisdom, environmental regulations could 
contribute to creating markets and advancing technological innovation 
versus suffocating businesses. For instance, the state of California—known 
for its superior leadership in environmental performance and energy 
efficiency—has pioneered one of the strongest regulations for its environ-
ment in advance of other states in the United States. Of course, regula-
tion alone cannot claim all the credit, because regulations need to be 
supplemented with incentives for consumers and producers. Some of 
best practices that can be applied to a low-carbon, green SEZ include 
energy-efficiency standards for sectors, green building codes, climate 
change impact assessment, and RPS. For utilities, RPS means that some 
portion of power supply should come from renewable sources. The SEZ 
authority may require that investors disclose their GHG emission estima-
tion for investment projects above a certain level, and that businesses as 
well as buildings monitor and report annual GHG emission data. In a 
country where comprehensive climate change mitigation measures 
already are being taken, low-carbon, green SEZs could follow suit, but 
could aim higher than the national average.
Incentive System
In many countries, SEZs have diverse incentive systems in place, includ-
ing corporate tax reductions or exemption; duty-free importation of raw 
materials, capital goods, and intermediate inputs; no restrictions or taxes 
on capital and profits repatriation; tax relief for foreign workers and 
executives; exemption from most local and indirect taxes; financial 
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 support; and so on. Also, many countries operate incentives to encourage 
investment in green industry, such as renewable energy and energy effi-
ciency. Therefore, to promote low-carbon investment and actions in SEZs, 
incorporating diverse incentives developed for different purposes into a 
coherent low-carbon, green SEZ incentive scheme is a key issue. When 
foreign investors bring in high-tech green capital equipment, intermedi-
ary parts, or materials, customs tariff and tax could be exempted. 
Indonesia introduced green initiatives in April 2010, stating that it would 
reduce the net tax base by 5 percent annually for the next six years on 
the total investment in renewable energy. Foreign investors will receive a 
lower tax rate on all dividend payments. Companies involved in construc-
tion will not be charged value added tax or import duty on machinery 
and equipment used for such projects. For renewable energy and energy 
efficiency for which it is hard to make the business case in the absence of 
government incentives, feed-in tariffs for renewable energy investment 
and tax credits for energy-efficiency investments are critical. Feed-in tar-
iff laws require mandatory purchases of renewable energy at a fixed price, 
such as those in Germany, Kenya, Spain, and South Africa, producing the 
highest market penetration rates in a short period. Investors consider 
these laws to be the most desirable and conducive to creating local indus-
tries because of their price certainty and administrative simplicity.
Several financial incentives to consider include reducing upfront capi-
tal costs through subsidies; reducing capital and operating costs through 
investment or production tax credits; improving revenue streams with 
carbon credits; and providing financial support through concessional 
loans and guarantees. Prioritizing R&D funds for projects in a low-carbon, 
green SEZ, or mass procurement of energy-efficient green products, 
could provide substantial incentives. In Uganda and Vietnam, the bulk 
procurement of 1 million compact fluorescent lamps in each country 
substantially reduced the cost of the lamps and improved product quality 
through technical specifications and warranty; once installed, they cut 
peak demand by 30 megawatts.
Institutional Framework
An institutional champion, such as a dedicated agency in charge of cli-
mate change policy, is essential to coordinate multiple stakeholders and 
promote and manage relevant policy issues. In a low-carbon, green SEZ, a 
dedicated department in charge of low-carbon initiatives needs to be 
established inside the SEZ authority. Because low-carbon initiatives are 
multidisciplinary, involving energy, environment, buildings, transportation, 
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and so on, such a department needs to be established as a control tower 
overlooking all relevant functions. Its main mission will be to make a low-
carbon master plan, lead the implementation process, and coordinate 
among different departments.
Carbon finance. A carbon-pricing mechanism is needed in developing 
countries to signal that investment in high-carbon projects will yield 
lower returns. This mechanism is needed to internalize externalities 
regarding environmental and climate problem. The carbon market will 
provide a cost-effective way to reduce emissions from MNCs and direct 
investment flow to low-income countries through its offset mechanism. 
Low-carbon, green SEZs can channel new source of financing through 
the carbon finance mechanism and facilitate investment in climate-
friendly investment.
Using Market Instruments: Clean Development Mechanisms
Market mechanisms can encourage private investment in GHG mitiga-
tion. Although some uncertainty remains after 2012 when the first com-
mitment period under the Kyoto Protocol ends, the CDM is one of the 
most prominent market instruments related to developing countries. 
CDMs enable low-carbon projects in developing countries to generate 
and trade carbon credits (Certified Emission Reductions, or CERs). For 
instance, a German power utility may acquire CERs by investing in 
renewable energy projects in Chile, or a Japanese steel company may 
acquire CERs by investing new clean mitigation technology in its 
Vietnamese steel projects. The CDM has triggered more than 4,000 
 recognized emission reduction projects since 1997 when CDM was con-
ceived by Kyoto Protocol, but a small group of middle-income countries 
such as Brazil, China, India, and the Republic of Korea have dominated 
75 percent of these carbon credit supplies. In the ongoing United Nations 
Framework Convention for Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations, 
the CDM reform agenda is one of the hottest topics on the table. The 
debate includes such issues as how to rectify the unequal distribution of 
CDM projects across developing countries and how to scale up the CDM 
scheme to have a greater impact on global mitigation.
From the low-carbon, green SEZ angle, CDM provides the potential to 
channel a new source of funding to develop low-carbon, green SEZs in 
middle- and low-income countries. The CDM scheme could be fully 
explored and utilized in many sustainable infrastructure projects. For 
example, as long as credible baseline and methodologies are developed, 
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building wind farms, deploying solar panels in buildings, changing street-
lights into energy-efficient LEDs, retrofitting old buildings into more 
energy-efficient ones, improving manufacturing processes into energy-
efficient ones, and recycling wastes to generate energy could create poten-
tial CDM projects. CDM projects increasingly are expanding to 
lower-income countries. Also, to overcome the limitation of individual 
project-based CDM, the concept of bundling multiple projects into one 
broader CDM program is being explored for scaling up.
Voluntary Carbon Market
Whereas CDM is a market mechanism based on the Kyoto Protocol, 
developing countries (more accurately, non–Annex I countries without 
mandatory compliance obligations according to the convention) could 
explore developing a voluntary carbon market domestically. A voluntary 
carbon market could be designed as a national, subnational, or private 
scheme in which participating companies voluntarily reduce GHG emis-
sion and get carbon credits (but different from CERs) from the appropri-
ate authorities, and participants could trade their carbon credits. For 
instance, the Republic of Korea developed a voluntary carbon market by 
creating the Korea Certified Emission Reduction (KCER) program in 
2005. In the national program, companies can voluntarily reduce GHG 
Table 12.1 Some Examples of CDM Projects of IDA Countries 
Host country Investor Project 
Emission 
reduction 
KENYA Ormat Technologies 
(United States) 
Geothermal expansion 177,600 t CO2e/yr 
UGANDA Global Development Forum 
Suez, Chubu Electric Power 
Co., BP Alternative Energy, 
Deutsch Bank, etc. 
Nile electrification 36,210 t CO2e/yr 
NIGERIA Atmosfair gGmbH, Lernen-
Helfen-Leben e.V. (Germany) 
Energy-efficient fuel 
wood stoves 
replacement 
31,309 t CO2e/yr 
SENEGAL 
MAURITANIA 
MALI 
IBRD acting as a trustee for 
the Spanish Carbon Fund 
Félou regional hydro-
power 
188,282 t CO2e/yr 
TANZANIA Consorzio Stabile Globus 
(Italian) 
Landfill gas recovery 
and electricity 
generation 
202,271 t CO2e/yr 
Source: Compiled by authors based on data from UNFCCC.
Note: IBRD = International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; IDA = International Development Associa-
tion; t CO2e/yr = tons of carbon dioxide emissions per year. 
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emissions and receive KCERs after the reduction is verified by the 
national authority. The Korean government provides incentives by pur-
chasing KCERs for a certain price according to a guideline. Companies 
are compensated for their voluntary mitigation actions, such as investing 
in clean technologies and facilities, and the program encourages other 
companies to take early actions of mitigation, although they are not 
obliged to do so. Through the KCER scheme, an estimated 5.6 million 
tons of carbon dioxide emissions (t CO2e) was reduced by 2009. Another 
example of a privately initiated voluntary carbon market is the Chicago 
Climate Exchange (CCX). The CCX is a private-sector-initiated, volun-
tary cap-and-trade program with members participating voluntarily but 
according to a legally binding contract. Its members represent 17 percent 
of the companies in the Dow Johns Industrial Average, including Ford, 
DuPont, Motorola, Sony, IBM, and Nike. Approximately 80 million 
t CO2e of offset credits have been issued to date.
A low-carbon, green SEZ could become the centerpiece of voluntary 
carbon market development in the country. As CDM transactions in the 
SEZ gain steam, further potential to develop local voluntary carbon 
market could be explored. As China’s representative low-carbon city, 
Jilin City, considers establishing a carbon exchange, hosting a carbon 
exchange in the low-carbon, green SEZ could promote the local carbon 
market.
Synergy between FDI and CDM
Although CDM is the principal instrument for catalyzing mitigation in 
developing countries, the CDM is unique in that it very much depends 
on a regulatory framework because it has to go through a lengthy and 
often bureaucratic approval process both domestically and internation-
ally. Only after the final approval goes through the United Nations 
CDM Executive Board will CDM projects be permitted and CERs gen-
erated accordingly. Such an administrative process inherently brings the 
problem of incompetent institutional capacity of developing countries 
to implement CDM projects. The interlinkage and similarity between 
FDI and CDM has been overlooked, however, as well as the possible 
synergy to be created between them in terms of institutional capacity 
building (see table 12.2). For instance, if a Danish utility company makes 
FDI to build a wind farm in Cameroon through a CDM instrument, the 
investment could be classified as FDI as well as CDM. Although CDM 
is not the same as FDI, many of the tools and experiences developed 
under the FDI regime, such as targeting, competitive analysis, marketing, 
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Table 12.2 Interlinkage between CDM and FDI 
Project design and 
formulation
The structure of information required for the project  design  document 
of the CDM is the same as that required for FDI
National approval The national approval is similar to the approval given within the ambit 
of the Investment Facilitating Committee
As the FDI projects, the technical review of projects can often involve 
the ministries and bureaus of the relevant sector
The legal framework required for FDI would also apply to CDM
Validation/regis-
tration
For validation and registration a designated operational entity will 
 review the project design document. A validation exercise by outside 
expects could also accompany many FDI-related projects.
Project financing Generally, FDI comes in based on equity shares of a company, whereas 
CDM is based on projects
Monitoring/ 
Verification/ 
certification
Monitoring, verification and verification functions are carried out as 
 required by EIAs or by specific requirements of particular industries
Issuance of CERs CERs can be sold in the international carbon market, which will generate 
 additional returns for MNCs
Source: Authors.
Note: CDM = clean development mechanism; CER = certified emission reduction; EIA = environmental impact 
assessment; FDI = foreign direct investment; MNCs = multinational companies.
and investor aftercare, could be used for CDM projects. One business 
executive from Sierra Leone has pointed out that existing channels 
handing FDI matters in developing countries could be made to handle 
CDM matters as FDI and CDM are interlinked (Keili 2003).
Low-Carbon, Green SEZs around the World: 
Current Status and Future Trends
Several countries are exploring ways to implement low-carbon, green 
SEZs in various forms, but with the common denominator of GHG 
mitigation and environmental and carbon footprint management. No 
clear industry model or leadership has been established for low-carbon, 
green SEZs. Some initiatives are emerging as pioneers in this area, with 
some of them expanding even further into low-carbon cities or eco-
city initiatives.
Since the 1960s, a few industrial parks or cities in Europe such as 
Denmark and Sweden have evolved toward eco-industrial parks (EIPs). 
One of the most successful cases of EIP is the Kalundborg EIP in 
Denmark. The Kalundborg industrial symbiosis (IS) was started out of 
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business  motivation to reduce costs by seeking income-producing uses for 
“waste” products. This EIP model gradually developed over decades, turn-
ing into a complex web of symbiotic interactions. In Kalundborg IS, firms 
have saved US$160 million by 2001 ($15 million in annual savings), with 
return on the total investment reaching $75 million in the 18 projects 
established up to the end of 1998; therefore, the average payback time 
for all projects was less than five years (Sakr, Baas, El-Haggar, and 
Huisingh 2011). By 2001, at least 40 similar projects in the United States 
and 60 in Asia, Europe, South America, Australia, and South Africa have 
been initiated.
As SEZs have proven to be a successful model for China, low-carbon, 
green SEZs are also drawing a lot of policy attention as low-carbon 
growth pilots. A road map to transform Jilin City in northeast China to 
the first low-carbon SEZ (city) is underway in a partnership between the 
European Union and China, with participating institutions from U.K.’s 
Chatham House, E3G and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 
Energy Research Institute, and Jilin University. According to the 
Washington Post (November 29, 2010), China’s National Development 
and Reform Commission has listed 13 cities and provinces as pilot low-
carbon areas to help reach the country’s carbon intensity target, which is 
expected to feature heavily in the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011–2015). 
Hangzhou, capital of East China’s Zhejiang province, for example, aims 
to reduce carbon intensity by about 35 percent by 2015 and 50 percent 
by 2020. India has also been quite active in rolling out its green SEZ 
initiatives. India’s Ministry of Commerce put forward Guidelines for 
Energy Conservation in SEZ in October 2010, which covers a wide range 
of measures to push for energy efficiency, renewable energy usage and 
environment management.
The Republic of Korea is also gearing up for its green growth agenda 
through low-carbon cities and low-carbon SEZ initiatives. For instance, 
Korea’s Incheon Free Economic Zone (IFEZ) set a new low-carbon, green 
vision with its “Low Carbon IFEZ 30” Plan, and a GHG mitigation target: 
30 percent reduction compared to BAU by 2020 (15 percent reduction 
compared to BAU by 2014). IFEZ made a low-carbon master plan in 
December 2009 and organized a “GHG Mitigation TF” to spearhead its 
low-carbon strategy and plan, overarching all different departments in the 
SEZ authority.
As such, concrete actions toward low-carbon, green SEZs are being 
taken in these countries. Developing country GHG emissions are 
expected to grow above the world average at 2.7% annually between 
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2001 and 2025, and surpass emissions of industrialized countries near 
2018 (Source: Energy Information Administration (EIA), International 
Energy Outlook, 2003). China, India, and Korea have clearly signaled that 
SEZs will have a growing role as components of their low-carbon, green 
growth path. As an instrument of trade and investment policy, SEZs have 
played a catalytic role in processes of industrialization, diversification and 
trade integration in developing countries. It is expected that SEZs will 
evolve to continue to play a similar role in low-carbon and green growth 
with more and more countries following suit to incorporate this new 
approach into their development models.
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It is more than 50 years since the establishment of the ﬁ rst modern special economic zones 
(SEZs). Over this time, SEZs have been credited with underpinning the dramatic export-
oriented growth of China and other East Asian countries. But their success has been uneven, 
and they have remained controversial from a trade, ﬁ scal, and social policy perspective. 
Yet policy makers appear to be increasingly attracted to economic zones. Since the mid-1980s, 
the number of newly-established zones has grown rapidly in almost all regions, with dramatic 
expansion in developing countries. In parallel with this growth, and in the evolving global 
trade and investment context, zones are also undergoing signiﬁ cant change in both their form 
and function, with traditional export processing zones (EPZs) increasingly giving way to larger 
and more ﬂ exible SEZ models. This will bring opportunities for developing countries to better 
take advantage of the dynamic potential of zones, but will also raise new challenges to their 
successful design and development.
This collection of papers aims to contribute to an improved understanding of the role and 
practice of SEZs in developing countries, in order to better equip policy makers in planning 
and implementing SEZ programs. Organized around three broad themes—attracting 
investment and creating jobs, facilitating dynamic beneﬁ ts, and ensuring sustainability—
this book addresses many of the emerging issues and challenges in SEZs with practical case 
examples from SEZ programs in developing countries, including China, the Dominican 
Republic, Bangladesh, Honduras, and Mauritius.
The World Bank’s International Trade Department produces and disseminates policy-
oriented knowledge products and forges partnerships on trade to advance an inclusive 
trade agenda for developing countries and to enhance developing countries’ trade 
competitiveness in global markets. Learn more about the World Bank’s trade portfolio 
at: www.worldbank.org/trade. 
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